Description Details
The US commercial air carriers provide a unique and critical enabler that helps us meet our mobility requirements in the form of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Colonel Schauber contends that changes allowing increased foreign ownership or control opportunities would threaten our national security by jeopardizing the DOD’s accessibility to CRAF assets. Although the CRAF has formally been utilized only twice, its importance and our reliance on it cannot be overstated....

Description Details
In this discerning assessment of Operation Allied Force (OAF), Lt Col Michael W. Lamb Sr. examines the myriad of lessons learned that have been written, and debated, from this campaign and synthesizes them into some golden nuggets for strategists and campaign planners. Indeed, there is much to be learned. From the beginning of the campaign, the military logic of OAF has been a matter of intense, even bitter debate. The problems and questions that arise from OAF are numerous and cut across the spectrum of military operations....

Description Details
This important research deals with the intellectual foundation of the American profession of arms—our joint doctrine. The author, Lt Col Carl R. Pivarsky Jr., USAF, argues that the current doctrine development process has become a zero-sum game driven by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) declaring joint doctrine to be “authoritative.” This research focuses on that document and the impact it has on how we think about high-intensity, conventional combat operations. Specifically, it deals with the corruption of the definitions of maneuver and interdiction to serve parochial land force interests. The author shows in detail how definitions and terms have destroyed the command authority of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and relegated air component capabilities solely to the support of surface maneuver commanders....

Description Details
This paper seeks to answer the following question: What are the doctrinal imperatives of providing effective airlift support to enclaves? Doctrinal imperatives are those necessary and sufficient propositions that describe the optimal way to employ airlift forces in support of an enclave. In short, this paper attempts to determine the best way to conduct airlift operations to support enclaves....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 THE LUFTWAFFE’S AERIAL RESUPPLY OF THE SIXTH ARMY AT STALINGRAD . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4 KHE SANH, THE AMERICAN AERIAL RESUPPLY OF THE US MARINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 1 A NEED FOR CHANGE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AS A MODEL FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3 REFORMING INTELLIGENCE: A 50-YEAR EFFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4 THE 9/11 REPORT AND INTELLIGENCE REFORM LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5 THE PUSH AND PULL OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 6 THE QUESTION OF BALANCE . . . . . . . . . 139 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Appendix A INTERVIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 B CHRONOLOGY OF INTELLIGE...

Description Details
The predictable nature of American strategic bombing may make it vulnerable to a perceptive enemy. By offering him the opportunity to design, test, and employ countermeasures, American air commanders may have inadvertently limited their ability to achieve success....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 3 2 THE EARLY YEARS AND WORLD WAR I . . . . 5 Notes . . . . 7 3 THE INTERWAR YEARS . . . . 9 Notes . . . .13 4 WORLD WAR II: THE EUROPEAN THEATER . . . . .15 Notes . . . .20 5 WORLD WAR II: THE PACIFIC THEATER . . . .23 Notes . . . .28 6 LIMITED WARFARE . . .31 Notes . . . .37 7 THE FUTURE . . . .39 Notes . . . .41...

Description Details
In this study, Lt Col Karen O. Dunivin, USAF, examines social change in American military culture and explores the current struggle between the military’s traditional and exclusionary combat, masculine-warrior (CMW) paradigm or belief system and the contradictory evolving model of military culture characterized by egalitarianism and inclusiveness. It is a contest between old thinking and new thinking. The author uses two recent and ongoing cases to illustrate the divergence between paradigm and model: women in combat and homosexuals in the military....

Description Details
This study examines the rise of operations other than war (OOTW) as a new and prominent tasking for the armed services of the United States. The author, Lt Col Charles W. Hasskamp, USAF, is an advocate of the OOTW mission, and he argues that the US Special Forces Command is an excellent instrument for the task....

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1 Do Concepts Matter· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 9 2 Instant Thunder: Why an Air Staff Plan · · 27 3 How Does Airpower Work?· · · · · · · · · · · · 51 4 Knockout Blow? Or Decision on Points? · · ·71 5 The Objective · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·85 6 Taking It to the Enemy· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·97 7 Seizing the High Ground: Airpower as a Maneuver Element? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 111 8 Setup for the Knockout Blow · · · · · · · · · 127 9 The First Information War · · · · · · · · · · ·145 10 Conclusions: What Is Air (and Space) Power? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 163 EPILOGUE: A View of the Air Force Today and Tomorrow · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·185 GLOSSARY· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 197 INDEX · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·201...

Description Details
In Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations, the authors propose that military actions should be employed through effects-based operations (EBO). Submitting that this methodology is extremely promising, they recognize two major areas of challenge. First, is modifying both service and joint doctrine to fully articulate what can be accomplished with EBO. Second, there are major issues in the area of command and control (C2). Effective C2 for EBO depends on how intelligence analysis and combat assessment not only are performed but also integrated into the planning process....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 TIME FOR A NEW PARADIGM? . . . . . . . . . . . .4 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON EFFECTS . . . 17 CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR EFFECTS . . . . . . . 29 A GENERAL THEORY OF JOINT EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 AN IDEALIZED JOINT EBO PROCESS . . . . . . .55 WHAT ARE THE MAJOR CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE EBO METHODOLOGY?. . .77 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 About Revolutions in Military Affairs and Disproportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 DOCTRINE FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . 8 Global-Mobility Strategic Air Campaigns . . . 10 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 4 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Operational Concepts for Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Operational Concepts for Global-Mobility Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5 TECHNOLOGY FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Technology for Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Technology for Global-Mobility ...

Description Details
This is a book of quotations and comments about air power, war, and military matters. But it would be a great mistake to simply read the quotes and take them literally. Each selection presents a picture that you can look at again and again. Taken together, different views of the same subject matter are like a drafter's plans: they can make either an interesting multiple-view description of the subject or a puzzle....

Description Details
Is America’s counterinsurgency (COIN) effort being shortchanged? Does a one-dimensional doctrine fail to exploit America’s full COIN potential? Would a genuinely joint approach provide better options to decision makers confronted with the harsh realities of twenty-first century insurgencies? This study insists the answers are unequivocally “yes.” It analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas from an Airman’s perspective for strengthening joint COIN doctrine development in order to deliver fresh alternatives to our national decision-makers and combatant commanders....

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................iii INTRODUCTION ........................................1 FM 3-24’S GROUND-FORCE CONVENTIONALITY ......................................................8 COIN AND AN AIRMAN’S WAY OF THINKING .......................................................11 FM 3-24’S AIRPOWER MYTHS.....................18 CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRMINDED COIN DOCTRINE ..........................................28 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.................63 END NOTES ..........................................69...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . xi INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 OUTCOMES AND ARGUMENTS . . . . . . 97 TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 PRINCIPLES OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 COMMAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 TWENTY GOOD BOOKS . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 SOURCE INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 TOPICAL INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259...

Description Details
The Multimission Framework for operational integration proposed by Colonel Dailey is a synthesis of the successful constructs across the many models currently being utilized throughout the Total Force. Current models in vogue are the Active Associate Wing, the reserve/Guard Associate Wing, the “Blended” Wing, and the Integrated Wing. Colonel Dailey examined each of these models for its positive and negative contributions to the Total Force. His research presented an ironic challenge: all of them work to varying degrees of success when coupled with good leaders and good people. Can history and research demonstrate a better way forward?...

Description Details
This British historian, David Hall, found relevant cross-service problems in Afghanistan during recent British air-ground operations. He was stricken by the similarities with British airground operations during World War II when the Royal Air Force and the British Army first struggled with doctrinal air support practices....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi LEARNING HOW TO FIGHT TOGETHER: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE WITH JOINT AIR-LAND WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Origins of the Air-Land Debate . . . . . . . . . . 5 Political Wrangling between the Independent Air Force and Army/Royal Air Force during the Interwar Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 The Battle for France, 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . 10 The Evolution of Air-Land Technique . . . . . .11 North Africa: The Adoption and Refinement of a New Air-Land Technique . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Success without Harmony: British Air-Land Co-operation by the End of the War . . . . . .25 Back to Afghanistan and Contemporary Air-Land Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Enduring Themes and Contemporary Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
It was inevitable that the airman’s perspective regarding the employment of airpower in an operational theater would surface in North Africa, the first major American offensive of World War II. The North Africa experience provided a model for the organization and employment of tactical airpower in subsequent campaigns in Europe, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. In each of these campaigns, planners have continued to refine, expand, and improve the effectiveness of tactical air support for all forces in a theater. Differences in opinion on the employment of forces will continue among air, ground, and sea commanders in combat situations. However, when the overall commander in the theater makes a decision on the strategy and priority of operations, the air component commander must and will apply his forces in accordance with that decision....

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GETTING TOGETHER...................................1 Vincent Orange A GLIDER IN THE PROPWASH OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE?..........................................30 David R. Mets THE LEGEND OF LAURENCE KUTER............64 Daniel R. Mortensen PATTON AND WEYLAND...........................100 David Spires APPENDIX...............................................108 BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................124...

Description Details
Dr. David R. Mets’s The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision Munitions and the Revolution in Military Affairs is a broad, thought-provoking examination of the relationship between the advancement in conventional weapons guidance technology and the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). He defines an RMA as a rapid change in military technology, doctrine, and organization leading to a sweeping new way that wars are fought. Dr. Mets then considers whether the improvement in conventional air weapons accuracy since World War II is the foundation, the main pillar, one of the principal supports, or is irrelevant to the RMA—which is said to be afoot....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 WHAT IS A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA)? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 WHAT WERE THE NOTIONS OF THE FIRST AIRPOWER ADVOCATES OF RMA? . . . . . . . .4 HOW DID RMA WORK OUT IN WARS FROM 1939 TO 1972?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 KOREA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 CHANGE AFTER VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 WAR AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1990s: HAS THE LAST SANCTUARY BEEN CLOSED? . . . . .34 THE REMAINING HUMANITARIAN SANCTUARY AND DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS. . . . . . . . . 47 ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . .48 NOTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67...

Description Details
The ground and air forces have strong interlocking connections in the battlefield operations known as close air support (CAS). In the 1970s the Army and Air Force began to develop a shared battlefield doctrine known as battlefield air interdiction(BAI) that was concerned with a class of targets that lay out a fair distance from the front lines. Later, on the battlefields of Desert Storm, the Air Force excluded BAI from its tasking orders, although some claimed interdiction missions of this nature were carried out under different names. Lt Col Terrance J. McCaffrey III looks into What Happened to BAI? Army and Air Force Battlefield Doctrine Development from Pre–Desert Storm to 2001. He traces airground doctrine and operational practices relative to battlefield interdiction from World War I to Operation Desert Storm and suggests at one point that even the flank support for Patton was, in effect, BAI. The author carries the discussion through the decade after Desert Storm and shows how the issue is too important to be dropped by either service, even as technology provides new weapons for both services....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 ORIGINS OF BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 3 WHERE WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION IN DESERT STORM? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION A VICTIM OF SUCCESS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 5 IS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION BACK? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 97 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115...

Description Details
This research paper addresses two of the important questions raised in the General Accounting Office report regarding the use of contractors in support of joint military operations. First, will a joint engineering and logistics service contract provide the combatant and service commanders any benefit over maintaining individual Navy, Army, and Air Force service augmentation contracts? Second, does current joint doctrine adequately address the use of contractor services in support of contingency and wartime operations? If not, what information should be included in future joint doctrine?...

Description Details
In this compelling study, Lt Col Carla D. Bass argues that the American military, underestimating vulnerabilities of the US information infrastructure, has based its strategic policy not on a firm foundation, but rather has built castles on sand. Lieutenant Colonel Bass believes that the United States cannot simply postulate doctrine and tactics which rely so extensively on information and information technology without comparable attention to information and information systems protection and assurance....

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PART I Conceptualization 1 Centralizing the Defense Establishment . . .3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 Defense Communications Agency and System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 National Military Command System . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WWMCCS Is Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5 Three WWMCCS Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 PART II Formalization 6 WWMCCS Automatic Data Processing Upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 7 Centralizing Communications Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 8 The WWMCCS Council and the Modern WWMCCS Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 9 The WWMCCS Architect and Architecture 163 Notes . . . . ...

Description Details
In “The National Guard Citizen-Soldier,” Col Mark P. Meyer provides an excellent examination of the linkage between responsible national security policy and the will of the people. He argues that for our democratic government to act responsibly, it is imperative that national policy reflects the will of the people. It is especially important when the policy involves the use of the armed forces. In the United States, the National Guard and its citizen-soldiers are an essential part of the linkage. Without the existence and use of the National Guard, the nation treads dangerously toward inconsistency between the will of the people and national security policy....

Description Details
This compelling study by Lt Col Lawrence E. Key examines how national will plays a decisive role during any application of US military power and not just the employment of forces to fight America’s wars. Because of the decisive role national will plays, leaders need to understand what it is and, beyond its definition, the ways in which they can articulate and cultivate it. To gain this understanding, leaders must look at various means by which the American public expresses its collective will; the most important means being public opinion. However, the author argues that only mature collective opinion can represent national will....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v Theory of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Patriotism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Air, Space , and Cyber Power . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Education , Training, and Lessons Learned . 24 Preparedness , Security, and Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Leadership and Professionalism . . . . . . . 32 Character and Leadership Traits . . . . . . 35 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Intelligence, Surveillance , and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Information and Communication S . . . . . . 49 Joint Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Coalition Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Airpower at War . . . . . . . . . . . ...

Description Details
This study analyzes and assesses the changes in organization and structure of the active Air Force and ANG fighter maintenance units from the time the ANG became a separate reserve component in 1946 to the present-day organization, paralleling it with the active Air Force. It takes the reader from the ANG maintenance unit's beginning, through the changes that occurred over the years and the reason for the changes, to the present day organization. It then provides a glimpse at the future maintenance organization....

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1 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE: PAST AND PRESENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I Centralized Control, 1930-45 . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Period of Uncertainty, 1945-55 . . . . . . . . . . 5 Return to Centralization, 1955-70 . . . . . . . . 7 Decentralized Control, 1970 to the Present . .8 Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Current Organization Structure Theory : A Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Air Force and Major Command Policy Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2 THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION AND THE COMBAT ORIENTED MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . 23 The Centralized Organization . . . . . . . . . . .23 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 The Decentralized Organization . . . . . . . . .26 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Air National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...