Description Details
The analysis presented in this thesis evaluates the contents of past Air Force strategic vision documents and studies the process used to create such documents. The thesis argument is that strategic vision documents can fulfill important functions for an organization, and that greater attention to the process of creating these documents can result in a more effective final product....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Historical Perspective . . . . . . 2 Overview . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 STRATEGIC VISION PRINCIPLES . . . . . . 5 Vision, Defined and Explained . . . . . 5 Attributes of Vision . . . . . 6 Functions of Vision . . . . . 6 Importance of Vision for an Organization . . . . . 7 Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Vision . . . . . . 8 Notes . . . . . . 10 3 VISIONS FROM THE PAST . . . . 13 Air Power and the Future . . . . 13 The Air Force and US National Security: Global Reach—Global Power . . . . . 15 Global Reach—Global Power: The Evolving Air Force Contribution to National Security . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . 20 4 VISION: A PRESENT-DAY VIEW . . . . 23 An Interest in Updating Our “Guiding Construct” . . . . . . 23 Global Presence . . . . 23 Current Efforts for a New Strategic Vision . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . 27 5 IMPROVING THE PROCESS . . . . . . 29 Phases in the Process for the Vision Architect . . . . . 29 Lesson Implications . . . . 38 Conclusion . . . . . . 38 Notes . . . . . . 39 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 41...

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First, this study develops a generalized model for United States military transformations in peacetime. To develop the model the author combines observations made by several historians about recurrent trends in military strategic innovation. The author concludes that, after taking into account inevitable uncertainty, there are three identifiable factors that occur in most cases of military transformation. The three key factors are the need for a coherent, congruent vision; an emerging culture that bolsters the vision and develops competing theories of victory to fulfill the vision; and a process for honestly assessing the maturing vision and its supporting theories of victory. After defining the limitations of the model and its usefulness, the author applies the framework to an important aspect of national security—the future of space power....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE TRANSFORMATION TRINITY . . . . 9 3 THE SPACE POWER VISION: MECCA OR MIRAGE? . . . . .23 4 CULTURAL CHANGE IN THE MILITARY SPACE COMMUNITY . . . . 39 5 ASSESSING SPACE THEORIES OF VICTORY . . . . 59 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 73...

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The United States has over the last 16 years demonstrated amazing proficiency in winning military campaigns, but failure in securing “a better peace” as Basil Liddell Hart advocated. There is a need for an interagency analysis model, owned by the National Security Council (NSC), that can determine how the different instruments of power (IOP) can contribute to the achievement of the national strategic objectives, including which combination of IOPs is most efficient, but it must also bridge the strategic level of war to the operational and tactical levels. Therefore, this paper proposes an analysis model based on Dr. Joseph L. Strange’s center of gravity (COG) model, Robert Pape’s concept of coercion, and effects-based operations (EBO). The model could create unity of effort in utilization of all national and international IOPs and in securing the necessary linkage among the three levels of war to affect the adversary’s will and his strategy....

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Since the end of the Gulf War, the debate over whether there should be a separate space service, equal with the Air Force, Army, and Navy, has grown in proportion to the indispensable value of space operations to our nation’s defense. Increasing dependency on space-systems is a fact of military life. In this well-documented essay, Col Michael C. Whittington compares the leading arguments for a separate space force to the cogent arguments for an independent air force made by airpower advocates during the interwar years of 1920–1940. The airpower issues in 1920 and the space power issues of today are strikingly similar, revolving around four key issues: leadership, doctrine, technology, and funding. The irony, of course, is that these arguments, which helped create an independent air force in 1947, are challenged by many within today’s Air Force leadership, which leads Colonel Whittington to ask, “If they were cogent in 1920, would they not be relevant today?”...

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This study analyzes the asymmetric threat to U.S. airpower across the political, operational, and tactical levels of war and examines whether the U.S. has adequately prepared itself to counter asymmetrical measures against its airpower assets. The answers are not reassuring....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION.......1 The Question.......2 Background and Significance of the Problem.....2 Limitations of the Study..... 4 Methodology.......5 Terminology.....6 Preview of the Argument.....7 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL....... 10 Propaganda.....11 Coalition Busting..... 15 Enemy Measures to Change U.S. Targeting Strategy.......22 Conclusion.....25 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL.......28 Attacking Airpower on the Ramp.......30 Aircraft Carriers.....33 Deception.....36 Urban Warfare.....39 Conclusion..... 42 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL.....44 The Israeli Experience..... 45 MANPADS.......48 The Laser Threat.......51 Conclusion..... 54 CONCLUSIONS.......57...

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This study examines the development and usefulness of US air attack theory and doctrine during the interwar period, 1919–1941. This period represents more than 20years of development in US Air Corps attack theory and doctrine. It was the first peacetime period of such development. Attack aviation during this time was a branch of aviation used to provide direct and indirect combat support to ground forces in the form of machine-gun strafing, light bombing, and chemical attacks....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Principal Research Question . . . . . 1 Background and Significance of the Problem . . . . 1 Limitations of the Study . . . . . 2 Definitions and Assumptions . . . . 2 Preview of the Argument . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . 3 2 ATTACK THEORY AND DOCTRINE OF THE AIR SERVICE, 1919–1926 . . . . 5 Attack Aviation’s World War I Legacy . . . . 5 Air Service Attack Theory . . . . 6 Attack Doctrine Established . . . . . 8 Early Training and Maneuvers . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . 13 3 ATTACK THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE AIR CORPS, 1926–1935 . . . . . 15 Attack Aviation in the New Air Corps . . . . 15 Air Corps Attack Theory . . . . . 16 Attack Doctrine Matures . . . . . 20 Annual Training and Maneuvers . . . . 22 Notes . . . . . 24 4 ATTACK THEORY AND DOCTRINE BEFORE WORLD WAR II, 1935–1941 . . . . . 27 Attack Aviation in the GHQ Air Force . . . . 27 Attack Theory Refined . . . . 28 Attack Doctrine before World War II . . . . 29 Prewar Codification of Doctrine . . . . . 32 Exercises, Maneuvers, and Lessons of War . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 34 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . 37 Summary of Findings . ....

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This study attempts to determine whether air component commands are capable of developing an effective airpower strategy. It examines US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) because of its recent experience in developing and executing a sizable airpower contribution to a theater campaign. The author sets the background by describing CENTAF’s role in the Persian Gulf War theater campaign strategy. The conclusion is that the commander in chief (CINC) of Central Command did not think that CENTAF had an acceptable holistic airpower strategy in August 1990 and therefore requested the assistance of the Air Staff at the Pentagon. Next, the author justifies and describes credible sources for determining the attributes of an effective operational-level airpower strategy. Using this information, he recommends a notional air component commander’s campaign planning organization and describes the individual branch’s responsibilities and products....

Table of Contents Details
1 USCENTAF’S ROLE IN CENTCOM’S PERSIAN GULF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 2 CREDIBLE SOURCES FOR DETERMINING THE ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 3 RECOMMENDED RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRODUCTS OF AN AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER’S CAMPAIGN PLANNING ORGANIZATION . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . 18 4 REPORT ON USCENTAF PLANNING STAFF’S STATUS—EARLY 1995 . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 27 5 IMPLICATIONS/SOLUTIONS TO AIR COMPONENT COMMANDS’ COMBAT PLANNING SHORTFALLS . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . 33 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 35 ...

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This paper analyzes the participation of the US Twelfth Air Force in the Mediterranean theater of operation from 1943 to 1944 and also studies the coalition and joint operations required in the air campaign. Coalition and joint warfare provides numerous command, control, and coordination problems that are not easily de-conflicted. The goal of this paper is to highlight the lessons learned from the selected operations and their applicability to twenty-first-century warfare. The author will examine the development of tactics and operational procedures that were unique to this theater of war and the leadership challenges encountered in a coalition or joint command structure. This study will also examine the effectiveness of combined air operations with the RAF in support of the amphibious landings conducted by the US Fifth and British Eight Armies at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, Italy....

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1 Introduction . . . . 1 2 ALLIED AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA . . . . .5 3 OPERATION HUSKY AND THE INVASION OF SICILY . . . .17 4 OPERATION AVALANCHE AND THE INVASION OF ITALY . .33 5 OPERATION SHINGLE AND THE ASSAULT OF ANZIO . . . .47 6 Conclusion . . . . 63 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 69...

Description Details
A call is being made for an aircraft dedicated to the counterinsurgency (COIN) mission within military academic circles and the special operations community. Support for a COIN aircraft needs hard numbers, given the Air Force’s budget constraints brought on by the dedication to the F- 22A. Building on Arthur Davis’s COIN aircraft advocacy paper, this research doesn’t focus on further advocacy, but on a process and method for COIN aircraft procurement. The acquisition focus is on United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) acquisition authority to couple its global war on terrorism (GWOT) mission responsibility with commercial-off-the-shelf aircraft procurement to specifically address the need for an airborne COIN capability....

Description Details
This study determines if a revival of the CRAF Enhancement Program is feasible and if it could be developed into a viable program for addressing AMC's airlift shortfall problem. To achieve this goal, the study analyzes the failure of the first CRAF Enhancement Program to determine if the barriers to its success were surmountable and if these same barriers might impede the success of a future program. The study determines that the first Enhancement Program failed because MAC was unable to develop an incentive plan that was attractive enough to ensure airline participation, yet be persuasive enough to elicit the required support and funding from Congress....

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1 INTRODUCTION.....1 2 THE NATIONAL AIRLIFT SYSTEM.......5 3 CRAF ENHANCEMENT: THEORY AND REALITY......21 4 THE FUTURE OF CRAF ENHANCEMENT...... 44 BIBLIOGRAPHY......65...

Description Details
A complex and interdependent environment in the global war on terrorism (GWOT) highlights the challenge of translating the theory of effects-based operations (EBO) into practice, particularly with respect to influencing the will of the people and achieving a desired end state. The following paper seeks to illustrate the conditions and challenges surrounding the translation of current effects-based theory into operational practice in the GWOT by using three conceptual constructs. First, the Microsoft Corporation, its connectivity to the Internet, and the persistent attacks by computer hackers on Microsoft products help frame the adversary and the complex environment and conditions surrounding the GWOT. Second, the Al-Jazeera satellite news network serves as an anecdotal backdrop for the challenges military planners face in managing EBO assessment and controlling the “effects” in EBO. Third, the versatility of both the MQ- 1B Predator unmanned aerial vehicle and Special Operations Forces illustrates the importance of developing and maintaining collective knowledge, technological relevance, and doctrinal adaptability in an ever-changin...

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As leaders at all levels, our Airmen must be able to anticipate and appropriately respond to a complicated and fluid national security environment. Developing such Airmen will require stronger commitments to education and training on the part of the learner to the point where learning never stops. Fostering this highly favorable attitude toward learning is possible only if Air Force education and training programs address learners’ goals, motivations, social interactions, and individual learning styles. This means the Air Force needs a stronger focus on affective learning during the instructional design (ID) process for education and training....

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This study analyzes current theater airlift organization and control principles for supporting a large contingency or conventional war. It segregates theater airlift management issues into three organizing categories: 1) organizational relationships and responsibilities, 2) theater command and control networks and supporting personnel, and 3) theater airlift management procedures. The study analyzes historical evidence from the Vietnam and Gulf Wars to derive theater airlift management lessons. By comparing this evidence to current policy trends it attempts to determine how well current doctrine reflects past lessons. In addition, the author evaluates how well-equipped current doctrine is to handle three future influences on the theater airlift system: divestiture of the C-130 fleet, growing uncertainty in the international security arena, and the fielding of the new C-17 transport aircraft....

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This is a book about strategy and war fighting in the midst of a revolution in military affairs as the world moves into the twenty-first century. The book's purpose is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies, and threats that will confront US national security decision makers in the twenty-first century. The participating authors are either professional military officers or civilian professionals who specialize in national security issues....

Table of Contents Details
1 Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Barry R. Schneider 2 New-Era Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Gen Charles A. Homer, USAF, (Ret.) 3 The Revolution in Military Affairs . . . . . . .65 Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill 4 Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century . . 103 Col John A. Warden III, USAF Overview: Future Airpower and Strategy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 5 Parallel War and Hyperwar Is Every Want a Weakness? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Col Richard Szafranski, USAF Overview: Information Warfare Issues . . . 149 6 Information War - Cyberwar - Netwar . . . 153 George Stein 7 Information Warfare: Impacts and Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Col JamesW. McLendon, USAF Overview: Biological Warfare Issues. . . . . 201 8 The Biological Weapon: APoor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction . . . . . . . . . . 205 Lt Col Terry N. Mayer, USAF 9 Twenty-First Century Germ W...

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This paper asserts there exists a dangerous GAP in US strategic intertheater transportation capabilities, propounds a model describing the GAP, and proposes a solution to the problem. Using the Gulf War logistics flow as a model, the three phase points are shown and their airlift/sealift tradeoffs discussed. Other logistics support options, which figured in the war, such as prepositioning and host nation support, are discussed and the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations shown to be, in many ways, a fortuitous theater of operations. This serendipitous combination of circumstances contributed greatly to our successful logistics buildup and is unlikely to recur....

Table of Contents Details
Logistics Flow During The Gulf War 1 Introduction 1 Strategic lift Phasing 4 Transportation/Support Modes 8 Mobility Studies 16 Summary 19 Conclusion 23 Notes 24 Filling The Gap: The Airship 28 Prologue 28 Introduction 31 The Airship in History 32 Airship Technology 42 Potential Military Roles 53 Conclusion 68 Epilogue 69 Notes 72...

Description Details
Two examples from twentieth-century conflicts demonstrate the potential that missiles possess to disrupt an opponent’s land-based airpower and achieve significant political consequences. Iraq’s use of Scud ballistic missiles in the 1991 Persian Gulf War produced nearly instantaneous political effects. The Scuds did not threaten the coalition military forces opposing Saddam Hussein, but instead threatened the existence of the coalition itself by nearly bringing Israel into the war. Negating this threat demanded an urgent response from land-based airpower, and large numbers of coalition aircraft were forced to perform a new mission: Scud Hunting. Almost 50years before Desert Storm, the Allies in World War II had faced a similar threat from the V-1 and V-2. Thousands of sorties were diverted to bomb missiles that were chiefly fired at London and Antwerp. In both conflicts, coalition and Allied forces possessed enough airpower that the diversion did not prevent them from performing other necessary missions. Yet, in the future, as the United States Air Force (USAF)dwindles in numbers, the ability of land-based airpower to deal with the m...

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v Theory of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Patriotism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Air, Space , and Cyber Power . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Education , Training, and Lessons Learned . 24 Preparedness , Security, and Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Leadership and Professionalism . . . . . . . 32 Character and Leadership Traits . . . . . . 35 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Intelligence, Surveillance , and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Information and Communication S . . . . . . 49 Joint Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Coalition Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Airpower at War . . . . . . . . . . . ...

Description Details
This study analyzes and assesses the changes in organization and structure of the active Air Force and ANG fighter maintenance units from the time the ANG became a separate reserve component in 1946 to the present-day organization, paralleling it with the active Air Force. It takes the reader from the ANG maintenance unit's beginning, through the changes that occurred over the years and the reason for the changes, to the present day organization. It then provides a glimpse at the future maintenance organization....

Table of Contents Details
1 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE: PAST AND PRESENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I Centralized Control, 1930-45 . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Period of Uncertainty, 1945-55 . . . . . . . . . . 5 Return to Centralization, 1955-70 . . . . . . . . 7 Decentralized Control, 1970 to the Present . .8 Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Current Organization Structure Theory : A Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Air Force and Major Command Policy Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2 THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION AND THE COMBAT ORIENTED MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . 23 The Centralized Organization . . . . . . . . . . .23 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 The Decentralized Organization . . . . . . . . .26 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Air National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...