Nothing speaks better to the subject of effective leadership than the need to develop professionally. General Lorenz believes that leadership is tied to a continuing study of the profession, thus the need for leaders to read. He particularly advocates reading biographies of great leaders. He found that learning from other’s experiences helped keep him from wasting time reinventing the wheel. And reading, like any other leadership development, is a lifetime experience because, as he describes it, “Life is a marathon, not a 50-yard dash.”...

After describing the type of visionary senior officers needed to lead the Air Force of the future, the study team recommends the identification of “high potential” officers upon selection for field-grade rank. This special designation allows the Air Force to focus education and assignment opportunities on those officers most likely to attain flag rank and senior joint billets. Subsequent recommendations are designed to provide additional leadership development opportunities for officers after they attain flag rank. These initiatives emphasize the focus we must place on developing and continuing leadership education for officers at every stage in their careers. The future strategic environment demands nothing less....

1 Introduction 1 2 Leadership Concepts 11 3 The Deliberate Development of Air Force Officers 21 4 Recommendations 35 5 Conclusions 45

Technology Horizons is our vision for key Air Force science and technology investments over the next decade that will provide us with truly game-changing capabilities to meet our strategic and joint force responsibilities. The coming decades hold high promise for amazing new capabilities across the air, space, and cyber domains. Yet the Air Force and our nation will also be confronted with substantial strategic, technology, and budget challenges. Our greatest advances will come with a focused investment of resources in the most promising technologies. The vision in Technology Horizons provides the shared awareness of the challenges and opportunities that will enable us to achieve this focus....

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . vii FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE . . . . ix PREFACE BY THE CHIEF SCIENTIST OF THE AIR FORCE . . . . xi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . xv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . xvii 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 A Vision for Air Force Science and Technology 2010–30 . . . . 1 Lessons Learned from Prior Air Force Science and Technology Visions . . . . 5 Organization and Conduct of Technology Horizons . . . . . 8 Organization of Results from Technology Horizons . . . . . 14 Caveats . . . . 16 2 STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR AIR FORCE S&T 2010–30 . . . . . 19 Relation to National Security Objectives . . . . . 21 Technology-Derived Challenges to Air Force Capabilities . . . . . 22 Strategic Implications of S&T Globalization . . . . 38 Federal Budget Implications for Air Force S&T Strategy . . . . . 41 3 ENDURING REALITIES FOR THE AIR FORCE 2010–30 . . . . . 43 Ensuring Interoperability with Legacy Systems . . . . 43 Sustainment Costs for Legacy Systems . . . . . 43 Importance of Low-Observable Systems . . . . 44 Energy Costs and Availability . . . . . 44 Growing Role ...

This thesis evaluates the near-term military utility of virtual reality (VR) and its component technologies to the battle management of an air campaign. It presumes a large-scale air campaign on the order to that in the Gulf War where air operations were continuous, prolonged, and intense. The research concludes by assessing the viability and implication of a military decision to invest in a VR-enhanced air battle management system. Recommendations are given for areas in need of further research and development....

This paper explores the utility of a debriefing method resulting in individual, unit, and organizational transcendence toward increased effectiveness in the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF). The conceptual framework is centered on the transformational and complexity theories of leadership science. The study offers for consideration a debriefing methodology termed “holistic” as a structure for achieving both individualistic and unit inner growth and efficiency. The problem examined is the lack of proper leadership tools in the RNoAF’s operational units to understand and cope with the effects of increased stress. Based on theory and examples from operational practice, holistic debriefing is presented as a possible means for leaders to increase mission effectiveness through improved stress coping mechanisms. The secondary effects from people engaging with themselves and each other through holistic debriefing are increased self-knowledge, interpersonal trust, group confidence, and an improved working environment....

In Preventing Catastrophe: US Policy Options for Management of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, Lt Col Martin J. “Marty” Wojtysiak, USAF, proposes a response to the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. This paper highlights the threat in “The Nuclear Catastrophe of 2005,” a gripping projection of the worstcase scenario on the current realities of the Indian subcontinent. Written a year after the “catastrophe,” it vividly describes the events leading up to the disaster as well as the grim aftermath of a South Asian nuclear war. The remainder of the paper looks at US regional objectives and suggests how they might be achieved. The author proposes a regional proliferation regime that realistically addresses the threat and moves the United States to a pragmatic approach to manage and limit the ongoing proliferation in South Asia....

In this important study, Lt Col Daniel R. Simmons, USAF, argues that the United States Air Force (USAF) officer success in the twenty-first century will depend on a robust ethical and professional foundation based on Air Force core values. The Air Force has widely promulgated the following core values: “Integrity first, Service before self, and Excellence in all we do.” However, recently well publicized cases of core values failures among some Air Force officers suggest a crisis in character that threatens leadership effectiveness in the Air Force....

Lt Col John J. Zentner’s The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Morale in Combat addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during combat. More specifically, Colonel Zentner’s study seeks to identify and define those unique characteristics associated with leading airmen that sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Leadership and Morale in Air Combat . . . . .91 Existing Thoughts on Military Morale . . . . . .92 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 2 THE MORALE PROBLEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Who Is the Leader? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Morale: The Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Power of Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Maintaining Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 3 MAJ ADOLF GALLAND: JAGDGESCHWADER 26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Germany’s Battle for Britain. . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Jagdgeschwader 26 in the Battle of Britain . .30 Pilot Morale within Jagdgeschwader 26 . . . . 31 Galland’s Influence on Morale . . . . . . . . . . 38 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . ...

Part 1 The Decision 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Rumblings of Laboratory Consolidation . . . 7 3 The Catalyst: National Defense Authorization Act and Vision 21 . . . . . . . . .23 4 Overhauling Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 Laboratory Studies and Strategy . . . . . . . 71 6 Corona 1996: Leadership and Decisions . .93 7 The Last Dance: Meeting in the Secretary’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Part 2 The Transition 9 Early Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 10 Shaping the Technology Directorates . . 161 11 Getting the Message Out . . . . . . . . . . 195 12 Other Perspectives: Independent Review Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 13 Headquarters: Two Staff Directorates . . 227 14 The Final Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253 15 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265...

DISCLAIMER...............................................ii FOREWORD...............................................vi ABOUT THE AUTHOR..................................viii ACKNOWLEDGMENT.....................................ix INTRODUCTION..........................................x Chapter 1 GERMINATION OF OUTER SPACE AS A LEGAL CONCEPT.......................................1 Chapter 2 AIR FORCE OPPOSITION TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON SPACE.....17 Chapter 3 AIR FORCE AS A BACKSEAT “DRIVER” IN SPACE LAW DEBATES................41 Chapter 4 PROJECT WEST FORD..................58 Chapter 5 MAJ GEN ALBERT M. KUHFELD AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP OF SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT...........................................64 Chapter 6 THE 1972 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CONVENTION............................................75 EPILOGUE.................................................86 Appendix A AIR STAFF REACTION TO PROJECT RAND REPORT DATED 28 OCTOBER 1957......90 Appendix B CONCLUSIONS OF THE AIR DOCTRINE BRANCH STUDY 8 OCTOBER 1958.......................................................92 Appendix C EXCERPTS FROM THE OPERATIONS COORDINATIN...

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE HUMP AIRLIFT OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 6 SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Illustrations Figure Page 1 Air Force Leadership Framework (Proposed) . . . . . . . . . ...

In this paper Lt Col Cristina M. Stone argues that the Air Force does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts; targeteers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operators; and unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and expertise required to fill these positions. The author recommends that the Air Force leverage its technical and scientific core and expert organizations across the government to improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. Regarding ISR operations, she proposes that the Air Force develop enhanced collection capabilities. This paper recommends changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD expertise, collection capabilities, and marketing to improve the nation’s ability to combat WMD....

This paper briefly traces the evolution of the military/media clash and identifies the Vietnam War as the turning point where mutual trust seemed to be permanently damaged. Government and military leadership pathologies combined with press distortions to leave the impression on the world stage that American wars could be won or lost in the news media. Right or wrong, the effects of a war perceived to be lost in the media, precipitated media safeguards to insure military campaigns in Grenada and Panama would not be lost on television news. While these safeguards and press controls became somewhat tempered by the time of the Gulf War, the Rubicon had been crossed. Military commanders could never again afford to ignore the way combat operations would be portrayed in the news media. This essential consideration for any would-be combat commander constitutes the new principle of war: media-spin....

This study seeks to answer the question, “If a joint force air commander finds it useful or necessary to operate at the theater level and one level below with mission-type orders or requests, what are the preconditions that must exist in order to make such a partially decentralized command system work?” To answer this question, the study examines theoretical perspectives on command and control,including those of Napoléon, the Germans, the Israelis, and former fighter pilot John R. Boyd. Following this theoretical survey, the study analyzes two historical case studies that exhibited both the use and non use of mission-type orders and requests in order to draw conclusions regarding the necessary preconditions in the categories of leadership, organization, communications technology, and procedure. These studies are Gen George C. Kenney’s air campaign in the Southwest Pacific during World War II and Operation Desert Storm....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 5 2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON COMMAND AND CONTROL . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . 14 3 MISSION ORDER COMMAND IN THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . 30 4 MISSION ORDER COMMAND IN OPERATION DESERT STORM: ITS PRESENCE AND ABSENCE . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . 45 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . 53 6 IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY’S AIR FORCE . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . 63...

Air Force Smart Operations for the Twenty-first Century (AFSO 21) is the Air Force’s initiative to recapitalize funds by maximizing value and minimizing waste in operations. This paper identifies potential failure points associated with the changing Air Force culture. Overall, the Air Force’s change plan appears to be proceeding according to schedule. However, it does not appear that the Air Force is adequately planning for a long-term sustainment of AFSO 21. There is still time for Air Force senior leadership to correct the system’s alignment and put AFSO 21 on track for long-term sustainment. A culture of continuous process improvement will take root once the Air Force leadership fully commits to AFSO 21....

Having flown in a single-seat cockpit more than 14 hours deploying to Southwest Asia, I am familiar with the negative effects of long duration flights as well as the impact transmeridian sorties have on an aircrew’s circadian rhythm. Any attempt to make that experience less painful for the aviators climbing into their jets during future deployments deserves pursuit and further investigation. Unfortunately, a great deal of the information available for the operational aircrews is either underemphasized at best or totally ignored by the personnel that the data is intended to support, the aviators. Typically, fatigue and circadian rhythm disruption are assumed as “necessary evils” that aviators have no choice but to accept. Yet fatigue can be a significant factor in terms of performance degradation and must no longer be overlooked. I have amassed the most current research regarding fatigue and its associated countermeasures, and I strongly recommend both commanders and aircrews apply the information presented in this research paper if they are to continue to safely meet the challenges of an Expeditionary Aerospace Force....

This study first provides a general discussion of peacekeeping and constructs a comprehensive framework to categorize and analyze the role of air power in peacekeeping. Next, several recommendations are presented concerning command and control, doctrine, and organizational issues. In the end, this study concludes that the role of air power in peacekeeping is primarily auxiliary. Nevertheless, among the potential US contributions to UN peacekeeping, air power may be the best medium as it offers capabilities different from those currently available to UN forces. Moreover, the use of airpower, as opposed to ground peacekeeping forces, will reduce the risk to American lives. Finally, the expanded use of air power in UN peacekeeping presents an opportunity to demonstrate US leadership and resolve while avoiding the perception of dominating the show. ...

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 2 2 DISCUSSION OF PEACEKEEPING . . . . 5 Peacekeeping Defined . . . . . . . 6 The Use of Force for Self-defense . . . . . 6 The Principles of Consent and Impartiality . . . . 7 Principle of Effective Military Support . . . . . . 8 Additional Principles . . . . 8 Peacekeeping and International Conflict Control . . . . . 8 Peacekeeping in the 21st Century . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . 12 3 AIR POWER AND PEACEKEEPING . . . . 15 Operational Analysis . . . . 17 Command and Control . . . . . . . 17 Communications . . . . . . 19 Intelligence . . . . . 21 Mobility . . . . . . . 24 Force Protection . . . . . . 26 Putting It Together—Military Effectiveness . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . 28 4 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . 34 5 CONCLUSION . . . . 37 Notes . . . . 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . 39...

Fifth Air Force light and medium bomber operations during 1942 and 1943 are textbook examples of doctrinal flexibility and extraordinary innovation. The unprecedented success of both the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid illustrate how airpower became the dominant force in the Southwest Pacific....

Through a careful examination of primary and secondary sources, as well as his own acumen as a sharp officer, Cox uses Brett’s life to illuminate those factors that at first sped Brett through the ranks and then those variables that appeared to block his further advancement....As much as studies of commanders who grabbed the brass ring, this examination of George H. Brett adds insight into the makings of effective leadership and successful command....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 EARLY LIFE AND CAREER . . . . . . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3 THE BUILDUP TO WAR . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4 CONFLAGRATION IN THE PACIFIC . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5 AIRPOWER AND ANTAGONISM IN AUSTRALIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 6 COMMAND IN THE CARIBBEAN . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101...