This study proposes a joint architecture that potentially would reduce the resources required to procure, move, store, and maintain bare base assets. Because expeditionary basing is one of its distinctive capabilities, the Air Force should be designated as the executive agent for joint bare base operations, with each service continuing to train its bare base support forces and meet its service-specific requirements....

Drawing on the histories of three services—Great Britain’s Royal Air Force from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force from 1967 to 1973, and the United States Air Force from 1953 to 1965—Major Carter offers three case studies to determine if the cult of the offensive applies to air forces. He concludes that cults of the offensive have indeed influenced airpower doctrine in the past, and that detailed offensive planning and a critical evaluation of capabilities provide two methods for avoiding this potential trap. ...

INTRODUCTION . . .1 THE NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE FOR AIRPOWER . . .5 AIRPOWER AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE OFFENSIVE . . .18 ROYAL AIR FORCE, 1918–38 . . .31 ISRAELI AIR FORCE, 1967–73 . . .52 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, 1953–65 . . .65 IMPLICATIONS . . .88 NOTES . . .95 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . .107...

Under command of British general Allenby, the EEF successfully executed one of the most decisive engagements in any theater of World War I. Ably employing and synchronizing infantry, cavalry, and air forces, Allenby provided future military professionals and historians with a shining illustration of the efficacy of combined arms operations. Unfortunately, the true lessons of Allenby’s campaign were lost for future generations of military officers. This paper analyzes the reasons those in the profession of arms missed the lessons of airpower and its role in combined arms operations. The paper also delves into the role of airpower in the Middle East and how Allenby integrated a relatively new weapon system into his force structure and operational planning and execution. Though largely unexplored by military professionals and historians, Allenby’s final campaign in Palestine proved to be a momentous step in the evolution of combined arms operations....

My interest in the center of gravity (COG) concept began in the Republic of Singapore when I noticed with some amusement that a concept which purports to help campaign planners focus their main effort can be embroiled in such controversy and confusion. I attempt to unravel some of the mystique that surrounds the employment of the COG concept. Hopefully, by drawing out the potential sources of confusion that often accompany the use of the concept, we can soften the difficulties of communication and shift the focus of our arguments in a direction that will be more profitable to all....

Lt Col John J. Zentner’s The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Morale in Combat addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during combat. More specifically, Colonel Zentner’s study seeks to identify and define those unique characteristics associated with leading airmen that sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Leadership and Morale in Air Combat . . . . .91 Existing Thoughts on Military Morale . . . . . .92 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .98 2 THE MORALE PROBLEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Who Is the Leader? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Morale: The Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 The Power of Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Maintaining Control. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 3 MAJ ADOLF GALLAND: JAGDGESCHWADER 26. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Germany’s Battle for Britain. . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Jagdgeschwader 26 in the Battle of Britain . .30 Pilot Morale within Jagdgeschwader 26 . . . . 31 Galland’s Influence on Morale . . . . . . . . . . 38 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . ...

Unfortunately, the existence of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) structures, mechanisms, systems, and capabilities does not guarantee success. Major Orr attacks the basic problem of producing a conceptual model of the combat operations process. Only after he establishes the context, a paradigm of warfare based on classical literature, does he discuss the appropriate C3I architecture that will yield the desired results. In a larger sense, Major Orr’s study is an attempt to redefine the nature of modern technology-intensive warfare. This is a broad and contentious problem. While the reader may not agree with all of Major Orr’s assumptions and conclusions, this larger effort is vital to the American military’s capability to cope successfully with a rapidly changing and increasingly dangerous world. In this larger sense, the importance of Major Orr’s study goes far beyond the particular problems of C3I....

I COMBAT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Sun Tzu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Objectives of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Civil-Military Relationships . . . . . . . . . . 2 Principles of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Tactical Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Carl von Clausewitz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Andre Beaufre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 The American Style of War . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 The Traditional Approach . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Maneuver Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 II C3I AND THE COMBAT OPERATIONS PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 The Combat Operations Process Model . . . .34 Expansion of the Process Model Functions . .37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 III COMMAND OF THE COMBAT OPERATIONS PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 The Purpose of Command . . . ....

A comparison of the Misty and A-10 FAC missions clearly demonstrates a failure of the USAF to develop a full range of suitable tactics for the direct attack of enemy fielded forces. Although the quantum leaps in weapons delivery accuracy from Vietnam to Kosovo now make it possible to destroy armor and artillery from the air, there has not been a corresponding improvement in target identification. Until USAF prioritizes the direct attack of ground forces and target identification, its ability to attack fielded forces effectively will remain limited. Drawing from the lessons of the Misty and A-10 FACs, the recommendations presented here focus on equipment, tactics and training, and doctrine....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF AIR INTERDICTION FROM WORLD WAR I THROUGH VIETNAM . . . . . . . 7 3 MISTY-FAC TACTICS: HYPOTHETICAL MISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 HISTORY OF ATTACKING FIELDED FORCES: POST-VIETNAM TO KOSOVO . . . . . . . . . . . .41 5 A-10 FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79...

PART I Space Organization, Doctrine, and Architecture 1 An Aerospace Strategy for an Aerospace Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Stephen E. Wright 2 After the Gulf War: Balancing Space Power’s Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Frank Gallegos 3 Blueprints for the Future: Comparing National Security Space Architectures . . . . . . . . . . 103 Christian C. Daehnick PART II Sanctuary/Survivability Perspectives 4 Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 David W. Ziegler PART III Space Control Perspectives 5 Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 James G. Lee 6 When the Enemy Has Our Eyes . . . . . . . 303 Cynthia A. S. McKinley PART IV High-Ground Perspectives 7 National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 William W. Bruner III 8 Concepts of Operations for a Reusable Launch Space Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 Michael A. Rampino 9 The Inherent Limitations of Space Power: Fact or Fiction...

The possible use of nonlethal chemical technologies in counterterrorist operations is drawing much attention in the ongoing global war on terrorism.The decision to apply nonlethal technologies requires an understanding of their overall effects, both tactically and strategically. This paper provides background information on both antipersonnel and antimaterial nonlethal chemical technologies; their applications within the special operations forces (SOF) counterterrorist environment; and their operational applications during armed conflict, combat search and rescue, and hostage rescue. Comparisons of technologies are made, their differences highlighted, and recommendations for use offered. While it may appear that nonlethal chemical technologies are new, their path to development has been navigated with forethought and discretion....

I believe the author has filled a critical gap in aerial warfare literature. Most works focus on the technical or tactical aspects of our profession and medium, but stop short of discussions of the broader nature of war itself. Consideration of war in that larger sense is essential for those who seek to understand and especially apply air and space power in combat....

PART I Conceptualization 1 Centralizing the Defense Establishment . . .3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 Defense Communications Agency and System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 National Military Command System . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WWMCCS Is Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5 Three WWMCCS Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 PART II Formalization 6 WWMCCS Automatic Data Processing Upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 7 Centralizing Communications Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 8 The WWMCCS Council and the Modern WWMCCS Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 9 The WWMCCS Architect and Architecture 163 Notes . . . . ...

This study analyzes the role of the military commander in termination planning during operations other than war. First, the author assesses past and present political guidance, such as the Weinberger doctrine and the presidential directive on peace operations, as well as conditions that affect exit strategy planning. The conclusion is that most of the guidance is vague and that internal and external influences make the process of transforming political goals into viable military objectives very difficult....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Methodology and Analytical Criteria . . . . 2 Definition of Terms . . . . 4 Summary . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . 5 2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS . . . . . 7 Weinberger’s Principles . . . . . 7 Current Guidance . . . . 11 Planning for Conflict Termination . . . . 13 Summary . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . 17 3 SOMALIA CASE STUDY . . . . 21 Political Considerations . . . . . 22 United Nations Mandates . . . . 23 Exit Strategy . . . . . 25 Success or Failure? . . . . 26 Weinberger’s Principles Revisited . . . . 27 Summary . . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . 29 4 HAITI CASE STUDY . . . . 31 Political Considerations . . . . . 32 United Nations Mandates . . . . 34 Exit Strategy . . . . . 35 Success or Failure? . . . . 37 Guidance Revisited . . . . 39 Summary . . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . 40 5 CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS . . . . . 43 Notes . . . . . 46...

In this well-researched and insightful study, Lt Col Gregory A. Roman examines the relationships between military organizational hierarchies and the impact of battlespace information. Drawing on a sophisticated range of studies and data and using numerous illustrations, the author contends that the outmoded effects of traditionally centralized (and technologically proliferating) command and control orientations preclude the US military (and particularly the Air Force) from effectively applying and acting upon the benefits of information-age technologies in an age of information warfare. The author sees future warfare characterized by faster decision making, faster operational tempos, and a torrent of tactical battlefield information. These new realities necessitate greater decentralization of control, more flexible information gathering, and creative, nontraditional military organizational arrangements....

Drawing from the vision of airpower theorists and building on insights gained from studies on various regime changes, this thesis advances a theory of regime change and outlines a strategy for the use of airpower. To remain in power, regimes must continue to provide goods to the group of people responsible for its rise to power—the winning coalition. Different types of regimes rely on different types of goods to satisfy their winning coalition. This thesis advances the hypothesis that adversely affecting these goods will create policy failure, increase dissatisfaction among the winning coalition, and cause members to seek out a new coalition and regime to provide the lost goods. Additionally, since many regimes supply goods to third parties to retain their support, an additional hypothesis was introduced to account for the influence of international support....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 THE THEORY . . . . 5 3 THE CAUSAL MECHANISM . . . . 19 4 AMERICAN REGIME CHANGE . . . . 27 5 SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIME CHANGE . . . . . 37 6 CONCLUSION . . . . 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 53...

Warfare is an ever evolving mixture of combinations: attack and defense, symmetry and asymmetry, maneuver and firepower, mass and economy of force, etc. True operational art manifests itself when the right balance of these combinations is applied to war fighting. This paper analyzes one such combination; ground maneuver and air interdiction. Indeed, this is a treatise on the synchronization of land power and air power, and how these two vital elements can better contribute to a successful operational campaign. The fundamental thesis is that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) must do more than merely balance this combination as separate entities, he must employ them as coequals in mutually complementary operations....

1 JOINT WARFARE IS TEAM WARFARE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 MANEUVER AND INTERDICTION—THE RELATIONSHIP . . . 5 Ground Maneuver . . . . 5 Air Interdiction . . . . . . 6 The Relationship . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . 11 3 HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS . . . . . 13 World War I . . . . . 13 World War II . . . . 14 Korean War . . . . . 16 Vietnam War . . . . 17 Desert Storm . . . . 18 Summary . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 19 4 CURRENT MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . . 21 Army Doctrine . . . . . . 21 USAF Doctrine . . . . . . 22 Joint Doctrine . . . . 23 Maneuver and Interdiction . . . . 23 Command Relationships . . . . . . 24 Summary . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . 28 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 31 Conditions . . . . . . 31 Orchestration . . . . 35 Summary . . . . . . 36 Conclusion . . . . . 36 Notes . . . . . 37...

A complex and interdependent environment in the global war on terrorism (GWOT) highlights the challenge of translating the theory of effects-based operations (EBO) into practice, particularly with respect to influencing the will of the people and achieving a desired end state. The following paper seeks to illustrate the conditions and challenges surrounding the translation of current effects-based theory into operational practice in the GWOT by using three conceptual constructs. First, the Microsoft Corporation, its connectivity to the Internet, and the persistent attacks by computer hackers on Microsoft products help frame the adversary and the complex environment and conditions surrounding the GWOT. Second, the Al-Jazeera satellite news network serves as an anecdotal backdrop for the challenges military planners face in managing EBO assessment and controlling the “effects” in EBO. Third, the versatility of both the MQ- 1B Predator unmanned aerial vehicle and Special Operations Forces illustrates the importance of developing and maintaining collective knowledge, technological relevance, and doctrinal adaptability in an ever-changin...

The planning for space-based MTI is in its early phases. A “Concept of Operations for Space-Based MTI” has been written, as has a “Space-Based MTI Roadmap.” US Space Command has also written the Long Range Plan, which includes space-based MTI concepts in its plan for 2020. These plans are a good start but do not address several important issues, including satellite architecture, whether satellite MTI systems should completely replace airborne systems, who should be responsible for the system, and how battle managers will operate in the new system....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 3 2 THE EVOLUTION OF MOVING TARGET INDICATOR RADAR SYSTEMS . . . .5 Notes . . . . 11 3 THE MECHANICS OF SPACE OPERATIONS . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . 23 4 UNITED STATES SPACE ORGANIZATIONS THAT MAY AFFECT SPACE-BASED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT . . . .27 Notes . . . . 34 5 TECHNOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT AIRBORNE MOVING TARGET INDICATOR SYSTEMS AND PROPOSED SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . 42 6 ISSUES TO CONSIDER FOR SPACE-BASED MOVING TARGET INDICATOR PLANNING . . . . 45 Notes . . . . 53 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . 55...

This thesis explores the evolution of Russian military doctrine in light of the lessons they say they learned from the Gulf War. Since the early 1980s, such prominent military thinkers as Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov argued that emerging technologies were generating a new revolution in military affairs. The Russian military doctrinal response to Desert Storm seems to confirm Marshal Ogarkov’s predictions. This thesis finds the new military doctrine (1) reverts from the defensive to an offensive preemption, (2) reverts from no nuclear first use to nuclear escalation, (3) guarantees ethnic Russians living in former Soviet states protection, (4) emphasizes the importance of military advancement in C4I, smart weapons, and mobility, and (5) emphasizes strategic nonnuclear deterrent forces....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 RUSSIAN VIEW OF MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 7 Relationship between Military Doctrine and Strategy . . . . 8 Military Doctrine—Military Art—Operational Art—Tactics . . . .9 Soviet/Russian Military Doctrine Evolution . . . . 9 Soviet Military Doctrine Stereotype . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . . 19 3 RUSSIAN IMPRESSION OF THE GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 Strategy . . . . . 24 The Threat . . . . . . 25 Future War . . . . . . 25 The Initial Period of War . . . . . 27 Operational Art . . . . 28 Force Structure . . . . 31 Tactics . . . . . . 32 Technology, Research, and Development . . . . . 33 Summary . . . . 34 Notes . . . . . . 35 4 EMERGING RUSSIAN POST–GULF WAR MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 39 The Threat . . . . . . 41 View of Future War . . . . . 42 Force Structure and Priorities . . . . . 42 Differences with Pre–Gulf War Military Doctrine . . . . . . 43 Conclusions . . . . . . 44 Notes . . . . . . 45 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGISTS . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . 52...

Information technology (IT) and its gadgets provide no allure. They are neither a marvel nor a toy but exist solely to help get something done. This impassive attitude allows me to avoid capability hype with what IT can do and ask “So, what does IT really do for me?” This attitude is partly due to my mechanical engineering background and to the practical systems engineering philosophies instilled in me by my father. I have successfully exploited IT capabilities to perform engine cold-start analyses, design coal crushers, train missile crews, simulate radar satellite constellations, track satellite parts and construction practices, and create intelligence fusion software. But with each success made possible through IT came scores of frustrations that sprang from IT solutions. While writing this paper I came to realize that this frustration comes from man having to manipulate IT rather than applying it as an extension of oneself. This fundamental disconnect between capability and utility comes from disconnects between developers and users, institutional restrictions on individual innovation, and general ignorance of available tools, p...