This study analyzes the feasibility of guerrilla warfare as the basis for a strategy of airpower employment for a weak air force confronting an opponent with a stronger air force. The analysis begins with a distillation of the theory of guerrilla warfare into five elements essential to its success: superior intelligence, security, mobility advantage, surprise, and sustainment. The author then compares the ground combat environment of the traditional guerrilla with the airpower environment of the potential air guerrilla and concludes that these five elements can be met in the airpower environment provided the weak force has sufficient ingenuity and the necessary resources. An investigation of recent trends in technology and the prevailing strategic environment indicates that it increasingly possible for a weak force to obtain these resources. The author assesses that air guerrilla warfare is a viable warfighting strategy, but points out that the likelihood of a weak force actually adopting air guerrilla warfare will depend on its regional security needs and its resolve to protract a conflict. The study concludes that air guerrilla wa...

INTRODUCTION . . . .1 THE ESSENTIALS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE . . . . . 11 GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE AIRPOWER ENVIRONMENT . . . 24 THE FEASIBILITY OF AIR GUERRILLA WARFARE . . . . 47 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . 58 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 64...

This study addresses three main questions to determine the transport bomber’s usefulness. The first is whether commanders can use such an aircraft in ways that truly enhance force application and mobility operations without unduly undermining one in favor of the other? The answer, because of technology enhancements and budget constraints, is definitely yes. The second question targets technology, specifically, by asking whether engineers could place some elements of both missions on a single aircraft? Again, the answer appears to be positive. This study analyzes budgetary and operational constraints in an attempt to answer the question of the appropriate force mix. ...

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . .3 2 OPERATIONAL UTILITY . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . 17 3 TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT . . . . 19 Notes . . . . .28 4 BUDGETARY AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . .31 Notes . . . .41 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . .43 Notes . . . . .45...

The study reviews each force’s combat glider experience and analyzes it in light of the glider doctrine, or lack thereof, with which each began the war. While military cargo gliders have seen their day, recent technological advances in gliders make them a viable platform for certain missions requiring stealth and silence....

ABSTRACT ii INTRODUCTION 1 PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENT 3 The Early Years in Germany 3 Early Gliders in the US 4 A US Military Glider? For What Purpose? 4 Gliders Head Into Combat. 5 Come Join the Glider pilot Corps! 8 Glider pilot Training Shortfalls 9 Military Gliders in Britain 12 OPERATIONAL USE OF GLIDERS 13 Germany 13 Early Commando Raids 14 Crete 15 Other Operations 16 US and Great Britain 17 Sicily 17 British Gliders are First to Normandy 24 US Glider Pilots Join the War in France 20 Disappointment at Arnhem 22 Operation Market 22 Glider Success Over the Rhine? 23 Operation Dragoon 24 US Commando Operations in Burma 25 Summation 26 POST-WAR GLIDER POLICY 27 TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN GLIDERS 29 TODAY’S LIMITED MILITARY ROLE FOR GLIDERS 31 CONCLUSIONS 32 NOTES 36 BIBLIOGRAPHY 42...

Why was the United States Air Force (USAF) so resistant to the idea of dedicated suppression of enemy air defenses and electronic countermeasures support for its strikers? Why had they given the electronic combat (EC) mission almost entirely to the Navy? Was the technology of stealth really the driving force, or was there more? They needed money and technology to make them work. In short, I found the four elements of the model I propose in this paper....

The study concludes with recommendations for rethinking the Air Operations Center. Methods for improving responsiveness include time-value based target analysis, greater use of alert or reserve forces, on-board mission planning, and limited decentralization, with mission-type orders and commander’s intent transmitted to lower echelons. Solutions for improving assessment include delegating target assessment functions to the wings, focusing theater-level intelligence personnel on mission assessment, using statistical and effects-based evaluation techniques, using Air Force Special Operations forces to evaluate target system degradation, and acquiring technology that can conduct “top-down” assessment of the enemy’s war-making systems....

Information is one of the most, if not the most, essential elements of combat capability. Because telecommunications affects every aspect of a society, and is probably the most important medium which military information is exchanged, this thesis provides an understanding of the telecommunications system and how best to exploit it across the spectrum of conflict. I examine the system’s vulnerabilities to both lethal and nonlethal attack mechanisms. While the ability to employ nonlethal technologies are currently limited, I recommend pursuing a strong research and development program to acquire this capability. The reason is that they provide additional policy options to deal with conflict, they are cheap, and because research may not only discover unanticipated capabilities for the US, but also identify countermeasures to protect our own systems. This thesis concludes by offering guidelines to help determine whether to exploit telecommunications with either lethal or nonlethal attack strategies....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . 1 Notes . . . 3 2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS . . . . . 5 The Modern Communications System . . . . . 6 Vulnerability Analysis . . . . . . 17 Targeting . . . . 23 Quantification . . . . . 29 Conclusion . . . 32 Notes . . . 35 3 DISABLING WEAPONS . . . . . . 38 Definition . . . . . 39 History And Legal Considerations . . . . . 41 Conventional And Disabling Kill Mechanisms . . . 44 Advantages/Disadvantages . . . . . . 49 Conclusion . . . . 53 Notes . . . . 55 4 GUIDANCE FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING . . . . . . 57 Planning Factors . . . . 57 Conclusion . . . . . 61 Notes . . . . . 62...

In Weather Operations in the Transformation Era, Col John M. Lanicci, USAF, takes a compelling look at future weather operations. His hypothesis is that a consolidated battlespace picture integrates both natural and man-made elements, which is totally consistent with USAF transformation efforts. He points out that the way ahead is easier said than done and offers several cogent reasons why the weather operations portion of information-in-warfare has not caught up with current USAF doctrine.Significant advances in information technology and advent of effects-based operations are propelling the USAF weather community away from traditional, single-inject stand-up briefings towards continuously updated advice to war fighters at every step of campaign/mission planning and execution. This technological momentum will make it necessary to fundamentally change data collection, analysis, prediction, and product tailoring. The author outlines these changes in a concept called weather, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (WISR), a term first used by the Air Staff to describe the total integration of natural and man-made environments ...

The most significant implication of this study, however, is the predicted variance in changing kill ratio as the force ratio changes. The wide middle area of stability, identified as numerical attrition, is consistent with the traditional notion that kill ratio is largely a function of training and technology. It is also consistent with most of the historical record, including the early campaigns of World War II, that suggested that nominal changes in the relative mass of forces brought about little change in the kill ratio. This is also the reason evolving technology often produced the only observable change in the kill ratio. The rapid change in attrition rate at either end of the model also has great explanatory value....

1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 METHODOLOGY: RED FLAG . . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 4 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207...

Lack of investment in future agile combat-support technologies could lead to a strategic surprise that diverts military attention and resources from critical air, space, and cyber operations. Looking to the national security environment in 2030, this research explores one technology—the microbial fuel cell (MFC)—that gives life to self-contained facilities decoupled from vulnerable supply lines and infrastructure networks. MFCs can dispose of waste (sewage, food scraps, gray water, etc.) while producing clean water (up to 70 percent of required volumes) and power (up to 600 watts per person). Using relevance tree methodology, the research concludes that USAF research and development investment alone will not bring MFCs to fruition. A successful strategy for MFCs will be collaborative, addressing not only the technological barriers but also the key social, industrial, and political hurdles to enabling this capability....

In this well-researched and insightful study, Lt Col Gregory A. Roman examines the relationships between military organizational hierarchies and the impact of battlespace information. Drawing on a sophisticated range of studies and data and using numerous illustrations, the author contends that the outmoded effects of traditionally centralized (and technologically proliferating) command and control orientations preclude the US military (and particularly the Air Force) from effectively applying and acting upon the benefits of information-age technologies in an age of information warfare. The author sees future warfare characterized by faster decision making, faster operational tempos, and a torrent of tactical battlefield information. These new realities necessitate greater decentralization of control, more flexible information gathering, and creative, nontraditional military organizational arrangements....

This paper analyzes the evolution of strategic bombing doctrine in order to identify the basic doctrinal tenets and then evaluate their compatibility with emerging stealth technologies. Current doctrine is an evolution of existing doctrine, theory, and experience. Therefore, to comprehend fully the meaning of doctrine, it is necessary to trace its lineage. As airpower arrived only recently in the doctrinal arena, no previous doctrine existed. Therefore, this analysis begins with the early airpower theories which provided the roots of evolution. Giulio Douhet is the most famous of the early theorists and his work provided a basis upon which to build. Following World War II (WWII), Bernard Brodie modified Douhet’s theory to incorporate atomic weapons and the experience to date. As theory evolved, so did early Air Corps "unsanctioned" doctrine. By testing each tenet against the demands of emerging stealth technologies, the paper finds that existing doctrine is basically sound, but incomplete. Therefore, the paper proposes and tests additional tenets to accommodate stealth and the increasing rate of technical advancement....

The United States Air Force has long favored attacking electrical power systems.Electric power has been considered a critical target in every war since World War II,and will likely be nominated in the future. Historically, there have been four basic strategies behind attacks on national electrical systems: to cause a decline in civilian morale; to inflict costs on the political leaders to induce a change; to hamper military operations; and to hinder war production. The evidence shows that the only sound reason for attacking electrical power is to effect the production of war material in a war of attrition against a self-supporting nation-state without outside assistance. The implication for future strategic air operations is important. Because attacks on electric power cause indirect collateral damage which can be politically counterproductive,and the military benefit is minimal, the United States should reject attacks on national electrical power systems in the near future....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . 5 Generation . . . . . . 5 Transmission . . . . . 7 Distribution . . . . . . 8 Control . . . . 8 Effects . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 12 3 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN TOTAL WAR . . . . . . 15 World War II—Germany . . . 17 World War II—Japan . . . . . 22 United States Strategic Bombing Survey . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . 28 4 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN LIMITED WAR . . . . . 33 Korean War . . . . . . 33 Vietnam War . . . . . 37 Desert Storm . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . 42 5 TARGETING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . 45 Failures . . . . 45 When to Target Electric Power . . . 48 Conclusions and Implications . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 57...

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE.............................1 Definitions................................................ 1 Direction.................................................. 3 Notes....................................................... 7 2 THE HISTORIC PRECEDENT: A REQUIREMENT FOR FLEXIBILITY........................................ 9 The Lessons of War.................................... 9 The Nuclear Imperative............................. 15 Notes.................................................. 21 3 THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY.................. 25 Real Smarts in Small Packages .................26 Near Nukes and Real Nukes .......................32 Space: Star Wars in Context .....................40 Notes.................................................. 47 4 APPLYING THE LESSONS: CHANGING AEROSPACE DOCTRINE.............................. 51 The Importance of Actions .........................52 The Global Perspective.............................. 57 Proposals for the Future: A Doctrinal Synthesis...............................................59 The Falklands: A Global Scenario..............64 Notes....................

Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the US Nuclear ASAT System and Present-Day Copycat Killers, by Lt Col Clayton K.S. Chun, is a case study of an early US antisatellite (ASAT) weapon system. In this study, Colonel Chun shows how the US Air Force developed a rudimentary ASA system from obsolete Thor intermediate ballistic missiles, an existing space tracking system, and nuclear warheads....

PROGRAM 437: THE BEGINNINGS . . . . . . . . 1 ASAT WEAPONS: AN ACCIDENTAL DISCOVERY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ASAT DEVELOPMENT: THE AIR FORCE LEADS THE WAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 WHY ASAT WEAPONS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 NIKE-ZEUS BECOMES A RIVAL. . . . . . . . . . . 8 OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAM 437 . . . . . . . . 10 LIMITING FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Funding Shortfalls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Location, Location, Location. . . . . . . . . . . . 20 The Nuclear Specter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 PROGRAM 437 UNMASKED . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A NEW MISSION FOR THE 10TH ADS . . . . . . 23 A THIRD LIFE FOR PROGRAM 437 . . . . . . . 27 THE DEMISE OF PROGRAM 437 . . . . . . . . . .29 SPACE: A CRITICAL DIMENSION . . . . . . . . .32 VULNERABILITY OF SPACE-BASED ASSETS . . 35 POTENTIAL THREATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 NORTH KOREA: KEY EXPORTER OF TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 The DPRK’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities. . . .38 North Korea: A N...

Although cruise missiles are among the newest and most sophisticated weapons fielded by the United States, they possess a rich conceptual and technological heritage . It is important that we understand this heritage as we consider deployment and employment options . It is also important that we understand the developmental process illustrated by the history of the cruise missile. Without the perspective provided by this history, our perceptions of their purpose and use lack depth and insight....

Endgame in the Pacific examines the challenges encountered by XX and XXI Bomber Commands in employing the B-29 against Japan, first from India and China, later from the Marianas. In turn, it examines the adaptations required to meet those challenges....

1 COMPLEXITY AND TECHNOLOGY IN WAR . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 ENDGAME AGAINST JAPAN: THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 DOCTRINAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4 APPLYING A TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5 UNCERTAINTY AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6 TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL ADAPTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45...

Information technology (IT) and its gadgets provide no allure. They are neither a marvel nor a toy but exist solely to help get something done. This impassive attitude allows me to avoid capability hype with what IT can do and ask “So, what does IT really do for me?” This attitude is partly due to my mechanical engineering background and to the practical systems engineering philosophies instilled in me by my father. I have successfully exploited IT capabilities to perform engine cold-start analyses, design coal crushers, train missile crews, simulate radar satellite constellations, track satellite parts and construction practices, and create intelligence fusion software. But with each success made possible through IT came scores of frustrations that sprang from IT solutions. While writing this paper I came to realize that this frustration comes from man having to manipulate IT rather than applying it as an extension of oneself. This fundamental disconnect between capability and utility comes from disconnects between developers and users, institutional restrictions on individual innovation, and general ignorance of available tools, p...

Recent airpower operations revealed a deficiency in the United States Air Force’s (USAF) ability to precisely attack mobile targets at standoff ranges with minimal collateral damage. Future airpower operations will be executed in politically sensitive strategic environments and thus will require the ability to precisely destroy mobile targets that may have been strategically placed by an adversary in areas with a high risk of collateral damage. Current air-to-ground guided weapon systems, including man-in-the-loop guidance weapon systems, have limited “collateral reduction” capabilities; and future autonomous precision standoff weapon systems may increase the risk and uncertainty associated with collateral damage due to technology limitations. The acquisition of a precision standoff man-in-the-loop weapon system through the modification of current weapon systems or the acquisition of a new weapon system may provide the USAF a critically needed air-to-ground capability against mobile targets in a high-risk collateral damage environment....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE NEED FOR PRECISION ENGAGEMENT AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS . . . . 5 3 USAF TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND GUIDED WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 23 4 FUTURE WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 35 5 LEGAL ISSUES, ACCOUNTABILITY, FLEXIBILITY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SHORTFALLS, AND ACQUISITION RISK MANAGEMENT . . . . 53 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 65 GLOSSARY . . . . . 69...

"From my experience in the aviation field, I find that this unique aviation and space history book provides a very realistic view on the use of technology in the aviation and space business as it was conquered during the past half century."...

1 Aeronautical Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Pilots and Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 3 Aircraft Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 4 Aeronautics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 5 Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 6 Computer Programming . . . . . . . . . . . .113 7 Spacefarers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 8 Secret Missiles and Tactics . . . . . . . . . . 161 9 Space Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .173 10 Pilots and Airplanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 11 Cyclogiro Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 12 Giromill Wind Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 13 Aquagiro Water Power . . . . . . . . . . . . .233...

Air War College Maxwell Paper Anthology, a compilation of the award-winning papers from our 2010 graduates. Since we published the first Maxwell Paper in May 1996, we have distributed 47 papers demonstrating the highest level of analytical creativity and scholarship. The 12 papers presented here provide insight into and promote discussion on topics of importance to senior leaders....

48 ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER: REVAMPING AN INCOMPLETE AND CONFUSING MASTER TENET . . . . . . . . .1 Col Rolanda Burnett Sr., USAF 49 THE DANGEROUS DECLINE IN THE US MILITARY’S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Col Kenneth E. Hall, USAF 50 LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR: A CASE STUDY . . . . . .39 Lt Col Michael Rafter, Canadian Forces 51 DEVELOPING A US EUROPEAN COMMAND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE STRATEGY FOR FY 2010–15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Lt Col Kevin M. Coyne, USAF 52 INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET: A 21ST CENTURY ISSUE: LEGAL, DOCTRINAL, AND POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE CYBER WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Col Rebecca A. Keller, USAF 53 US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC . . .85 Lt Col Lars Helmrich, Swedish Air Force 54 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE BELOW A 1,000-WARHEAD LIMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Lt Col David J. Baylor, USAF 55 GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED, WH...