ISBN: 978-9952-8265-2-4

The Department of Defense (DOD) anticipates the realization of biomimetic bird and two-inch, insect-sized systems within the 2015–47 period. Although robot systems of one millimeter or smaller are not explicitly specified in current DOD and Air Force technology road maps, the technological aims towards this size can be clearly inferred from official documents. This research assesses the likelihood of, and barriers to, the realization of true microrobots and nanorobots (defined as submillimeter-sized robots of micro-meter and nanometer proportions, respectively) that can perform in military applications by 2035. This research finds that the realization of true microrobots for military applications by 2035 is unlikely, except for a single case of microrobots....

The study investigates whether information as a weapon can achieve the purposes of war. Specifically, can the use of the “information weapon” diminish an adversary’s will and capacity to fight. The results indicate that while information may be considered a weapon, it is one that must be used with caution. The more enthusiastic proponents of the information weapon tend to overestimate its ability to diminish enemy will and capacity to fight....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 2 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ—TIMELESS AND ENDURING . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . 14 3 INFORMATION—THE ULTIMATE PRECISON-GUIDED WEAPON . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 23 4 ANALYSIS—IS INFORMATION A WEAPON? . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . 35 5 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION . . . . 37 Notes . . . . 39...

This study analyzes the use of airpower against enemy ground forces. Maj Scott G.Walker assesses current doctrinal definitions of the close air support and interdiction missions as seen by the Air Force and Army, comparing and contrasting the two. The themes that recur throughout are the need for planning to remain flexible, using the speed and firepower of air attack to concentrate force where needed, and the requirement for good operational and tactical intelligence....

INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 THE FIELD ARMY DESCRIBED . . . . 9 ATTACKING THE ENEMY . . . . . 19 SYNCHRONIZING AIR AND GROUND FORCES . . . . . 39 CASE STUDIES . . . . 45 AN ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERLAND OPERATIONS . . . . 71...

The introduction of Shrike anti-radiation missile (ARM) negated the requirement to overfly the site, but its short range required further improvement. The improvement came in the Standard ARM, a missile that was followed by development of the High-Speed Anti- Radiation Missile, or HARM, the weapon of choice for today’s Weasel. That aircraft is the Wild Weasel, indicating the need for such an aircraft in the future....

This analysis concludes the answer is to reorganize existing forces into a Quick Response Airpower Force (QRAF). The QRAF concept involves a force structure that can help reduce the operations tempo in the DOD by replacing forward presence with a credible continental United States-based, quick response, deterrent force. This study presents a discussion and background of the problem, its importance, related problems, and past attempts at solutions. It offers a framework describing a quick response force and what it should be capable of doing. After discussing the current US Air Force attempts to provide this capability, the composite wing and the Airpower Expeditionary Force, the force of tomorrow—the threetiered QRAF—is presented. The study concludes with recommendations for further study, limitations of the analysis, and its implications....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 2 2 THE PROBLEM . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . 8 3 THE FORCE REQUIREMENT . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . 13 4 THE FORCE TODAY . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . 25 5 THE FORCE TOMORROW . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . 31 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 37...

This paper explores the advances in automatic identification technology, specifically radio frequency identification, and seeks to exploit these capabilities for use in the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain. Using technological trends, a thorough literature review, and the opinions of experts, the paper compares current technology to a 2035 requirements forecast to identify capability gaps. The end goal is logistics situational awareness, whereby the DOD has the ability to provide end-to-end visibility throughout its supply chain and can rapidly mobilize, deploy, sustain, and redeploy forces in support of national security objectives....

After exploring the definitions and theories of nonkinetic warfare, this paper charts the development of warfare in practice and finds that the latest incarnation of warfare, by making the will of the people the primary target, has moved into the nonkinetic realm....

The authors assert that the lack of an effective cyberspace C2 structure critically reduces the responsiveness to combatant and joint task force commanders and increases the difficulty of integrating cyberspace capabilities into operational plans and execution. The traditional military hierarchies currently used for cyberspace C2 do not have the agility to deal with the high velocity of change that characterizes cyberspace. Instead, the authors argue for flexible organizational structures to match the complexity and pace of the cyberspace operational environment....

The US commercial air carriers provide a unique and critical enabler that helps us meet our mobility requirements in the form of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Colonel Schauber contends that changes allowing increased foreign ownership or control opportunities would threaten our national security by jeopardizing the DOD’s accessibility to CRAF assets. Although the CRAF has formally been utilized only twice, its importance and our reliance on it cannot be overstated....

Gen John P. Jumper, former Air Force chief of staff, tasked Air Force Space Command with the responsibility of developing, fielding, and executing tactical and operationally responsive space capabilities near and through space. The newly created initiative known as Joint Warfighting Space focused on near space due to the advantage of achieving spacelike capabilities at a lower cost. Such capabilities could offer continuous, organic, survivable, and “stay and stare” persistence to theater commanders, thus potentially relieving the need for national and strategic systems. Effects-based operations, network-centric warfare, and rapid maneuver demand this persistence....

In support of national and military security strategies, the DOD has established the joint force commander (JFC) as the means to provide unity of command, exercised through component commanders, during contingency operations. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is key to the JFC’s successful prosecution of contingency operations. The multifaceted complexity cannot be overstated as both national and theater ISR architectures include many linked nodes that can act and be tasked independently from one another (i.e., the platforms, sensors, DOD and commercial communication nodes, and a variety of exploitation organizations). The JFC cannot continue to ignore this reality if he or she wants to properly employ ISR-intensive effects-based operations (EBO) to achieve overall campaign objectives—that is, to provide unity of ISR effects in support of the campaign plan....

In this discerning assessment of Operation Allied Force (OAF), Lt Col Michael W. Lamb Sr. examines the myriad of lessons learned that have been written, and debated, from this campaign and synthesizes them into some golden nuggets for strategists and campaign planners. Indeed, there is much to be learned. From the beginning of the campaign, the military logic of OAF has been a matter of intense, even bitter debate. The problems and questions that arise from OAF are numerous and cut across the spectrum of military operations....

Col Thompson, in his concentrated focus on China’s military space applications, examines PRC ground, space, counterspace, and space policy aspects. His principal findings: China has plans to construct a new launch site in the deep south; PRC telemetry, tracking and com-mand capacities are improving; China has the ability to conduct limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions from space; the PRC is pursuing a counterspace capability most likely using satellite jammers and anti-satellites (possibly parasitic or nano-satellites). Col Thompson concludes that while China’s space program does not now constitute a global threat, the PRC is pursuing space capabilities that will increase its regional influence, and deny an adversary certain uses of space....

Colonel Felker’s paper espouses a practical theory of airpower based on the synergistic relationship among societal structure and lines of communications that comprise infrastructure. Rather than isolating different elements of society and their concomitant targets, the theory views targets in a more holistic way. Of note, the theory articulates a culturally based paradigm with airpower applied against the linkages within a society’s system processes, rather than a “one-size-fits-all” target list that attacks form. The theory describes a way to think about airpower, not a way to execute its missions....

This important research deals with the intellectual foundation of the American profession of arms—our joint doctrine. The author, Lt Col Carl R. Pivarsky Jr., USAF, argues that the current doctrine development process has become a zero-sum game driven by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) declaring joint doctrine to be “authoritative.” This research focuses on that document and the impact it has on how we think about high-intensity, conventional combat operations. Specifically, it deals with the corruption of the definitions of maneuver and interdiction to serve parochial land force interests. The author shows in detail how definitions and terms have destroyed the command authority of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and relegated air component capabilities solely to the support of surface maneuver commanders....

In the end, the theories we considered can be synthesized to form a better overall description of the control of combat airpower. Centralized control and decentralized execution is a good concept at any level, but it suffers from lack of precision....

To reinvigorate strategic thought within the Air Force, this study addresses a single question: what critical capabilities—through the combatant commanders—will the nation require of the Air Force by 2030?...

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Supporting Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Air Force Critical Capabilities, 2020–30 . . . . .5 Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Freedom of Action: Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Freedom of Action: Space . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Freedom of Action: Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Global Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . .13 Air Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Military Support to Civil Authorities . . . . . . . 17 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Freedom of Action: Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Freedom of Action: Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Freedom of Action: Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Global Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . .29 Air Diplomacy . ...

This study argues that certain actions of the Air Force, taken together, will go a long way toward enabling war fighters to plan and execute cyber tasks, apply cyber capabilities, and integrate operations in cyberspace with military capabilities executed in the traditional war-fighting domains....

This paper seeks to answer the following question: What are the doctrinal imperatives of providing effective airlift support to enclaves? Doctrinal imperatives are those necessary and sufficient propositions that describe the optimal way to employ airlift forces in support of an enclave. In short, this paper attempts to determine the best way to conduct airlift operations to support enclaves....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 THE LUFTWAFFE’S AERIAL RESUPPLY OF THE SIXTH ARMY AT STALINGRAD . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4 KHE SANH, THE AMERICAN AERIAL RESUPPLY OF THE US MARINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55...