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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 1 A NEED FOR CHANGE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS AS A MODEL FOR INTELLIGENCE REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 3 REFORMING INTELLIGENCE: A 50-YEAR EFFORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4 THE 9/11 REPORT AND INTELLIGENCE REFORM LEGISLATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 5 THE PUSH AND PULL OF INTELLIGENCE REFORM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 6 THE QUESTION OF BALANCE . . . . . . . . . 139 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Appendix A INTERVIEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 B CHRONOLOGY OF INTELLIGE...

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In this study, Lt Col Karen O. Dunivin, USAF, examines social change in American military culture and explores the current struggle between the military’s traditional and exclusionary combat, masculine-warrior (CMW) paradigm or belief system and the contradictory evolving model of military culture characterized by egalitarianism and inclusiveness. It is a contest between old thinking and new thinking. The author uses two recent and ongoing cases to illustrate the divergence between paradigm and model: women in combat and homosexuals in the military....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii NOTE from the Commander of Air University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xv PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 PHOTOGRAPHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 WHAT BECAME OF THEM? . . . . . . . . . . . . .135 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . ....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . xi INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Habit 1 Get a Haircut! First Impressions Last . . . . . 1 Habit 2 Shut Up! Listen and Pay Attention . . . . . . 9 Habit 3 Look Up! Attitude Is Everything . . . . . . . 15 Habit 4 Be Care-Full! Take Care of Your Troops . . . 23 Habit 5 Sharpen the Sword! Take Care of Yourself First. . . . . . . . . . . 35 Habit 6 Be Good! Know Your Stuff . . . . . . . . . . 45 Habit 7 Build Trust! Be Trustworthy . . . . . . . . . 51 Habit 8 Hang on Tight! Find an Enlisted Mentor . . . 59 FINAL THOUGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67...

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1 Do Concepts Matter· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 9 2 Instant Thunder: Why an Air Staff Plan · · 27 3 How Does Airpower Work?· · · · · · · · · · · · 51 4 Knockout Blow? Or Decision on Points? · · ·71 5 The Objective · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·85 6 Taking It to the Enemy· · · · · · · · · · · · · ·97 7 Seizing the High Ground: Airpower as a Maneuver Element? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 111 8 Setup for the Knockout Blow · · · · · · · · · 127 9 The First Information War · · · · · · · · · · ·145 10 Conclusions: What Is Air (and Space) Power? · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 163 EPILOGUE: A View of the Air Force Today and Tomorrow · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·185 GLOSSARY· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 197 INDEX · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·201...

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At first glance, strategic aerial reconnaissance appears to be a mere technical tool. The term refers to the use of aircraft to collect strategic intelligence using photographic or electronic means. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), strategic intelligence refers to “intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels.” Strategic intelligence includes information provided by sources other than aircraft, including naval vessels, ground communications intercept sites, satellites, published literature, defectors, and spies. Because Air Force aircraft provided the bulk of information used by American war plans from 1945 to 1953, this book focuses on the origins of the USAF strategic aerial reconnaissance. Although official JCS publications did not specifically list strategic aerial reconnaissance, the term may be defined as the use of aircraft to gather information necessary to conduct strategic air war, also called strategic air bombardment....

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1 THE ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2 GROPING IN THE DARK: RECONNAISSANCE BEFORE CONTAINMENT, 1945 –1946 . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 3 FROM CONTAINMENT TO BERLIN: ORGANIZATIONAL STEPS TO FILL INTELLIGENCE GAPS, 1947–1948 . . . . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 STRATEGIC BOMBING QUESTIONED: INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS AND WAR PLANS, 1949 –1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 5 THE TEST: STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE IN KOREA, 1950 –1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174...

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In Tanker-Force Structure: Recapitalization of the KC-135, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Narvid challenges air mobility warriors to develop a tanker-force structure that overcomes the thinking of old to launch new concepts and capabilities for the future tanker. He argues that the future of warfare will require a tanker that is able to operate as a force enabler across the full spectrum of operations. This research is very timely with the Boeing 767 being looked at as a replacement for some of the older KC-135s. In this paper, Colonel Narvid examines the chronology of the tanker and the role it has played throughout its history. He argues that the next tanker must break from old capabilities, tied to a Cold War strategy, and embark on new operations and more capabilities that are able to respond to future threats....

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This is a book of quotations and comments about air power, war, and military matters. But it would be a great mistake to simply read the quotes and take them literally. Each selection presents a picture that you can look at again and again. Taken together, different views of the same subject matter are like a drafter's plans: they can make either an interesting multiple-view description of the subject or a puzzle....

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The author's contention is that training for night air operations, particularly with our sister services, is in its infancy. Using his personal experience he sets out to recommend better uses of the training facilities of all the services to improve the situation . After examining the history of joint operations and night air operations, presenting a hypothetical joint night scenario to show the tremendous challenges of such operations, and describing the current status of joint night training programs, the author recommends a phased building-block approach that should increase the Air Force's capability to perform both single-service and joint operations any time of the day or night. This will ensure that we train as we plan to fight in future air operations....

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1 HISTORY AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . 1 Joint Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Night Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2 DOING IT IN THE DARK THE CHALLENGE . . 17 Operation Tae Kwon Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Mission Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Offensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 On-Call Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 Mission Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Offensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 On-Call Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 Mission Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 PHOTO SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 3 CURRENT TRAINING PROGRAMS . . . . . . . 61 Requirements for Re...

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This is not a history of military airlift but rather an investigation of ideas and concepts as they have evolved and have been applied to warfighting . Airlift is the backbone of deterrence . A properly structured and equipped airlift force is critical to the successful execution of the national military strategy . How we think about airlift and how we translate those thoughts into a meaningful expression of how to develop, deploy, and employ airlift forces is vital to the national defense. Colonel Miller's study is a definitive step in that important process....

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1 THE PRE-WORLD WAR II ERA . . . . . . . . . .1 The Air Power Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I Air Transportation Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ANew Air Transport Organization . . . . . . . . .13 The Woodring Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Prewar Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Prelude to World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 2 WORLDWIDE AIRLIFT IN THE WAR YEARS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Air Corps Ferrying Command . . . . . . . .27 June 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Air Transport Command . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Army Air Force Regulation 20-44 . . . . . . . . 65 The Nexus of Policy and Doctrine . . . . . . .67 White and Green: Doctrinal Hallmarks . . . . .72 The Strategic Airlift Heritage of World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 3 TROOP CARRIER AND THEATER AIRLIFT IN WORLD WAR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 Origins of Troo...

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Is America’s counterinsurgency (COIN) effort being shortchanged? Does a one-dimensional doctrine fail to exploit America’s full COIN potential? Would a genuinely joint approach provide better options to decision makers confronted with the harsh realities of twenty-first century insurgencies? This study insists the answers are unequivocally “yes.” It analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas from an Airman’s perspective for strengthening joint COIN doctrine development in order to deliver fresh alternatives to our national decision-makers and combatant commanders....

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................iii INTRODUCTION ........................................1 FM 3-24’S GROUND-FORCE CONVENTIONALITY ......................................................8 COIN AND AN AIRMAN’S WAY OF THINKING .......................................................11 FM 3-24’S AIRPOWER MYTHS.....................18 CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRMINDED COIN DOCTRINE ..........................................28 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.................63 END NOTES ..........................................69...

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The overseas base planning process reflected the evolution and growing sophistication of American strategic thinking during the tumultuous period from 1942 through 1948. The results of the planning shaped, in many ways, the East-West struggle for much of the second half of the twentieth century. Elliott Converse has performed a great and remarkable service by capturing the often confusing and chaotic essence of the base planning effort during this turbulent period. His exhaustive research brings the issues, attitudes, and personalities involved into clear focus....

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1 THE FIRST PLANS, 1942–1943 . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2 BASE PLANNING, 1943–1945 . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 3 BASE PLANNING TAKES SHAPE, 1945 . . . . 101 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 4 POSTWAR ADJUSTMENTS, 1946–1948 . . .151 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227 ...

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"The publication of this book puts to rest 35 years of false history. It also decisively concludes the erroneous dishonor suffered by Gen John Daniel Lavelle, the Seventh Air Force commander. General Lavelle, Colonel O’Malley, and personnel of the Seventh Air Force acted pursuant to presidential orders secretly issued on 3 February 1972 in the Oval Office. It is clear that they loyally and bravely served, protected, and defended the Constitution of the United States."...

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1 The Fatal Crash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 The Hard Coal Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 Saint Rose School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4 Saint Rose Basketball . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5 West Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 6 Diane Muennink, Silver Wings, and the Air Force Academy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7 The B-47 Bomber and the General’s Aide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 8 The Blackbird SR-71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 9 Colonel O’Malley and Combat in Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 10 Combat Operations in North Vietnam . . 129 11 SAC Wing Commander . . . . . . . . . . . .163 12 Brigadier General: First General Officer Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175 13 Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185 14 Air Staff Plans and Operations . . . . . . .201 15 Vice-Chief of the US Air Force . . . . . . . 219 16 Pacific Air Force Commander . . . . . . . . 233 17 Tactical Air Force Commander and the Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .243 APPENDIX: War Messages ...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE HUMP AIRLIFT OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 6 SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Illustrations Figure Page 1 Air Force Leadership Framework (Proposed) . . . . . . . . . ...

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The Multimission Framework for operational integration proposed by Colonel Dailey is a synthesis of the successful constructs across the many models currently being utilized throughout the Total Force. Current models in vogue are the Active Associate Wing, the reserve/Guard Associate Wing, the “Blended” Wing, and the Integrated Wing. Colonel Dailey examined each of these models for its positive and negative contributions to the Total Force. His research presented an ironic challenge: all of them work to varying degrees of success when coupled with good leaders and good people. Can history and research demonstrate a better way forward?...

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The purpose of The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis is to share Major Mills’s rhetorical understanding with young officers attending initial intelligence training. Throughout he infuses key elements from the rhetorical discourse community into the discourse community that deals with training in military intelligence....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 LET’S GET RHETORICAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 INTELLIGENCE PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4 WHAT THE FOUCAULT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 5 POWER PLUG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 6 DISCONTINUITY FEVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7 IN THE TRENCHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

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LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT: WHAT IS IT AND WHY SHOULD IT CONCERN THE USAF? . . . . . 1 Low-Intensity Conflict Defined . . . . . . . . . . .1 Special Characteristics of Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Operational Terms Relating to Low-Intensity Conflict . . . . . . . 8 Future Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Dealing with Future Conflict. . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 AIR POWER IN SMALL WARS : THE BRITISH AIR CONTROL EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Air Control's Genesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Air Control: From Concept to Doctrine . . . . .22 The Requirements of British Air Control . . . .24 Air Control and Today's US Air Force . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 3 THE MOROCCO-POLISARIO WAR: A CASE STUDY OF A MODERN LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Resources and Topography of Western Sahara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 Moroccan Claims and Stakes in Western Sahara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

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Lt Col Richard M. Clark’s Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles: Airpower by the People, For the People, But Not with the People, draws on that long history to gauge what the future may hold for uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UCAV). Given the problematic history of UAVs/UCAVs, knowledge of past experience could prove beneficial to the current generation of UCAV developers and planners. To that end, Colonel Clark examines technological obstacles that have handicapped UCAVs historically and which could continue to impede their future evolution. He then turns to more contemporary organizational and cultural issues that might hinder integration of UCAVs into the force. Clark concludes his study by proposing answers to two fundamental questions: (1) What are the major obstacles to UCAVs achieving meaningful operational status in the Air Force, and (2) Can those obstacles be overcome?...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 EVOLUTION OF UNINHABITED COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES (UCAV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 TODAY’S UCAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 TOMORROW’S UCAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85...

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Chapter 1 Navigators of the First Global Air Force.........................................................1 Chapter 2 Prelude to War.............................8 Chapter 3 Death on a Bright Sunday Morning...................................................13 Chapter 4 Attack on Clark Field...................16 Chapter 5 George Berkowitz........................20 Chapter 6 Harry Schreiber...........................23 Chapter 7 William Meenagh........................27 Chapter 8 Regroup....................................31 Chapter 9 Richard Wellington Cease............34 Chapter 10 Paul E. Dawson.........................38 Chapter 11 George Markovich.....................40 Chapter 12 War Plan Orange III.................46 Chapter 13 Carl R. Wildner.........................51 Chapter 14 Harry McCool............................55 Chapter 15 Merrill Kern Gordon, Jr...............58 Chapter 16 Francis B. Rang........................64 Chapter 17 Corregidor................................66 Chapter 18 William Scott Warner.................70 Chapter 19 Jay M. Horowitz.........................74 Chapter 20 The Super Fort...

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The ground and air forces have strong interlocking connections in the battlefield operations known as close air support (CAS). In the 1970s the Army and Air Force began to develop a shared battlefield doctrine known as battlefield air interdiction(BAI) that was concerned with a class of targets that lay out a fair distance from the front lines. Later, on the battlefields of Desert Storm, the Air Force excluded BAI from its tasking orders, although some claimed interdiction missions of this nature were carried out under different names. Lt Col Terrance J. McCaffrey III looks into What Happened to BAI? Army and Air Force Battlefield Doctrine Development from Pre–Desert Storm to 2001. He traces airground doctrine and operational practices relative to battlefield interdiction from World War I to Operation Desert Storm and suggests at one point that even the flank support for Patton was, in effect, BAI. The author carries the discussion through the decade after Desert Storm and shows how the issue is too important to be dropped by either service, even as technology provides new weapons for both services....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 ORIGINS OF BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 3 WHERE WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION IN DESERT STORM? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION A VICTIM OF SUCCESS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 5 IS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION BACK? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 97 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115...

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PART I Conceptualization 1 Centralizing the Defense Establishment . . .3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 Defense Communications Agency and System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 National Military Command System . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WWMCCS Is Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5 Three WWMCCS Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 PART II Formalization 6 WWMCCS Automatic Data Processing Upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 7 Centralizing Communications Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 8 The WWMCCS Council and the Modern WWMCCS Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 9 The WWMCCS Architect and Architecture 163 Notes . . . . ...

Description Details
Religion and culture in general have been long neglected by planners, policy makers, and diplomats. Our experience in Phase IV, or the constructive phase, of Operation Iraqi Freedom has clearly exposed this inattention as a serious flaw in bringing peaceful development to Iraq. These authors suggest that military chaplains can be a part of a better solution. It is not a case of trying to proselyte; it is rather one of engaging local religious leaders to facilitate the stabilization process....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 RELIGION IN STABILITY OPERATIONS . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 CHAPLAINS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 4 MODIFICATIONS TO THE CHAPLAIN SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39...

Description Details
This book, Guidelines for Command, is the result of countless hours of research and contains the collective thoughts and lessons learned from many previous commanders. It has a wealth of information to assist you during your tenure as a commander. Use it in conjunction with your personal leadership skills, your base’s subject-matter experts, and your fellow commanders to lead our Airmen to new heights....

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A huge portion of the military burden in support of these operations falls on the shoulders of the Mobility Air Forces (MAF). Lt Col Eileen M. Isola’s Leading Air Mobility Operations in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies provides just such an educational foundation for MAF war fighters charged with leading CHEs. She provides a superb synthesis of a dozen years of lessons learned from many resources and institutions, sifting through the tactical and operational lessons learned so as to focus her research into the most important tenets for strategic success in a CHE: build a team of teams, gather and share information (not “intelligence”), and establish centers for interagency success. She reviews key joint and service doctrine manuals, culling critical nuances that would likely be overlooked by war fighters new to the CHE environment, or rushed in a crisis deployment. Her cultural comparison of the military and nongovernmental organizations is insightful and valuable. Throughout her work Colonel Isola provides tangible, real examples from past operations of what worked and what did not—and why. The implications for the future are clear...

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"Setting the Context: Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses and Joint War Fighting in an Uncertain World explains why SEAD has changed the basic fabric of air warfare. In discussing the familiar themes of the past and the emerging paradigms of the future, Colonel Brungess weaves a web of changing interrelationships among services, politico-military structures, and research and development strategies, as well as developing a novel methodology for assessing events critical to air power's future."...

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1 HISTORY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 CRITERIA FORASSESSING SEAD EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 3 SERVICE APPROACHES TO SEAD . . . . . . .93 4 THE MERITS OF JSEAD: THE QUESTTO ACHIEVE EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 5 JSEAD: STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND THE CHANGED THREAT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 6 WHERE TO NEXT: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207...

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This study analyzes Gen O. P. Weyland’s impact on close air support (CAS) during the Korean War. First, the author briefly traces the history and evolution of air-ground support from its infancy to the start of the Korean War. Second, he shifts his focus to the effectiveness of CAS throughout the conflict and addresses why this mission was controversial for the Army and Air Force. Third, he highlights General Weyland’s perspective on tactical airpower and his role in the close-air-support “controversy.”...

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1 Close Air Support in 2006 . . . . . . . . .1 2 History and Evolution of Close Air Support: World War I to the Korean War . . . . . . . 5 3 Background on Gen O. P. Weyland . . . . 17 4 Close Air Support in Korea: The Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5 An Airman’s Perspective of Close Air Support in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83...

Description Details
In “The National Guard Citizen-Soldier,” Col Mark P. Meyer provides an excellent examination of the linkage between responsible national security policy and the will of the people. He argues that for our democratic government to act responsibly, it is imperative that national policy reflects the will of the people. It is especially important when the policy involves the use of the armed forces. In the United States, the National Guard and its citizen-soldiers are an essential part of the linkage. Without the existence and use of the National Guard, the nation treads dangerously toward inconsistency between the will of the people and national security policy....

Description Details
This compelling study by Lt Col Lawrence E. Key examines how national will plays a decisive role during any application of US military power and not just the employment of forces to fight America’s wars. Because of the decisive role national will plays, leaders need to understand what it is and, beyond its definition, the ways in which they can articulate and cultivate it. To gain this understanding, leaders must look at various means by which the American public expresses its collective will; the most important means being public opinion. However, the author argues that only mature collective opinion can represent national will....

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ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE THROUGH WORLD WAR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 British Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The V-1 Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 American Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . . 22 German Flak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Allied Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Fratricide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46 The US Navy in the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 Japanese Antiaircraft Artillery . . . . . . . . . . .53 The Lessons of World War II . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 2 FROM GUNS TO MISSILES, 1945–1965 . . .69 Antiaircraft Returns to Combat: The Korean War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Antiaircraft Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 3 AIRMEN VERSUS GUERRILLAS: VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113 French Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 America Enters the War . . . . . . . . . . . . . .114...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 PREPARING TO TALK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Types of Speaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Teaching Lecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Audience Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Audience Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 Selecting the Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Narrowing the Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Choosing a Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 General Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Specific Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Gathering Material . . . . . . . . . . ....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THE INNOVATION IMPERATIVE . . . . . . . . . 3 THE ADVERSARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 THE PLAN: 3 AUGUST 1990–15 JANUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 CLASH OF ARMS: 17–26 JANUARY 1991 . . . .28 CENTAF ADAPTS: 27 JANUARY–5 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 ATTRITION WAR: 6–23 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . 59 GROUND WAR: 24–28 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . .63 THE KEYS TO INNOVATION . . . . . . . . . . . 71 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Appendix A Primary USAF Units That Participated . . . 101 B Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 C Location of Air Strikes during Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 D Distribution of Strikes against RGFC Heavy Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 E Iraqi Prisoner of War Comment...

Description Details
The analysts were charged with the task of anticipating which specific contentious issues likely will propel large, organized political units to choose violent means of acquiring their sociopolitical objectives rather than attaining them peacefully. The units on which we focus have been traditionally identified as states, but we recognize that a host of new sub- and suprastate actors also will play major roles in such wars; hence, we also will allude to them....

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DISCLAIMER...............................................ii PREFACE....................................................vi HISTORY, CULTURE, AND CHANGE: FOUNDATIONS OF CONFLICTS AND WARS......1 RELIGION-A BANNER FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CONFLICT............................19 NATIONAL FRAGMENTATION, ETHNICITY, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER............................32 POPULATION PRESSURES, MIGRATION, AND REFUGEES...................................46 TRANSNATIONAL CRIME ITS EFFECT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILITY..............................................58 HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS............................................70 ANTICIPATING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMIC SOURCES OF CONFLICTS..........82 THE THIRD WORLD’S NONVIABLE STATES A MAJOR SOURCE OF CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY...........................96 Table 2..................................................101 WHEN THE WATER RUNS OUT......................................................111 TRANSNATIONAL AIR, WATER, AND LAND DEGRADATION PROBLEMS.............................................124 NUCLEAR CONFLICT AND NONPROLIFERATIO...

Description Details
As the nation’s campaign against terrorism proceeds, our military services continue to embrace high technology, advanced sensors, and precision weaponry for use on current battlefields. The term cyber warrior has truly stepped from the pages of science fiction into reality. Equipment and technology do not constitute the only developments, however, because today’s cyber warriors emerge from a society and military culture very different in many respects from those of past generations of warriors....

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1 EMPLOYEE WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Values Crisis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Harnessing a Different Military . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cultures in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 2 TRADITIONAL MILITARY CULTURE . . . . . . .7 Professionalism and Homogeneity . . . . . . . .7 Fraternity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Institutional Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Value Studies of the Military . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Traditional Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 THE NEW BUSINESS-SCIENTIFIC CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 New World Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Volunteer Fighting Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Occupational Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Technology and the Great Engineering Venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Civilian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Force of Specialists . . . . . ...