Psychological Operations : Principles and Case Studies serves as a fundamental guide to PSYOP philosophy, concepts, principles, issues, and thought for both those new to, and those experienced in, the PSYOP field and PSYOP applications . This book clarifies the value of PSYOP as a cost-effective weapon and incorporates it as a psychological instrument of US military and political power, especially given our present budgetary constraints. The authors contribute to the understanding of psychological operations by presenting diverse articles that portray the value of the planned use of human actions to influence perceptions, public opinion, attitudes, and behaviors so that PSYOP victories can be achieved in war and in peace. The four sections classify articles with related themes into a common category....

This study uses Brig Gen J. F. C. Fuller’s theory of war to investigate the motivation of pilots flying in combat. The study holds the physical and cognitive domains of war variables constant and analyzes the moral domain effects on pilot behavior....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 THE MORAL DOMAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 3 METHODOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4 SURVEY RESULTS AND ANALYSIS . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40...

Lt Col Thomas D. Torkelson claims that the inability of the United States to achieve its stated political objectives in its global war on terror (GWOT) reflects its flawed kinetic-centric military strategy. This study erects a framework of effectiveness utilizing Clausewitzian principles to judge military strategy. By considering the expressed political objectives of the GWOT, the centers of gravity (COG) that military strategy should target within this struggle, and the GWOT’s placement along a Clausewitzian continuum of violence, this paper evaluates US military efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) through the perspective of two opposing models....

1 THE TIMELINESS OF TIMELESSNESS . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 2 CLAUSEWITZIAN EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . .9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 THE KINETIC MODEL AND ITS PREVALENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4 THE NONKINETIC MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: THE MODELS APPLIED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113...

In the aftermath of 9/11, President George W. Bush declared the dawn of a new kind of war. He has repeatedly emphasized that means and measures of success in this new war will differ greatly from wars past. However, if this “war on terrorism” is unlike any other war, then what is it like? From the public statements of high-ranking US officials, metaphorical answers emerge: terrorism is a metastasizing cancer, a plague, a threat from which we are not immune. This study explores the analogies of immunity, infection, and cancer. In doing so it addresses the classic strategic question: What is the nature of the enemy and of the fight?...

1 EMERGING METAPHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THREATS FROM WITHOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 THREATS FROM WITHIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 REDEFINING WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33...

This paper explores the relationship between Information Warfare (IW) and Public Affairs (PA) and reveals a direct link through the role of propaganda in each. A historical analysis of propaganda in past wars yields lessons which can be applied to formulating PA policy on IW today. In light of the evidence, three possible options emerge regarding the possible IW roles PA might adopt. Option One—a “Hands Off” policy—seeks to avoid any association with IW and represents the current PA approach. Option Two upholds the primacy of truth but acknowledges PA must take an active role in IW. Option Three suggests PA abandon its policy to tell the truth and actively en-gage in all IW activities, including disinformation. This paper finds Option Two as the logical role for PA in today’s environment and concludes with several recommendations to implement the policy....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 4 2 DEFINING INFORMATION WARFARE AND IDENTIFYING THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS LINK . . . . . 5 Information Warfare and the CNN Factor . . . . 7 Public Affairs and Psychological Operations Roles Begin to Blur . . . . 8 Notes . . . .12 3 A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MILITARY PROPAGANDA . . . . .15 Revolutionary War . . . . . 16 Civil War . . . . .17 Spanish–American War . . . . .18 World War I . . . . .19 World War II: The War against Germany . . . . .21 World War II: The War against Japan . . . . .23 Korea and Vietnam . . . .24 Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War . . . . . 25 Summary . . . . .27 Notes . . . .28 4 PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPTIONS/IMPLICATIONS FOR INFORMATION WARFARE . . . . .31 Three Public Affairs Path Options . . . . .31 Option One: “Hands Off” . . . .31 Option Two: Public Affairs Conducts Information Warfare, Upholding Primacy of Truth . . . . .34 Option Three: Public Affairs Engages in Information Warfare, Including Disinformation . . . . .38 Notes . . . .40 5 CONCLUSION . . . . .43...

This study seeks to answer the question, “How can airpower help resolve time-induced tensions between political and military imperatives in the conduct of modern warfare?” To answer this question, the study begins by exploring time in the theory of war with an emphasis on time as a fourth dimension that provides a distinct perspective on warfare. With concepts gleaned from theory, this study analyzes the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Falklands War, and the Gulf War to determine the role airpower played in overcoming time conflicts and achieving political-military congruence. The study concludes that a time-based strategy, defined as one in which time is a paramount or extremely significant consideration, was the mechanism through which airpower worked to resolve time-induced tensions between political and military imperatives....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Overview . . . 1 Methodology . . . . . 2 Definitions . . . . . . 2 Limits of the Argument . . . 3 Notes . . . . . 3 2 TIME IN THE THEORY OF WAR . . . 5 War Theorists on Time . . . . 6 Characteristics of Time in War . . . 7 Physical and Psychological Aspects of Time . . . . . 8 Political and Military Dynamics of Time . . . . . . 9 Summary . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 11 3 THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF 1967 . . . . . . 13 The Course of the War . . . . 13 Political Imperatives . . . . . 14 Military Imperatives . . . . . 15 The Time Problem . . . . . . 15 Operational Consequences and Risk . . . . . 16 Airpower’s Role . . . . 17 Summary . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 20 4 THE FALKLANDS WAR . . . . 21 The Course of the War . . . . 21 Political Imperatives . . . . . 22 Military Imperatives . . . . . 24 The Time Problem . . . . . . 25 Operational Consequences and Risk . . . . . 25 The Role of Airpower . . . . . 27 Summary . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 29 5 THE GULF WAR . . . . 31 The Course of the War . . . . 31 Political Imperatives . . . . . 32 Military Imperatives . . . . . 34 The Time Problem . . ....

As we near the beginning of a new century the international system and relations between nations are undergoing far-reaching and fundamental changes.

Part 1 Factors Inhibiting Accommodative Diplomacy since World War II 1 Bargaining with Threats and Incentives : The Nature of Positive Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Kerman, Containment, and Carrots . . . . . 23 3 Historical Analogies, the Containment Paradigm, and the Role of Inducements . . .47 4 Other Impediments to Conciliation: Rhetoric, Politics, and Personality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 5 Global Change and Superpower Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101 Part 2 Case Studies 6 Quemoy Crisis of 1958 . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 7 Berlin Crisis of 1958--59 . . . . . . . . . . . .193 8 Berlin Crisis of 1961 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .221 9 Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .251 Part 3 Summary 10 Sticks, Carrots, and Positive Diplomacy: A Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .293 11 Some Final Thoughts on Force and Accommodation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .349...

Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia provides a comprehensive analysis of the factors that affected both interagency processes and policy outcomes during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91) and the early stages of the Bosnia crisis (1993–95). Going one-on-one with members of Washington’s policy elite who were involved directly in these two cases, the author demonstrates that the US government’s approach to termination policy proved fragmented and personality driven. She systematically presents evidence to support the study’s conclusion, revealing that the nature of the gap between diplomats and war fighters will consistently produce policies that bring about cease-fire in the form of war termination, but fail to address the underlying causes and conditions that generated conflict (and, potentially, war). These issues must be resolved if the US government hopes to improve the social and political conditions of those embroiled in conflict while at the same time bolstering a security posture favorable to US interests in the aftermath of intervention. The three sections of this work thematically present...

PART I Framing the Problem 1 CONFLICT TERMINATION WITHIN A BUREAUCRATIC ENVIRONMENT . . . . . . . . . 3 Interagency Decision Making via Negotiation. . . . . . . . . . 5 The Efficacy of the Policy-Making Process . . 14 Outline of the Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Implications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CHOICE . . . . . . . 27 Decision-Making Approaches: Units of Analysis as Delimiters . . . . . . . . . 28 Rational Choice Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 Groups as “Less than Rational” Actors . . . . .41 Rationale for Alternative Approaches . . . . . .48 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 CONFLICT TERMINATION MODELS . . . . . . 61 Points or Processes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 Rational Actor Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . 85 Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Approach . . . . 85 US Government Decision Making . . . . . . . . 92 ...