Description Details
In this important study, Lt Col Wayne Johnson, USAF, argues that systematic tightening of interagency cooperation and better work on defining sensitive technology prohibitions are needed to maintain the US technological edge. He also maintains that the US government requires a new and disciplined export control process—not the current mosaic of rules, regulations, and perspectives that came out of the cold war, but a process that provides a revamped, systemic approach with consistent implementation. Colonel Johnson explores the problem of defining which technologies the United States is willing to transfer(military or dual-use) and the need to ensure that national security objectives do not take a backseat to economic expediency. To accomplish this end, he argues for better interagency cooperation as a first step leading to a more centralized, coordinated, and strategic view of technology transfer and how it impacts US national security....

Description Details
Colonel Felker’s paper espouses a practical theory of airpower based on the synergistic relationship among societal structure and lines of communications that comprise infrastructure. Rather than isolating different elements of society and their concomitant targets, the theory views targets in a more holistic way. Of note, the theory articulates a culturally based paradigm with airpower applied against the linkages within a society’s system processes, rather than a “one-size-fits-all” target list that attacks form. The theory describes a way to think about airpower, not a way to execute its missions....

Description Details
Lt Col Thomas D. Torkelson claims that the inability of the United States to achieve its stated political objectives in its global war on terror (GWOT) reflects its flawed kinetic-centric military strategy. This study erects a framework of effectiveness utilizing Clausewitzian principles to judge military strategy. By considering the expressed political objectives of the GWOT, the centers of gravity (COG) that military strategy should target within this struggle, and the GWOT’s placement along a Clausewitzian continuum of violence, this paper evaluates US military efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) through the perspective of two opposing models....

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1 THE TIMELINESS OF TIMELESSNESS . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 2 CLAUSEWITZIAN EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . .9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 THE KINETIC MODEL AND ITS PREVALENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4 THE NONKINETIC MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: THE MODELS APPLIED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113...

Description Details
This important research deals with the intellectual foundation of the American profession of arms—our joint doctrine. The author, Lt Col Carl R. Pivarsky Jr., USAF, argues that the current doctrine development process has become a zero-sum game driven by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) declaring joint doctrine to be “authoritative.” This research focuses on that document and the impact it has on how we think about high-intensity, conventional combat operations. Specifically, it deals with the corruption of the definitions of maneuver and interdiction to serve parochial land force interests. The author shows in detail how definitions and terms have destroyed the command authority of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and relegated air component capabilities solely to the support of surface maneuver commanders....

Description Details
The study concludes that a viable Air Force strategy in Africa is properly based on modest “ends” that reflect US national interests on the continent that are themselves limited in scope. These modest ends require that correspondingly limited “ways” and “means” be applied in order for the entire Air Force approach to remain balanced. The ways should focus on missions that create conditions for African states to solve their own security issues, thereby increasing their legitimacy. The means should focus on building the capacity for long-term operations in Africa with access to airfields, a force structure that includes strike and transport aircraft specialized for the region, an Air Force organization tailored to the peculiar demands of the continent, and specialized cultural training for Airmen. Spaven concludes that “only by accepting the risk of stepping beyond tactical and operational thinking can the Air Force do great things for the poorest of continents.”...

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1 THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 2 AIRPOWER IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM THE PAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 CURRENT US ACTIVITIES AND GUIDANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 4 WHAT CAN AIRMEN EXPECT IN AFRICA? . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 5 HOW SHOULD AIRMEN THINK ABOUT AFRICA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 6 CONCLUSION: A US AIR FORCE STRATEGY FOR AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75...

Description Details
In the end, the theories we considered can be synthesized to form a better overall description of the control of combat airpower. Centralized control and decentralized execution is a good concept at any level, but it suffers from lack of precision....

Description Details
What follows are points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning airpower and strategic bombing. This in turn, hopefully, will give our political and military leaders a better basis on which to form decisions in future conflicts....

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1 Between the world wars, even though the US Army Air Corps received more than its fair share of funds from the Army, it continued to complain, agitate, and ask for more. . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2 Entering World War II, the Air Corps’s unbalanced doctrine and force structure leaned too heavily towards strategic bombing. Thus, air support of ground forces was inadequate and largely ignored by airmen. . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 The Air Corps entered World War II with a “Douhetian” concept of air war that emphasized area bombing and the waging of war on women and children. . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4 Airmen thought they could win the war alone. . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5 The fact that German production, especially of aircraft, continued to increase throughout 1944 proves that the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was ineffective and that the resources devoted to it would have been better spent elsewhere. . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 B...

Description Details
There is a story that still needs to be told about the Air Force contribution to—and shaping by—arms control. The ability to make these assessments did not blossom overnight. This book captures the story of a young Air Force’s initial (and limited) impact on arms-control negotiations and outcomes. It goes on to document a growing awareness by the service that it was better to help craft the US position than to be only a recipient of the outcome. The book highlights the lesson it belatedly learned in the early days of arms control: the Air Force has to plan and budget for treaty implementation as aggressively as it works to protect its equities during treaty negotiations....

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PART I Foundations for Strategic Arms Control, 1945–68 1 The United States Air Force and Arms Control: The Early Years . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Michael O. Wheeler 2 Peace through Strength Alone: US Air Force Views on Arms Control in the 1950s and Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Edward Kaplan PART II Strategic Arms Limitations, 1969–80 3 The Road to SALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Anne G. Campbell 4 Strategic Arms Control and the US Air Force: The SALT Era, 1969–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Jeffrey A. Larsen PART III The Reagan Years, 1981–88 5 Arms Control during the Reagan Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 Charles D. Dusch Jr. 6 National Security Strategy, Arms Control, and the US Air Force: The Reagan Years, 1981–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Forrest E. Waller Jr. PART IV Strategic Arms Reductions, 1989–2000 7 Arms Control after the Cold War . . . . . . 191 Thomas S. Mowle 8 Downsizing and Shifting Operational Emphasis for the US Air Force: The Bush and Clinton Years, 1989–2000 . . . . . . . . .227 Thomas D. Miller PART V Conclusion ...

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Part 1 The Decision 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Rumblings of Laboratory Consolidation . . . 7 3 The Catalyst: National Defense Authorization Act and Vision 21 . . . . . . . . .23 4 Overhauling Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 Laboratory Studies and Strategy . . . . . . . 71 6 Corona 1996: Leadership and Decisions . .93 7 The Last Dance: Meeting in the Secretary’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Part 2 The Transition 9 Early Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 10 Shaping the Technology Directorates . . 161 11 Getting the Message Out . . . . . . . . . . 195 12 Other Perspectives: Independent Review Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 13 Headquarters: Two Staff Directorates . . 227 14 The Final Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253 15 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265...

Description Details
In his book The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II, Charles Griffith makes a major contribution in detailing the role played by General Hansell from his early days as an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School to the heady days and nights as a young war planner developing the air war plan used by the United States during World War II to his triumphs and disappointments as a commander in the field. While the book tells this story well, it does more than just relate the life and times of Possum Hansell. The book goes a long way toward explaining the origins of many of the arguments about the utility of airpower in the closing decade of the twentieth century....

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1 THE PROBLEMS OF AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2 THE EARLY YEARS: EDUCATION AND ACTS .23 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 3 PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 4 THE FRICTIONS OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 5 THE GLOBAL BOMBER FORCE . . . . . . . . .129 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 6 TRIUMPH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 7 TRAGEDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 About Revolutions in Military Affairs and Disproportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 DOCTRINE FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . 8 Global-Mobility Strategic Air Campaigns . . . 10 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 4 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Operational Concepts for Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Operational Concepts for Global-Mobility Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5 TECHNOLOGY FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Technology for Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Technology for Global-Mobility ...

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Essays Introduction: The Protraction and Prolongation of Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Karl P. Magyar Iran-Iraq: Protracted Conflict, Prolonged War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 M. A. Shahriar Shirkhani and Constantine P. Danopoulos The Longevity of the Lebanese Civil War . . .41 As’ad AbuKhalil The Arab-Israeli Wars: A Conflict of Strategic Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Stewart Reiser Prolonged Conflict in the Sudan . . . . . . . . .99 Ann Mosely Lesch Fire in the Horn: Prolonged War in Ethiopia and Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Cobie Harris Chad: The Apparent Permanence of Ethno-Regional Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Frédérick Belle Torimiro Liberia’s Conflict: Prolongation through Regional Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177 Karl P. Magyar The Rhodesian Conflict: 1966–79 . . . . . . .195 Herbert M. Howe Civil War in a Fragile State—Mozambique . 225 Christopher Gregory The War Over Angola and Namibia: Factors of Prolongation . . . . . ...

Description Details
To reinvigorate strategic thought within the Air Force, this study addresses a single question: what critical capabilities—through the combatant commanders—will the nation require of the Air Force by 2030?...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Supporting Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Air Force Critical Capabilities, 2020–30 . . . . .5 Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Freedom of Action: Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Freedom of Action: Space . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Freedom of Action: Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Global Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . .13 Air Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Military Support to Civil Authorities . . . . . . . 17 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Freedom of Action: Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Freedom of Action: Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Freedom of Action: Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Global Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . .29 Air Diplomacy . ...

Description Details
This study argues that certain actions of the Air Force, taken together, will go a long way toward enabling war fighters to plan and execute cyber tasks, apply cyber capabilities, and integrate operations in cyberspace with military capabilities executed in the traditional war-fighting domains....

Description Details
A comparison of the Misty and A-10 FAC missions clearly demonstrates a failure of the USAF to develop a full range of suitable tactics for the direct attack of enemy fielded forces. Although the quantum leaps in weapons delivery accuracy from Vietnam to Kosovo now make it possible to destroy armor and artillery from the air, there has not been a corresponding improvement in target identification. Until USAF prioritizes the direct attack of ground forces and target identification, its ability to attack fielded forces effectively will remain limited. Drawing from the lessons of the Misty and A-10 FACs, the recommendations presented here focus on equipment, tactics and training, and doctrine....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF AIR INTERDICTION FROM WORLD WAR I THROUGH VIETNAM . . . . . . . 7 3 MISTY-FAC TACTICS: HYPOTHETICAL MISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 HISTORY OF ATTACKING FIELDED FORCES: POST-VIETNAM TO KOSOVO . . . . . . . . . . . .41 5 A-10 FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79...

Description Details
This paper seeks to answer the following question: What are the doctrinal imperatives of providing effective airlift support to enclaves? Doctrinal imperatives are those necessary and sufficient propositions that describe the optimal way to employ airlift forces in support of an enclave. In short, this paper attempts to determine the best way to conduct airlift operations to support enclaves....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 THE LUFTWAFFE’S AERIAL RESUPPLY OF THE SIXTH ARMY AT STALINGRAD . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4 KHE SANH, THE AMERICAN AERIAL RESUPPLY OF THE US MARINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55...

Description Details
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction dramatically in-creases the likelihood of operating in “hostile” environments, thereby eliminating the civil reserve airfleet’s contribution to strategic airlift. Commercial airlift aircraft, built for efficiency, represent a fiscally responsible complement to the military’s airlift fleet. In order to meet current and future force requirements, especially with a continental-based force structure, the United States needs to supplement its strategic airlift fleet with a COTS airlift aircraft....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 THE CIVILIAN–MILITARY AIRLIFT PARTNERSHIP: EFFICIENCY VERSUS EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS, CURRENT CAPABILITIES, AND THE SHORTFALL . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 4 THE ALTERNATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58...

Description Details
Maj Richard J. Hazdra’s Air Mobility: The Key to the United States National Security is an examination of the force structure of Air Mobility Command (AMC) based on a model for two major theater wars. His study examines this organization’s current force structure. Air mobility is the key that unlocks the national security strategy (NSS). AMC’s force structure is crucial for the United States to implement its NSS. His study centers on the question: Can a force structure based on the possibility of fighting two major theater wars satisfy the requirements for steady-state operations? Major Hazdra examines three corollary issues: air mobility as a form of airpower that enables the military instrument of power in two basic ways, requirements placed on mobility air forces, and the structure of mobility air forces and the effectiveness of that structure....

Description Details
As the nation’s campaign against terrorism proceeds, our military services continue to embrace high technology, advanced sensors, and precision weaponry for use on current battlefields. The term cyber warrior has truly stepped from the pages of science fiction into reality. Equipment and technology do not constitute the only developments, however, because today’s cyber warriors emerge from a society and military culture very different in many respects from those of past generations of warriors....

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1 EMPLOYEE WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Values Crisis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Harnessing a Different Military . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cultures in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 2 TRADITIONAL MILITARY CULTURE . . . . . . .7 Professionalism and Homogeneity . . . . . . . .7 Fraternity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Institutional Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Value Studies of the Military . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Traditional Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 THE NEW BUSINESS-SCIENTIFIC CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 New World Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Volunteer Fighting Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Occupational Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Technology and the Great Engineering Venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Civilian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Force of Specialists . . . . . ...

Description Details
The Air Force has challenged leaders to integrate and use quality principles as a way to improve operations throughout the service. In this study Lt Col David F. Bird, USAF, reminds us that these quality principles apply to emergency response forces, both before and during a crisis. He proposes that senior leaders view quality concepts and principles as a way of creating an environment to spark the highest performance by their subordinates and not as giving up authority or control....