Description Details
The study investigates whether information as a weapon can achieve the purposes of war. Specifically, can the use of the “information weapon” diminish an adversary’s will and capacity to fight. The results indicate that while information may be considered a weapon, it is one that must be used with caution. The more enthusiastic proponents of the information weapon tend to overestimate its ability to diminish enemy will and capacity to fight....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 2 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ—TIMELESS AND ENDURING . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . 14 3 INFORMATION—THE ULTIMATE PRECISON-GUIDED WEAPON . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 23 4 ANALYSIS—IS INFORMATION A WEAPON? . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . 35 5 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION . . . . 37 Notes . . . . 39...

Description Details
This study analyzes the use of airpower against enemy ground forces. Maj Scott G.Walker assesses current doctrinal definitions of the close air support and interdiction missions as seen by the Air Force and Army, comparing and contrasting the two. The themes that recur throughout are the need for planning to remain flexible, using the speed and firepower of air attack to concentrate force where needed, and the requirement for good operational and tactical intelligence....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 THE FIELD ARMY DESCRIBED . . . . 9 ATTACKING THE ENEMY . . . . . 19 SYNCHRONIZING AIR AND GROUND FORCES . . . . . 39 CASE STUDIES . . . . 45 AN ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERLAND OPERATIONS . . . . 71...

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The US commercial air carriers provide a unique and critical enabler that helps us meet our mobility requirements in the form of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Colonel Schauber contends that changes allowing increased foreign ownership or control opportunities would threaten our national security by jeopardizing the DOD’s accessibility to CRAF assets. Although the CRAF has formally been utilized only twice, its importance and our reliance on it cannot be overstated....

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In this discerning assessment of Operation Allied Force (OAF), Lt Col Michael W. Lamb Sr. examines the myriad of lessons learned that have been written, and debated, from this campaign and synthesizes them into some golden nuggets for strategists and campaign planners. Indeed, there is much to be learned. From the beginning of the campaign, the military logic of OAF has been a matter of intense, even bitter debate. The problems and questions that arise from OAF are numerous and cut across the spectrum of military operations....

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This important research deals with the intellectual foundation of the American profession of arms—our joint doctrine. The author, Lt Col Carl R. Pivarsky Jr., USAF, argues that the current doctrine development process has become a zero-sum game driven by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) declaring joint doctrine to be “authoritative.” This research focuses on that document and the impact it has on how we think about high-intensity, conventional combat operations. Specifically, it deals with the corruption of the definitions of maneuver and interdiction to serve parochial land force interests. The author shows in detail how definitions and terms have destroyed the command authority of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and relegated air component capabilities solely to the support of surface maneuver commanders....

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In the end, the theories we considered can be synthesized to form a better overall description of the control of combat airpower. Centralized control and decentralized execution is a good concept at any level, but it suffers from lack of precision....

Description Details
To reinvigorate strategic thought within the Air Force, this study addresses a single question: what critical capabilities—through the combatant commanders—will the nation require of the Air Force by 2030?...

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Supporting Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Air Force Critical Capabilities, 2020–30 . . . . .5 Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Freedom of Action: Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Freedom of Action: Space . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Freedom of Action: Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Global Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . .13 Air Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Military Support to Civil Authorities . . . . . . . 17 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Freedom of Action: Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Freedom of Action: Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Freedom of Action: Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Global Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . .29 Air Diplomacy . ...

Description Details
This paper seeks to answer the following question: What are the doctrinal imperatives of providing effective airlift support to enclaves? Doctrinal imperatives are those necessary and sufficient propositions that describe the optimal way to employ airlift forces in support of an enclave. In short, this paper attempts to determine the best way to conduct airlift operations to support enclaves....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 THE LUFTWAFFE’S AERIAL RESUPPLY OF THE SIXTH ARMY AT STALINGRAD . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4 KHE SANH, THE AMERICAN AERIAL RESUPPLY OF THE US MARINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55...

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The Air Force has challenged leaders to integrate and use quality principles as a way to improve operations throughout the service. In this study Lt Col David F. Bird, USAF, reminds us that these quality principles apply to emergency response forces, both before and during a crisis. He proposes that senior leaders view quality concepts and principles as a way of creating an environment to spark the highest performance by their subordinates and not as giving up authority or control....

Description Details
Minelaying by the U.S. Army Air Forces (AAF) had to overcome the absence of doctrine, serious questions of service autonomy, and preconceptions about naval and air force traditional roles. Though this initially unappreciated weapon gained considerable acceptance during the years of World War II, mines were not again dropped from aircraft in combat until the Vietnam War. During the Cold War, the U.S. Air Force gave little effort to its collateral maritime missions until concern grew over containing an expanding Soviet naval threat. Today, Air Force capabilities for aerial minelaying and other naval missions remain an important (though little appreciated) means for projecting long-range air power in support of "Global Reach--Global Power."...

Table of Contents Details
1. MINE WARFARE..................3 Theory and History Mines and How They Worked 2. WORLD WAR II AERIAL MINELAYING IN EUROPE............7 First Use by Germany The Royal Air Force Fights Back 3. MINELAY’ING IN JAPAN’S "OUTER ZONE" -1942-1945............10 Early Plans and Capability U.S. Navy Submarine and Surface Laid Mines Air Operations Minelaying by Naval Aviation 4. AAF MINELAYING IN JAPAN/S "INNER ZONE" -1945...............18 Planning "Operation Starvation LeMay and the XXI Bomber Command 5. PLAN AND REALITY -THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AAF AERIAL MINELAYING............26 Plans and Opportunities “Outer Zone" Results “Inner Zone" Results Japanese Mine Countermeasures World War II Conclusions 6. AERIAL MINELAYING -AN AIR FORCE MISSION............31 Contributions of the Army Air Forces Mines and the Postwar Air Force Mines in Three Limited Wars The Lessons -Are They Learned? Applications in the Future Conclusion...

Description Details
Present and future force presentation options include more than just the single air domain, for the presentation of Air Force operations now includes the air, space, and cyberspace domains....

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DISCLAIMER . . . .ii FUTURE OPERATOR SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS Introduction/Background . . . .1 Methodology . . . .2 Determining the Future Operator Definition . . . . 5 Cross-domain Competencies . . . . 7 Cross-domain Force Development Path . . . .9 Force Development Paradigms . . . .18 Culture . . . .19 Summary . . . . .21...

Description Details
The predictable nature of American strategic bombing may make it vulnerable to a perceptive enemy. By offering him the opportunity to design, test, and employ countermeasures, American air commanders may have inadvertently limited their ability to achieve success....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 3 2 THE EARLY YEARS AND WORLD WAR I . . . . 5 Notes . . . . 7 3 THE INTERWAR YEARS . . . . 9 Notes . . . .13 4 WORLD WAR II: THE EUROPEAN THEATER . . . . .15 Notes . . . .20 5 WORLD WAR II: THE PACIFIC THEATER . . . .23 Notes . . . .28 6 LIMITED WARFARE . . .31 Notes . . . .37 7 THE FUTURE . . . .39 Notes . . . .41...

Description Details
The thesis of this paper is that the advanced capabilities provided by TSAT are limited and will not be sufficient to serve the ground-based portion of the communications network supporting network-centric warfare (NCW). To validate this proposition, this study will start by identifying space-based systems that will enable NCW, discuss the requirements for ground-based NCW, and finally determine the combination of spaced-based systems sufficient to deliver advanced capabilities to the war fighter....

Description Details
In this paper an Air Force ground commander and scholar, Lt Col Dave Marttala, brings to light a problem previously overlooked in popular discussion: Air Force deployment of large numbers of Airmen to augment the joint ground fight and the consequent breakage of the US war-fighting capability writ large....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Myth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 This Paper . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Genesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Convoy Airmen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Assumptions and Expectations . . . . . . . . . . 7 In-Lieu-of Expansion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Current Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Joint Requirements and Sourcing . . . . . . . . 8 Scope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Command and Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Popular Criticisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Studying the Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 3 CASE STUDY: SECURITY FORCES . . . . . . .17 Description of Security Forces . . . . . ...

Description Details
This study examines the rise of operations other than war (OOTW) as a new and prominent tasking for the armed services of the United States. The author, Lt Col Charles W. Hasskamp, USAF, is an advocate of the OOTW mission, and he argues that the US Special Forces Command is an excellent instrument for the task....

Description Details
During the Lebanon conflict, the Israeli Air Force(IAF) employed the most advanced combat aircraft in the world to attack targets in southern Lebanon in an effort to compel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Shi’ite forces to reduce the frequency of guerrilla attacks against Israeli ground troops. This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of those air raids in supporting the Israeli coercive strategy. This study contends there were two reasons for this failure. First, the asymmetry of motivation favored the Shi’ites, which negated the effectiveness of air strikes as a“carrot.” Second, the air strikes were unable to create a realistic fear of escalation for the targets. This was caused by two factors: the Lebanese environment and the inability of the air strikes to add significantly to the costs of the target organizations....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Overview . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 2 2 THE LEBANON PERIOD . . . . . 3 Israeli Objectives . . . . . 3 Airpower’s Role . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 7 3 THE ISRAELI STRATEGY . . . . . 9 Defining the Israeli Strategy . . . . . 9 The Israeli Airpower Strategy . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 11 4 FACTORS INFLUENCING THE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . 13 The Shi’ites and Long-Term Security . . . . 13 Hizbollah and the PLO . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . 15 5 EFFECTIVENESS OF IAF REPRISAL RAIDS . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 19 6 WHY THE AIR STRIKES FAILED . . . . 21 Asymmetry of Motivation . . . . 22 Inability to Create Fear of Unacceptable Escalation . . . . 23 Lebanon Environment . . . . 23 Israeli Air Strikes Could Not Increase Costs on Attackers 24 Notes . . . . . 25 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 27 Summary of Findings . . . . . 27 Key Lessons . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . 29...

Description Details
This study analyzes the evolution of targeting organizations to identify their strengths and evaluate their impact on future organizations. While both strategic and tactical targeting are discussed, the primary emphasis is on the former. This study analyzes the evolution of targeting organizations to identify their strengths and evaluate their impact on future organizations. While both strategic and tactical targeting are discussed, the primary emphasis is on the former....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 CENTRALIZATION OR DECENTRALIZATION? . . . . 3 3 TARGETING AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE . . . . 9 4 THE EVOLUTION OF TARGETING . . . . 17 5 FINDINGS, OBSERVATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . 37...