Description Details
This study answers the following questions: Is John A. Warden III’s, “The Enemy as a System” analogous to the Air Corps Tactical School’s (ACTS) industrial web theory of airpower employment? If so, why (given the 50 plus years between development of these theories)? If not, what are the prime sources of divergence? The author first describes both theories using an outline from which they are compared on an “apples to apples” basis. From this analysis, similarities and differences are presented. Next, the author discusses contextual factors affecting development of both theories....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 THEORY DESCRIPTIONS AND COMPARISON . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 15 3 ANALYSIS OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 30 4 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 36 GLOSSARY . . . . 37...

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The early proponents of air power believed that with suitable aircraft, and control of the air, airmen would make surface operations impossible and irrelevant. In the years since they made these predictions, aircraft have gained capabilities far beyond those predicted by early advocates. However, airmen are still searching for a strategy that will guarantee the results their predecessors promised. Instead of replacing surface forces, air power has become their indispensable partner. Air power contributes to the security, mobility, and firepower of joint forces, but its primary contribution may be air superiority....

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I set a goal of utilizing primary sources as the basis for this paper. I wanted to research what the key players wrote or said at the time or later in their memoirs. But, in addition to finding information relevant to this thesis....

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In this paper, I seek to demonstrate that the methods of using airpower to take the fight to the enemy and protect our ground forces during small wars need not involve the most advanced aircraft available. This “low-tech” approach does not suggest using lesser technology per se but proposes a different look for the types of aircraft that can perform a specific mission and for their manner of employment—that of protecting ground forces while combating the elusive insurgent. These same aircraft can prove invaluable in training an indigenous force to take the fight forward. By looking to relatively inexpensive, off-the-shelf aircraft, the Air Force can protect its ground-based charges and cement a relationship with embattled nations by helping them help themselves....

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This is a story of long-range airpower, from Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s vision of a global mission to the Global Strike Task Force and expeditionary air forces of the year 2001. It examines global power from its origins as Strategic Air Command built a fleet of bombers and tankers to meet the needs of the global nuclear-deterrent policy of the Cold War. This evolution is traced through the studies and commissions of the 1990s established to determine the force structure for the twenty-first century. The assumptions that were made to develop a force focused on expeditionary short-range airpower to project global power are established and then examined with four case studies in the application of airpower over long range....

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1 GLOBAL POWER FOR AMERICA . . . . . . . . . 1 2 WORLD WAR II ORIGINS AND COLD WAR MATURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 3 GLOBAL POWER––POST–COLD WAR: ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . .21 4 CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL POWER . . . . . . 45 5 EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . .75 6 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89...

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The Air Force doctrinally advocates centralized command and control (C2) with decentralized execution as the best means to concentrate force on any facet of an enemy’s power. Although there are historical examples of effective command and control that have been less centralized, the USAF views decentralization as the cause of inefficient and suboptimal use of airpower....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . .10 2 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMPLEXITY . . . . . .13 Notes . . .29 3 DESCRIBING CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK . . .35 Notes . . .51 4 APPLYING COMPLEXITY THEORY TO DECENTRALIZE AIRPOWER COMMAND AND CONTROL . . . .55 Notes . . .88 5 ADAPTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL . . . .93 Notes . . .100 6 CONCLUSION—A CULTURAL SHIFT . . . .103 Notes . . .108...

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The role of airpower in theater campaigns is a matter of heated debate among the military services and their supporters. Lt Col. Robert P. Givens’s Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower As a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign addresses a question that is fundamental to that debate: to what extent can airpower function as a maneuver force in a theater campaign....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 FUNCTIONS OF A MANEUVER FORCE . . . . . 7 Ancient Greece––Shock Action through Direct Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Rome—A Maneuver Force Exerts a Zone of Influence over the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Neoclassical Period—A Maneuver Force Compels or Denies Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Napoleonic Era—A Maneuver Force Gains and Exploits a Position of Advantage . . . . . 13 Maneuver Force Performance Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Gettysburg Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Maneuver Force Characteristics of Israeli Air Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Summary ....

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The intent of this study is to develop general propositions regarding the nature of force-application (FA) effects. As part of that development, effect propositions are developed regarding time relationships, major functions of warfare, organizing schemes, levels of war, and simple and complex systems....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . 1 2 CONCEPTS AND TERMS . . . . 7 3 SYSTEMS APPROACH . . . . . . 27 4 EFFECTS: APPLICABILITY, COMPLEXITY, AND PLANNING . . . . . . 39 5 APRIMER ON EFFECTS . . . . 51 6 TARGET-EFFECT PAIRINGS AND MECHANISMS . . . . . . 63 7 COERCIVE FORCE APPLICATION AND EFFECTS . . . . . 73 8 FRAMEWORK FOR A SYSTEMS-AND-EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH. . . . . 87 9 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . 97...

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The author’s examination of the counterair strategy process shows how joint force commanders should balance objectives, the balance of forces, the nature of the theater, and policy limits to build a counterair strategy that links means to ends by choosing methods, targets, and attack timing.The author’s discussion of current counterair issues shows that the services appreciate the product (freedom of action for land, sea, and air forces) that control of the air provides, but neglect the process of obtaining it. Current air power disputes emphasize the control and targeting of air resources, and slight the potential impact of these issues on America’s future ability to control the air and space....

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1 AIR SUPERIORITY AND JOINT OPERATIONS . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 2 VISIONS AND DOCTRINE . . . . 5 Doctrine . . . . 6 Counterair Doctrine Evaluation . . . . . 8 Service Doctrine . . . . . 12 Joint Doctrine . . . . . 14 Conclusion . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . 15 3 COUNTERAIR STRATEGY, TARGETS, AND TIMING . . . . . 19 The Counterair System . . . . 19 Basic Strategy Considerations . . . . 20 Strategic Choices . . . . . 22 Offense and Defense . . . . . 23 Targets . . . . 27 Strategy, Targets, and Timing . . . . 29 Measures of Success . . . . . 31 Conclusion . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . 32 4 COUNTERAIR FORCES . . . . 35 Capability and Cost . . . . 35 Air-to-Air and Surface-to-Air Weapons . . . . . 36 Manned and Unmanned Systems . . . . 37 Specialized and Multirole Forces . . . . 37 Weapons . . . . 38 Force Multipliers . . . . . 39 Conclusion . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . 40 5 COUNTERAIR ISSUES . . . . 43 Roles and Missions . . . . 43 The Bottom Up Review . . . . 44 Controlling Joint Air Forces . . . . . 48 Fire Support Coordination . . . . 50 Theater Missile Defense . . . . . 52 Conclusion . . . . 53 No...

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1 Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 2 Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II . . . . . . . . 41 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 3 Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Lt Col Mark A. Clodfelter 4 The Influence of Aviation on the Evolution of American Naval Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Dr. David R. Mets 5 Airpower Thought in Continental Europe between the Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Dr. James S. Corum 6 Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Lt Col Peter R. Faber 7 Alexander P. de Seversky and American Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 8 Strategic Airpower and Nuclear Strategy: New Theory for a Not-Quite-So-New Apocalypse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Dr. Karl P. Mueller 9 Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict: A Short Journey to ...

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This research project addresses how I believe airpower should be employed in urban warfare to achieve operational and strategic results. I chose this topic because there is an apparent disconnection between how military planners and operators view urban combat and their awareness of airpower’s unique and potentially decisive contributions in this environment. This disconnect could prove disastrous for military forces operating on urban terrain. Urban warfare has been given considerable attention by the United States Army and Marine Corps. Although their concerns are soundly based on changes in the strategic environment, I believe their focus is misplaced at the tactical level of warfare....

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Boyd and Warden represent a major transition in the evolution of air power theory. Early air power theorists argued that one could defeat the enemy by paralyzing his war-making and war-sustaining capabilities—a form of economic warfare based upon industrial targeting. In contrast, Boyd and Warden contend thatone should target enemy command and control—that is, control warfare based upon command targeting....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 THE NOTION OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 BOYD’S THEORY OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . 20 WARDEN’S THEORY OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 23 Notes . . . . . 30 CLAUSEWITZ AND JOMINI REVISITED . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 37 BOYD, WARDEN, AND THE EVOLUTION OF AIR POWER THEORY . . . . 39 The Past—Paralysis by Economic Warfare and Industrial Targeting . . . . 39 The Present—Paralysis by Control Warfare and Command Targeting . . . . 41 The Future—Paralysis by Control Warfare and Informational Targeting . . . . 42 Notes . . . . . 44 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . 50 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 51...

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The method or objective of Strategic Paralysis is to selectively attack or threaten those strategic or national level targets that most directly support the enemy’s war-making efforts and will to continue with his current behavior. Strategic Paralysis warfare should result in a change in the enemy’s behavior at a lesser cost to both sides as Airpower assets are the primary weapons --not ground troops. Why Airpower? It is the only weapon that can provide the near simultaneous shock to the enemy’s central nervous system necessary to induce paralysis. To achieve success Strategic Paralysis requires four key ingredients: 1) Correctly identifying the enemy’s National Elements of Value (NEVs), 2) High technology, 3) An enemy dependent upon a well developed, modern and vulnerable infrastructure, and 4) Aerospace Control. The bulk of this study is devoted to defining this strategy and bettering our understanding of the first ingredient, that of choosing the best targets for attack....

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1. Introduction...............1 2. The Theory of Strategic Paralysis...............12 3. Choosing the Right Targets...............34 4. More Targeting Theories...............61 5. The National Elements of Value Model...............77 6. Conclusions...............110...

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Dr. William P. Head’s War from above the Clouds: B-52 Operations during the Second Indochina War and the Effects of the Air War on Theory and Doctrine is an examination of B-52 operations in Vietnam and how the air war affected airpower doctrine and theory. His study examines the evolution of this awesome manned strategic weapon in Vietnam to see how the design of the B-52s originally intended mission altered—if at all—the theories of airpower first put forward by Giulio Douhet and William “Billy” Mitchell. Dr. Head also analyzes how this same operational alteration affected official United States Air Force (USAF) doctrine first formulated by Army Air Corps and Army Air Forces leaders before and during World War II—later modified in the 1950s after the USAF became a separate service....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 AIRPOWER THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Airpower Enters the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . 8 America Is Drawn in Deeper . . . . . . . . . . . .10 DEVELOPMENT OF THE B-52 STRATOFORTRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Insurgency War and Doctrine in the Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Arc Light (B-52 Raids, 1965–68) . . . . . . . . .17 Modifying the B-52 Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Arc Light Expands and Airpower Controversies Grow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Arc Light Operations Continue . . . . . . . . . . 27 AIR FORCE THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 KEEPING A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT . . . . . . . 35 Project CHECO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Corona Harvest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 MENU BOMBING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 COMMANDO HUNT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . 42 AIR F...

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In The Politics of Coercion: Toward a Theory of Coercive Airpower for Post–Cold War Conflict, Lt Col Ellwood P. “Skip” Hinman IV confronts an issue of high interest to airmen and policy makers alike: What does coercion theory suggest about the use of airpower in the early twenty-first century? More specifically, Colonel Hinman seeks to determine whether any of the existing theories of coercion can stand alone as a coherent, substantive, and codified approach to airpower employment. Framing his analysis on three key attributes of conflict in the post–Cold War era—limited, nonprotracted war; political re-straint; and the importance of a better state of peace—Hinman examines the contemporary applicability of the four major theories of coercive airpower: punishment, risk, decapitation, and denial....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 What Is a Theory of Coercive Airpower? . . . . 2 The Attributes of Post–Cold War Conflict . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 COERCION THEORY AND THE POST–COLD WAR ERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Punishment-Based Coercion: A Theory for Total War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Risk-Based Coercion: A Theory for Limited War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Decapitation-Based Coercion: Echoes of the Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Denial-Based Coercion: Too Much of a Good Thing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3 A NEW THEORY FOR A NEW ERA . . . . . . . .31 Phase One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Phase Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Phase Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Limited, Nonprotracted War and the Coercion Hybrid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 The Coercion Hybrid and the Politically Restrained Natur...

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This study reveals how airpower made four contributions to the collapse of Italy. First, airpower shaped the grand strategy of the western Allied powers in 1943. Second, mainland attacks against rail marshaling yards, ports, and airfields did indirectly contribute militarily to Operations Husky and Avalanche. Third, both American and British strategic bombing contributed to the psychological decapitation and fall of the Fascist government on 25 July 1943. Finally, airpower coerced and aided the interim Marshal Pietro Badoglio’s government to surrender unconditionally and escape to the Allies on 9 September....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 AN UNEXAMINED VICTORY . . . . . 3 WHEN GIANTS WALKED THE EARTH . . . . . 7 A TALE OF TWO TIGERS . . . . . 19 WHEN IN ROME . . . . 37 THE DENOUEMENT OF DEFEAT . . . . 57 NO CROWING FOR A NEW DAWN . . . . . 71...

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This study seeks to answer the question, “How can airpower help resolve time-induced tensions between political and military imperatives in the conduct of modern warfare?” To answer this question, the study begins by exploring time in the theory of war with an emphasis on time as a fourth dimension that provides a distinct perspective on warfare. With concepts gleaned from theory, this study analyzes the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Falklands War, and the Gulf War to determine the role airpower played in overcoming time conflicts and achieving political-military congruence. The study concludes that a time-based strategy, defined as one in which time is a paramount or extremely significant consideration, was the mechanism through which airpower worked to resolve time-induced tensions between political and military imperatives....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Overview . . . 1 Methodology . . . . . 2 Definitions . . . . . . 2 Limits of the Argument . . . 3 Notes . . . . . 3 2 TIME IN THE THEORY OF WAR . . . 5 War Theorists on Time . . . . 6 Characteristics of Time in War . . . 7 Physical and Psychological Aspects of Time . . . . . 8 Political and Military Dynamics of Time . . . . . . 9 Summary . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 11 3 THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF 1967 . . . . . . 13 The Course of the War . . . . 13 Political Imperatives . . . . . 14 Military Imperatives . . . . . 15 The Time Problem . . . . . . 15 Operational Consequences and Risk . . . . . 16 Airpower’s Role . . . . 17 Summary . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 20 4 THE FALKLANDS WAR . . . . 21 The Course of the War . . . . 21 Political Imperatives . . . . . 22 Military Imperatives . . . . . 24 The Time Problem . . . . . . 25 Operational Consequences and Risk . . . . . 25 The Role of Airpower . . . . . 27 Summary . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 29 5 THE GULF WAR . . . . 31 The Course of the War . . . . 31 Political Imperatives . . . . . 32 Military Imperatives . . . . . 34 The Time Problem . . ....

Description Details
The term real-time information into the cockpit (RTIC) involves systems capabilities required to provide aircrews timely and essential off-board information to allow mission adjustments in response to rapidly changing combat conditions. The term military technical revolution (MTR) requires converging technological products which have a demonstrated military utility, and military recognition that the application of these converging technologies will cause a radical change in the character of warfare over a very short period of time. This thesis assesses the capabilities of RTIC from two perspectives: its impact on the air tasking process, and the command and control flexibility it affords the joint force air component commander (JFACC). It concludes that the impact on the air tasking process is evolutionary, not revolutionary—current RTIC capabilities remain largely dependent on human-intensive operations which limit reductions in decision cycle times. It further suggests that RTIC’s true impact on targeting is directly attributable to the increased flexibility provided to the JFACC for prosecuting the execution-day air tasking order...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THE AIR TASKING PROCESS TODAY . . . . . . . . . . 7 SENSOR-TO-SHOOTER CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . 17 ENHANCING JFACC TARGETING FLEXIBILITY . . . . . . 27 A LOOK TO THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45...

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Airpower for Strategic Effect is intended to contribute to the understanding of airpower—what it is, what it does, why it does it, and what the consequences are. This is the plot: airpower generates strategic effect. Airpower’s product is strategic effect on the course of strategic history. Everything about military airpower is instrumental to the purpose of securing strategic effect....

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This study concludes airpower will play an increasingly dominant role in future US contingency responses. Power projection is defined as the finite application of military power by national command authority to achieve discrete political ends outside the borders of the United States, its territories, and possessions. Power projection contingencies are characterized as wars and operations short of war, but not conflicts that are global or total in nature. Future contingencies that demand a US response may occur without warning, be time sensitive, and require short duration deployments. Building a strong power projection capability requires a thorough evaluation of the relative efficacy of air, land, and sea power to perform the power projection mission. This evaluation concludes airpower has a great potential to achieve national security objectives decisively in future contingency responses....

Description Details
This study analyzes the asymmetric threat to U.S. airpower across the political, operational, and tactical levels of war and examines whether the U.S. has adequately prepared itself to counter asymmetrical measures against its airpower assets. The answers are not reassuring....

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INTRODUCTION.......1 The Question.......2 Background and Significance of the Problem.....2 Limitations of the Study..... 4 Methodology.......5 Terminology.....6 Preview of the Argument.....7 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL....... 10 Propaganda.....11 Coalition Busting..... 15 Enemy Measures to Change U.S. Targeting Strategy.......22 Conclusion.....25 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL.......28 Attacking Airpower on the Ramp.......30 Aircraft Carriers.....33 Deception.....36 Urban Warfare.....39 Conclusion..... 42 ASYMMETRIC RESPONSES AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL.....44 The Israeli Experience..... 45 MANPADS.......48 The Laser Threat.......51 Conclusion..... 54 CONCLUSIONS.......57...

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This study analyzes how real-time battle damage assessment (BDA) might contribute to airpower strategy and execution. It provides a historical review of BDA during World War II, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War and examines the current BDA doctrine, capabilities, and procedures to illustrate contemporary strengths and shortcomings. This study identifies potential remedies to contemporary issues based on real-time BDA solutions by addressing technological, procedural, and organizational aspects. It evaluates the strengths and limitations of these possible remedies, with respect to airpower planning and execution, to identify viable solutions. This study assesses how alternative solutions might affect airpower strategy formation and execution by examining the improvements intelligence agencies and the services are likely to pursue over the near term and concludes with recommendations for the future....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT . . . . 3 3 BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TODAY . . . . . 15 4 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS . . . . . . . . 27 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRPOWER . . . . . . 47 GLOSSARY . . . . 55...

Description Details
This study attempts to determine whether air component commands are capable of developing an effective airpower strategy. It examines US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) because of its recent experience in developing and executing a sizable airpower contribution to a theater campaign. The author sets the background by describing CENTAF’s role in the Persian Gulf War theater campaign strategy. The conclusion is that the commander in chief (CINC) of Central Command did not think that CENTAF had an acceptable holistic airpower strategy in August 1990 and therefore requested the assistance of the Air Staff at the Pentagon. Next, the author justifies and describes credible sources for determining the attributes of an effective operational-level airpower strategy. Using this information, he recommends a notional air component commander’s campaign planning organization and describes the individual branch’s responsibilities and products....

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1 USCENTAF’S ROLE IN CENTCOM’S PERSIAN GULF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 2 CREDIBLE SOURCES FOR DETERMINING THE ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 3 RECOMMENDED RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRODUCTS OF AN AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER’S CAMPAIGN PLANNING ORGANIZATION . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . 18 4 REPORT ON USCENTAF PLANNING STAFF’S STATUS—EARLY 1995 . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 27 5 IMPLICATIONS/SOLUTIONS TO AIR COMPONENT COMMANDS’ COMBAT PLANNING SHORTFALLS . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . 33 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 35 ...

Description Details
This paper analyzes the evolution of strategic bombing doctrine in order to identify the basic doctrinal tenets and then evaluate their compatibility with emerging stealth technologies. Current doctrine is an evolution of existing doctrine, theory, and experience. Therefore, to comprehend fully the meaning of doctrine, it is necessary to trace its lineage. As airpower arrived only recently in the doctrinal arena, no previous doctrine existed. Therefore, this analysis begins with the early airpower theories which provided the roots of evolution. Giulio Douhet is the most famous of the early theorists and his work provided a basis upon which to build. Following World War II (WWII), Bernard Brodie modified Douhet’s theory to incorporate atomic weapons and the experience to date. As theory evolved, so did early Air Corps "unsanctioned" doctrine. By testing each tenet against the demands of emerging stealth technologies, the paper finds that existing doctrine is basically sound, but incomplete. Therefore, the paper proposes and tests additional tenets to accommodate stealth and the increasing rate of technical advancement....

Description Details
Two examples from twentieth-century conflicts demonstrate the potential that missiles possess to disrupt an opponent’s land-based airpower and achieve significant political consequences. Iraq’s use of Scud ballistic missiles in the 1991 Persian Gulf War produced nearly instantaneous political effects. The Scuds did not threaten the coalition military forces opposing Saddam Hussein, but instead threatened the existence of the coalition itself by nearly bringing Israel into the war. Negating this threat demanded an urgent response from land-based airpower, and large numbers of coalition aircraft were forced to perform a new mission: Scud Hunting. Almost 50years before Desert Storm, the Allies in World War II had faced a similar threat from the V-1 and V-2. Thousands of sorties were diverted to bomb missiles that were chiefly fired at London and Antwerp. In both conflicts, coalition and Allied forces possessed enough airpower that the diversion did not prevent them from performing other necessary missions. Yet, in the future, as the United States Air Force (USAF)dwindles in numbers, the ability of land-based airpower to deal with the m...

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Recent airpower operations revealed a deficiency in the United States Air Force’s (USAF) ability to precisely attack mobile targets at standoff ranges with minimal collateral damage. Future airpower operations will be executed in politically sensitive strategic environments and thus will require the ability to precisely destroy mobile targets that may have been strategically placed by an adversary in areas with a high risk of collateral damage. Current air-to-ground guided weapon systems, including man-in-the-loop guidance weapon systems, have limited “collateral reduction” capabilities; and future autonomous precision standoff weapon systems may increase the risk and uncertainty associated with collateral damage due to technology limitations. The acquisition of a precision standoff man-in-the-loop weapon system through the modification of current weapon systems or the acquisition of a new weapon system may provide the USAF a critically needed air-to-ground capability against mobile targets in a high-risk collateral damage environment....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE NEED FOR PRECISION ENGAGEMENT AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS . . . . 5 3 USAF TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND GUIDED WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 23 4 FUTURE WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 35 5 LEGAL ISSUES, ACCOUNTABILITY, FLEXIBILITY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SHORTFALLS, AND ACQUISITION RISK MANAGEMENT . . . . 53 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 65 GLOSSARY . . . . . 69...