DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABOUT THE EDITOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Introduction to Genocide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Dr. Douglas C. Peifer Case Studies 1 American Intervention in Africa: Building on the Lessons of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . 21 Lt Col Aaron Steffens, USAF 2 Genocide, Airpower, and Intervention: Rwanda 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Maj George Stanley, USAF 3 Defeating Genocide: An Operational Concept Based on the Rwandan Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Lt Col Keith Reeves, USAF 4 Côte d’Ivoire: Intervention and Prevention Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 CDR Timothy E. Boyer, USN Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Dr. Douglas C. Peifer CONTRIBUTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14...

Kenneth Newton Walker had significant influence in the early days of airpower’s rise to prominence. Ms. Byrd has brought us the man behind the influence....

Chapter 1 The Formative Years....................1 Chapter 2 The Spokesman for Bombardment ..............................................................21 Chapter 3 More Schooling and Command.....44 Chapter 4 Washington and AWPD-l..............64 Chapter 5 The Southwest Pacific and Fifth Bombern Command.................................89 Chapter 6 Walker’s Last Mission ...............111 Chapter 7 The Lingering Doubts ..............126...

This study analyzes the effectiveness of airpower versus terrorism using three case studies.

1 Terrorism: Its Impact, the New American Approach, and Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .   1 2 Operation El Dorado Canyon: Airpower versus Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 3 Operation Infinite Reach: The 1998 US Embassy Bombing Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4 The Second Palestinian Intifada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 APPENDIX: THE OSLO NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79...

The Slovak National Uprising of 1944 is ignored and/or treated as a nonevent in the Western historiography of World War II. The political climate during World War II and the Cold War that followed obscured and distorted the history and understanding of this revolt. The raising of the Iron Curtain in the 1990s removed the veil of secrecy from much of Eastern Europe’s wartime history, and Western historians are exploring the new resources available, but coverage of Slovakia’s story and uprising remains very limited. This work aims to fill some of the void....

Nothing speaks better to the subject of effective leadership than the need to develop professionally. General Lorenz believes that leadership is tied to a continuing study of the profession, thus the need for leaders to read. He particularly advocates reading biographies of great leaders. He found that learning from other’s experiences helped keep him from wasting time reinventing the wheel. And reading, like any other leadership development, is a lifetime experience because, as he describes it, “Life is a marathon, not a 50-yard dash.”...

In this study, we discuss five issues for change, and our recommendations provide the framework needed to produce the project’s desired end state of a measurable and sustainable expeditionary process that meets combatant commanders’ requirements across the range of military operations. The Air Force continues to support CCDR requirements around the globe. However, the stresses in today’s operating environment have revealed weaknesses in the way the Air Force presents forces and capabilities in support of CCDR needs. The challenge is to change current processes so that every deployment is not a custom-made wooden shoe....

Executive Summary ix Introduction 1 Organize-Train-Equip 7 Force Presentation Model 15 Force Generation and Presentation 21 Training, Education, and Strategic Communication 25 Conclusion 31 Notes 32 List of Acronyms 33...

After describing the type of visionary senior officers needed to lead the Air Force of the future, the study team recommends the identification of “high potential” officers upon selection for field-grade rank. This special designation allows the Air Force to focus education and assignment opportunities on those officers most likely to attain flag rank and senior joint billets. Subsequent recommendations are designed to provide additional leadership development opportunities for officers after they attain flag rank. These initiatives emphasize the focus we must place on developing and continuing leadership education for officers at every stage in their careers. The future strategic environment demands nothing less....

1 Introduction 1 2 Leadership Concepts 11 3 The Deliberate Development of Air Force Officers 21 4 Recommendations 35 5 Conclusions 45

Technology Horizons is our vision for key Air Force science and technology investments over the next decade that will provide us with truly game-changing capabilities to meet our strategic and joint force responsibilities. The coming decades hold high promise for amazing new capabilities across the air, space, and cyber domains. Yet the Air Force and our nation will also be confronted with substantial strategic, technology, and budget challenges. Our greatest advances will come with a focused investment of resources in the most promising technologies. The vision in Technology Horizons provides the shared awareness of the challenges and opportunities that will enable us to achieve this focus....

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . . . . . vii FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE AND CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE . . . . ix PREFACE BY THE CHIEF SCIENTIST OF THE AIR FORCE . . . . xi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . xv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . xvii 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 A Vision for Air Force Science and Technology 2010–30 . . . . 1 Lessons Learned from Prior Air Force Science and Technology Visions . . . . 5 Organization and Conduct of Technology Horizons . . . . . 8 Organization of Results from Technology Horizons . . . . . 14 Caveats . . . . 16 2 STRATEGIC CONTEXT FOR AIR FORCE S&T 2010–30 . . . . . 19 Relation to National Security Objectives . . . . . 21 Technology-Derived Challenges to Air Force Capabilities . . . . . 22 Strategic Implications of S&T Globalization . . . . 38 Federal Budget Implications for Air Force S&T Strategy . . . . . 41 3 ENDURING REALITIES FOR THE AIR FORCE 2010–30 . . . . . 43 Ensuring Interoperability with Legacy Systems . . . . 43 Sustainment Costs for Legacy Systems . . . . . 43 Importance of Low-Observable Systems . . . . 44 Energy Costs and Availability . . . . . 44 Growing Role ...

The Department of Defense (DOD) anticipates the realization of biomimetic bird and two-inch, insect-sized systems within the 2015–47 period. Although robot systems of one millimeter or smaller are not explicitly specified in current DOD and Air Force technology road maps, the technological aims towards this size can be clearly inferred from official documents. This research assesses the likelihood of, and barriers to, the realization of true microrobots and nanorobots (defined as submillimeter-sized robots of micro-meter and nanometer proportions, respectively) that can perform in military applications by 2035. This research finds that the realization of true microrobots for military applications by 2035 is unlikely, except for a single case of microrobots....

This study analyzes the need for a national aerospace strategy that encompasses the two aspects of aerospace power: the aerospace industry and military aerospace. The author assesses the aerospace industry as to its importance to the United States. The conclusion is that this industry provides the kind of high-technology, high-wage jobs necessary to improve the nation’s standard of living in the future. Next, the writer evaluates current military strategies against a set of political imperatives and the reliance each strategy has upon aerospace power. The results of this process show that each military service is very reliant upon aerospace power for the success of its strategy. By coupling these two building blocks with the serious problems that exist in the aerospace industry and in military aerospace, the author shows the need for the United States to develop a national aerospace strategy. The final section of the study proposes the goals and objectives of such a strategy and proposes the formation of a National Aerospace Council to fully develop and implement a national aerospace strategy. ...

The study investigates whether information as a weapon can achieve the purposes of war. Specifically, can the use of the “information weapon” diminish an adversary’s will and capacity to fight. The results indicate that while information may be considered a weapon, it is one that must be used with caution. The more enthusiastic proponents of the information weapon tend to overestimate its ability to diminish enemy will and capacity to fight....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 2 CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ—TIMELESS AND ENDURING . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . 14 3 INFORMATION—THE ULTIMATE PRECISON-GUIDED WEAPON . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 23 4 ANALYSIS—IS INFORMATION A WEAPON? . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . 35 5 IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION . . . . 37 Notes . . . . 39...

This study analyzes the use of airpower against enemy ground forces. Maj Scott G.Walker assesses current doctrinal definitions of the close air support and interdiction missions as seen by the Air Force and Army, comparing and contrasting the two. The themes that recur throughout are the need for planning to remain flexible, using the speed and firepower of air attack to concentrate force where needed, and the requirement for good operational and tactical intelligence....

INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 THE FIELD ARMY DESCRIBED . . . . 9 ATTACKING THE ENEMY . . . . . 19 SYNCHRONIZING AIR AND GROUND FORCES . . . . . 39 CASE STUDIES . . . . 45 AN ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK FOR COUNTERLAND OPERATIONS . . . . 71...

I submit there are two ways we can use limited numbers of prototype systems to ensure we learn relevant tactical lessons before we have to fight:(1) capitalizing on interactive computing technologies to better develop requirements and tactics throughout the system life cycle and (2) changing our concept of prototypes from the buying of one or two “experimental”items to procuring entire “prototypical” units....

1 SETTING THE STAGE . . . . 1 Background . . . . . 1 Methodology . . . . 2 Military Doctrine: Definitions and Types . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . 5 2 DEVELOPING ROBUST EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE . . . . 7 Why Employment Doctrine Matters . . . . 7 How Employment Doctrine Develops . . . . . 8 Combat-Capable versus Combat-Lethal Doctrine . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . 13 3 DOCUMENTING DOCTRINAL LAG . . . . 15 The YB-17 and Refining Doctrine under Fire . . . . . 15 Modern Perspectives . . . . 18 Notes . . . . 21 4 CRITIQUING THE YOCKEY POLICY . . . . . 23 The Fallacy of Strategic Warning . . . . . 23 We Can’t Predict What We’ll Need . . . . . 25 Summarizing the Policy Critique . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . 27 5 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS . . . . 29 Interactive Simulation for Employment Doctrine . . . . . 29 Prototypical Units . . . . . 32 Historical Perspective . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . 33 6 CONCLUSION . . . . 35 Notes . . . . 37 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 39...

The primary conclusion of this study is that airpower, as a pervasive element of combat operations, will have an important impact on any peace enforcement operation. Strong, centrally controlled air forces serve to assert escalation dominance at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. They can also provide a coercive force that can threaten to escalate the fighting beyond peace enforcement on short notice.However, in almost all cases tactical aviation and special operations aircraft will be critical to support or protect ground forces and help control violence at the lower end of the spectrum. Peace enforcement operations are likely to succeed only when airpower is combined with dominant ground forces and strong diplomacy. Finally,peace enforcement is a complicated affair, perhaps even more so than war itself.Intangible political factors such as the cohesion of the coalition, its willingness to maintain a long-term commitment to the mission, and its ability to balance restraint against credibility will be the primary determining factors in the efficacy of airpower and the mission as a whole. Airpower alone will rarely offer the pos...

INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE: PEACE ENFORCEMENT . . . . . 5 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ: PROVIDE COMFORT . . . . . 15 INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: UNITAF AND UNOSOM II . . . . 31 THE AIRPOWER CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE ENFORCEMENT . . . . 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 51...

The traditional American military brute-force strategy does not always meet our national needs in this new world order. Strategic Coercion offers one alternative to this brute-force approach. Simply stated, strategic coercion is the act of inducing or compelling an adversary to do something to which he is averse. It involves using force and threatening action to compel an adversary to cease his current activity, or coerce him to reverse actions already taken. Two contemporary theories of strategic coercion seem to offer promising alternatives to brute force....

The decline of the Soviet Union upset the world’s balance of power and opened the door to third world proliferation since the superpowers no longer have tight control over their client-states. This increase in proliferation raised the issue of how the United States (US) should respond to a third world nation that is acquiring nuclear weapons. Should the United States depend on preventive attacks to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Preventive attacks are politically untenable and are not militarily possible. Without perfect political conditions, it is unacceptable for the only remaining superpower to attack a second-rate power. It is militarily impossible for the United States to guarantee the removal of all nuclear weapons in a single preventive attack. This study concludes that the United States should not depend on preventive attacks to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 2 2 PREVENTIVE ATTACK . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . 5 3 PAST CASES OF PREVENTIVE WAR . . . . . 7 Notes . . . .14 4 NORTH KOREA: A REPRESENTATIVE THREAT . . . . . 17 Notes . . . .25 5 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .27...

The purpose of this work is to provide the air planner with an air strategy that may, under certain defined conditions, be more likely to yield success than current air power theories. Our current stock of strategic ideas tend to rely on a unitary, rational actor assumption to describe the decision-making environments of our potential adversaries. We believe reliance on this simplistic assumption may skew the counterstrategy development process. We propose an alternate decision framework that identifies the importance of consensus decision making and the central role organizations often play in this complex process....

1 INTRODUCTION. . . .1 Notes . . . . .3 2 ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES ON NATIONAL DECISION MAKING. . . .5 Notes. . . . .10 3 AIR STRATEGIES. . . .11 Notes. . . .21 4 THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CRISIS—A CASE STUDY. . . . .23 Notes. . . .27 5 CONCLUSION. . . . .29 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . .33...

The study reviews each force’s combat glider experience and analyzes it in light of the glider doctrine, or lack thereof, with which each began the war. While military cargo gliders have seen their day, recent technological advances in gliders make them a viable platform for certain missions requiring stealth and silence....

ABSTRACT ii INTRODUCTION 1 PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENT 3 The Early Years in Germany 3 Early Gliders in the US 4 A US Military Glider? For What Purpose? 4 Gliders Head Into Combat. 5 Come Join the Glider pilot Corps! 8 Glider pilot Training Shortfalls 9 Military Gliders in Britain 12 OPERATIONAL USE OF GLIDERS 13 Germany 13 Early Commando Raids 14 Crete 15 Other Operations 16 US and Great Britain 17 Sicily 17 British Gliders are First to Normandy 24 US Glider Pilots Join the War in France 20 Disappointment at Arnhem 22 Operation Market 22 Glider Success Over the Rhine? 23 Operation Dragoon 24 US Commando Operations in Burma 25 Summation 26 POST-WAR GLIDER POLICY 27 TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN GLIDERS 29 TODAY’S LIMITED MILITARY ROLE FOR GLIDERS 31 CONCLUSIONS 32 NOTES 36 BIBLIOGRAPHY 42...

The purpose of this thesis is to determine which form of airpower will best serve American power projection requirements as we approach the turn of the century. It examines three forms of airpower: carrier air, long-range combat air (B-2), and theater air (i.e., F-15, F-16, and EF-111). The author concludes that theater aircraft are the mainstay of US airpower. Theater airpower was the decisive form of airpower in our three major conflicts since World War II (Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq) and will be in the regional conflicts of the future. It is superior in the broadest sense of the word—economically, militarily, and politically....

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . 1 FUNDING, AIRPOWER, AND POWER PROJECTION . . . . 2 CRITERIA . . . 4 FIXED-COST COMPOSITION OF EACH AIRPOWER INSTRUMENT . . . . . 8 ORDNANCE LOAD . . . . 12 ORDNANCE FLEXIBILITY . . . 16 MISSION FLEXIBILITY . . . . . 18 ANALYSIS . . . . . . 23 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . 26 NOTES . . . . . 29...