The thesis of this paper is that the advanced capabilities provided by TSAT are limited and will not be sufficient to serve the ground-based portion of the communications network supporting network-centric warfare (NCW). To validate this proposition, this study will start by identifying space-based systems that will enable NCW, discuss the requirements for ground-based NCW, and finally determine the combination of spaced-based systems sufficient to deliver advanced capabilities to the war fighter....

The purpose of this study is to help ensure the US military, especially the USAF, is prepared to take advantage of reusable launch vehicles (RLV) should the NASA-led effort to develop an RLV demonstrator prove successful. The focus of this study is an explanation of how the US military could use RLVs, by describing and analyzing two concepts of operations....

INTRODUCTION . . . 1 CONCEPTS AND ATTRIBUTES . . . . . . . 7 CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS . . . . . . 19 ANALYSIS . . . . 29 CONCLUSIONS . . . . 43 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . 49...

Regardless of one’s views on the AEF, this paper presents points for discussion as the Air Force comes to grips with both the changing nature of future conflict and the Air Force’s ability to provide the National Command Authorities with a credible aerospace force. We encourage open debate on this critical topic....

This study analyzes the need for a national aerospace strategy that encompasses the two aspects of aerospace power: the aerospace industry and military aerospace. The author assesses the aerospace industry as to its importance to the United States. The conclusion is that this industry provides the kind of high-technology, high-wage jobs necessary to improve the nation’s standard of living in the future. Next, the writer evaluates current military strategies against a set of political imperatives and the reliance each strategy has upon aerospace power. The results of this process show that each military service is very reliant upon aerospace power for the success of its strategy. By coupling these two building blocks with the serious problems that exist in the aerospace industry and in military aerospace, the author shows the need for the United States to develop a national aerospace strategy. The final section of the study proposes the goals and objectives of such a strategy and proposes the formation of a National Aerospace Council to fully develop and implement a national aerospace strategy. ...

This history continues the story of United States Air Force ideas, concepts, and doctrine from the watershed of massive retaliation/flexible response that was occasioned in 1960. The first three chapters of this volume are in effect reprinted from the 1974 edition of Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, and the following chapters have been added to bring this never-ending story up to 1984....

This is not a history of military airlift but rather an investigation of ideas and concepts as they have evolved and have been applied to warfighting . Airlift is the backbone of deterrence . A properly structured and equipped airlift force is critical to the successful execution of the national military strategy . How we think about airlift and how we translate those thoughts into a meaningful expression of how to develop, deploy, and employ airlift forces is vital to the national defense. Colonel Miller's study is a definitive step in that important process....

1 THE PRE-WORLD WAR II ERA . . . . . . . . . .1 The Air Power Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I Air Transportation Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ANew Air Transport Organization . . . . . . . . .13 The Woodring Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Prewar Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Prelude to World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 2 WORLDWIDE AIRLIFT IN THE WAR YEARS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Air Corps Ferrying Command . . . . . . . .27 June 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Air Transport Command . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Army Air Force Regulation 20-44 . . . . . . . . 65 The Nexus of Policy and Doctrine . . . . . . .67 White and Green: Doctrinal Hallmarks . . . . .72 The Strategic Airlift Heritage of World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 3 TROOP CARRIER AND THEATER AIRLIFT IN WORLD WAR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 Origins of Troo...

A decision to put weapons in space—or to refrain from doing so—should be based on a firm understanding about what such weapons can be expected to achieve. More specifically since numerous orbital weapons concepts have been advocated as natural evolutions of surface and airborne weapons, it would appear useful to compare those proposed spacebased systems with their terrestrial counterparts. Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? by Maj William L. Spacy II evaluates the theoretical capabilities of orbital weapons and compares them to weapons already in existence and to emerging concepts proposed for development....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Space Weaponization Debate . . . . . . . . . . 1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 SPACE-BASED WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Directed Energy Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Direct Impact Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Defending Space-Based Assets . . . . . . . . . 32 Technological Factors Bearing on Space-Based Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3 SEEKING CONTROL OF SPACE: GROUND-BASED ALTERNATIVES FOR SPACE CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Defensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Nondestructive Approaches to Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Destructive Approaches to Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4 ATTACKING TERRESTRIAL...

To lead the US Air Force into the future, it is necessary to understand the past and present nature of the force. With this in mind, Air Force leaders have always sought to arm members of the force with a basic knowledge and understanding of Air Force culture and history. This volume is a contribution to that ongoing educational process, but as the title states, this is only an introduction. The information provided here merely scratches the surface of the fascinating stories of the people, equipment, and operations of the Air Force. Topics that are covered here in only a few short paragraphs have been, and will continue to be the subject of entire books. We hope this volume will be a starting point and a reference work to facilitate your continuing study of aerospace power....

PART I Space Organization, Doctrine, and Architecture 1 An Aerospace Strategy for an Aerospace Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Stephen E. Wright 2 After the Gulf War: Balancing Space Power’s Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Frank Gallegos 3 Blueprints for the Future: Comparing National Security Space Architectures . . . . . . . . . . 103 Christian C. Daehnick PART II Sanctuary/Survivability Perspectives 4 Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 David W. Ziegler PART III Space Control Perspectives 5 Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 James G. Lee 6 When the Enemy Has Our Eyes . . . . . . . 303 Cynthia A. S. McKinley PART IV High-Ground Perspectives 7 National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 William W. Bruner III 8 Concepts of Operations for a Reusable Launch Space Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 Michael A. Rampino 9 The Inherent Limitations of Space Power: Fact or Fiction...

1 OVERARCHING CONCEPTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Information War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Parallel War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Revolution in Military Affairs . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 2 PEER COMPETITOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .68 3 NICHE COMPETITOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 4 NEAR-TERM ACTIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107...

Control of the vertical dimension—air and space—is essential to preserving healthy commerce and situational awareness during peacetime and sustaining military operations during conflict. Air and space forces must be integrated in order to achieve rapid dominance of the battle space when necessary. While airpower has existed for almost a century, military space operations are yet in their infancy. Military leaders, planners, and operators are just beginning to recognize the importance and legitimacy of space as a center of gravity and war-fighting medium....

The method or objective of Strategic Paralysis is to selectively attack or threaten those strategic or national level targets that most directly support the enemy’s war-making efforts and will to continue with his current behavior. Strategic Paralysis warfare should result in a change in the enemy’s behavior at a lesser cost to both sides as Airpower assets are the primary weapons --not ground troops. Why Airpower? It is the only weapon that can provide the near simultaneous shock to the enemy’s central nervous system necessary to induce paralysis. To achieve success Strategic Paralysis requires four key ingredients: 1) Correctly identifying the enemy’s National Elements of Value (NEVs), 2) High technology, 3) An enemy dependent upon a well developed, modern and vulnerable infrastructure, and 4) Aerospace Control. The bulk of this study is devoted to defining this strategy and bettering our understanding of the first ingredient, that of choosing the best targets for attack....

1. Introduction...............1 2. The Theory of Strategic Paralysis...............12 3. Choosing the Right Targets...............34 4. More Targeting Theories...............61 5. The National Elements of Value Model...............77 6. Conclusions...............110...

National leaders are debating the merits of American weapons in space. A decision to operationally deploy such weapons would reverse the United States’s long-standing commitment to space as a sanctuary. That sanctuary—the idea that space should remain relatively unthreatened by weapons—has been challenged in the past but for the most part still exists today. Further weaponizing space, though, could change that and introduces important issues. The political, military, social, economic, and diplomatic ramifications of American space weapons demand that strategists carefully consider all sides of this critical debate. Current defense literature, however, indicates analysts and leaders have been slow to develop the arguments supporting a space sanctuary. This omission could undermine the military community’s appreciation for all aspects of both problem and solution. In turn the quality of the space strategy eventually pursued might suffer. This study attempts to understand the argument against weapons in space. It asks the question: Could pursuing a space sanctuary policy in the immediate future benefit the national interest? This study...

INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 DEFINITIONS . . . . 5 SPACE WEAPONS AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE . . . . 9 CONTEMPORARY US POLICY AND SPACE WEAPONS . . . . 21 THE SANCTUARY ARGUMENT . . . . 27 CONCLUSIONS . . . . 47...

Having flown in a single-seat cockpit more than 14 hours deploying to Southwest Asia, I am familiar with the negative effects of long duration flights as well as the impact transmeridian sorties have on an aircrew’s circadian rhythm. Any attempt to make that experience less painful for the aviators climbing into their jets during future deployments deserves pursuit and further investigation. Unfortunately, a great deal of the information available for the operational aircrews is either underemphasized at best or totally ignored by the personnel that the data is intended to support, the aviators. Typically, fatigue and circadian rhythm disruption are assumed as “necessary evils” that aviators have no choice but to accept. Yet fatigue can be a significant factor in terms of performance degradation and must no longer be overlooked. I have amassed the most current research regarding fatigue and its associated countermeasures, and I strongly recommend both commanders and aircrews apply the information presented in this research paper if they are to continue to safely meet the challenges of an Expeditionary Aerospace Force....

This history seeks to discover and record the mainstream of thought within the United States Air Force (and its predecessors) concerning the role to be played by air and aerospace power in a deadly struggle for national survival . It seeks to trace the development of a theme of institutional thought, describe the organizational framework in which the thinking took place, and identify individual thinkers and their ideas. In great measure this chronology is the story of dedicated professional men who were attempting to discover the capabilities and limitations of new forms of air and aerospace power and to relate these new characteristics of military power to the defense of the United States and its national interests....

The purpose of this thesis is to take the first steps toward a military space power theory. It begins by answering the question: Why does the US military need space power theory? The United States or any military spacefaring nation needs theory because space power is more than simply a force enhancer but is a separate and unique form of military power with the capacity to deter and compel. An analysis of the fundamental attributes of military power—identified here as presence, perspective, response, and destructive capability—demonstrates the unique advantages and disadvantages of space vis-à-vis land, sea, and airpower. A unifying principle of “globalness” links the laws, rules, and precepts of a prototype theory based on space power’s unique capabilities. The space power theory provides a common vision that allows a space-faring nation to take full advantage of these unique capabilities....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . 1 2 NATIONAL AND MILITARY POWER . . . . 9 3 SPACE AND MILITARY POWER . . . . . . 25 4 SPACE POWER THEORY . . . . . . . . . 41 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 61 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . 67...

1 NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS . . . . . . . . . . 1 Ambling toward Sputnik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 NASA’s Predecessor Organization and the DOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2 EISENHOWER ACT I: REACTION TO SPUTNIK AND THE BIRTH OF NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Eisenhower Attempts to Calm the Nation . . .32 President’s Scientific Advisory Committee and Civil Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Johnson and the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee . . . . . . . . . . . 46 The NACA Enters the Fray . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 The PSAC and “Introduction to Outer Space” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 Balancing Civilian and Military Responsibilities in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 3 EISENHOWER ACT II: FORGING A NASA-DOD RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 To Compete with the Soviet Union . . . . . . . 93 Space for Peace? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Air Force Phi...

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . .xvii Essays Airpower in World War I, 1914–1918 . . . . . . .1 Robin Higham The True Believers: Airpower between the Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Alan Stephens Did the Bomber Always Get Through?: The Control of Strategic Airspace, 1939–1945 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 John McCarthy World War II: Air Support for Surface Forces 85 Vincent Orange World War II: The Bombing of Germany . . 107 Richard J. Overy Definite Limitations: The Air War in Korea 1950–1953 . . . . . . . 143 Jeffrey Grey The Air War in Vietnam: Reevaluating Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .169 C. D. Coulthard-Clark Airpower as a National Instrument: The Arab-Israeli Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .191 R. A. Mason It Was a Bit of a Close Call: Some Thoughts on the S...

This study chronologically traces the historical development of the aerospace concept, from its initial inception in 1944 as it was embodied in the far-reaching vision of Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold, until its public appearance in 1958. This study also uncovers reasons why airmen came to see their primary area of responsibility differently than the rest of the nation and why their aerospace concept failed to win bureaucratic support. By tracing the aerospace concept’s technological and intellectual development against a contextual backdrop of geopolitics, national security strategy, national space policy, interservice competition, and internal tensions within the Air Force, this paper offers historical lessons learned for today’s planners seeking to move the Air Force toward an aerospace force....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 5 2 AEROSPACE’S NASCENCY (1944–47) . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . 18 3 AEROSPACE VERSUS THE AIR FORCE (1947–52) . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . 32 4 AEROSPACE VERSUS EISENHOWER (1953–58) . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . 63 5 SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . 82 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . 85 Notes . . . . . 86...

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE.............................1 Definitions................................................ 1 Direction.................................................. 3 Notes....................................................... 7 2 THE HISTORIC PRECEDENT: A REQUIREMENT FOR FLEXIBILITY........................................ 9 The Lessons of War.................................... 9 The Nuclear Imperative............................. 15 Notes.................................................. 21 3 THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY.................. 25 Real Smarts in Small Packages .................26 Near Nukes and Real Nukes .......................32 Space: Star Wars in Context .....................40 Notes.................................................. 47 4 APPLYING THE LESSONS: CHANGING AEROSPACE DOCTRINE.............................. 51 The Importance of Actions .........................52 The Global Perspective.............................. 57 Proposals for the Future: A Doctrinal Synthesis...............................................59 The Falklands: A Global Scenario..............64 Notes....................

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix PART I Strategic Factors Reshaping Strategies and Missions Maj Gen Charles D. Link, USAF Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Air Power in the New Security Environment . . .9 Secretary of the Air Force Donald B . Rice Air Power in US Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Dr EdwardN. Luttwak The United States as an Aerospace Power in the Emerging Security Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Dr Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Col John A . Warden III, USAF The Role of the US Air Force in the Employment of Air Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 PART II Air Power as an Element of US Power Projection Page Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Air Power since World War I...

This paper asserts there exists a dangerous GAP in US strategic intertheater transportation capabilities, propounds a model describing the GAP, and proposes a solution to the problem. Using the Gulf War logistics flow as a model, the three phase points are shown and their airlift/sealift tradeoffs discussed. Other logistics support options, which figured in the war, such as prepositioning and host nation support, are discussed and the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations shown to be, in many ways, a fortuitous theater of operations. This serendipitous combination of circumstances contributed greatly to our successful logistics buildup and is unlikely to recur....

Logistics Flow During The Gulf War 1 Introduction 1 Strategic lift Phasing 4 Transportation/Support Modes 8 Mobility Studies 16 Summary 19 Conclusion 23 Notes 24 Filling The Gap: The Airship 28 Prologue 28 Introduction 31 The Airship in History 32 Airship Technology 42 Potential Military Roles 53 Conclusion 68 Epilogue 69 Notes 72...

The planning for space-based MTI is in its early phases. A “Concept of Operations for Space-Based MTI” has been written, as has a “Space-Based MTI Roadmap.” US Space Command has also written the Long Range Plan, which includes space-based MTI concepts in its plan for 2020. These plans are a good start but do not address several important issues, including satellite architecture, whether satellite MTI systems should completely replace airborne systems, who should be responsible for the system, and how battle managers will operate in the new system....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 3 2 THE EVOLUTION OF MOVING TARGET INDICATOR RADAR SYSTEMS . . . .5 Notes . . . . 11 3 THE MECHANICS OF SPACE OPERATIONS . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . 23 4 UNITED STATES SPACE ORGANIZATIONS THAT MAY AFFECT SPACE-BASED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT . . . .27 Notes . . . . 34 5 TECHNOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT AIRBORNE MOVING TARGET INDICATOR SYSTEMS AND PROPOSED SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . 42 6 ISSUES TO CONSIDER FOR SPACE-BASED MOVING TARGET INDICATOR PLANNING . . . . 45 Notes . . . . 53 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . 55...

In March 1992, the Air Force published a new Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. This document is not merely an update of previous editions. Instead, it is a statement of propositions concerning the use of aerospace power set within the context of war, and based on explicit analysis of historical and contemporary experience. Its intent is to provide guidance for the exercise of professional judgement by all aerospace leaders. This thesis is intended to provide a framework for examining this new doctrine. It traces the heritage of aerospace power and examines the history and theory behind Air Force doctrine. It then evaluates how well this new manual explains aerospace power’s role in Desert Storm and assesses the implications of the doctrine necessary for the future joint use of aerospace forces. The research question asks how well this new AFM 1-1 provides the basic guidelines needed for using aerospace power in a theater-level conventional war such as Desert Storm. Unclassified material relating to the history of aerospace doctrine, aerospace performance in Desert Storm, and other service...

I. DOCTRINAL BEGINNINGS Introduction 1 Doctrine Defined 2 Sources of Doctrine 3 Previous Doctrines 4 II. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW AFM 1-1 Introduction 19 Chapter 1. "War and the American Mind" 20 Chapter 2. “The Nature of Aerospace Power" 21 Chapter 3. "Employing Aerospace Forces" 23 Chapter 4. "Preparing the Air Force for War" 25 Evaluation of AFM 1-1 as Doctrine 26 AFM 1-1 and Desert Storm 29 III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS National Security Policy 34 Nationa1 Mi1itary Strategy 35 Need For Joint Doctrine 38 Naval Doctrine 40 Marine Doctrine 42 Army Doctrine 44 Air Force Doctrine 45 Resolution 46 IV. CONCLUSION . 48...