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Unfortunately, the existence of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) structures, mechanisms, systems, and capabilities does not guarantee success. Major Orr attacks the basic problem of producing a conceptual model of the combat operations process. Only after he establishes the context, a paradigm of warfare based on classical literature, does he discuss the appropriate C3I architecture that will yield the desired results. In a larger sense, Major Orr’s study is an attempt to redefine the nature of modern technology-intensive warfare. This is a broad and contentious problem. While the reader may not agree with all of Major Orr’s assumptions and conclusions, this larger effort is vital to the American military’s capability to cope successfully with a rapidly changing and increasingly dangerous world. In this larger sense, the importance of Major Orr’s study goes far beyond the particular problems of C3I....

Table of Contents Details
I COMBAT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Sun Tzu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Objectives of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Civil-Military Relationships . . . . . . . . . . 2 Principles of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Tactical Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Carl von Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Andre Beaufre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The American Style of War . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 The Traditional Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Maneuver Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 II C3I AND THE COMBAT OPERATIONS PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 The Combat Operations Process Model . . . .34 Expansion of the Process Model Functions . .37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 III COMMAND OF THE COMBAT OPERATIONS PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 The Purpose of Command . . . ....

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The most significant implication of this study, however, is the predicted variance in changing kill ratio as the force ratio changes. The wide middle area of stability, identified as numerical attrition, is consistent with the traditional notion that kill ratio is largely a function of training and technology. It is also consistent with most of the historical record, including the early campaigns of World War II, that suggested that nominal changes in the relative mass of forces brought about little change in the kill ratio. This is also the reason evolving technology often produced the only observable change in the kill ratio. The rapid change in attrition rate at either end of the model also has great explanatory value....

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1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 METHODOLOGY: RED FLAG . . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 4 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207...

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In this well-researched and insightful study, Lt Col Gregory A. Roman examines the relationships between military organizational hierarchies and the impact of battlespace information. Drawing on a sophisticated range of studies and data and using numerous illustrations, the author contends that the outmoded effects of traditionally centralized (and technologically proliferating) command and control orientations preclude the US military (and particularly the Air Force) from effectively applying and acting upon the benefits of information-age technologies in an age of information warfare. The author sees future warfare characterized by faster decision making, faster operational tempos, and a torrent of tactical battlefield information. These new realities necessitate greater decentralization of control, more flexible information gathering, and creative, nontraditional military organizational arrangements....

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After exploring the definitions and theories of nonkinetic warfare, this paper charts the development of warfare in practice and finds that the latest incarnation of warfare, by making the will of the people the primary target, has moved into the nonkinetic realm....

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In this paper, Lt Col Devin L. Cate tackles the question of whether an air superiority fighter is relevant to warfare in the twenty-first century.

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At its core this work is a database covering Anglo-American strategic bomber operations against Germany, Italy, and Axis associated or occupied Europe. As such it allows swift and easy listing of day-by-day bombing, bombing of strategic target systems by location and tonnage, bombing of specific countries, comparisons of US and British targeting and operations, and much more....

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Technical innovation lies at the heart of the case for privileging airpower in the American way of war, but such innovation comprises only one of warfare’s seven vital contexts. The sheer complexity of war and warfare renders prediction, technological and other, a high-risk activity. The contexts of war and warfare are (1) political, (2) societal-cultural, (3)economic, (4) technological, (5) military-strategic, (6) geographical, and (7) historical....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii THE AIRPOWER ADVANTAGE IN FUTURE WARFARE: THE NEED FOR STRATEGY . . . . . . .1 Plan of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Why this Study? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Airpower Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Issues and Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Future Warfare: Contextual Realities . . . . . 20 US Airpower Advantage in Future Warfare . . 30 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35...