Description Details
This thesis focuses on operational-level coalition air force interactions in three conflicts: the Korean War (1950–53), the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), and the Balkan Air Campaign (1992–95). The capability that coalition air forces offer usually benefits the overall effort, while each member’s diverging desires (or will) can degrade overall unity of effort. Analysis of the three conflicts presented here suggests several coalition considerations for air component commanders. Because each case in this thesis had unique elements that may have affected the coalition, a comparison of these elements may also reveal considerations which are important to the air component commander. Finally, the current US programs to train joint force air component commanders and operational-level staffs show promising trends for improving our ability to operate within a coalition....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE KOREAN WAR . . . . . . 7 THE PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 THE BALKAN AIR CAMPAIGN . . . . 37 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 61...

Description Details
The years from 1947 through the beginning of the twenty first century witnessed the USAF steadily progress until it became the preeminent air force in the world. With less than 400,000 active duty personnel, the USAF has capabilities and tasks today that were not imaginable six decades ago. The World War II legacy from the Army Air Forces, epitomized in the familiar Air Force song lyrics “off we go into the wild blue yonder, climbing high into the sky!” is not forgotten. However, a strong professional image and unparalleled responsibilities in air and space are far more descriptive of today’s USAF....

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1 GREAT ADVENTURE BEGINS . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THREE MUSKETEERS TIMES TWO . . . . . . . 11 3 AIR-TO-GROUND BATTLE FOR ITALY . . . . .45 4 OPERATION STRANGLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65...

Description Details
This volume offers the best assessment we have of General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold as he survived four wartime heart attacks and continued to work tirelessly for proper recognition of airpower. It will also continue my emphasis while Chief of Staff of the US Air Force on encouraging professional reading through making historical accounts available to personnel of the finest air force in the world, a success achieved in large part because of Hap Arnold....

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HAP AT MIDPOINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6 ENGLAND 31 AUGUST–8 SEPTEMBER 1943 . . . . . . . . . 13 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 The Diary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 7 CAIRO, TEHRAN, PALESTINE, CAIRO, ITALY 11 NOVEMBER–15 DECEMBER 1943 . . . . . . .67 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 The Diary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 8 ENGLAND, NORMANDY BEACHES, ITALY 8 JUNE–21 JUNE 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131 The Diary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 9 QUEBEC 11 SEPTEMBER–16 SEPTEMBER 1944 . ...

Description Details
This volume offers the best assessment we have of General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold as he survived four wartime heart attacks and continued to work tirelessly for proper recognition of airpower. It will also continue my emphasis while Chief of Staff of the US Air Force on encouraging professional reading through making historical accounts available to personnel of the finest air force in the world, a success achieved in large part because of Hap Arnold....

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1 ENGLAND 9 APRIL–1 MAY 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125 The Diary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 2 ARGENTIA, NEWFOUNDLAND 31 JULY–14 AUGUST 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207 The Diary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216 Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 3 ENGLAND 22 MAY–3 JUNE 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .265 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .265 The Diary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316 PHOTO SECTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .329 4 SOUTH PACIFIC 16 SEPTEMBER–2 OCTOBER 1942 . . . . . . .345 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345 The Diary . . . . . ....

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Lt Col John J. Zentner’s The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Morale in Combat addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during combat. More specifically, Colonel Zentner’s study seeks to identify and define those unique characteristics associated with leading airmen that sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Leadership and Morale in Air Combat . . . . .91 Existing Thoughts on Military Morale . . . . . .92 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 2 THE MORALE PROBLEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Who Is the Leader? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Morale: The Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Power of Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Maintaining Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 3 MAJ ADOLF GALLAND: JAGDGESCHWADER 26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Germany’s Battle for Britain. . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Jagdgeschwader 26 in the Battle of Britain . .30 Pilot Morale within Jagdgeschwader 26 . . . . 31 Galland’s Influence on Morale . . . . . . . . . . 38 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . ...

Description Details
Col William Palmby’s award-winning study, Outsourcing the Air Force Mission: A Strategy for Success, explores how the Air Force must adjust to this new reality of a world where the state no longer possesses a monopoly on war. He reviews the history and driving forces that have led to increased outsourcing by the Air Force, finding that while it may be the most dominant such force in history, the range of roles turned over to the private market means that private companies and their employees now have a significant influence on the very success or failure of its critical operations....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 WHERE WE ARE TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4 A STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59...

Description Details
America’s First Air Battles: Lessons Learned or Lessons Lost? provides a successful evaluation of Michael Howard’s construct that current doctrine is probably wrong, but what matters is the capability of the military to get it right when a particular conflict begins. In the course of this evaluation, Lt Col Aldon E. Purdham Jr. examines several important airpower factors to include familiarity with the nature and geography of the conflict; parity with the adversary, especially in terms of air superiority; command and control of air assets, especially in interdiction and close air support missions; and the confluence of airpower weapons with doctrine and training....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN THE KOREAN WAR, 25 JUNE–25 JULY 1950 . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR, 2 MARCH–1 APRIL 1965 . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 4 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN DESERT STORM, 17 JANUARY–15 FEBRUARY 1991 . . 45 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 5 ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79...

Description Details
I believe the author has filled a critical gap in aerial warfare literature. Most works focus on the technical or tactical aspects of our profession and medium, but stop short of discussions of the broader nature of war itself. Consideration of war in that larger sense is essential for those who seek to understand and especially apply air and space power in combat....

Description Details
In the 53-year history of the United States Air Force (USAF), only two airmen have risen to serve as regional commanders in chief (CINC). During the same period, 74 soldiers, sailors, and Marines were selected for geographic CINC billets. In Once in a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command, Lt Col Howard D. Belote examines the reasons for this disparity and suggests how airmen might improve their prospects for becoming future regional commanders....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 EARLY PERSPECTIVES ON JOINT/COALITION COMMAND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97 AN AIRMAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF: LAURIS NORSTAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 AN AIRMAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT WAR: ALBRECHT KESSELRING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . .53 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 FINAL THOUGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Illustrations 1 Allied Advances in Italy, 1943–44 . . . . . . 41 2 Commanders in Chief versus USAF Generals’ Careers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Photographs Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower and Gen Lauris Norstad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

Description Details
Colonel Lenderman explores the increase in the number and influence of mobility generals in the late twentieth century and looks toward the future, presenting possible reasons why these generals will continue to rise or why their opportunities may be limited. She concludes by discussing the significance of this study as it pertains to the Air Force’s development and the nation’s security....

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1 MAHAN AND THE PURPOSE OF AIRPOWER . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 THE RISE OF MOBILITY OPERATIONS . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 THE RISE OF MOBILITY GENERALS . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4 THE FUTURE OF MOBILITY GENERALS . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79...

Description Details
Since our founding 50 years ago, the US Air Force has been responsible to the nation for controlling and exploiting the air and space environment. We are the nation’s Air Force—the only service that provides air and space power across the spectrum, from basic research to combat operations. In Apollo’s Warriors, Col Michael Haas, USAF, Retired, brings to life the critical, albeit little-known, contributions US Air Force special operations forces have made to the exercise of air and space power....

Description Details
Drawing on the histories of three services—Great Britain’s Royal Air Force from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force from 1967 to 1973, and the United States Air Force from 1953 to 1965—Major Carter offers three case studies to determine if the cult of the offensive applies to air forces. He concludes that cults of the offensive have indeed influenced airpower doctrine in the past, and that detailed offensive planning and a critical evaluation of capabilities provide two methods for avoiding this potential trap. ...

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INTRODUCTION . . .1 THE NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE FOR AIRPOWER . . .5 AIRPOWER AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE OFFENSIVE . . .18 ROYAL AIR FORCE, 1918–38 . . .31 ISRAELI AIR FORCE, 1967–73 . . .52 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, 1953–65 . . .65 IMPLICATIONS . . .88 NOTES . . .95 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . .107...

Description Details
By the end of the Vietnam War, advances in technology allowed these FACs to control strikes against targets at night, in bad weather, and with improved precision. Laser-guided weapons systems, new computer navigation equipment, and advanced ground radars combined to provide an effective and lethal capability. If the Mosquitoes were an annoyance in Korea, the Wolves of Vietnam proved to be a deadly addition to the concept of FAC....

Description Details
In this paper an Air Force ground commander and scholar, Lt Col Dave Marttala, brings to light a problem previously overlooked in popular discussion: Air Force deployment of large numbers of Airmen to augment the joint ground fight and the consequent breakage of the US war-fighting capability writ large....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Myth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 This Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Genesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Convoy Airmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Assumptions and Expectations . . . . . . . . . . 7 In-Lieu-of Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Current Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Joint Requirements and Sourcing . . . . . . . . 8 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Popular Criticisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Studying the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3 CASE STUDY: SECURITY FORCES . . . . . . .17 Description of Security Forces . . . . . ...

Description Details
This study uses Brig Gen J. F. C. Fuller’s theory of war to investigate the motivation of pilots flying in combat. The study holds the physical and cognitive domains of war variables constant and analyzes the moral domain effects on pilot behavior....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 THE MORAL DOMAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 3 METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40...

Description Details
This study analyzes the air war plans in World War II and the Persian Gulf War. The goal of this study is to ascertain whether there is a continuity of thought reflected in American air planning over the years. This study assesses Air War Plans Division–1/42 and Instant Thunder as to their importance to contemporary airpower theory. This study concludes that there is a continuity of thought reflected in major air plans, particularly in the issues of strategic bombing, precision attack, and command and control. This study also evaluates Korea and Vietnam as a bridge between World War II and Operation Desert Storm and evaluates the implications of this demonstrated continuity of thought on current and future Air Force doctrine and strategy....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN AIRPOWER THEORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 AIR WAR PLANS DIVISION–42 . . . . . . . . .13 4 KOREA AND VIETNAM: THE BRIDGE . . . . . .25 5 INSTANT THUNDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . .55...

Description Details
The importance of combat effects in warfare has no second. However, most combat effects would never be delivered without crucial information delivered from combat support forces. In this time of turbulent recapitalization and reorganization within the Air Force, the critical nature of combat and combat support effects must remain foremost in our decisions as we create new commands, place people and resources where needed, and forecast budgets....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi EXPANSION OR MARGINALIZATION: HOW EFFECTS-BASED ORGANIZATION COULD DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND . . . . . . . . . . .1 Domain versus Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Kepler Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Filling the Effects-Based Void . . . . . . . . . . .13 Further Consolidation for Better Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Combat Support Is the Mission . . . . . . . . . 23 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 LIST OF ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41...

Description Details
The author outlines the issue in an introduction and has a background chapter that explains the current system, which provides a useful description of sensors, fusion of information, shooters, and weapons. He explains the current reactive method and identifies various system weaknesses and strengths. His main theme of a preemptive approach describes in great detail the projected employment of LOCPADs as a very effective system for time-critical targeting. Marzolf insists that persistence of surveillance is crucial, especially when Airmen directing the air war in Iraq used persistence surveillance to identify and effectively target the illusive Iraqi insurgents....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 REACTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4 PREEMPTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85...

Description Details
The use of the heavy bomber during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is just one more chapter on the flexibility of airpower. Bombers in the early stages of the war destroyed the Taliban air force on the ground and the limited air-to-air defenses, as well as disrupting command and control nodes. Orbiting close over problem areas, heavy bombers, guided by ground terminal attack controllers, precisely struck key targets. The bombers were supplying something different than traditional CAS. This new form of warfare used small parties of ground troops in support of the massive firepower that the bombers could provide. Each war is different; and in this case, there were virtually no external threats to the bombers. With total air dominance and the freedom to range over the battlefield at will, utilizing heavy bombers in the GAPS role was possible. This combination of the JDAM along with improved communications systems made this new mission a reality. With the success of these operations, Colonel Theisen believes the USAF should initiate doctrine, rules of engagement, and training changes to accommodate this mission....

Description Details
There is a story that still needs to be told about the Air Force contribution to—and shaping by—arms control. The ability to make these assessments did not blossom overnight. This book captures the story of a young Air Force’s initial (and limited) impact on arms-control negotiations and outcomes. It goes on to document a growing awareness by the service that it was better to help craft the US position than to be only a recipient of the outcome. The book highlights the lesson it belatedly learned in the early days of arms control: the Air Force has to plan and budget for treaty implementation as aggressively as it works to protect its equities during treaty negotiations....

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PART I Foundations for Strategic Arms Control, 1945–68 1 The United States Air Force and Arms Control: The Early Years . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Michael O. Wheeler 2 Peace through Strength Alone: US Air Force Views on Arms Control in the 1950s and Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Edward Kaplan PART II Strategic Arms Limitations, 1969–80 3 The Road to SALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Anne G. Campbell 4 Strategic Arms Control and the US Air Force: The SALT Era, 1969–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Jeffrey A. Larsen PART III The Reagan Years, 1981–88 5 Arms Control during the Reagan Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 Charles D. Dusch Jr. 6 National Security Strategy, Arms Control, and the US Air Force: The Reagan Years, 1981–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Forrest E. Waller Jr. PART IV Strategic Arms Reductions, 1989–2000 7 Arms Control after the Cold War . . . . . . 191 Thomas S. Mowle 8 Downsizing and Shifting Operational Emphasis for the US Air Force: The Bush and Clinton Years, 1989–2000 . . . . . . . . .227 Thomas D. Miller PART V Conclusion ...

Description Details
A comparison of the Misty and A-10 FAC missions clearly demonstrates a failure of the USAF to develop a full range of suitable tactics for the direct attack of enemy fielded forces. Although the quantum leaps in weapons delivery accuracy from Vietnam to Kosovo now make it possible to destroy armor and artillery from the air, there has not been a corresponding improvement in target identification. Until USAF prioritizes the direct attack of ground forces and target identification, its ability to attack fielded forces effectively will remain limited. Drawing from the lessons of the Misty and A-10 FACs, the recommendations presented here focus on equipment, tactics and training, and doctrine....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF AIR INTERDICTION FROM WORLD WAR I THROUGH VIETNAM . . . . . . . 7 3 MISTY-FAC TACTICS: HYPOTHETICAL MISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 HISTORY OF ATTACKING FIELDED FORCES: POST-VIETNAM TO KOSOVO . . . . . . . . . . . .41 5 A-10 FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79...

Description Details
The essays and speeches in this volume are some of Dennis Drew's best and most important. They reflect the struggle over the past 30 years to relate classical military theory to modern airpower, the difficulties of dealing with the new realities of the post–Cold War era, the struggle to understand the true nature of airpower and put it into perspective, and finally the importance of educating Airmen and raising their thinking above the tactical level....

Description Details
To lead the US Air Force into the future, it is necessary to understand the past and present nature of the force. With this in mind, Air Force leaders have always sought to arm members of the force with a basic knowledge and understanding of Air Force culture and history. This volume is a contribution to that ongoing educational process, but as the title states, this is only an introduction. The information provided here merely scratches the surface of the fascinating stories of the people, equipment, and operations of the Air Force. Topics that are covered here in only a few short paragraphs have been, and will continue to be the subject of entire books. We hope this volume will be a starting point and a reference work to facilitate your continuing study of aerospace power....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 1 THE USAF TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 FRAMING THE QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 THE CURRENT FIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Irregular Warfare: Winning the Long War . . . 6 Air Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Strategic Communication: Spreading the Word . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Culture and Language in the Expeditionary Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Distributed Planning: The Key to Centralized Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Unmanned Aerial Systems: The Air Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Intelligence Reform: The Secondary Effects of Merging Intelligence with Surveillance and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 The Total Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Air Base Disaster Planning: Contingency Operations . . . . . . ....

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During the Cold War, the Air Force had a fairly easy time explaining its mission to the American public. It also had a coherent public affairs structure to help execute that mission. The new threat environment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, combined with steep personnel cuts to its public affairs community, have dramatically altered the communication challenge for the Air Force. To effectively operate in this new climate with an emphasis on strategic communication, the Air Force has tinkered with a few organizational models to strengthen the communication function....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 AIR FORCE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION EFFORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: US NAVY PUBLIC AFFAIRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION EFFORTS . . . . . . . . . . . .29 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35...

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With the ending of the Cold War, the apparent conclusion of many political leaders of states that war is hardly a practical tool of statesmanship, and the recent preoccupations of the American military on counterinsurgency, some people have wondered whether the original reasons for the founding of a separate air force are any longer valid. The original argument for the autonomous air force was that its Airmen would be the only ones whose perception was concentrated on the global level. The conclusion is therefore that the argument remains valid that a service with consistent culture focused on the problems of global vigilance, global reach, and global power is a fundamental requirement for United States national security. Only an organization made up of Airmen whose indoctrination from the start of their service is concentrated on a global outlook can satisfy that requirement. ...

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In this study Mr. James Lafrenz, a civil engineer in the Department of the Air Force, notes that American global security policy requires expedient responses to war, to natural disasters, and to problems between thes e two extremes. The Air Force owns the assets to make these responses, but our response forces are “concrete dependent” airplanes need hard-surfaced runways from which to operate. And where there is concrete, there are usually buildings. Will these buildings collapse if attacked and subjected to blast loads? Are civil engineering forces trained to make rapid determinations about expedient protection at reasonable cost and within time limitations? Can the civil engineers successfully approach and perform search and rescue within a building that is subject to collapse?...

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Analysis of the percentage of men and women by commissioned years of service in the Air Force indicates that women separate prior to retirement more frequently than men. Having determined that women separate from the Air Force prior to retirement eligibility more often than men, Lt Col Laura DiSilverio wanted to find out why. The first chapter demonstrates why the Air Force needs women. It makes the demographic case and presents research results showing the value of diversity in general and the value of women leaders in particular. The second chapter presents the survey results, analyzes why women separate from the Air Force, and lists the types of programs that might retain them. The final chapter looks at the feasibility of implementing some programs that might help the Air Force retain more of its talented members....

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1 WHY THE AIR FORCE NEEDS WOMEN . . . . . 1 The War for Talent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Value of Diversity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 WHY WOMEN LEAVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Reasons for Leaving the Air Force . . . . . . . .27 Retention Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 3 USEFULNESS AND FEASIBILITY OF RETENTION MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Home Basing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 Sabbatical/Break in Service Opportunity . . . 45 Permeability of Active-Reserve Barrier . . . . .49 Childbirth/Nursing Programs . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59...

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Why was the United States Air Force (USAF) so resistant to the idea of dedicated suppression of enemy air defenses and electronic countermeasures support for its strikers? Why had they given the electronic combat (EC) mission almost entirely to the Navy? Was the technology of stealth really the driving force, or was there more? They needed money and technology to make them work. In short, I found the four elements of the model I propose in this paper....

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Professor Gray identifies and discusses nine fallacies that: (1) the USAF should abandon large-scale regular warfare; (2) airpower is inherently a strategic weapon; (3) airpower is driven by technology rather than ideas; (4) airpower is about targeting; (5) airpower must be subordinate to land power; (6) the theory of strategic airpower is flawed; (7) an independent USAF interferes with an effective joint force structure; (8) airpower is a minor player in counterinsurgency (COIN); and finally, a longstanding issue, (9) the twenty-first century is about missiles, space, and cyber power and airpower is yesterday’s revolution. The discussion of these “fallacies” should stimulate the appetite of most thoughtful Airmen, but also serious advocates of all services and everyone interested in national defense....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix UNDERSTANDING AIRPOWER: BONFIRE OF THE FALLACIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Fallacies to the Left of Them, Fallacies to the Right of Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 The Fallacies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 America, the Air Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61...

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Since the end of the Gulf War, the debate over whether there should be a separate space service, equal with the Air Force, Army, and Navy, has grown in proportion to the indispensable value of space operations to our nation’s defense. Increasing dependency on space-systems is a fact of military life. In this well-documented essay, Col Michael C. Whittington compares the leading arguments for a separate space force to the cogent arguments for an independent air force made by airpower advocates during the interwar years of 1920–1940. The airpower issues in 1920 and the space power issues of today are strikingly similar, revolving around four key issues: leadership, doctrine, technology, and funding. The irony, of course, is that these arguments, which helped create an independent air force in 1947, are challenged by many within today’s Air Force leadership, which leads Colonel Whittington to ask, “If they were cogent in 1920, would they not be relevant today?”...

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Lt Col Clint Hinote looks at recent combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, interested particularly with the operational intersection of air and ground forces. He discovered a continuing dialog about one of the Air Force’s major tenets—centralized control, decentralized execution. He suggests that all parties, both ground and air advocates, may need to reexamine the purpose and application of this doctrinal point....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix CENTRALIZED CONTROL AND DECENTRALIZED EXECUTION: A CATCHPHRASE IN CRISIS? . . . 1 Salvaging the Master Tenet . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Historical Context and an Age-Old Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Breaking Down the Master Tenet and Understanding Fundamental Issues . . . . . 13 Challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan . . . . . .22 Answering the Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Centralization versus Decentralization in Air Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 ...

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This companion to personal professional study is intended to promote the early development of such a lifetime program and to serve as a tool to facilitate its planning and execution....

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1 THE INFANCY OF AIRPOWER. . . . . . . . . .3 2 NAVAL AVIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 AIRPOWER IN WORLD WAR I . . . . . . . . . 11 4 LAYING THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS, 1919–1931 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5 AN AGE OF INNOVATION, 1931–1941 . . . . 19 6 NAVAL AVIATION BETWEEN THE WARS . . . .23 7 WORLD WAR II: THE RISE OF THE LUFTWAFFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—THE STRATEGIC BOMBING DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . .33 9 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—THE TACTICAL AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 10 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—NAVAL AVIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 11 WORLD WAR II: ROYAL AIR FORCE . . . .45 12 WORLD WAR II: SOVIET AIR FORCE . . . .51 13 WORLD WAR II: THE FALL OF THE LUFTWAFFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 14 WORLD WAR II: PACIFIC—JAPANESE AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 15 WORLD WAR II: PACIFIC—THE USAAF IN THE SOUTHWEST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 16 WORLD WAR II: CENTRAL PACIFIC—NAVAL AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 17 WORLD WAR II...

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Caustic as well as complimentary valuations are presented here in the belief that they are ultimately beneficial to PME. If the aim of Air Force professional education is to produce capable officers, then it should be flexible enough to accommodate changes which pursue that goal. Readers of this book will discover that PME continues to serve the best interests of the Air Force because of-rather than in spite of-the steady gaze of critical eyes....

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1 CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . 1 Inception Phase, 1946-50 . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Trans-and Post-Korean War Phase, 1950-57 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Post-Sputnik Phase, 1958-65 . . . . . . . . . . .5 Vietnam War Phase, 1965-74 . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Post-Vietnam War Phase, 1974-79 . . . . . . . .8 Defense Resurgence Phase, 1980-87 . . . . . 9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2 EVOLUTION OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION DOCTRINE FOR AIR FORCE OFFICERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Purpose of Air Force Professional Military Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Original Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Stated Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Broad versus Specialized Education . . . . . . .21 Air University's Professional Military Education Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Original Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 Informal Guidance . . . . . . . . ....

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Endgame in the Pacific examines the challenges encountered by XX and XXI Bomber Commands in employing the B-29 against Japan, first from India and China, later from the Marianas. In turn, it examines the adaptations required to meet those challenges....

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1 COMPLEXITY AND TECHNOLOGY IN WAR . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 ENDGAME AGAINST JAPAN: THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 DOCTRINAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4 APPLYING A TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5 UNCERTAINTY AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6 TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL ADAPTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45...

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One of the challenges Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, sends to Air Force students, researchers, and staff offices is to investigate future concepts of operations (CONOPS). One in particular relates to this study, the CONOPS for space and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is very sensitive about incorporating new technology into its operations. While the authors advocate a feasibility study for reactors in space in a CONOPS, they also explore a deeper problem with widespread societal rejection and revulsion concerning the theoretical employment of nuclear technology in space....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 WHITHER SPACE NUCLEAR POWER? . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 SPACE NUCLEAR POWER AS TRANSSCIENTIFIC PUBLIC POLICY . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 POLITICAL PERMISSION—THE CONTEMPORARY DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 A TRANSSCIENTIFIC POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Appendix A THE HISTORY OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 B PROJECT PROMETHEUS—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—DECEMBER 2003 . . . . . . . . . . 89 C THE MEMBER GROUPS OF THE ...

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Formative Years in Total War . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2 Marketing A Vision (1945–53) . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3 Curtis E. LeMay and the Rise of the Strategic Air Command (1948–57) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 4 The Apogee of Strategic Air Command and the Missile Challenge (1961–62) . . . . 103 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 5 Flexible Response and the Ossification of the Senior Absolutists (1963–65) . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 6 Absolutists and the Frustration of Airpower in Vietnam (1964–69) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 7 The Vindication of Airpower and the Rise of the Fighter Community (1965–72) . . . . 185 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 8 Changing of the Guard: The Rise of the Fighter Generals (1973–82) . . . . . . 211 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...