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In this study Lt Col Joseph M. Codispoti, USAF, describes an emerging partnership between two long-time allies of the United States—Turkey and Israel. On the surface this Muslim-Jewish partnership seems unlikely, particularly on the fringes of the Arab world. A closer examination, however, reveals a number of mutual security interests and a shared sense of isolation at the crossroads of Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East. The Turco-Israeli partnership has important national security implications for the United States. Working in tandem, these allies can promote the American vision for the region by fostering democracy, peace, and free markets in the region....

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Organizational change strategies for acquisition are essential due to the enormity of change required of the acquisition community. The Congress and the DOD have made many previous attempts at acquisition reform, but most have had little effect. To make sure our current reform efforts make positive, lasting changes, we must transform the acquisition culture. To date, little attention has been paid to cultural change aspects. To that end, this paper offers some ideas for organizations undergoing change for acquisition reform....

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This book is about national security strategy : what it is, what its objectives are, what problems it seeks to solve or at least manage, and what kinds of influences constrain and create opportunities for the development and implementation of strategies....

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ANZUS is a defense alliance, a special and functional relationship between three close allies-Australia, New Zealand, and the United States .

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The United States has been involved in peace enforcement operations for many years. In that time we have learned some lessons. Unfortunately, we continue to repeat many of the same mistakes. Sometimes we have forgotten hard-learned lessons, and sometimes we never learned from our earlier experiences. Focusing on command and control, the issues can be loosely grouped into categories of force and command structure, political impacts, and interoperability. Finally, for a multinational peace enforcement operation to succeed, interoperability must be achieved. Equipment and logistics provide the most visiblearea of concern; and problems remain with equipment, fuels, and transportation andrelated skills. Overall, to improve command and control for multinational peace operations, we must look at past experiences, recognize the recurring problems, and aggressively attack the roots of those problems. This paper identifies some of the “stickiest wickets” from the Dominican Republic and Somalia and suggests some solutions. The solutions are not simple or easy, but if we ignore the problems, they will certainly not simply go away....

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1. INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 2 2. COMMAND AND FORCE STRUCTURE . . . . . . 3 Dominican Republic . . . . 3 Somalia . . . . . 9 Summary . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . 21 3. POLITICAL IMPACTS ON OPERATIONS . . . . . 27 Dominican Republic . . . . 27 Somalia . . . . . 35 Summary . . . . 45 Notes . . . . . . 47 4. INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES . . . . . 53 Dominican Republic . . . . 53 Somalia . . . . . 59 Intelligence . . . . . . 63 Summary . . . . 68 Notes . . . . . . 70 5. CONCLUSION . . . . . 75 Notes . . . . . . 79...

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To what extent was the effectiveness of joint operations in the Gulf War influenced by individual service perspectives? This study uses Graham Allison’s three models of bureaucratic behavior (Model I, Rational Actor; Model II, Organizational Process;and Model III, Bureaucratic Politics) to answer this question....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 METHODOLOGY . . . . 3 Jointnesss . . . . 3 Allison’s Models . . . . 4 Observations . . . . . . 8 Notes . . . . 9 3 THE UNITED STATES NAVY . . . . . . 11 Beyond Visual Range Rules of Engagement . . . . 11 Analysis . . . . . 15 Joint Operations . . . . 19 Notes . . . . 19 4 THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS . . . . . . 21 Marine Air Operations . . . . . . 21 Analysis . . . . . 29 Joint Operations . . . . 34 Notes . . . . 34 5 THE UNITED STATES ARMY . . . . . . 37 Battlefield Preparation . . . . . . 37 Analysis . . . . . 47 Joint Operations . . . . 49 Notes . . . . 50 6 THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE . . . . . . 55 Deep Strike Coordination . . . . . 55 Analysis . . . . . 64 Joint Operations . . . . 66 Notes . . . . 66 7 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . 69 Command . . . . 70 Doctrine . . . . . 70 Command Location . . . . . 72 CINC Interaction with Tactical Commanders . . . . . . 75 Information . . . . . . 77 Joint Force Integration . . . . . . 78 USAF/US Army Command Alignment . . . . 79 Summary . . . . . 81 Notes . . . . 81...

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In this paper Lt Col Cristina M. Stone argues that the Air Force does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts; targeteers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operators; and unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and expertise required to fill these positions. The author recommends that the Air Force leverage its technical and scientific core and expert organizations across the government to improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. Regarding ISR operations, she proposes that the Air Force develop enhanced collection capabilities. This paper recommends changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD expertise, collection capabilities, and marketing to improve the nation’s ability to combat WMD....

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During the Cold War, the Air Force had a fairly easy time explaining its mission to the American public. It also had a coherent public affairs structure to help execute that mission. The new threat environment in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, combined with steep personnel cuts to its public affairs community, have dramatically altered the communication challenge for the Air Force. To effectively operate in this new climate with an emphasis on strategic communication, the Air Force has tinkered with a few organizational models to strengthen the communication function....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 A BRIEF HISTORY OF STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 AIR FORCE STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION EFFORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: US NAVY PUBLIC AFFAIRS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AIR FORCE COMMUNICATION EFFORTS . . . . . . . . . . . .29 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35...

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The intent of this research is to provide an analysis of the ICBM maintenance team utilization at the current intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) alert rate and at lowered alert rates. Quantitative research methodologies are used to model historical ICBM maintenance data from the 341st Maintenance Group (MG) and simulate future maintenance team utilization at both the current and decreased ICBM alert rates. The results of this simulation and modeling show negligible savings in overall ICBM maintenance team utilization....

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This paper identifies a possible shortfall in United States (US) military planning, the experience of US Central Command (CENTCOM) planners in dealing with the Central Asian States. The problem is that military planners have little experience with engagement activities in the Newly Independent States (NIS), particularly in the Central Asian States. In this paper, I took a three-step approach to solving this problem. First, I familiarized the reader with ethnic conflict and its proximate and underlying causes. Second, I described what is at stake in Central Asia in terms of US interests. Third, I evaluated current US Central Command (CENTCOM) activities in the CAS and recommended some improvements....

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With the ending of the Cold War, the apparent conclusion of many political leaders of states that war is hardly a practical tool of statesmanship, and the recent preoccupations of the American military on counterinsurgency, some people have wondered whether the original reasons for the founding of a separate air force are any longer valid. The original argument for the autonomous air force was that its Airmen would be the only ones whose perception was concentrated on the global level. The conclusion is therefore that the argument remains valid that a service with consistent culture focused on the problems of global vigilance, global reach, and global power is a fundamental requirement for United States national security. Only an organization made up of Airmen whose indoctrination from the start of their service is concentrated on a global outlook can satisfy that requirement. ...

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I believe the author has filled a critical gap in aerial warfare literature. Most works focus on the technical or tactical aspects of our profession and medium, but stop short of discussions of the broader nature of war itself. Consideration of war in that larger sense is essential for those who seek to understand and especially apply air and space power in combat....

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The purpose of The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis is to share Major Mills’s rhetorical understanding with young officers attending initial intelligence training. Throughout he infuses key elements from the rhetorical discourse community into the discourse community that deals with training in military intelligence....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 LET’S GET RHETORICAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 INTELLIGENCE PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4 WHAT THE FOUCAULT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 5 POWER PLUG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 6 DISCONTINUITY FEVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7 IN THE TRENCHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

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This British historian, David Hall, found relevant cross-service problems in Afghanistan during recent British air-ground operations. He was stricken by the similarities with British airground operations during World War II when the Royal Air Force and the British Army first struggled with doctrinal air support practices....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi LEARNING HOW TO FIGHT TOGETHER: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE WITH JOINT AIR-LAND WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Origins of the Air-Land Debate . . . . . . . . . . 5 Political Wrangling between the Independent Air Force and Army/Royal Air Force during the Interwar Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 The Battle for France, 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . 10 The Evolution of Air-Land Technique . . . . . .11 North Africa: The Adoption and Refinement of a New Air-Land Technique . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Success without Harmony: British Air-Land Co-operation by the End of the War . . . . . .25 Back to Afghanistan and Contemporary Air-Land Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Enduring Themes and Contemporary Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

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National leaders are debating the merits of American weapons in space. A decision to operationally deploy such weapons would reverse the United States’s long-standing commitment to space as a sanctuary. That sanctuary—the idea that space should remain relatively unthreatened by weapons—has been challenged in the past but for the most part still exists today. Further weaponizing space, though, could change that and introduces important issues. The political, military, social, economic, and diplomatic ramifications of American space weapons demand that strategists carefully consider all sides of this critical debate. Current defense literature, however, indicates analysts and leaders have been slow to develop the arguments supporting a space sanctuary. This omission could undermine the military community’s appreciation for all aspects of both problem and solution. In turn the quality of the space strategy eventually pursued might suffer. This study attempts to understand the argument against weapons in space. It asks the question: Could pursuing a space sanctuary policy in the immediate future benefit the national interest? This study...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 DEFINITIONS . . . . 5 SPACE WEAPONS AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE . . . . 9 CONTEMPORARY US POLICY AND SPACE WEAPONS . . . . 21 THE SANCTUARY ARGUMENT . . . . 27 CONCLUSIONS . . . . 47...

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The reader should know that the scenario presented in this monograph is not a forecast of a specific future but rather is structured to help the reader understand the magnitude and shape of Africa’s largest economy and the impact it has on the world. As we see in the 2009 global recession and credit crisis in today’s globalized world, a failure in Nigeria, like the failure of almost any other nation, could have serious repercussions across the planet. Whether Nigeria is able to grow into a thriving, stable, and vibrant democracy or whether it becomes a failed state, the people of the United States must be ready to support Nigeria as a fellow member of the international system....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 NIGERIA IN CONTEXT: DEFINING FAILURE . . . . 9 3 THE SOCIAL SCHISMS OF NIGERIA . . . . 21 Col Douglas W. Jaquis 4 NIGERIAN POLITICS . . . . 33 Col Mark D. DeLong 5 NIGERIA’S ECONOMY . . . 39 Col Daniel B. Gordon 6 MILITARY VECTORS . . . . 55 Col Robert S. McAllum 7 NIGERIA IN 2030: PATHS TO FAILURE . . . .65 Col Christopher J. Kinnan 8 TECHNOLOGY AND FAILED STATE 2030—THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCERESPONDS . . . . .95 Col Christopher J. Kinnan 9 SUMMARY . . . . . 109...

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In The Politics of Coercion: Toward a Theory of Coercive Airpower for Post–Cold War Conflict, Lt Col Ellwood P. “Skip” Hinman IV confronts an issue of high interest to airmen and policy makers alike: What does coercion theory suggest about the use of airpower in the early twenty-first century? More specifically, Colonel Hinman seeks to determine whether any of the existing theories of coercion can stand alone as a coherent, substantive, and codified approach to airpower employment. Framing his analysis on three key attributes of conflict in the post–Cold War era—limited, nonprotracted war; political re-straint; and the importance of a better state of peace—Hinman examines the contemporary applicability of the four major theories of coercive airpower: punishment, risk, decapitation, and denial....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 What Is a Theory of Coercive Airpower? . . . . 2 The Attributes of Post–Cold War Conflict . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 COERCION THEORY AND THE POST–COLD WAR ERA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 Punishment-Based Coercion: A Theory for Total War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Risk-Based Coercion: A Theory for Limited War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Decapitation-Based Coercion: Echoes of the Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Denial-Based Coercion: Too Much of a Good Thing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3 A NEW THEORY FOR A NEW ERA . . . . . . . .31 Phase One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Phase Two . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .36 Phase Three . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Limited, Nonprotracted War and the Coercion Hybrid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 The Coercion Hybrid and the Politically Restrained Natur...

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In the 53-year history of the United States Air Force (USAF), only two airmen have risen to serve as regional commanders in chief (CINC). During the same period, 74 soldiers, sailors, and Marines were selected for geographic CINC billets. In Once in a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command, Lt Col Howard D. Belote examines the reasons for this disparity and suggests how airmen might improve their prospects for becoming future regional commanders....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 EARLY PERSPECTIVES ON JOINT/COALITION COMMAND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97 AN AIRMAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF: LAURIS NORSTAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 AN AIRMAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT WAR: ALBRECHT KESSELRING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . .53 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 FINAL THOUGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Illustrations 1 Allied Advances in Italy, 1943–44 . . . . . . 41 2 Commanders in Chief versus USAF Generals’ Careers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Photographs Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower and Gen Lauris Norstad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

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This study reveals how airpower made four contributions to the collapse of Italy. First, airpower shaped the grand strategy of the western Allied powers in 1943. Second, mainland attacks against rail marshaling yards, ports, and airfields did indirectly contribute militarily to Operations Husky and Avalanche. Third, both American and British strategic bombing contributed to the psychological decapitation and fall of the Fascist government on 25 July 1943. Finally, airpower coerced and aided the interim Marshal Pietro Badoglio’s government to surrender unconditionally and escape to the Allies on 9 September....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 AN UNEXAMINED VICTORY . . . . . 3 WHEN GIANTS WALKED THE EARTH . . . . . 7 A TALE OF TWO TIGERS . . . . . 19 WHEN IN ROME . . . . 37 THE DENOUEMENT OF DEFEAT . . . . 57 NO CROWING FOR A NEW DAWN . . . . . 71...

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This study asks how effectively has the USAF incorporated the concept of effects-based operations into its procedures for targeting and combat assessment. To answer this question, the study defines effects-based targeting, asserting that commanders should direct airpower against targets in ways that produce specific, predetermined, military, and political effects. This study explores the historical development of effects-based targeting theory and then conducts a focused comparison of four major air operations—Pointblank, Linebacker II, Desert Storm, and Allied Force—in order to survey US airpower’s actual combat experience with regard to effects-based operations. This study determines that senior decision makers have always been interested in creating specific effects rather than simply destroying targets; however, as a whole, the USAF has been inconsistent in employing effects-based operations across the spectrum of conflict....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 EFFECTS-BASED TARGETING: WHAT IS IT? . . . . 5 3 THE THEORETICAL BASIS . . . . . 15 4 OPERATION POINTBLANK . . . . 23 5 OPERATION LINEBACKER II . . . . 35 6 OPERATION DESERT STORM . . . . . 51 7 OPERATION ALLIED FORCE . . . . 69 8 CONCLUSIONS, FINDINGS, AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 85...