Description Details
To reinvigorate strategic thought within the Air Force, this study addresses a single question: what critical capabilities—through the combatant commanders—will the nation require of the Air Force by 2030?...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Supporting Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Air Force Critical Capabilities, 2020–30 . . . . .5 Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Freedom of Action: Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Freedom of Action: Space . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Freedom of Action: Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Global Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . .13 Air Diplomacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Military Support to Civil Authorities . . . . . . . 17 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 3 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Power Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Freedom of Action: Air . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Freedom of Action: Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Freedom of Action: Cyber . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Global Situational Awareness . . . . . . . . . . .29 Air Diplomacy . ...

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The Air Force has challenged leaders to integrate and use quality principles as a way to improve operations throughout the service. In this study Lt Col David F. Bird, USAF, reminds us that these quality principles apply to emergency response forces, both before and during a crisis. He proposes that senior leaders view quality concepts and principles as a way of creating an environment to spark the highest performance by their subordinates and not as giving up authority or control....

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The use of the heavy bomber during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is just one more chapter on the flexibility of airpower. Bombers in the early stages of the war destroyed the Taliban air force on the ground and the limited air-to-air defenses, as well as disrupting command and control nodes. Orbiting close over problem areas, heavy bombers, guided by ground terminal attack controllers, precisely struck key targets. The bombers were supplying something different than traditional CAS. This new form of warfare used small parties of ground troops in support of the massive firepower that the bombers could provide. Each war is different; and in this case, there were virtually no external threats to the bombers. With total air dominance and the freedom to range over the battlefield at will, utilizing heavy bombers in the GAPS role was possible. This combination of the JDAM along with improved communications systems made this new mission a reality. With the success of these operations, Colonel Theisen believes the USAF should initiate doctrine, rules of engagement, and training changes to accommodate this mission....

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The study concludes that a viable Air Force strategy in Africa is properly based on modest “ends” that reflect US national interests on the continent that are themselves limited in scope. These modest ends require that correspondingly limited “ways” and “means” be applied in order for the entire Air Force approach to remain balanced. The ways should focus on missions that create conditions for African states to solve their own security issues, thereby increasing their legitimacy. The means should focus on building the capacity for long-term operations in Africa with access to airfields, a force structure that includes strike and transport aircraft specialized for the region, an Air Force organization tailored to the peculiar demands of the continent, and specialized cultural training for Airmen. Spaven concludes that “only by accepting the risk of stepping beyond tactical and operational thinking can the Air Force do great things for the poorest of continents.”...

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1 THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 2 AIRPOWER IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM THE PAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 CURRENT US ACTIVITIES AND GUIDANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 4 WHAT CAN AIRMEN EXPECT IN AFRICA? . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 5 HOW SHOULD AIRMEN THINK ABOUT AFRICA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 6 CONCLUSION: A US AIR FORCE STRATEGY FOR AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75...

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Lt Col John J. Zentner’s The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Morale in Combat addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during combat. More specifically, Colonel Zentner’s study seeks to identify and define those unique characteristics associated with leading airmen that sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Leadership and Morale in Air Combat . . . . .91 Existing Thoughts on Military Morale . . . . . .92 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 2 THE MORALE PROBLEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Who Is the Leader? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Morale: The Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Power of Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Maintaining Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 3 MAJ ADOLF GALLAND: JAGDGESCHWADER 26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Germany’s Battle for Britain. . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Jagdgeschwader 26 in the Battle of Britain . .30 Pilot Morale within Jagdgeschwader 26 . . . . 31 Galland’s Influence on Morale . . . . . . . . . . 38 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . ...

Description Details
There is a story that still needs to be told about the Air Force contribution to—and shaping by—arms control. The ability to make these assessments did not blossom overnight. This book captures the story of a young Air Force’s initial (and limited) impact on arms-control negotiations and outcomes. It goes on to document a growing awareness by the service that it was better to help craft the US position than to be only a recipient of the outcome. The book highlights the lesson it belatedly learned in the early days of arms control: the Air Force has to plan and budget for treaty implementation as aggressively as it works to protect its equities during treaty negotiations....

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PART I Foundations for Strategic Arms Control, 1945–68 1 The United States Air Force and Arms Control: The Early Years . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Michael O. Wheeler 2 Peace through Strength Alone: US Air Force Views on Arms Control in the 1950s and Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Edward Kaplan PART II Strategic Arms Limitations, 1969–80 3 The Road to SALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Anne G. Campbell 4 Strategic Arms Control and the US Air Force: The SALT Era, 1969–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Jeffrey A. Larsen PART III The Reagan Years, 1981–88 5 Arms Control during the Reagan Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 Charles D. Dusch Jr. 6 National Security Strategy, Arms Control, and the US Air Force: The Reagan Years, 1981–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Forrest E. Waller Jr. PART IV Strategic Arms Reductions, 1989–2000 7 Arms Control after the Cold War . . . . . . 191 Thomas S. Mowle 8 Downsizing and Shifting Operational Emphasis for the US Air Force: The Bush and Clinton Years, 1989–2000 . . . . . . . . .227 Thomas D. Miller PART V Conclusion ...

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Part 1 The Decision 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Rumblings of Laboratory Consolidation . . . 7 3 The Catalyst: National Defense Authorization Act and Vision 21 . . . . . . . . .23 4 Overhauling Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 Laboratory Studies and Strategy . . . . . . . 71 6 Corona 1996: Leadership and Decisions . .93 7 The Last Dance: Meeting in the Secretary’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Part 2 The Transition 9 Early Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 10 Shaping the Technology Directorates . . 161 11 Getting the Message Out . . . . . . . . . . 195 12 Other Perspectives: Independent Review Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 13 Headquarters: Two Staff Directorates . . 227 14 The Final Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253 15 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265...

Description Details
To make the report useful to a potentially broad audience, team members set out to answer this question through a wide-ranging examination of the geopolitical, sociological, diplomatic, technological, and operational factors that shaped the characteristics and outcome of this particular air campaign....

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1 The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Dr. Karl Mueller 2 The Planning Background . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Lt Col Bradley S. Davis 3 US and NATO Doctrine for Campaign Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Col Maris McCrabb 4 The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan . .87 Col Christopher M. Campbell 5 Executing Deliberate Force, 30 August–14 September 1995 . . . . . . . . . 131 Lt Col Mark J. Conversino 6 Combat Assessment: A Commander’s Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 7 Assessing the Effectiveness of Deliberate Force: Harnessing the Political-Military Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 8 Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . 199 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent iii Chapter Page 9 Weapons Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . 257 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 10 Deliberate Force Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 11 Deliberate Force Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 12 Deliber...

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A comparison of the Misty and A-10 FAC missions clearly demonstrates a failure of the USAF to develop a full range of suitable tactics for the direct attack of enemy fielded forces. Although the quantum leaps in weapons delivery accuracy from Vietnam to Kosovo now make it possible to destroy armor and artillery from the air, there has not been a corresponding improvement in target identification. Until USAF prioritizes the direct attack of ground forces and target identification, its ability to attack fielded forces effectively will remain limited. Drawing from the lessons of the Misty and A-10 FACs, the recommendations presented here focus on equipment, tactics and training, and doctrine....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF AIR INTERDICTION FROM WORLD WAR I THROUGH VIETNAM . . . . . . . 7 3 MISTY-FAC TACTICS: HYPOTHETICAL MISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 HISTORY OF ATTACKING FIELDED FORCES: POST-VIETNAM TO KOSOVO . . . . . . . . . . . .41 5 A-10 FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79...

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The essays and speeches in this volume are some of Dennis Drew's best and most important. They reflect the struggle over the past 30 years to relate classical military theory to modern airpower, the difficulties of dealing with the new realities of the post–Cold War era, the struggle to understand the true nature of airpower and put it into perspective, and finally the importance of educating Airmen and raising their thinking above the tactical level....

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America’s First Air Battles: Lessons Learned or Lessons Lost? provides a successful evaluation of Michael Howard’s construct that current doctrine is probably wrong, but what matters is the capability of the military to get it right when a particular conflict begins. In the course of this evaluation, Lt Col Aldon E. Purdham Jr. examines several important airpower factors to include familiarity with the nature and geography of the conflict; parity with the adversary, especially in terms of air superiority; command and control of air assets, especially in interdiction and close air support missions; and the confluence of airpower weapons with doctrine and training....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN THE KOREAN WAR, 25 JUNE–25 JULY 1950 . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN THE VIETNAM WAR, 2 MARCH–1 APRIL 1965 . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 4 INITIAL PERIOD OF OPERATIONS IN DESERT STORM, 17 JANUARY–15 FEBRUARY 1991 . . 45 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .64 5 ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79...

Description Details
To lead the US Air Force into the future, it is necessary to understand the past and present nature of the force. With this in mind, Air Force leaders have always sought to arm members of the force with a basic knowledge and understanding of Air Force culture and history. This volume is a contribution to that ongoing educational process, but as the title states, this is only an introduction. The information provided here merely scratches the surface of the fascinating stories of the people, equipment, and operations of the Air Force. Topics that are covered here in only a few short paragraphs have been, and will continue to be the subject of entire books. We hope this volume will be a starting point and a reference work to facilitate your continuing study of aerospace power....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 1 THE USAF TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 FRAMING THE QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 THE CURRENT FIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Irregular Warfare: Winning the Long War . . . 6 Air Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Strategic Communication: Spreading the Word . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Culture and Language in the Expeditionary Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Distributed Planning: The Key to Centralized Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Unmanned Aerial Systems: The Air Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Intelligence Reform: The Secondary Effects of Merging Intelligence with Surveillance and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 The Total Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Air Base Disaster Planning: Contingency Operations . . . . . . ....

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One of the challenges Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, sends to Air Force students, researchers, and staff offices is to investigate future concepts of operations (CONOPS). One in particular relates to this study, the CONOPS for space and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is very sensitive about incorporating new technology into its operations. While the authors advocate a feasibility study for reactors in space in a CONOPS, they also explore a deeper problem with widespread societal rejection and revulsion concerning the theoretical employment of nuclear technology in space....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 WHITHER SPACE NUCLEAR POWER? . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 SPACE NUCLEAR POWER AS TRANSSCIENTIFIC PUBLIC POLICY . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 POLITICAL PERMISSION—THE CONTEMPORARY DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 A TRANSSCIENTIFIC POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Appendix A THE HISTORY OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 B PROJECT PROMETHEUS—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—DECEMBER 2003 . . . . . . . . . . 89 C THE MEMBER GROUPS OF THE ...

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In this important study, Lt Col Daniel R. Simmons, USAF, argues that the United States Air Force (USAF) officer success in the twenty-first century will depend on a robust ethical and professional foundation based on Air Force core values. The Air Force has widely promulgated the following core values: “Integrity first, Service before self, and Excellence in all we do.” However, recently well publicized cases of core values failures among some Air Force officers suggest a crisis in character that threatens leadership effectiveness in the Air Force....

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Col William Palmby’s award-winning study, Outsourcing the Air Force Mission: A Strategy for Success, explores how the Air Force must adjust to this new reality of a world where the state no longer possesses a monopoly on war. He reviews the history and driving forces that have led to increased outsourcing by the Air Force, finding that while it may be the most dominant such force in history, the range of roles turned over to the private market means that private companies and their employees now have a significant influence on the very success or failure of its critical operations....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 WHERE WE ARE TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4 A STRATEGY FOR SUCCESS . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59...

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Formative Years in Total War . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2 Marketing A Vision (1945–53) . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 3 Curtis E. LeMay and the Rise of the Strategic Air Command (1948–57) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 4 The Apogee of Strategic Air Command and the Missile Challenge (1961–62) . . . . 103 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 5 Flexible Response and the Ossification of the Senior Absolutists (1963–65) . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 6 Absolutists and the Frustration of Airpower in Vietnam (1964–69) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 7 The Vindication of Airpower and the Rise of the Fighter Community (1965–72) . . . . 185 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 8 Changing of the Guard: The Rise of the Fighter Generals (1973–82) . . . . . . 211 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228 9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...