Description Details
This paper examines how these rules affected the effective military execution of the Rolling Thunder air campaign, as well as their impact on American aircrews and the enemy. During the Vietnam War, many American air commanders were convinced that rigid Rules of Engagement (ROEs) prevented an American aerial victory over North Vietnam during the Rolling Thunder air campaign from 1965-1968. ROEs became so complicated and changed so often that aircrews found it difficult to know what the rules were from day to day. As a result, many vital military targets were either not bombed or were attacked in a very limited and piecemeal fashion....

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1. INTRODUCTION. 1 2. BACKGRIDUND INFORMATION. 3 3. IMPACT OF ROEs ON MILITARY COMMANDERS AND AIRCREWS. 12 4. ROLLINIG THUNDER --MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. 20 5. IMPACT OF ROEs ON THE ENEMY. 27 6. CONCLUSIONS. 32...

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Major Rick Paulsen's study analyzes the role of United States nuclear weapons in this new, multipolar environment. He begins with a historical look at the role nuclear weapons have played in US defense policy since 1945. He reviews current unclassified guidance and the spectrum of public opinion on where the United States should be going with its nuclear weapons programs . He then surveys the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction. Major Paulsen concludes his study by suggesting nuclear force capabilities that would provide the United States with a viable deterrent for the post-cold war era. His recommendations address a broad range of issues that focus on developing a coherent nuclear strategy....

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Under command of British general Allenby, the EEF successfully executed one of the most decisive engagements in any theater of World War I. Ably employing and synchronizing infantry, cavalry, and air forces, Allenby provided future military professionals and historians with a shining illustration of the efficacy of combined arms operations. Unfortunately, the true lessons of Allenby’s campaign were lost for future generations of military officers. This paper analyzes the reasons those in the profession of arms missed the lessons of airpower and its role in combined arms operations. The paper also delves into the role of airpower in the Middle East and how Allenby integrated a relatively new weapon system into his force structure and operational planning and execution. Though largely unexplored by military professionals and historians, Allenby’s final campaign in Palestine proved to be a momentous step in the evolution of combined arms operations....

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1 THE NATURE OF THE BEAST . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-EARLY GERMAN CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-THE GERMAN 1941 CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA . . . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 PHOTO SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 4 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-THE SOVIET VERSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 5 ISRAEL: MANEUVER WARFARE, AIR POWER, AND LOGISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 6 MANEUVER WARFARE AND AIR POWER IN THE 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .193 Past Limitations on Air Power . . . . . . . . . .193 Air Power and New Developments . . . . . . . 196 Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .197 Situational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 The Cordon Sanitaire of Reconstruction . . .200 Differences in ...

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This thesis focuses on operational-level coalition air force interactions in three conflicts: the Korean War (1950–53), the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), and the Balkan Air Campaign (1992–95). The capability that coalition air forces offer usually benefits the overall effort, while each member’s diverging desires (or will) can degrade overall unity of effort. Analysis of the three conflicts presented here suggests several coalition considerations for air component commanders. Because each case in this thesis had unique elements that may have affected the coalition, a comparison of these elements may also reveal considerations which are important to the air component commander. Finally, the current US programs to train joint force air component commanders and operational-level staffs show promising trends for improving our ability to operate within a coalition....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE KOREAN WAR . . . . . . 7 THE PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 THE BALKAN AIR CAMPAIGN . . . . 37 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 61...

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This is a story of long-range airpower, from Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s vision of a global mission to the Global Strike Task Force and expeditionary air forces of the year 2001. It examines global power from its origins as Strategic Air Command built a fleet of bombers and tankers to meet the needs of the global nuclear-deterrent policy of the Cold War. This evolution is traced through the studies and commissions of the 1990s established to determine the force structure for the twenty-first century. The assumptions that were made to develop a force focused on expeditionary short-range airpower to project global power are established and then examined with four case studies in the application of airpower over long range....

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1 GLOBAL POWER FOR AMERICA . . . . . . . . . 1 2 WORLD WAR II ORIGINS AND COLD WAR MATURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 3 GLOBAL POWER––POST–COLD WAR: ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . .21 4 CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL POWER . . . . . . 45 5 EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . .75 6 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89...

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Introduction . . . .1 Right Weapons, Wrong War . . . .2 Finding the Right Mission . . . .3 Finding the Right Weapons—Aircraft . . . .6 Unintended Consequences . . . . .8 Finding the Right Weapons—Tactics, Procedures, and Ordnance . . . .11 Right Weapons, Wrong Way . . . . .13 Right Weapons, Right Way . . . . .15 The Wild Card . . . .18 Looking for Lessons . . . . .20 Notes . . . .27...

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This study then examined Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, and determined it could better incorporate the lessons learned from World War II. Current joint doctrine could be improved by underscoring the contribution that deception provides to surprise, the importance of integrating deception within all three levels of war, and the importance of exploiting an adversary’s preexisting beliefs when creating a deception story. Applying these World War II lessons will bolster US deception capabilities....

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This thesis analyzes the factors and conditions of command dysfunction from the cognitive, or mental, perspective of command and control warfare (C2W). The author examines the limitations of rational decision making and the tension that exists between rational and intuitive processes. Next, this thesis examines the vulnerabilities of rational and intuitive processes in order to build a cognitive warfare framework. The framework consists of three categories: the command baseline, stressors, and deception. The stressor and deception categories act on the command baseline. The analysis also suggests that there are a number of possible interactions that exist between the stressor and deception categories. This thesis uses the framework to analyze evidence of command dysfunction in three historical campaigns. The historical analyses study the German command during the Normandy Invasion, the Allied command during the first week of the Battle of the Bulge, and the Israeli command during the first half of the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War. In addition to showing that there are interactions between stressors and deception, the analyses highl...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 DECISION PROCESSES . . . . . 7 CONSIDERING A COGNITIVE WARFARE FRAMEWORK . . . 23 THE NORMANDY INVASION . . . . 35 THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE . . . . . 51 THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR IN THE SINAI . . . . . 65 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 83...

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This paper addresses the use of airpower during the French military operations in Africa since 1960. Using case study methodology, it emphasizes the operational level of war and analyzes the use of the different French army, air force, and naval aviation operational roles; the adaptation of equipment to conditions in Africa; and the changes in the French- African policy that have influenced the use of airpower....

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Essays Introduction: The Protraction and Prolongation of Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Karl P. Magyar Iran-Iraq: Protracted Conflict, Prolonged War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 M. A. Shahriar Shirkhani and Constantine P. Danopoulos The Longevity of the Lebanese Civil War . . .41 As’ad AbuKhalil The Arab-Israeli Wars: A Conflict of Strategic Attrition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Stewart Reiser Prolonged Conflict in the Sudan . . . . . . . . .99 Ann Mosely Lesch Fire in the Horn: Prolonged War in Ethiopia and Eritrea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Cobie Harris Chad: The Apparent Permanence of Ethno-Regional Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Frédérick Belle Torimiro Liberia’s Conflict: Prolongation through Regional Intervention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177 Karl P. Magyar The Rhodesian Conflict: 1966–79 . . . . . . .195 Herbert M. Howe Civil War in a Fragile State—Mozambique . 225 Christopher Gregory The War Over Angola and Namibia: Factors of Prolongation . . . . . ...

Description Details
The author's contention is that training for night air operations, particularly with our sister services, is in its infancy. Using his personal experience he sets out to recommend better uses of the training facilities of all the services to improve the situation . After examining the history of joint operations and night air operations, presenting a hypothetical joint night scenario to show the tremendous challenges of such operations, and describing the current status of joint night training programs, the author recommends a phased building-block approach that should increase the Air Force's capability to perform both single-service and joint operations any time of the day or night. This will ensure that we train as we plan to fight in future air operations....

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1 HISTORY AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . 1 Joint Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Night Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2 DOING IT IN THE DARK THE CHALLENGE . . 17 Operation Tae Kwon Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Mission Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Offensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 On-Call Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 Mission Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Offensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 On-Call Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 Mission Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 PHOTO SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 3 CURRENT TRAINING PROGRAMS . . . . . . . 61 Requirements for Re...

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The third world continues to grow in its importance to the United States . Often possessing a wealth of vital natural resources or a geographic position astride crucial lines of communications, third world nations have, in many cases, become the focal point of East-West confrontations . Additionally, the frequent political turmoil and economic crises that plague some of these third world nations often threaten the vital interests of the West . For all of these reasons, it is imperative that we understand the utility and limitations of military power applied to crisis situations in the third world. Land based air power is of particular importance in rapidly developing crises because of its range of action and speed of response . Dr Mets' study focuses on land-based air power in a variety of these situations over the past three decades. Clearly, the subject is important to our understanding of the most effective use of air power. It is also clear that Dr Mets has made a significant contribution to the literature of air power and provides a message that we all should heed ....

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1 POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY POWER: SOME RELATIONSHIPS . . . . . . . . . .1 Crisis Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Categories and Characteristics of Military Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Land-Based Air Power Capabilities . . . . . . . . 3 Options in Selecting Land-Based AirPower. . . .5 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 THE THIRD WORLD ANDTHEUNITED STATES: PROBLEMS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND OUTLOOKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Problems and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Blind Alleys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Crises and Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Interdependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Diffusing Advanced Arms to Less-Developed Countries (LDCs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Utility of Military Power . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 THEMAYAGUEZ INCIDENT: SIMPLE CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Scenario . .. . . . . . . . ...

Description Details
America’s First Air Battles: Lessons Learned or Lessons Lost? provides a successful evaluation of Michael Howard’s construct that current doctrine is probably wrong, but what matters is the capability of the military to get it right when a particular conflict begins. In the course of this evaluation, Lt Col Aldon E. Purdham Jr. examines several important airpower factors to include familiarity with the nature and geography of the conflict; parity with the adversary, especially in terms of air superiority; command and control of air assets, especially in interdiction and close air support missions; and the confluence of airpower weapons with doctrine and training....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN THE KOREAN WAR, 25 JUNE–25 JULY 1950 . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR, 2 MARCH–1 APRIL 1965 . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 4 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN DESERT STORM, 17 JANUARY–15 FEBRUARY 1991 . . 45 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 5 ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix A HISTORY OF DIVISION AND CONFLICT . . . .1 THE DEATH OF YUGOSLAVIA ACCELERATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 DENY FLIGHT: THE DETERRENT USE OF AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE . . . . . . . . . 31 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . .43 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 DISENGAGEMENT IN STRATEGY . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE COLD WAR . . . . .25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 5 REFRAMING DISENGAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . .83 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 6 EFFECTS OF BARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123 Illustrations Figure 1 P...

Description Details
In sum, the petroleum-based sector of a nation’s economy offers a large, vulnerable target for today’s air planner. By merging the lessons of the past with current and future trends, one can achieve immediate results and dramatically affect the out-come of war....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 UNLIMITED WAR AND OIL . . . . 3 Summary . . . . . 10 3 LIMITED WAR AND OIL . . . . . 11 Summary . . . . . 15 4 HYPERWAR AND THE FUTURE . . . . . 17 Summary . . . . . 27 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 39...

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The history of four terrorist organizations in the Balkans and a general introduction to terrorism and freedom fighting. Also includes essays about religious co-existence in the Balkans and about pathological narcissism as a precursor to terrorism. ...

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This analysis of air control examines all three conceptual frameworks. By assessing the validity of the RAF and USAF models, this study finds that air control provides political and military leaders a military strategy for a smaller defense establishment. It also identifies shortcomings and advises caution when choosing the escalatory pattern of the control model....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 4 2 BRITISH AIR CONTROL FROM 1922 TO 1936 . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . 13 3 PROJECT CONTROL FROM 1953 TO 1954 . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . 24 4 THE PERSIAN GULF WAR FROM 1990 TO 1991 . . . . 29 Notes . . . . 35 5 ASSESSING AIR CONTROL . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . 46 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . 51...

Description Details
Accounts of seizing the tactical or operational initiative abound. At the strategic level of war, however, initiative receives only transitory mention. Authors and military professionals often assume a common understanding of strategic initiative, including which combatant has it and why. There is neither a clear definition of the concept, nor any significant analysis of the elements that contribute to it. This thesis contributes to the elimination of that gap by answering the question—what factors lead to significant shifts in strategic initiative during the conduct of modern, conventional war?...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45 . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 3 THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45 . . . . . . . . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 4 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113...