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This study investigates Europe’s motives to develop the independent satellite navigation system known as Galileo despite the existence of America’s successful global positioning system (GPS). The study begins by analyzing both systems to familiarize the reader with global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and to provide an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of GPS and Galileo, as well as the systems’ similarities and differences. Although the two systems have different founding principles, they employ similar infrastructures and operational concepts. In the short term, Galileo will provide better accuracy for civilian users until GPS upgrades take effect. But performance is only part of the rationale. The author contends that Europe’s pursuit of Galileo is driven by a combination of reasons, including performance, independence, and economic incentive. With Galileo, Europe hopes to achieve political, security, and technological independence from the United States....
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 GPS VERSUS GALILEO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 3 WHY GALILEO? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 4 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . .51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Illustrations 1 Satellite geometry 9 2 Global positioning system (GPS) satellite 14 3 Galileo satellite 16 Table 1 Number of visible satellites for various masking angles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13...
NASA commissioned a study of the management of the Surveyor and Lunar Orbiter projects.
In this important study, Lt Col Wayne Johnson, USAF, argues that systematic tightening of interagency cooperation and better work on defining sensitive technology prohibitions are needed to maintain the US technological edge. He also maintains that the US government requires a new and disciplined export control process—not the current mosaic of rules, regulations, and perspectives that came out of the cold war, but a process that provides a revamped, systemic approach with consistent implementation. Colonel Johnson explores the problem of defining which technologies the United States is willing to transfer(military or dual-use) and the need to ensure that national security objectives do not take a backseat to economic expediency. To accomplish this end, he argues for better interagency cooperation as a first step leading to a more centralized, coordinated, and strategic view of technology transfer and how it impacts US national security....
Lt Col Anthony Mastalir has done policy makers a welcome service by exploring the enigma wrapped in a conundrum which is Chinese space policy, focusing on the Chinese kinetic energy antisatellite (KE-ASAT) test of January 2007. That test ended a de facto moratorium on KE-ASAT tests which the United States and Russia had observed for over two decades. It also announced the arrival of a new player in strategic space, forcing a reevaluation of US capabilities in space as well as Chinese intentions there. Colonel Mastalir examines both that reevaluation and those intentions, relying on open-source material, particularly from Chinese strategic and military analysts....
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 EXTREME DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4 INFORMATION DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 5 ECONOMIC DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 6 MILITARY DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86 7 FINDINGS/CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . .89 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103...
Information is one of the most, if not the most, essential elements of combat capability. Because telecommunications affects every aspect of a society, and is probably the most important medium which military information is exchanged, this thesis provides an understanding of the telecommunications system and how best to exploit it across the spectrum of conflict. I examine the system’s vulnerabilities to both lethal and nonlethal attack mechanisms. While the ability to employ nonlethal technologies are currently limited, I recommend pursuing a strong research and development program to acquire this capability. The reason is that they provide additional policy options to deal with conflict, they are cheap, and because research may not only discover unanticipated capabilities for the US, but also identify countermeasures to protect our own systems. This thesis concludes by offering guidelines to help determine whether to exploit telecommunications with either lethal or nonlethal attack strategies....
1 INTRODUCTION . . . 1 Notes . . . 3 2 TELECOMMUNICATIONS . . . . . 5 The Modern Communications System . . . . . 6 Vulnerability Analysis . . . . . . 17 Targeting . . . . 23 Quantification . . . . . 29 Conclusion . . . 32 Notes . . . 35 3 DISABLING WEAPONS . . . . . . 38 Definition . . . . . 39 History And Legal Considerations . . . . . 41 Conventional And Disabling Kill Mechanisms . . . 44 Advantages/Disadvantages . . . . . . 49 Conclusion . . . . 53 Notes . . . . 55 4 GUIDANCE FOR CAMPAIGN PLANNING . . . . . . 57 Planning Factors . . . . 57 Conclusion . . . . . 61 Notes . . . . . 62...
Lack of investment in future agile combat-support technologies could lead to a strategic surprise that diverts military attention and resources from critical air, space, and cyber operations. Looking to the national security environment in 2030, this research explores one technology—the microbial fuel cell (MFC)—that gives life to self-contained facilities decoupled from vulnerable supply lines and infrastructure networks. MFCs can dispose of waste (sewage, food scraps, gray water, etc.) while producing clean water (up to 70 percent of required volumes) and power (up to 600 watts per person). Using relevance tree methodology, the research concludes that USAF research and development investment alone will not bring MFCs to fruition. A successful strategy for MFCs will be collaborative, addressing not only the technological barriers but also the key social, industrial, and political hurdles to enabling this capability....
The United States Air Force has long favored attacking electrical power systems.Electric power has been considered a critical target in every war since World War II,and will likely be nominated in the future. Historically, there have been four basic strategies behind attacks on national electrical systems: to cause a decline in civilian morale; to inflict costs on the political leaders to induce a change; to hamper military operations; and to hinder war production. The evidence shows that the only sound reason for attacking electrical power is to effect the production of war material in a war of attrition against a self-supporting nation-state without outside assistance. The implication for future strategic air operations is important. Because attacks on electric power cause indirect collateral damage which can be politically counterproductive,and the military benefit is minimal, the United States should reject attacks on national electrical power systems in the near future....
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . 5 Generation . . . . . . 5 Transmission . . . . . 7 Distribution . . . . . . 8 Control . . . . 8 Effects . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 12 3 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN TOTAL WAR . . . . . . 15 World War II—Germany . . . 17 World War II—Japan . . . . . 22 United States Strategic Bombing Survey . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . 28 4 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN LIMITED WAR . . . . . 33 Korean War . . . . . . 33 Vietnam War . . . . . 37 Desert Storm . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . 42 5 TARGETING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . 45 Failures . . . . 45 When to Target Electric Power . . . 48 Conclusions and Implications . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 57...
Recent airpower operations revealed a deficiency in the United States Air Force’s (USAF) ability to precisely attack mobile targets at standoff ranges with minimal collateral damage. Future airpower operations will be executed in politically sensitive strategic environments and thus will require the ability to precisely destroy mobile targets that may have been strategically placed by an adversary in areas with a high risk of collateral damage. Current air-to-ground guided weapon systems, including man-in-the-loop guidance weapon systems, have limited “collateral reduction” capabilities; and future autonomous precision standoff weapon systems may increase the risk and uncertainty associated with collateral damage due to technology limitations. The acquisition of a precision standoff man-in-the-loop weapon system through the modification of current weapon systems or the acquisition of a new weapon system may provide the USAF a critically needed air-to-ground capability against mobile targets in a high-risk collateral damage environment....
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE NEED FOR PRECISION ENGAGEMENT AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS . . . . 5 3 USAF TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND GUIDED WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 23 4 FUTURE WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 35 5 LEGAL ISSUES, ACCOUNTABILITY, FLEXIBILITY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SHORTFALLS, AND ACQUISITION RISK MANAGEMENT . . . . 53 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 65 GLOSSARY . . . . . 69...
The author addresses four questions: how have these air forces responded to post–Cold War political uncertainties, how have they operated, how have they responded to new air power thinking, and how have they adapted to the challenges of costs and technologies? He convincingly argues that budgetary provision has not been the most important factor in generating effective air power....
The history of planetary protection is presented by tracing the responses to interplanetary concerns on NASA's missions.
Air War College Maxwell Paper Anthology, a compilation of the award-winning papers from our 2010 graduates. Since we published the first Maxwell Paper in May 1996, we have distributed 47 papers demonstrating the highest level of analytical creativity and scholarship. The 12 papers presented here provide insight into and promote discussion on topics of importance to senior leaders....
48 ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER: REVAMPING AN INCOMPLETE AND CONFUSING MASTER TENET . . . . . . . . .1 Col Rolanda Burnett Sr., USAF 49 THE DANGEROUS DECLINE IN THE US MILITARY’S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Col Kenneth E. Hall, USAF 50 LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR: A CASE STUDY . . . . . .39 Lt Col Michael Rafter, Canadian Forces 51 DEVELOPING A US EUROPEAN COMMAND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE STRATEGY FOR FY 2010–15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Lt Col Kevin M. Coyne, USAF 52 INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET: A 21ST CENTURY ISSUE: LEGAL, DOCTRINAL, AND POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE CYBER WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Col Rebecca A. Keller, USAF 53 US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC . . .85 Lt Col Lars Helmrich, Swedish Air Force 54 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE BELOW A 1,000-WARHEAD LIMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Lt Col David J. Baylor, USAF 55 GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED, WH...
The Book details on how to approach CMMI Implementation in an organization. It details out the various phases involved in CMMI Implementation and how to plan and execute them. It details on various aspects which we tend to overlook in CMMI Implementation. Who Should Read? • Organization looking forward to implement CMMI • Top Management person, trying to understand how to go about • SEPG, Program manager and Process Quality members • Anyone who is interested in understanding the Implementation of CMMI Why to Read? • To get complete End to End understanding on CMMI Implementation Lifecycle • Plan your budget, effort and resources for the program • Set your expectations clear on CMMI Implementation • Be aware of the different aspects in Implementation How it’s different: • Written from practitioners’ point of view • Communicates the reality in practical implementation Word of Caution: • The book contains only samples and typical examples and they are not comprehensive and to be verified and validated on a particular context for applicability ...
This CMMI Implementation Guide is a reference book for anyone interested in implementing CMMI in their organization. The purpose of this book is, to provide insight in to CMMI Implementation phases and best practices to be followed in this journey. Most of us agree, that CMMI is more a De facto model that IT Industry follows and other industries also has shown lot of interest in adopting this model. The day to day popularity and its adoption rate is on the surge for CMMI. In this scenario, this book will help the new organizations and implementers, on how to approach CMMI Implementation practically in their organization. This book is not a replacement to the Model or to the resources which CMMI Institute Publishes. This is only an additional resource which user can benefit from. CMMI Institute holds the complete authority and rights to CMMI model and all the components within the framework. This book is prepared based on the experience of a practitioner on implementing the model in various organizations. The Author has worked in multiple roles in CMMI Implementation and has global exposure in implementing the model. We reiterate ...
Contents Introduction to CMMI Initiating CMMI Implementation Planning CMMI Implementation Executing CMMI Implementation Appraising CMMI Implementation Sustaining CMMI Implementation CMMI High Maturity Implementation Miscellaneous References ...
Sustained Coercive Air Presence (SCAP) is an airpower approach to peace enforcement designed to impose a cease-fire on an unwilling belligerent and then use a prolonged air presence to enhance long-term diplomatic efforts that seek a political solution. The competing agendas and political infighting associated with United Nations and coalition operations also seriously hinders a SCAP strategy. Nonetheless, if politicians decide on an airpower approach to peace enforcement, SCAP in concert with the economic, informational, and political instruments of power is a viable strategy against a modern, well-armed foe....
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF SUSTAINED COERCIVE AIR PRESENCE . . . . . 7 3 OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT . . . . 19 4 COERCIVE AIRPOWER OVER BOSNIA–HERZEGOVINA . . . . 39 5 CONCLUSION . . . . 59...
One of the United States’ greatest military advantages is rapid global mobility. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) provides a crucial supplement to the military’s mobility resources in time of war or national emergency. The proliferation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), however, poses a growing threat to the CRAF and its critical airlift capacity. In this study, Lt Col Glen Downing describes the US government’s historical and potential future uses of the CRAF during contingency operations. He examines current CRAF policies, the operating environment, and the MANPAD threat, describing the negative consequences of the shoot down of a CRAF airliner. Positing several options to counter the threat, he analyzes each following the parameters of unit cost, operating cost, funding sources, insurability, and crew training. The study concludes with a thoughtful recommendation to the Department of Defense on a course of action to confront the MANPADS threat to the CRAF....
A decision to put weapons in space—or to refrain from doing so—should be based on a firm understanding about what such weapons can be expected to achieve. More specifically since numerous orbital weapons concepts have been advocated as natural evolutions of surface and airborne weapons, it would appear useful to compare those proposed spacebased systems with their terrestrial counterparts. Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? by Maj William L. Spacy II evaluates the theoretical capabilities of orbital weapons and compares them to weapons already in existence and to emerging concepts proposed for development....
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Space Weaponization Debate . . . . . . . . . . 1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 SPACE-BASED WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Directed Energy Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Direct Impact Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Defending Space-Based Assets . . . . . . . . . 32 Technological Factors Bearing on Space-Based Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3 SEEKING CONTROL OF SPACE: GROUND-BASED ALTERNATIVES FOR SPACE CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Defensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Nondestructive Approaches to Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Destructive Approaches to Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4 ATTACKING TERRESTRIAL...
This study asks how effectively has the USAF incorporated the concept of effects-based operations into its procedures for targeting and combat assessment. To answer this question, the study defines effects-based targeting, asserting that commanders should direct airpower against targets in ways that produce specific, predetermined, military, and political effects. This study explores the historical development of effects-based targeting theory and then conducts a focused comparison of four major air operations—Pointblank, Linebacker II, Desert Storm, and Allied Force—in order to survey US airpower’s actual combat experience with regard to effects-based operations. This study determines that senior decision makers have always been interested in creating specific effects rather than simply destroying targets; however, as a whole, the USAF has been inconsistent in employing effects-based operations across the spectrum of conflict....
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 EFFECTS-BASED TARGETING: WHAT IS IT? . . . . 5 3 THE THEORETICAL BASIS . . . . . 15 4 OPERATION POINTBLANK . . . . 23 5 OPERATION LINEBACKER II . . . . 35 6 OPERATION DESERT STORM . . . . . 51 7 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE . . . . 69 8 CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS, AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 85...
In this paper, Lt Col Rex R. Kiziah, USAF, examines current US efforts to cooperatively develop and deploy with Japan and South Korea a theater missile defense (TMD) family of systems (FoS) in Northeast Asia. First, the author summarizes the US security strategy for the East Asia-Pacific region with emphasis on the importance of regional missile defense. Second, he characterizes the ballistic missile capabilities of North Korea and China, which constitute the primary threat in the region and have spurred increased US and allied pursuit of advanced TMD systems. Third, the author discusses the advantages, country-specific issues and status of cooperative US, Japanese, and South Korean TMD developmental activities. Finally, Colonel Kiziah details some of the complex regional security issues associated with US, Japanese, and South Korean missile defense activities vis-à-vis China and Taiwan; the challenges in ameliorating Chinese concerns; and the prospects of longterm partnering and fielding of a tri-country, integrated regional TMD system....
Major M. V. Smith’s 'Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower' is an important contribution to the spacepower literature. Major Smith’s work begins to quench the growing thirst among those seeking to understand elements contributing to spacepower. More importantly, it offers a view of what spacepower will mean for the United States in the coming decades. I believe Ten Propositions Regarding Spacepower will live up to its aim: assisting political leaders, military professionals, and interested citizens to understand better the nature of space as a source of national and military power....
This study concludes airpower will play an increasingly dominant role in future US contingency responses. Power projection is defined as the finite application of military power by national command authority to achieve discrete political ends outside the borders of the United States, its territories, and possessions. Power projection contingencies are characterized as wars and operations short of war, but not conflicts that are global or total in nature. Future contingencies that demand a US response may occur without warning, be time sensitive, and require short duration deployments. Building a strong power projection capability requires a thorough evaluation of the relative efficacy of air, land, and sea power to perform the power projection mission. This evaluation concludes airpower has a great potential to achieve national security objectives decisively in future contingency responses....
This paper shows that in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other counterinsurgency operations, space forces will not be “war winners” but can provide crucial support. Specifically, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities can help isolate the battlespace. These systems can also enhance the ability to combat fielded rebels through surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications. Finally, the effects space forces generate can support the government and help strengthen its ability to solve the insurgents’ cause. The discussion concludes with specific recommendations to improve performance against this and future insurrections....