Iraq : Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Dci on Iraq's Wmd

Book Id: WPLBN0000699949
Format Type: PDF eBook
File Size: 68.26 MB.
Reproduction Date: 2005

Title:	Iraq : Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Dci on Iraq's Wmd
Author:
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Literature, Asian literature, Writing.
Collections:	e-Asia Digital Library Collection
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	University of Oregon Libraries; e-Asia Digital Library


Citation APA MLA Chicago Iraq : Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Dci on Iraqs Wmd. (n.d.). Iraq : Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the Dci on Iraqs Wmd. Retrieved from http://www.gutenberg.us/

Excerpt
Excerpt: Key Findings; Saddam never abandoned his intentions to resume a C.W. effort when sanctions were lifted and conditions were judged favorable: Saddam and many Iraqis regarded C.W. as a proven weapon against an enemy?s superior numerical strength, a weapon that had saved the nation at least once already--during the Iran-Iraq war--and contributed to deterring the Coalition in 1991 from advancing to Baghdad. While a small number of old, abandoned chemical munitions have been discovered, I.S.G. judges that Iraq unilaterally destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991. There are no credible indications that Baghdad resumed production of chemical munitions thereafter, a policy I.S.G. attributes to Baghdad?s desire to see sanctions lifted, or rendered ineffectual, or its fear of force against it should W.M.D. be discovered. ? The scale of the Iraqi conventional munitions stockpile, among other factors, precluded an examination of the entire stockpile; however, I.S.G. inspected sites judged most likely associated with possible storage or deployment of chemical weapons. Iraq?s C.W. program was crippled by the Gulf war and the legitimate chemical industry, which suffered under sanctions, only began to recover in the mid-1990s. Subsequent changes in the management of key military and civilian organizations, followed by an influx of funding and resources, provided Iraq with the ability to reinvigorate its industrial base. ? Poor policies and management in the early 1990s left the Military Industrial Commission (MIC) financially unsound and in a state of almost complete disarray.

Table of Contents
Table of Contents: Key Findings, 1 -- Evolution of the Chemical Warfare Program, 5 -- Regime Strategy and WMD Timeline, 5 -- The Early Years, 1960-1980: A Slow Start, 5 -- The Chemical Corps and Al-Hasan Ibn-al-Haytham Research Foundation, 5 -- Full Capability, 1981-1991: Ambition, 6 -- Foundation of the Al Muthanna State Establishment, 6 -- Agent Production Begins and Al Muthanna State Establishment Takes Shape, 6 -- Early Weaponization: Simple Solutions, 8 -- CW?A Permanent and Pivotal Strategic Weapon, 9 -- The Decline, 1991-1996, 9 -- Destroying Iraqi Weapons, 9 -- Recovery and Transition, 1996-2003, 12 -- Miscalculation, 2002-2003, 13 -- Command and Control, 14 -- Preamble: Muddling Through After the Gulf War, 14 -- Iraq Could Maintain CW Competence With Relative Ease, 15 -- Infrastructure?Research and Development, 16 -- Creation of the Iraqi Industrial Committee, 17 -- The Power of the IIC, 17 -- The IIC?s Master Plan for Self-Reliance: the List of 1,000 Chemicals, 18 -- Dual-Use Chemicals on the List of 1,000 Chemicals, 18 -- Thionyl Chloride, 19 -- DCC, 19 -- Thiourea, 22 -- Chemicals From the List Move Toward Production, 22 -- Infrastructure?Production Capability, 23 -- State of Chemical Industry at OIF?Limited Break-Out Capability, 24 -- Weaponization, 29 -- Suspect Munitions Activities, 29 -- Disposition of CW Munitions Post-1991, 29 -- The 1991 Decision To Destroy Undeclared Weapons, 31 -- Iraq Unilateral Weapons Destruction in 1991, 31 -- Destruction of Chemical Munitions, Bulk Agent, and Precursors, 31