Description Details
This thesis describes crony attack, comments on requirements for successful development of crony attack methodology, and investigates a prominent case where the United States apparently used this strategy. This thesis treats crony attack primarily as a form of strategic attack, carried out during the air campaign portion of military operations. It also outlines a theoretical foundation for such a targeting strategy....

Table of Contents Details
1 Introduction . . . .1 2 Background . . . . . 5 3 Theory of Crony Attack. . . . .15 4 Strategy of Crony Attack. . . . .21 5 Operation Allied Force: A Case Study. . . . .27 6 Conclusions. . . . .41 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .43...

Description Details
This study attempts to determine whether air component commands are capable of developing an effective airpower strategy. It examines US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) because of its recent experience in developing and executing a sizable airpower contribution to a theater campaign. The author sets the background by describing CENTAF’s role in the Persian Gulf War theater campaign strategy. The conclusion is that the commander in chief (CINC) of Central Command did not think that CENTAF had an acceptable holistic airpower strategy in August 1990 and therefore requested the assistance of the Air Staff at the Pentagon. Next, the author justifies and describes credible sources for determining the attributes of an effective operational-level airpower strategy. Using this information, he recommends a notional air component commander’s campaign planning organization and describes the individual branch’s responsibilities and products....

Table of Contents Details
1 USCENTAF’S ROLE IN CENTCOM’S PERSIAN GULF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 2 CREDIBLE SOURCES FOR DETERMINING THE ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 3 RECOMMENDED RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRODUCTS OF AN AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER’S CAMPAIGN PLANNING ORGANIZATION . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . 18 4 REPORT ON USCENTAF PLANNING STAFF’S STATUS—EARLY 1995 . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 27 5 IMPLICATIONS/SOLUTIONS TO AIR COMPONENT COMMANDS’ COMBAT PLANNING SHORTFALLS . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . 33 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 35 ...

Description Details
This paper explains why the Iraqi performance in Desert Storm was predictable: Nonindustrialized, third world nations are incapable of fielding a decisive, conventional air force. To illustrate the point, this essay studies Iraq’s performance in the war against Iran. During the conflict, the Iraqi air force obtained all the equipment and training money could buy, but after eight years of combat experience it still made only minor contributions in a war effort against an equal foe. The in- ability of third world nations to independently organize, train, and equip air forces to decisive levels is inevitable. Avoiding large, wasted sums of money fielding a force of questionable value should lead these countries to alternative forms of aerial warfare....

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1 ORGANIZATION 1 Origins of the Ba’athist Movement 1 Iraqi Military Political Involvement 2 Organization of the Air Force 3 Organizational Summary 5 Notes 6 2 TRAINING 7 Importance of Training 7 Public Education in Iraq 8 Iraqi Military Training 9 Foreign Training 10 The Training Factor 11 Notes 13 3 EQUIPPING 14 Expanding the Military in Iraq 14 Growth of the Iraqi Air Force 15 Iraq’s Money Supply 17 Problems of Acquisition 18 Notes 20 4 EMPLOYMENT. 21 Prewar Air Power Balance 22 Start of the War 22 Air Power in the First Two Years 25 Export War 27 Targeting Iran’s Will 33 Air Support of the Army 37 Summary of Iraqi Air Combat 41 Notes 42 5 CONCLUSION 45 Failure of the Iraqi Air Force 45 Limits of Third World Air Power 46 Alternatives to a Large Air Force 46 The Future 48 BIBLIOGRAPHY 49...

Description Details
This paper analyzes the participation of the US Twelfth Air Force in the Mediterranean theater of operation from 1943 to 1944 and also studies the coalition and joint operations required in the air campaign. Coalition and joint warfare provides numerous command, control, and coordination problems that are not easily de-conflicted. The goal of this paper is to highlight the lessons learned from the selected operations and their applicability to twenty-first-century warfare. The author will examine the development of tactics and operational procedures that were unique to this theater of war and the leadership challenges encountered in a coalition or joint command structure. This study will also examine the effectiveness of combined air operations with the RAF in support of the amphibious landings conducted by the US Fifth and British Eight Armies at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, Italy....

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1 Introduction . . . . 1 2 ALLIED AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA . . . . .5 3 OPERATION HUSKY AND THE INVASION OF SICILY . . . .17 4 OPERATION AVALANCHE AND THE INVASION OF ITALY . .33 5 OPERATION SHINGLE AND THE ASSAULT OF ANZIO . . . .47 6 Conclusion . . . . 63 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 69...

Description Details
To help educate airmen about the realities of counterinsurgency, this study addresses how insurgent warfare is fundamentally different from conventional wars, develops lessons from two case studies, highlights the challenges that US airmen face, and examines the adequacy of Air Force and Joint doctrine for counterinsurgency operations....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION......8 Insurgencies: Not Uncommon ....8 Insurgencies in the Abstract....10 Insurgencies: Fundamentally Different.....11 Counterinsurgency: The US Airman’s Challenge .....12 Methodology of this Study......14 Limitations of the Study....15 SOUTH VIETNAMESE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN AND OPERATION FARMGATE, 1961-1964.....16 Origins of Conflict ......16 Overview of FARMGATE .....18 Program Inception....18 Concept of Operations ......19 Analysis of Operations......20 US Air Force Involvement......20 Army of the Republic of Vietnam ......22 Vietnamese Air Force ....23 Factors Affecting the Role of Air Advisors....24 National Politics....24 US Inter-Service Competition....26 Cultural Factors.....28 Command, Control and Operations ....29 Tasking Air Assets......29 Mission Planning and Targeting Guidance.....31 Combat Intelligence ....32 Other Significant Issues ....33 Rules of Engagement .....33 Training.....34 Equipment....35 FARMGATE Counterinsurgency Operations: Lessons Learned.....37 EL SALVADOR INSURGENCY: 1981-1992.....39 Overview of Operations....41 US Involvement ....41 Salvadoran Milita...

Description Details
Drawing from the vision of airpower theorists and building on insights gained from studies on various regime changes, this thesis advances a theory of regime change and outlines a strategy for the use of airpower. To remain in power, regimes must continue to provide goods to the group of people responsible for its rise to power—the winning coalition. Different types of regimes rely on different types of goods to satisfy their winning coalition. This thesis advances the hypothesis that adversely affecting these goods will create policy failure, increase dissatisfaction among the winning coalition, and cause members to seek out a new coalition and regime to provide the lost goods. Additionally, since many regimes supply goods to third parties to retain their support, an additional hypothesis was introduced to account for the influence of international support....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 THE THEORY . . . . 5 3 THE CAUSAL MECHANISM . . . . 19 4 AMERICAN REGIME CHANGE . . . . 27 5 SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIME CHANGE . . . . . 37 6 CONCLUSION . . . . 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 53...

Description Details
This study determines if a revival of the CRAF Enhancement Program is feasible and if it could be developed into a viable program for addressing AMC's airlift shortfall problem. To achieve this goal, the study analyzes the failure of the first CRAF Enhancement Program to determine if the barriers to its success were surmountable and if these same barriers might impede the success of a future program. The study determines that the first Enhancement Program failed because MAC was unable to develop an incentive plan that was attractive enough to ensure airline participation, yet be persuasive enough to elicit the required support and funding from Congress....

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1 INTRODUCTION.....1 2 THE NATIONAL AIRLIFT SYSTEM.......5 3 CRAF ENHANCEMENT: THEORY AND REALITY......21 4 THE FUTURE OF CRAF ENHANCEMENT...... 44 BIBLIOGRAPHY......65...

Description Details
This study follows the history of close air support (CAS) since World War II to examine how it has been apportioned and allocated in the past. It then examines the current joint air operations process. It is the contention of this study that the current system, rooted in its historical past, does not fully employ CAS to its optimum potential. The historical view of CAS has been as a tactical measure, with limited localized effects. However, properly integrated and coequal with the ground scheme of maneuver, it can have operational level effects. This study examines two theories of the use of CAS at the operational level and then recommends changes to the view of CAS and the process for its apportionment and allocation....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE HISTORY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT . . . . 7 3 CURRENT JOINT CAS DOCTRINE . . . . 39 4 TWO THEORIES OF CAS AS AN OPERATIONAL ASSET . . . . 51 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 59 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 65...

Description Details
Caustic as well as complimentary valuations are presented here in the belief that they are ultimately beneficial to PME. If the aim of Air Force professional education is to produce capable officers, then it should be flexible enough to accommodate changes which pursue that goal. Readers of this book will discover that PME continues to serve the best interests of the Air Force because of-rather than in spite of-the steady gaze of critical eyes....

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1 CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . 1 Inception Phase, 1946-50 . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Trans-and Post-Korean War Phase, 1950-57 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Post-Sputnik Phase, 1958-65 . . . . . . . . . . .5 Vietnam War Phase, 1965-74 . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Post-Vietnam War Phase, 1974-79 . . . . . . . .8 Defense Resurgence Phase, 1980-87 . . . . . 9 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 2 EVOLUTION OF PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION DOCTRINE FOR AIR FORCE OFFICERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Purpose of Air Force Professional Military Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Original Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Stated Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Broad versus Specialized Education . . . . . . .21 Air University's Professional Military Education Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Original Charter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 Informal Guidance . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
The United States Air Force has long favored attacking electrical power systems.Electric power has been considered a critical target in every war since World War II,and will likely be nominated in the future. Historically, there have been four basic strategies behind attacks on national electrical systems: to cause a decline in civilian morale; to inflict costs on the political leaders to induce a change; to hamper military operations; and to hinder war production. The evidence shows that the only sound reason for attacking electrical power is to effect the production of war material in a war of attrition against a self-supporting nation-state without outside assistance. The implication for future strategic air operations is important. Because attacks on electric power cause indirect collateral damage which can be politically counterproductive,and the military benefit is minimal, the United States should reject attacks on national electrical power systems in the near future....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . 5 Generation . . . . . . 5 Transmission . . . . . 7 Distribution . . . . . . 8 Control . . . . 8 Effects . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 12 3 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN TOTAL WAR . . . . . . 15 World War II—Germany . . . 17 World War II—Japan . . . . . 22 United States Strategic Bombing Survey . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . 28 4 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN LIMITED WAR . . . . . 33 Korean War . . . . . . 33 Vietnam War . . . . . 37 Desert Storm . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . 42 5 TARGETING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . 45 Failures . . . . 45 When to Target Electric Power . . . 48 Conclusions and Implications . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 57...

Description Details
An extended nuclear deterrent for protecting allies may also contribute significantly to nonproliferation efforts—the nuclear umbrella provides allies an assurance so they do not perceive the need to develop nuclear weapons arsenals for themselves. This study explores the impact of US nuclear weapon policy on the current and future effectiveness of extended nuclear deterrence for the Republic of Turkey. It concludes that the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence for Turkey depends on many factors and not just the quality and quantity of the US nuclear arsenal....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . .1 Why Turkey? . . . . .2 The Argument: It’s All about Relationships and Leadership . . . .5 Research Questions and Methods . . . . .5 Outline . . . . .6 Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations . . . . .6 2 WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS? . . . . .11 Political Uses for US Nuclear Weapons . . . .12 A Special Case of Deterrence: Extended Nuclear Deterrence . . . . .15 Linking Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Nonproliferation . . . . .19 Summary and Cautions . . . . .21 3 ASSESSING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY . . . . .27 Assessing Credibility Elements for US Extended Deterrence . . . .28 Assessing Nuclear Weapons Tipping Point: Warnings and Indicators . . . . .35 Few Warnings and Indicators of Real Intentions and Capabilities . . . .44 Summary and Conclusions . . . .45 4 IMPROVING US EXTENDED NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FOR THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY . . . . .51 Addressing Credibility Elements . . . .51 Adding Weight: Preventing Tipping . . . .58 Summary and Conclusions . . . .61 5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS . .65 Conclusions . . . . .65 Policy Impl...

Description Details
Wills argues that the twentieth-century argument between air and ground proponents has changed significantly since the Gulf War, and it comes down to the relative importance of the ground or air in the mix. It is more than just using air as a supporting component to the ground forces—if this is true, current force organization and employment is adequate. However, if the air predominates in combat operations, then, as Wills puts it in his first chapter, joint operations doctrine needs to be rethought. A changed balance “will affect the military at every level . . . force structure, organization, weapons acquisition, doctrine, and training” (p. 3). Notwithstanding the blunt commentary from ground proponents, Wills offers that airpower has come to dominate air/ground relations....

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1 FRAMING THE DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 AIRPOWER, WAR, AND DIPLOMACY . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 3 ASSESSING THE AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 4 THE AFGHAN MODEL AND BEYOND . . . . . .35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 5 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69...

Description Details
The purpose of this paper is to recommend that the United States government maintain the defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) by aggressively supporting the US defense industry in the arms transfer process. Ironically, this recommendation is contrary to the position held at the onset of this research and analysis effort. To accomplish this purpose, this paper has three aims. First, it recognizes that the DTIB requires preservation. Second, it describes arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy based on US national security interests and the foreign policy challenges of the day. Third, it focuses on the current arms transfer decision-making process and represents it as a “Labyrinth of Control.” This section of the paper demonstrates the maze of controls used to adequately ensure that US military technologies are not diffused to foreign nations....

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PRESERVING THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . 14 THE LABYRINTH OF CONTROL . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 27 MAINTAINING THE DTIB WITH US GOVERNMENT SUPPORT . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 34 GLOSSARY . . . . . 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

Description Details
Gen George S. Patton Jr. remains one of the most storied commanders of World War II. Patton’s spectacularly successful drive across France in August–September 1944 as commander of the US Third Army was perhaps his greatest campaign....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 KEY PLAYERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Evolution of Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Understanding ULTRA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 New Kid on the Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 BREAKOUT IN BRITTANY . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Patton’s Playground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Combat Operations Begin . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 The Lure from the East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 4 MORTAIN COUNTEROFFENSIVE AND THE FALAISE GAP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 “To the Sea”—Targeting the Third Army Lifeline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 ULTRA Improvements at Third Army . . . . . .54 German Neck in a Noose That the Allies Fail to Pull . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 5 TALE OF TWO RIVERS—SEINE AND LOIRE . 71 ...

Description Details
Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the US Nuclear ASAT System and Present-Day Copycat Killers, by Lt Col Clayton K.S. Chun, is a case study of an early US antisatellite (ASAT) weapon system. In this study, Colonel Chun shows how the US Air Force developed a rudimentary ASA system from obsolete Thor intermediate ballistic missiles, an existing space tracking system, and nuclear warheads....

Table of Contents Details
PROGRAM 437: THE BEGINNINGS . . . . . . . . 1 ASAT WEAPONS: AN ACCIDENTAL DISCOVERY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ASAT DEVELOPMENT: THE AIR FORCE LEADS THE WAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 WHY ASAT WEAPONS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 NIKE-ZEUS BECOMES A RIVAL. . . . . . . . . . . 8 OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAM 437 . . . . . . . . 10 LIMITING FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Funding Shortfalls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Location, Location, Location. . . . . . . . . . . . 20 The Nuclear Specter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 PROGRAM 437 UNMASKED . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A NEW MISSION FOR THE 10TH ADS . . . . . . 23 A THIRD LIFE FOR PROGRAM 437 . . . . . . . 27 THE DEMISE OF PROGRAM 437 . . . . . . . . . .29 SPACE: A CRITICAL DIMENSION . . . . . . . . .32 VULNERABILITY OF SPACE-BASED ASSETS . . 35 POTENTIAL THREATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 NORTH KOREA: KEY EXPORTER OF TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 The DPRK’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities. . . .38 North Korea: A N...

Description Details
This thesis examines three campaigns during which aerial terror raids, peripheral to the main war efforts and incapable of destroying the enemy war-making capacity, elicited disproportionate reactions from the targeted leaderships. The raids on London during World War I, the V-1 and V-2 raids on London three decades later, and the Scud attacks on Israel during Desert Storm each show evidence of overreaction by Allied/coalition leaders. A review of the nature of terrorism and of airpower reveals that aerial weapons are uniquely suitable as terror weapons. An analysis of the differences between nuisance attacks and conventional civilian bombing, along with an understanding of the pressures on the leaders involved, leads to an explanation for past overreactions: aerial terror raids shock targeted leaders into visceral responses. Historically short-lived, these responses are based on the pressures of representative government and the tendency to overestimate the capability of terror weapons while underestimating the resilience of the population....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE ANATOMY OF TERROR . . . . . 3 BEYOND THE TRENCHES . . . . 9 “V” FOR VENGEANCE . . . . . 13 DECISIVE TERROR . . . . 19 ANALYSIS . . . . . 25 CONCLUSION . . . . . 31 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

Description Details
In Unmanned Airlift: A Viable Option for Meeting the Strategic Airlift Shortfall, Lt Col Chad T. Manske points to the growing dependency on strategic airlift as well as the abiding corollary that there will continue to be a shortfall in strategic airlift. To get to the analysis, Colonel Manske raised three crucial questions: (1) are operational requirements able to justify unmanned airlifters, (2) are current and emerging technologies likely to meet these potential operational requirements, and (3) are the operational concepts cost-effective?...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 THE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SHORTFALL . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4 TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY . . . . . . . . .31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 5 FINANCIAL CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 6 ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS .89 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99...

Description Details
The initial question of this study concerns the debate between those who believe in a general Islamic threat, as defined most eloquently by Samuel P. Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, and others who see a small band of religious fanatics who have hijacked Islam from the moderate majority. This question about the source of terrorism has importance to the major Islamic nations as it does for Latin American countries, where Muslims are a largely undistinguishable minority....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 UNDERSTANDING “ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Perspectives of Islam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Islamic Anti-Western Rage: Historic and Strategic Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Islamic Angst: Psychological and Religious Struggles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Clash or Collusion of Islamic Fundamentalists? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN . . . . . . . . . . 19 Muslim Demographics in the Region . . . . . .20 Islamic Terrorist Attacks in the Region . . . . 21 Islamic Terrorist Support in the Region . . . . 23 Muslims’ Geographic Connection with Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
Arguably a top tier concern for American foreign policy for more than a few years, Iran gets the meticulous attention of two distinguished Air Force scholars. Lt Cols Charles A. Douglass and Michael D. Hays are critical of the current American policy toward Iran and tell us why. More importantly, they point to elements necessary for an effective Iranian strategy. Their aim: “to change the fundamental calculus of the Iranian problem” to one beneficial for both Americans and Iranians....

Table of Contents Details
1 SOLVING IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS: HISTORIC ROOTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Ancient Persian Greatness and Cultural Pride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Resentment of Foreign Interference . . . . . . 7 Persian-Shiite Strategic Loneliness . . . . . 10 Pragmatic National Interest Replaces Revolutionary Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 ANALYSIS OF IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Demographics, Politics, and Economics . . . .24 Internal Dynamics, Personalities, Power Centers, and Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Nuclear Desire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 US PERCEPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 US Perceptions of Iran Internally . . . . . . . .49 US Perceptions of Iran Externally . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 5 REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
One of the challenges Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, sends to Air Force students, researchers, and staff offices is to investigate future concepts of operations (CONOPS). One in particular relates to this study, the CONOPS for space and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is very sensitive about incorporating new technology into its operations. While the authors advocate a feasibility study for reactors in space in a CONOPS, they also explore a deeper problem with widespread societal rejection and revulsion concerning the theoretical employment of nuclear technology in space....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 WHITHER SPACE NUCLEAR POWER? . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 SPACE NUCLEAR POWER AS TRANSSCIENTIFIC PUBLIC POLICY . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 POLITICAL PERMISSION—THE CONTEMPORARY DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 A TRANSSCIENTIFIC POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Appendix A THE HISTORY OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 B PROJECT PROMETHEUS—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—DECEMBER 2003 . . . . . . . . . . 89 C THE MEMBER GROUPS OF THE ...

Description Details
Snow’s and Drew’s newest version has been slightly retitled and almost totally rewritten to reflect radically changed politicalmilitary realities. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy addresses not only traditional strategy concerns but also the chaotic nature of the post–Cold War world and the stark realities of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military conflicts along religious fault lines. Although the authors have changed a great deal in this edition, the original strategy process model, first published in 1980, remains the constant organizing scheme....

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Contents DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii SECTION I FRAMING THE PROBLEM 1 STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Warfare in the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . 4 Foundations of Modern Warfare . . . . . . . . . .7 Contrasts in the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2 THE STRATEGY PROCESS—AN OVERVIEW . .13 Determining National Security Objectives . . .14 Formulating Grand National Strategy . . . . . .17 Developing Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Composing Operational Strategy . . . . . . . . 22 Formulating Battlefield Strategy (Tactics) . . .23 Influences on the Strategy Process . . . . . . .25 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 SECTION II THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 3 GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 31 Vital National Interests . . . . . ....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 1 THE COLD WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Strategic Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 THE LEADERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 General Curtis E. LeMay (1906–90) . . . . . . 17 Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (1900–86) . . . . 22 3 THE WEAPON SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 The Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Tanker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile-ICBM . .68 The Cruise Missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 The Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine SSBN. . 72 SAC Alert Force Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Boomer Patrol Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 88 4 FUN, GAMES, AND SERIOUS BUSINESS . . . .93 Combat Crew Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 SAC Bombing Competition . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Spot Promotions . . . . ...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THE INNOVATION IMPERATIVE . . . . . . . . . 3 THE ADVERSARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 THE PLAN: 3 AUGUST 1990–15 JANUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 CLASH OF ARMS: 17–26 JANUARY 1991 . . . .28 CENTAF ADAPTS: 27 JANUARY–5 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 ATTRITION WAR: 6–23 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . 59 GROUND WAR: 24–28 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . .63 THE KEYS TO INNOVATION . . . . . . . . . . . 71 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Appendix A Primary USAF Units That Participated . . . 101 B Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 C Location of Air Strikes during Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 D Distribution of Strikes against RGFC Heavy Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 E Iraqi Prisoner of War Comment...

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As the nation’s campaign against terrorism proceeds, our military services continue to embrace high technology, advanced sensors, and precision weaponry for use on current battlefields. The term cyber warrior has truly stepped from the pages of science fiction into reality. Equipment and technology do not constitute the only developments, however, because today’s cyber warriors emerge from a society and military culture very different in many respects from those of past generations of warriors....

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1 EMPLOYEE WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Values Crisis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Harnessing a Different Military . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cultures in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 2 TRADITIONAL MILITARY CULTURE . . . . . . .7 Professionalism and Homogeneity . . . . . . . .7 Fraternity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Institutional Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Value Studies of the Military . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Traditional Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 THE NEW BUSINESS-SCIENTIFIC CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 New World Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Volunteer Fighting Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Occupational Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Technology and the Great Engineering Venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Civilian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Force of Specialists . . . . . ...

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Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia provides a comprehensive analysis of the factors that affected both interagency processes and policy outcomes during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) and the early stages of the Bosnia crisis (1993–95). Going one-on-one with members of Washington’s policy elite who were involved directly in these two cases, the author demonstrates that the US government’s approach to termination policy proved fragmented and personality driven. She systematically presents evidence to support the study’s conclusion, revealing that the nature of the gap between diplomats and war fighters will consistently produce policies that bring about cease-fire in the form of war termination, but fail to address the underlying causes and conditions that generated conflict (and, potentially, war). These issues must be resolved if the US government hopes to improve the social and political conditions of those embroiled in conflict while at the same time bolstering a security posture favorable to US interests in the aftermath of intervention. The three sections of this work thematically present...

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PART I Framing the Problem 1 CONFLICT TERMINATION WITHIN A BUREAUCRATIC ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . 3 Interagency Decision Making via Negotiation. . . . . . . . . . 5 The Efficacy of the Policy-Making Process . . 14 Outline of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CHOICE . . . . . . . 27 Decision-Making Approaches: Units of Analysis as Delimiters . . . . . . . . . 28 Rational Choice Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 Groups as “Less than Rational” Actors . . . . .41 Rationale for Alternative Approaches . . . . . .48 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 CONFLICT TERMINATION MODELS . . . . . . 61 Points or Processes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 Rational Actor Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . 85 Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Approach . . . . 85 US Government Decision Making . . . . . . . . 92 ...