This paper investigates the DOD’s tactical logistical challenges and each service’s tactical lift requirements, especially with respect to the movement of supplies from forward supply hubs to forward forces. To address these challenges and requirements, the author suggests the use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) as a potential solution. Focusing on existing and quickly emerging technologies as well as the joint operating requirements, the author proposes RPA performance and design characteristics along with a concept of employment that increases tactical lift capabilities and meets all current service requirements....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . .1 Notes . . . . . 12 2 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS . . . .15 Notes . . . . 26 3 TECHNOLOGY REVIEW/PROOF OF CONCEPT . . .27 Notes . . . .41 4 PROPOSED SOLUTION . . . . 45 Notes . . . . .51 5 SYNOPSIS OF CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT . . . .53 Notes . . . . 59 6 CONCLUSION . . . . .61...

The Department of Defense (DOD) anticipates the realization of biomimetic bird and two-inch, insect-sized systems within the 2015–47 period. Although robot systems of one millimeter or smaller are not explicitly specified in current DOD and Air Force technology road maps, the technological aims towards this size can be clearly inferred from official documents. This research assesses the likelihood of, and barriers to, the realization of true microrobots and nanorobots (defined as submillimeter-sized robots of micro-meter and nanometer proportions, respectively) that can perform in military applications by 2035. This research finds that the realization of true microrobots for military applications by 2035 is unlikely, except for a single case of microrobots....

This paper explores the advances in automatic identification technology, specifically radio frequency identification, and seeks to exploit these capabilities for use in the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain. Using technological trends, a thorough literature review, and the opinions of experts, the paper compares current technology to a 2035 requirements forecast to identify capability gaps. The end goal is logistics situational awareness, whereby the DOD has the ability to provide end-to-end visibility throughout its supply chain and can rapidly mobilize, deploy, sustain, and redeploy forces in support of national security objectives....

Col Thompson, in his concentrated focus on China’s military space applications, examines PRC ground, space, counterspace, and space policy aspects. His principal findings: China has plans to construct a new launch site in the deep south; PRC telemetry, tracking and com-mand capacities are improving; China has the ability to conduct limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions from space; the PRC is pursuing a counterspace capability most likely using satellite jammers and anti-satellites (possibly parasitic or nano-satellites). Col Thompson concludes that while China’s space program does not now constitute a global threat, the PRC is pursuing space capabilities that will increase its regional influence, and deny an adversary certain uses of space....

In this paper, I seek to demonstrate that the methods of using airpower to take the fight to the enemy and protect our ground forces during small wars need not involve the most advanced aircraft available. This “low-tech” approach does not suggest using lesser technology per se but proposes a different look for the types of aircraft that can perform a specific mission and for their manner of employment—that of protecting ground forces while combating the elusive insurgent. These same aircraft can prove invaluable in training an indigenous force to take the fight forward. By looking to relatively inexpensive, off-the-shelf aircraft, the Air Force can protect its ground-based charges and cement a relationship with embattled nations by helping them help themselves....

By the end of the Vietnam War, advances in technology allowed these FACs to control strikes against targets at night, in bad weather, and with improved precision. Laser-guided weapons systems, new computer navigation equipment, and advanced ground radars combined to provide an effective and lethal capability. If the Mosquitoes were an annoyance in Korea, the Wolves of Vietnam proved to be a deadly addition to the concept of FAC....

The author contends that urban terrain has become the preferred battlespace of US adversaries in the early twenty-first century. This environment poses unique challenges, especially to air and space warfare. The difficulty of sorting friendlies from enemy combatants, the latter intermingled with large numbers of noncombatants in very confined spaces, creates serious dilemmas for maneuver and aviation forces. Colonel Kemper believes that this mission, though well documented, has received neither the priority nor the resources necessary to ensure operational excellence and success on the modern battlefield. Thus, he not only inquires about whether we are training like we fight, but also seeks to determine what makes aviation urban operations so complicated and unique that they require stand-alone doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures....

1 THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THE DOCTRINAL PROCESS: SOME SUGGESTED STEPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 CONCEPTS, DOCTRINES, PRINCIPLES . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4 SOME SEMINAL THINKERS ON TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 5 WEAPONS AND DOCTRINE: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 6 INSIGHTS ON TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 7 OF SABER CHARGES, ESCORT FIGHTERS, AND SPACECRAFT: THE SEARCH FOR DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 8 LOOKING BACKWARD TO SEE AHEAD IN SPACE: REFLECTIONS ON THE NEED FOR SPACE DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 9 A MO...

Technology Horizons is our vision for key Air Force science and technology investments over the next decade that will provide us with truly game-changing capabilities to meet our strategic and joint force responsibilities. The coming decades hold high promise for amazing new capabilities across the air, space, and cyber domains. Yet the Air Force and our nation will also be confronted with substantial strategic, technology, and budget challenges. Our greatest advances will come with a focused investment of resources in the most promising technologies. The vision in Technology Horizons provides the shared awareness of the challenges and opportunities that will enable us to achieve this focus....

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . vii FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE . . . . ix PREFACE BY THE CHIEF SCIENTIST OF THE AIR FORCE . . . . xi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . xv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . xvii 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 A Vision for Air Force Science and Technology 2010–30 . . . . 1 Lessons Learned from Prior Air Force Science and Technology Visions . . . . 5 Organization and Conduct of Technology Horizons . . . . . 8 Organization of Results from Technology Horizons . . . . . 14 Caveats . . . . 16 2 STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR AIR FORCE S&T 2010–30 . . . . . 19 Relation to National Security Objectives . . . . . 21 Technology-Derived Challenges to Air Force Capabilities . . . . . 22 Strategic Implications of S&T Globalization . . . . 38 Federal Budget Implications for Air Force S&T Strategy . . . . . 41 3 ENDURING REALITIES FOR THE AIR FORCE 2010–30 . . . . . 43 Ensuring Interoperability with Legacy Systems . . . . 43 Sustainment Costs for Legacy Systems . . . . . 43 Importance of Low-Observable Systems . . . . 44 Energy Costs and Availability . . . . . 44 Growing Role ...

I submit there are two ways we can use limited numbers of prototype systems to ensure we learn relevant tactical lessons before we have to fight:(1) capitalizing on interactive computing technologies to better develop requirements and tactics throughout the system life cycle and (2) changing our concept of prototypes from the buying of one or two “experimental”items to procuring entire “prototypical” units....

1 SETTING THE STAGE . . . . 1 Background . . . . . 1 Methodology . . . . 2 Military Doctrine: Definitions and Types . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . 5 2 DEVELOPING ROBUST EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE . . . . 7 Why Employment Doctrine Matters . . . . 7 How Employment Doctrine Develops . . . . . 8 Combat-Capable versus Combat-Lethal Doctrine . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . 13 3 DOCUMENTING DOCTRINAL LAG . . . . 15 The YB-17 and Refining Doctrine under Fire . . . . . 15 Modern Perspectives . . . . 18 Notes . . . . 21 4 CRITIQUING THE YOCKEY POLICY . . . . . 23 The Fallacy of Strategic Warning . . . . . 23 We Can’t Predict What We’ll Need . . . . . 25 Summarizing the Policy Critique . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . 27 5 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS . . . . 29 Interactive Simulation for Employment Doctrine . . . . . 29 Prototypical Units . . . . . 32 Historical Perspective . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . 33 6 CONCLUSION . . . . 35 Notes . . . . 37 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 39...

The study reviews each force’s combat glider experience and analyzes it in light of the glider doctrine, or lack thereof, with which each began the war. While military cargo gliders have seen their day, recent technological advances in gliders make them a viable platform for certain missions requiring stealth and silence....

ABSTRACT ii INTRODUCTION 1 PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENT 3 The Early Years in Germany 3 Early Gliders in the US 4 A US Military Glider? For What Purpose? 4 Gliders Head Into Combat. 5 Come Join the Glider pilot Corps! 8 Glider pilot Training Shortfalls 9 Military Gliders in Britain 12 OPERATIONAL USE OF GLIDERS 13 Germany 13 Early Commando Raids 14 Crete 15 Other Operations 16 US and Great Britain 17 Sicily 17 British Gliders are First to Normandy 24 US Glider Pilots Join the War in France 20 Disappointment at Arnhem 22 Operation Market 22 Glider Success Over the Rhine? 23 Operation Dragoon 24 US Commando Operations in Burma 25 Summation 26 POST-WAR GLIDER POLICY 27 TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN GLIDERS 29 TODAY’S LIMITED MILITARY ROLE FOR GLIDERS 31 CONCLUSIONS 32 NOTES 36 BIBLIOGRAPHY 42...

This thesis evaluates the near-term military utility of virtual reality (VR) and its component technologies to the battle management of an air campaign. It presumes a large-scale air campaign on the order to that in the Gulf War where air operations were continuous, prolonged, and intense. The research concludes by assessing the viability and implication of a military decision to invest in a VR-enhanced air battle management system. Recommendations are given for areas in need of further research and development....

This study examines the history of technology and sovereignty, which reveals a model for the evolution of international law. Specifically, the history of sea, air, and space provides examples on past issues of sovereignty. A three-stage pat-tern of international law emerges. Under the assumption that sovereignty issues related to information warfare will follow the same path, the current state of sovereignty regarding information is established. To focus the study, a functional outline for international convention, the International Regime for Information Security (IRIS), is advanced. IRIS balances US domestic privacy needs with US national security demands. Specifically, technology issues regarding digital identification and encryption are weighed against civil liberties and intelligence needs....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . 7 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . 16 3 INFORMATION RELIANCE . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . 28 4 STATUS QUO—CYBERLITIGATION . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . 36 5 THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR INFORMATION SECURITY MODEL. . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . 47 6 THE FUTURE . . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . . 56...

In this important study, Lt Col Wayne Johnson, USAF, argues that systematic tightening of interagency cooperation and better work on defining sensitive technology prohibitions are needed to maintain the US technological edge. He also maintains that the US government requires a new and disciplined export control process—not the current mosaic of rules, regulations, and perspectives that came out of the cold war, but a process that provides a revamped, systemic approach with consistent implementation. Colonel Johnson explores the problem of defining which technologies the United States is willing to transfer(military or dual-use) and the need to ensure that national security objectives do not take a backseat to economic expediency. To accomplish this end, he argues for better interagency cooperation as a first step leading to a more centralized, coordinated, and strategic view of technology transfer and how it impacts US national security....

Part 1 The Decision 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Rumblings of Laboratory Consolidation . . . 7 3 The Catalyst: National Defense Authorization Act and Vision 21 . . . . . . . . .23 4 Overhauling Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 Laboratory Studies and Strategy . . . . . . . 71 6 Corona 1996: Leadership and Decisions . .93 7 The Last Dance: Meeting in the Secretary’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Part 2 The Transition 9 Early Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 10 Shaping the Technology Directorates . . 161 11 Getting the Message Out . . . . . . . . . . 195 12 Other Perspectives: Independent Review Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 13 Headquarters: Two Staff Directorates . . 227 14 The Final Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253 15 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265...

Unfortunately, the existence of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) structures, mechanisms, systems, and capabilities does not guarantee success. Major Orr attacks the basic problem of producing a conceptual model of the combat operations process. Only after he establishes the context, a paradigm of warfare based on classical literature, does he discuss the appropriate C3I architecture that will yield the desired results. In a larger sense, Major Orr’s study is an attempt to redefine the nature of modern technology-intensive warfare. This is a broad and contentious problem. While the reader may not agree with all of Major Orr’s assumptions and conclusions, this larger effort is vital to the American military’s capability to cope successfully with a rapidly changing and increasingly dangerous world. In this larger sense, the importance of Major Orr’s study goes far beyond the particular problems of C3I....

I COMBAT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Sun Tzu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Objectives of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Civil-Military Relationships . . . . . . . . . . 2 Principles of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Tactical Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Carl von Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Andre Beaufre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The American Style of War . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 The Traditional Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Maneuver Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 II C3I AND THE COMBAT OPERATIONS PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 The Combat Operations Process Model . . . .34 Expansion of the Process Model Functions . .37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 III COMMAND OF THE COMBAT OPERATIONS PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 The Purpose of Command . . . ....

In this study Lt Col Michael J. Costigan, USAF, takes a critical look at the F-22 and its role in our military strategy in the twenty-first century. Its innovative technologies provide the F-22 with supercruise, stealth, and integrated avionics, and enable it to guarantee the air superiority so necessary to victory....

Lt Col Anthony Mastalir has done policy makers a welcome service by exploring the enigma wrapped in a conundrum which is Chinese space policy, focusing on the Chinese kinetic energy antisatellite (KE-ASAT) test of January 2007. That test ended a de facto moratorium on KE-ASAT tests which the United States and Russia had observed for over two decades. It also announced the arrival of a new player in strategic space, forcing a reevaluation of US capabilities in space as well as Chinese intentions there. Colonel Mastalir examines both that reevaluation and those intentions, relying on open-source material, particularly from Chinese strategic and military analysts....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 EXTREME DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4 INFORMATION DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 5 ECONOMIC DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 6 MILITARY DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86 7 FINDINGS/CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . .89 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103...

This study investigates Europe’s motives to develop the independent satellite navigation system known as Galileo despite the existence of America’s successful global positioning system (GPS). The study begins by analyzing both systems to familiarize the reader with global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and to provide an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of GPS and Galileo, as well as the systems’ similarities and differences. Although the two systems have different founding principles, they employ similar infrastructures and operational concepts. In the short term, Galileo will provide better accuracy for civilian users until GPS upgrades take effect. But performance is only part of the rationale. The author contends that Europe’s pursuit of Galileo is driven by a combination of reasons, including performance, independence, and economic incentive. With Galileo, Europe hopes to achieve political, security, and technological independence from the United States....

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 GPS VERSUS GALILEO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 3 WHY GALILEO? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 4 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . .51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Illustrations 1 Satellite geometry 9 2 Global positioning system (GPS) satellite 14 3 Galileo satellite 16 Table 1 Number of visible satellites for various masking angles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13...

The method or objective of Strategic Paralysis is to selectively attack or threaten those strategic or national level targets that most directly support the enemy’s war-making efforts and will to continue with his current behavior. Strategic Paralysis warfare should result in a change in the enemy’s behavior at a lesser cost to both sides as Airpower assets are the primary weapons --not ground troops. Why Airpower? It is the only weapon that can provide the near simultaneous shock to the enemy’s central nervous system necessary to induce paralysis. To achieve success Strategic Paralysis requires four key ingredients: 1) Correctly identifying the enemy’s National Elements of Value (NEVs), 2) High technology, 3) An enemy dependent upon a well developed, modern and vulnerable infrastructure, and 4) Aerospace Control. The bulk of this study is devoted to defining this strategy and bettering our understanding of the first ingredient, that of choosing the best targets for attack....

1. Introduction...............1 2. The Theory of Strategic Paralysis...............12 3. Choosing the Right Targets...............34 4. More Targeting Theories...............61 5. The National Elements of Value Model...............77 6. Conclusions...............110...