Description Details
Sustained Coercive Air Presence (SCAP) is an airpower approach to peace enforcement designed to impose a cease-fire on an unwilling belligerent and then use a prolonged air presence to enhance long-term diplomatic efforts that seek a political solution. The competing agendas and political infighting associated with United Nations and coalition operations also seriously hinders a SCAP strategy. Nonetheless, if politicians decide on an airpower approach to peace enforcement, SCAP in concert with the economic, informational, and political instruments of power is a viable strategy against a modern, well-armed foe....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF SUSTAINED COERCIVE AIR PRESENCE . . . . . 7 3 OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT . . . . 19 4 COERCIVE AIRPOWER OVER BOSNIA–HERZEGOVINA . . . . 39 5 CONCLUSION . . . . 59...

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While investigating these topics, my research centered on an interview with one of the former Soviet Union’s top missile engineers, the vice commander of Air Combat Command, discussions with the USAF Air Armament Center’s chief of advanced concepts, and on recently declassified CIA documents regarding the US reconnaissance program and National Intelligence Estimates. Also important to this work are Russian language sources documenting the Soviet need to develop mobile missiles. Although many other sources within the media and academia were tapped for information, these were the most prominent. As a result, this study highlights many of the great technological leaps America has made toward being able to attack mobile missiles, but it also underscores the need for improved coordination....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . .1 2 THE EVOLUTION AND SPREAD OF MOBILE BALLISTIC MISSILES. . . 5 3 THE AMERICAN COLD WAR RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . 21 4 RESPONDING TO MOBILE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE POST–COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT. . . . . . . 37 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . 51...

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My interest in the center of gravity (COG) concept began in the Republic of Singapore when I noticed with some amusement that a concept which purports to help campaign planners focus their main effort can be embroiled in such controversy and confusion. I attempt to unravel some of the mystique that surrounds the employment of the COG concept. Hopefully, by drawing out the potential sources of confusion that often accompany the use of the concept, we can soften the difficulties of communication and shift the focus of our arguments in a direction that will be more profitable to all....

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One of the United States’ greatest military advantages is rapid global mobility. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) provides a crucial supplement to the military’s mobility resources in time of war or national emergency. The proliferation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), however, poses a growing threat to the CRAF and its critical airlift capacity. In this study, Lt Col Glen Downing describes the US government’s historical and potential future uses of the CRAF during contingency operations. He examines current CRAF policies, the operating environment, and the MANPAD threat, describing the negative consequences of the shoot down of a CRAF airliner. Positing several options to counter the threat, he analyzes each following the parameters of unit cost, operating cost, funding sources, insurability, and crew training. The study concludes with a thoughtful recommendation to the Department of Defense on a course of action to confront the MANPADS threat to the CRAF....

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In Tanker-Force Structure: Recapitalization of the KC-135, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Narvid challenges air mobility warriors to develop a tanker-force structure that overcomes the thinking of old to launch new concepts and capabilities for the future tanker. He argues that the future of warfare will require a tanker that is able to operate as a force enabler across the full spectrum of operations. This research is very timely with the Boeing 767 being looked at as a replacement for some of the older KC-135s. In this paper, Colonel Narvid examines the chronology of the tanker and the role it has played throughout its history. He argues that the next tanker must break from old capabilities, tied to a Cold War strategy, and embark on new operations and more capabilities that are able to respond to future threats....

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There is a story that still needs to be told about the Air Force contribution to—and shaping by—arms control. The ability to make these assessments did not blossom overnight. This book captures the story of a young Air Force’s initial (and limited) impact on arms-control negotiations and outcomes. It goes on to document a growing awareness by the service that it was better to help craft the US position than to be only a recipient of the outcome. The book highlights the lesson it belatedly learned in the early days of arms control: the Air Force has to plan and budget for treaty implementation as aggressively as it works to protect its equities during treaty negotiations....

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PART I Foundations for Strategic Arms Control, 1945–68 1 The United States Air Force and Arms Control: The Early Years . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Michael O. Wheeler 2 Peace through Strength Alone: US Air Force Views on Arms Control in the 1950s and Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Edward Kaplan PART II Strategic Arms Limitations, 1969–80 3 The Road to SALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Anne G. Campbell 4 Strategic Arms Control and the US Air Force: The SALT Era, 1969–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Jeffrey A. Larsen PART III The Reagan Years, 1981–88 5 Arms Control during the Reagan Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 Charles D. Dusch Jr. 6 National Security Strategy, Arms Control, and the US Air Force: The Reagan Years, 1981–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Forrest E. Waller Jr. PART IV Strategic Arms Reductions, 1989–2000 7 Arms Control after the Cold War . . . . . . 191 Thomas S. Mowle 8 Downsizing and Shifting Operational Emphasis for the US Air Force: The Bush and Clinton Years, 1989–2000 . . . . . . . . .227 Thomas D. Miller PART V Conclusion ...

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To make the report useful to a potentially broad audience, team members set out to answer this question through a wide-ranging examination of the geopolitical, sociological, diplomatic, technological, and operational factors that shaped the characteristics and outcome of this particular air campaign....

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1 The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Dr. Karl Mueller 2 The Planning Background . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Lt Col Bradley S. Davis 3 US and NATO Doctrine for Campaign Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Col Maris McCrabb 4 The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan . .87 Col Christopher M. Campbell 5 Executing Deliberate Force, 30 August–14 September 1995 . . . . . . . . . 131 Lt Col Mark J. Conversino 6 Combat Assessment: A Commander’s Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 7 Assessing the Effectiveness of Deliberate Force: Harnessing the Political-Military Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 8 Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . 199 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent iii Chapter Page 9 Weapons Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . 257 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 10 Deliberate Force Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 11 Deliberate Force Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 12 Deliber...

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A comparison of the Misty and A-10 FAC missions clearly demonstrates a failure of the USAF to develop a full range of suitable tactics for the direct attack of enemy fielded forces. Although the quantum leaps in weapons delivery accuracy from Vietnam to Kosovo now make it possible to destroy armor and artillery from the air, there has not been a corresponding improvement in target identification. Until USAF prioritizes the direct attack of ground forces and target identification, its ability to attack fielded forces effectively will remain limited. Drawing from the lessons of the Misty and A-10 FACs, the recommendations presented here focus on equipment, tactics and training, and doctrine....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF AIR INTERDICTION FROM WORLD WAR I THROUGH VIETNAM . . . . . . . 7 3 MISTY-FAC TACTICS: HYPOTHETICAL MISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 HISTORY OF ATTACKING FIELDED FORCES: POST-VIETNAM TO KOSOVO . . . . . . . . . . . .41 5 A-10 FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79...

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Maj Richard J. Hazdra’s Air Mobility: The Key to the United States National Security is an examination of the force structure of Air Mobility Command (AMC) based on a model for two major theater wars. His study examines this organization’s current force structure. Air mobility is the key that unlocks the national security strategy (NSS). AMC’s force structure is crucial for the United States to implement its NSS. His study centers on the question: Can a force structure based on the possibility of fighting two major theater wars satisfy the requirements for steady-state operations? Major Hazdra examines three corollary issues: air mobility as a form of airpower that enables the military instrument of power in two basic ways, requirements placed on mobility air forces, and the structure of mobility air forces and the effectiveness of that structure....

Description Details
The United States no longer enjoys a near monopoly on space effects. Every week brings news of advances in space technologies by China, Russia, India, European powers, and others. Space, as a strategic medium (and probably a future war-fighting medium), is the ultimate high ground; it is now widely shared and could be hotly contested. Ranging from satellite-based access to Internet services to China’s recent shoot down of one of its own satellites, new capabilities derived from space-based assets are accelerating in terms of quality, ingenuity, and importantly, availability to allies and enemies alike....

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1 MODELING THE SPACE-POWER CONTINUUM.1 Domestic Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 National-Security Space Power . . . . . . . . . . 2 Military Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 International Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Applying the Strategic Framework . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Domestic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 National-Security Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Military Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 International Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3 INDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Domestic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 National-Security Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Military Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 International Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4 EUROPEAN UNION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Domestic Envi...

Description Details
A decision to put weapons in space—or to refrain from doing so—should be based on a firm understanding about what such weapons can be expected to achieve. More specifically since numerous orbital weapons concepts have been advocated as natural evolutions of surface and airborne weapons, it would appear useful to compare those proposed spacebased systems with their terrestrial counterparts. Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? by Maj William L. Spacy II evaluates the theoretical capabilities of orbital weapons and compares them to weapons already in existence and to emerging concepts proposed for development....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Space Weaponization Debate . . . . . . . . . . 1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 SPACE-BASED WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Directed Energy Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Direct Impact Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Defending Space-Based Assets . . . . . . . . . 32 Technological Factors Bearing on Space-Based Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3 SEEKING CONTROL OF SPACE: GROUND-BASED ALTERNATIVES FOR SPACE CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Defensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Nondestructive Approaches to Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Destructive Approaches to Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4 ATTACKING TERRESTRIAL...

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1 OVERARCHING CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Information War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Parallel War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Revolution in Military Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 2 PEER COMPETITOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68 3 NICHE COMPETITOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 4 NEAR-TERM ACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107...

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1 Space Coordinating Authority: Information Services from Space . . . . . . 1 Maj Tyler M. Evans Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2 Oriented Toward Superiority: Counterspace Operations and the Counterterrorism Fight. .25 Lt Col Michael J. Lutton Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 3 It Isn’t Space, It’s Warfare! Joint Warfighting Space and the Command and Control of Deployable Space Forces . . . . . . . . . 65 Maj Mark A. Schuler Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 4 Space Expeditionary Power: A Polemic Strategy for Space Forces Integration . . . .89 Maj Patrick A. Brown and Maj John F. Duda Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .106 5 Theater Space Operations in a Warfighting Headquarters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 Maj John R. Thomas Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .116 6 The Next Evolution for Theater Space Organizations: Specializing for Space Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Maj Keith W. Balts Notes . . . . . . . . . . . ....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 1 THE USAF TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 FRAMING THE QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 THE CURRENT FIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Irregular Warfare: Winning the Long War . . . 6 Air Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Strategic Communication: Spreading the Word . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Culture and Language in the Expeditionary Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Distributed Planning: The Key to Centralized Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Unmanned Aerial Systems: The Air Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Intelligence Reform: The Secondary Effects of Merging Intelligence with Surveillance and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 The Total Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Air Base Disaster Planning: Contingency Operations . . . . . . ....

Description Details
Control of the vertical dimension—air and space—is essential to preserving healthy commerce and situational awareness during peacetime and sustaining military operations during conflict. Air and space forces must be integrated in order to achieve rapid dominance of the battle space when necessary. While airpower has existed for almost a century, military space operations are yet in their infancy. Military leaders, planners, and operators are just beginning to recognize the importance and legitimacy of space as a center of gravity and war-fighting medium....

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This study analyzes the need for changes to NATO airpower doctrine to reflect current Post–Cold War realities. NATO air doctrine does not yet reflect the actuality of today’s operations, nor does it anticipate the probable future employment of NATO’s airpower. Out–of–area operations and PFP participation in NATO operations will have profound effects on combined doctrine, training, organizational structures, exercises and employment of forces. NATO’s tactical doctrine revision process served the alliance well during the Cold War. But today, the international environment has drastically changed: both the nature of the threat and the use of NATO airpower during conflict have changed. The current doctrinal revision process has proven too slow and cumbersome to provide adequate direction for air strategists during ongoing operations. There are many new doctrinal areas that must be thoroughly addressed so that NATO can chart a course for the future that in the end provides the best, most effective mix of forces....

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INTRODUCTION...1 The Goal: Stability And The Spread Of Democracy....2 Airpower Doctrine And Why It Should Be Kept Current.....5 Preview And Methodology..6 ISSUE BACKGROUND.....8 The NATO Air Doctrine Process ....8 Out–Of–Area Operations .. 11 The PFP And NATO Enlargement .... 13 OUT OF AREA IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO’S AIR DOCTRINE..... 25 Potential Areas For Doctrinal Revision.. 28 Conclusion....44 ENLARGEMENT AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO’S AIRPOWER... 49 Immediate Considerations For PFP Integration.. 50 The Cold War Military Legacy.. 51 Training And Equipment ... 53 The Cold War Deployment Of Assets.... 54 Suggested Solutions.. 55 Long Term Implications For PFP Integration .... 57 Conclusion.... 64 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS... 67 BIBLIOGRAPHY..... 70...

Description Details
In this paper Lt Col Cristina M. Stone argues that the Air Force does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts; targeteers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operators; and unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and expertise required to fill these positions. The author recommends that the Air Force leverage its technical and scientific core and expert organizations across the government to improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. Regarding ISR operations, she proposes that the Air Force develop enhanced collection capabilities. This paper recommends changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD expertise, collection capabilities, and marketing to improve the nation’s ability to combat WMD....

Description Details
Dr. William P. Head’s War from above the Clouds: B-52 Operations during the Second Indochina War and the Effects of the Air War on Theory and Doctrine is an examination of B-52 operations in Vietnam and how the air war affected airpower doctrine and theory. His study examines the evolution of this awesome manned strategic weapon in Vietnam to see how the design of the B-52s originally intended mission altered—if at all—the theories of airpower first put forward by Giulio Douhet and William “Billy” Mitchell. Dr. Head also analyzes how this same operational alteration affected official United States Air Force (USAF) doctrine first formulated by Army Air Corps and Army Air Forces leaders before and during World War II—later modified in the 1950s after the USAF became a separate service....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 AIRPOWER THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Airpower Enters the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . 8 America Is Drawn in Deeper . . . . . . . . . . . .10 DEVELOPMENT OF THE B-52 STRATOFORTRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Insurgency War and Doctrine in the Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Arc Light (B-52 Raids, 1965–68) . . . . . . . . .17 Modifying the B-52 Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Arc Light Expands and Airpower Controversies Grow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Arc Light Operations Continue . . . . . . . . . . 27 AIR FORCE THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 KEEPING A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT . . . . . . . 35 Project CHECO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Corona Harvest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 MENU BOMBING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 COMMANDO HUNT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . 42 AIR F...

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The possible use of nonlethal chemical technologies in counterterrorist operations is drawing much attention in the ongoing global war on terrorism.The decision to apply nonlethal technologies requires an understanding of their overall effects, both tactically and strategically. This paper provides background information on both antipersonnel and antimaterial nonlethal chemical technologies; their applications within the special operations forces (SOF) counterterrorist environment; and their operational applications during armed conflict, combat search and rescue, and hostage rescue. Comparisons of technologies are made, their differences highlighted, and recommendations for use offered. While it may appear that nonlethal chemical technologies are new, their path to development has been navigated with forethought and discretion....