Description Details
This study concludes that in order for peacekeepers to achieve their mandate, it is critical to possess strong political will and a minimum of operational support.Furthermore, regional organizations run the gamut in both political will and operational capability. Their performance indicates that when their national interests are at stake, the regionals demonstrate the required political will to persevere in a mission....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING . . . . . 5 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING . . . . . 13 PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. . . . . 19 THE US ROLE IN SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING. . . . .33 RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . . 39 CONCLUSION . . . . . 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . 51...

Description Details
This study analyzes the need for a national aerospace strategy that encompasses the two aspects of aerospace power: the aerospace industry and military aerospace. The author assesses the aerospace industry as to its importance to the United States. The conclusion is that this industry provides the kind of high-technology, high-wage jobs necessary to improve the nation’s standard of living in the future. Next, the writer evaluates current military strategies against a set of political imperatives and the reliance each strategy has upon aerospace power. The results of this process show that each military service is very reliant upon aerospace power for the success of its strategy. By coupling these two building blocks with the serious problems that exist in the aerospace industry and in military aerospace, the author shows the need for the United States to develop a national aerospace strategy. The final section of the study proposes the goals and objectives of such a strategy and proposes the formation of a National Aerospace Council to fully develop and implement a national aerospace strategy. ...

Description Details
The primary conclusion of this study is that airpower, as a pervasive element of combat operations, will have an important impact on any peace enforcement operation. Strong, centrally controlled air forces serve to assert escalation dominance at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. They can also provide a coercive force that can threaten to escalate the fighting beyond peace enforcement on short notice.However, in almost all cases tactical aviation and special operations aircraft will be critical to support or protect ground forces and help control violence at the lower end of the spectrum. Peace enforcement operations are likely to succeed only when airpower is combined with dominant ground forces and strong diplomacy. Finally,peace enforcement is a complicated affair, perhaps even more so than war itself.Intangible political factors such as the cohesion of the coalition, its willingness to maintain a long-term commitment to the mission, and its ability to balance restraint against credibility will be the primary determining factors in the efficacy of airpower and the mission as a whole. Airpower alone will rarely offer the pos...

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 PEACE OPERATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE: PEACE ENFORCEMENT . . . . . 5 MILITARY INTERVENTION IN IRAQ: PROVIDE COMFORT . . . . . 15 INTERVENTION IN SOMALIA: UNITAF AND UNOSOM II . . . . 31 THE AIRPOWER CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE ENFORCEMENT . . . . 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 51...

Description Details
The decline of the Soviet Union upset the world’s balance of power and opened the door to third world proliferation since the superpowers no longer have tight control over their client-states. This increase in proliferation raised the issue of how the United States (US) should respond to a third world nation that is acquiring nuclear weapons. Should the United States depend on preventive attacks to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons? Preventive attacks are politically untenable and are not militarily possible. Without perfect political conditions, it is unacceptable for the only remaining superpower to attack a second-rate power. It is militarily impossible for the United States to guarantee the removal of all nuclear weapons in a single preventive attack. This study concludes that the United States should not depend on preventive attacks to stop proliferation of nuclear weapons....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 2 2 PREVENTIVE ATTACK . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . 5 3 PAST CASES OF PREVENTIVE WAR . . . . . 7 Notes . . . .14 4 NORTH KOREA: A REPRESENTATIVE THREAT . . . . . 17 Notes . . . .25 5 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . .27...

Description Details
Sustained Coercive Air Presence (SCAP) is an airpower approach to peace enforcement designed to impose a cease-fire on an unwilling belligerent and then use a prolonged air presence to enhance long-term diplomatic efforts that seek a political solution. The competing agendas and political infighting associated with United Nations and coalition operations also seriously hinders a SCAP strategy. Nonetheless, if politicians decide on an airpower approach to peace enforcement, SCAP in concert with the economic, informational, and political instruments of power is a viable strategy against a modern, well-armed foe....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF SUSTAINED COERCIVE AIR PRESENCE . . . . . 7 3 OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT . . . . 19 4 COERCIVE AIRPOWER OVER BOSNIA–HERZEGOVINA . . . . 39 5 CONCLUSION . . . . 59...

Description Details
From this basic research and meetings with Chinese experts both in the United States and in China, the team began to explore the various directions China might take in the future. This exploration is not a forecast of a specific future, but rather is designed to help the reader better understand the magnitude and shape of a rapidly rising Asian power. This power may be our friend or foe. Whatever it does become, the nation must be ready to engage it as a fellow member of the international system....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . .1 Col John P. Geis II, PhD 2. THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE, DEMOGRAPHICS, AND EDUCATION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM . . . .7 Lt Col Scott E. Caine 3. 正义与和谐社会 (HARMONIOUS SOCIETY: RISE OF THE NEW BOXERS) . . . 29 Col Blaine D. Holt Col John P. Geis II, PhD 4. THE PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT ROAD: CHINA’S ECONOMIC PROGRAM . . . . 47 Col Edwin F. Donaldson 5. CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION . . .71 Lt Col Ralph A. Sandfry, PhD 6. HARMONIOUS DISCORDANCE: CHINA IN 2030 . . . . . 93 Col John P. Geis II, PhD 7. CONCLUSION: US CAPABILITIES NEEDED TO RESPOND TO POTENTIAL CHINESE CHALLENGES . . . . 109 ABBREVIATIONS . . . 123...

Description Details
One of the United States’ greatest military advantages is rapid global mobility. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) provides a crucial supplement to the military’s mobility resources in time of war or national emergency. The proliferation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), however, poses a growing threat to the CRAF and its critical airlift capacity. In this study, Lt Col Glen Downing describes the US government’s historical and potential future uses of the CRAF during contingency operations. He examines current CRAF policies, the operating environment, and the MANPAD threat, describing the negative consequences of the shoot down of a CRAF airliner. Positing several options to counter the threat, he analyzes each following the parameters of unit cost, operating cost, funding sources, insurability, and crew training. The study concludes with a thoughtful recommendation to the Department of Defense on a course of action to confront the MANPADS threat to the CRAF....

Description Details
In this important study, Lt Col Wayne Johnson, USAF, argues that systematic tightening of interagency cooperation and better work on defining sensitive technology prohibitions are needed to maintain the US technological edge. He also maintains that the US government requires a new and disciplined export control process—not the current mosaic of rules, regulations, and perspectives that came out of the cold war, but a process that provides a revamped, systemic approach with consistent implementation. Colonel Johnson explores the problem of defining which technologies the United States is willing to transfer(military or dual-use) and the need to ensure that national security objectives do not take a backseat to economic expediency. To accomplish this end, he argues for better interagency cooperation as a first step leading to a more centralized, coordinated, and strategic view of technology transfer and how it impacts US national security....

Description Details
Lt Col Thomas D. Torkelson claims that the inability of the United States to achieve its stated political objectives in its global war on terror (GWOT) reflects its flawed kinetic-centric military strategy. This study erects a framework of effectiveness utilizing Clausewitzian principles to judge military strategy. By considering the expressed political objectives of the GWOT, the centers of gravity (COG) that military strategy should target within this struggle, and the GWOT’s placement along a Clausewitzian continuum of violence, this paper evaluates US military efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) through the perspective of two opposing models....

Table of Contents Details
1 THE TIMELINESS OF TIMELESSNESS . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 2 CLAUSEWITZIAN EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . .9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 THE KINETIC MODEL AND ITS PREVALENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4 THE NONKINETIC MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: THE MODELS APPLIED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113...

Description Details
To make the report useful to a potentially broad audience, team members set out to answer this question through a wide-ranging examination of the geopolitical, sociological, diplomatic, technological, and operational factors that shaped the characteristics and outcome of this particular air campaign....

Table of Contents Details
1 The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Dr. Karl Mueller 2 The Planning Background . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Lt Col Bradley S. Davis 3 US and NATO Doctrine for Campaign Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Col Maris McCrabb 4 The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan . .87 Col Christopher M. Campbell 5 Executing Deliberate Force, 30 August–14 September 1995 . . . . . . . . . 131 Lt Col Mark J. Conversino 6 Combat Assessment: A Commander’s Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 7 Assessing the Effectiveness of Deliberate Force: Harnessing the Political-Military Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 8 Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . 199 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent iii Chapter Page 9 Weapons Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . 257 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 10 Deliberate Force Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 11 Deliberate Force Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 12 Deliber...

Description Details
Over the years many researchers have analyzed the political aspects of the air war in Southeast Asia. Their studies range from the original Pentagon Papers to those published more recently. Very little, however, focuses on the economic and operational aspects of the war. The purpose of this book is to fill that void by presenting a set of case studies that subject selected air campaigns during the Southeast Asia era to rigid economic analysis....

Description Details
This is a book of quotations and comments about air power, war, and military matters. But it would be a great mistake to simply read the quotes and take them literally. Each selection presents a picture that you can look at again and again. Taken together, different views of the same subject matter are like a drafter's plans: they can make either an interesting multiple-view description of the subject or a puzzle....

Description Details
From the Mind to the Feet: Assessing the Perception-to-Intent-to-Action Dynamic is an interagency, multidisciplinary collection of 12 essays addressing operational and academic perspectives on the elusive concept of an adversary’s “intent”—its indicators and relation to behavior. It is primarily intended for the operational and policy community in the Department of Defense, the intelligence community, the Department of Homeland Security, and other US government agencies....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 PART 1 Operational Perspective: Basic Issues in Gauging Intent 1 From Shoe Leather to Satellites: Shifting the Conceptual Lens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Kathleen L. Kiernan and Daniel J. Mabrey 2 Betting Responsibly: An Effects-Based Thinker’s Framework for Characterizing Intent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Harry A. Foster 3 Gauging the Intent of Nation-States and Nonstate Actors: An Operator’s Perspective . 27 Gary Schaub, Jr. 4 From Observation to Action: Redefining Winning and Sovereignty for the Information Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 John W. Bodnar PART 2 Academic Perspective: Theory and Research in Gauging Intent 5 Anthropological Reflections on Motive and Intent and the Strategic Multilayer Ass...

Description Details
When the Cold War set off a prolonged arms race and space competition with the Soviet Union, this well-educated cadre of the greatest generation was ready to provide the technical and managerial expertise needed to meet the Soviet challenge. Combining patriotism with a desire to be on the cutting edge of technology, these “technocrats” played key roles in the defense industry, university and federal research centers, the military services, and other government agencies....

Description Details
In this excellent essay Lt Col David G. Curdy examines the prospects for democratic transitions in the Middle East. He notes that with the conclusion of the cold war, the basis for US Middle East policy, which had centered around oil, Israel, and the Soviet Union, should be reexamined and, perhaps, redesigned....

Description Details
It is understandable that developments in Europe are carefully monitored in the United States. US concern that its relationship to a unified Europe will be different from the relationship with Europe as it exists now is also quite obvious. There must be a new balance. This paper offers a perfect view of how the new US-EU relationship will develop. It will take time before a unified Europe will be a powerful ally, especially from a military point of view, but we will get there. Meanwhile, we will continue to make critical comments regarding US foreign policy decisions....

Table of Contents Details
1 NOSTALGIA, NATO, AND THE NEW EUROPE . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 THE VERY MODEL OF A MODERN MAJOR NATION-STATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 3 ANARCHY, POWER, AND INTEREST: UNDERSTANDING ALLIANCES . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4 GOOD-BYE TO ALL THAT: THE END OF NOSTALGIA IN THE TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

Description Details
Missile defense has become a key factor in US strategic planning. The problem, of course, lies with the stage of current technological development. Mid-course or terminal-phase systems appear closer to feasibility just now, at least theoretically....

Table of Contents Details
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 2 Déjà vu All Over Again . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 Evaluation of Current National Missile-DEFENSE PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 4 Asia and the US Missile-defense Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73...

Description Details
Lt Col Anthony Mastalir has done policy makers a welcome service by exploring the enigma wrapped in a conundrum which is Chinese space policy, focusing on the Chinese kinetic energy antisatellite (KE-ASAT) test of January 2007. That test ended a de facto moratorium on KE-ASAT tests which the United States and Russia had observed for over two decades. It also announced the arrival of a new player in strategic space, forcing a reevaluation of US capabilities in space as well as Chinese intentions there. Colonel Mastalir examines both that reevaluation and those intentions, relying on open-source material, particularly from Chinese strategic and military analysts....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 EXTREME DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC DIMENSION . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4 INFORMATION DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 5 ECONOMIC DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 6 MILITARY DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .86 7 FINDINGS/CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . .89 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .103...

Description Details
Psychological Operations : Principles and Case Studies serves as a fundamental guide to PSYOP philosophy, concepts, principles, issues, and thought for both those new to, and those experienced in, the PSYOP field and PSYOP applications . This book clarifies the value of PSYOP as a cost-effective weapon and incorporates it as a psychological instrument of US military and political power, especially given our present budgetary constraints. The authors contribute to the understanding of psychological operations by presenting diverse articles that portray the value of the planned use of human actions to influence perceptions, public opinion, attitudes, and behaviors so that PSYOP victories can be achieved in war and in peace. The four sections classify articles with related themes into a common category....

Description Details
The third world continues to grow in its importance to the United States . Often possessing a wealth of vital natural resources or a geographic position astride crucial lines of communications, third world nations have, in many cases, become the focal point of East-West confrontations . Additionally, the frequent political turmoil and economic crises that plague some of these third world nations often threaten the vital interests of the West . For all of these reasons, it is imperative that we understand the utility and limitations of military power applied to crisis situations in the third world. Land based air power is of particular importance in rapidly developing crises because of its range of action and speed of response . Dr Mets' study focuses on land-based air power in a variety of these situations over the past three decades. Clearly, the subject is important to our understanding of the most effective use of air power. It is also clear that Dr Mets has made a significant contribution to the literature of air power and provides a message that we all should heed ....

Table of Contents Details
1 POLITICAL OBJECTIVES AND MILITARY POWER: SOME RELATIONSHIPS . . . . . . . . . .1 Crisis Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Categories and Characteristics of Military Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Land-Based Air Power Capabilities . . . . . . . . 3 Options in Selecting Land-Based AirPower. . . .5 Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 THE THIRD WORLD ANDTHEUNITED STATES: PROBLEMS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND OUTLOOKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Problems and Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Blind Alleys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Crises and Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Interdependence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Diffusing Advanced Arms to Less-Developed Countries (LDCs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20 Utility of Military Power . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 THEMAYAGUEZ INCIDENT: SIMPLE CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Scenario . .. . . . . . . . ...

Description Details
A decision to put weapons in space—or to refrain from doing so—should be based on a firm understanding about what such weapons can be expected to achieve. More specifically since numerous orbital weapons concepts have been advocated as natural evolutions of surface and airborne weapons, it would appear useful to compare those proposed spacebased systems with their terrestrial counterparts. Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? by Maj William L. Spacy II evaluates the theoretical capabilities of orbital weapons and compares them to weapons already in existence and to emerging concepts proposed for development....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Space Weaponization Debate . . . . . . . . . . 1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 SPACE-BASED WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Directed Energy Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Direct Impact Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Defending Space-Based Assets . . . . . . . . . 32 Technological Factors Bearing on Space-Based Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3 SEEKING CONTROL OF SPACE: GROUND-BASED ALTERNATIVES FOR SPACE CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Defensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Nondestructive Approaches to Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Destructive Approaches to Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4 ATTACKING TERRESTRIAL...

Description Details
This study investigates Europe’s motives to develop the independent satellite navigation system known as Galileo despite the existence of America’s successful global positioning system (GPS). The study begins by analyzing both systems to familiarize the reader with global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) and to provide an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of GPS and Galileo, as well as the systems’ similarities and differences. Although the two systems have different founding principles, they employ similar infrastructures and operational concepts. In the short term, Galileo will provide better accuracy for civilian users until GPS upgrades take effect. But performance is only part of the rationale. The author contends that Europe’s pursuit of Galileo is driven by a combination of reasons, including performance, independence, and economic incentive. With Galileo, Europe hopes to achieve political, security, and technological independence from the United States....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2 GPS VERSUS GALILEO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 3 WHY GALILEO? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 4 IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . .51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Illustrations 1 Satellite geometry 9 2 Global positioning system (GPS) satellite 14 3 Galileo satellite 16 Table 1 Number of visible satellites for various masking angles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13...

Description Details
Is America’s counterinsurgency (COIN) effort being shortchanged? Does a one-dimensional doctrine fail to exploit America’s full COIN potential? Would a genuinely joint approach provide better options to decision makers confronted with the harsh realities of twenty-first century insurgencies? This study insists the answers are unequivocally “yes.” It analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas from an Airman’s perspective for strengthening joint COIN doctrine development in order to deliver fresh alternatives to our national decision-makers and combatant commanders....

Table of Contents Details
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................iii INTRODUCTION ........................................1 FM 3-24’S GROUND-FORCE CONVENTIONALITY ......................................................8 COIN AND AN AIRMAN’S WAY OF THINKING .......................................................11 FM 3-24’S AIRPOWER MYTHS.....................18 CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRMINDED COIN DOCTRINE ..........................................28 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.................63 END NOTES ..........................................69...

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER...............................................ii FOREWORD...............................................vi ABOUT THE AUTHOR..................................viii ACKNOWLEDGMENT.....................................ix INTRODUCTION..........................................x Chapter 1 GERMINATION OF OUTER SPACE AS A LEGAL CONCEPT.......................................1 Chapter 2 AIR FORCE OPPOSITION TO INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON SPACE.....17 Chapter 3 AIR FORCE AS A BACKSEAT “DRIVER” IN SPACE LAW DEBATES................41 Chapter 4 PROJECT WEST FORD..................58 Chapter 5 MAJ GEN ALBERT M. KUHFELD AND AIR FORCE LEADERSHIP OF SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT...........................................64 Chapter 6 THE 1972 LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CONVENTION............................................75 EPILOGUE.................................................86 Appendix A AIR STAFF REACTION TO PROJECT RAND REPORT DATED 28 OCTOBER 1957......90 Appendix B CONCLUSIONS OF THE AIR DOCTRINE BRANCH STUDY 8 OCTOBER 1958.......................................................92 Appendix C EXCERPTS FROM THE OPERATIONS COORDINATIN...

Description Details
Arguably a top tier concern for American foreign policy for more than a few years, Iran gets the meticulous attention of two distinguished Air Force scholars. Lt Cols Charles A. Douglass and Michael D. Hays are critical of the current American policy toward Iran and tell us why. More importantly, they point to elements necessary for an effective Iranian strategy. Their aim: “to change the fundamental calculus of the Iranian problem” to one beneficial for both Americans and Iranians....

Table of Contents Details
1 SOLVING IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS: HISTORIC ROOTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Ancient Persian Greatness and Cultural Pride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Resentment of Foreign Interference . . . . . . 7 Persian-Shiite Strategic Loneliness . . . . . 10 Pragmatic National Interest Replaces Revolutionary Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 ANALYSIS OF IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Demographics, Politics, and Economics . . . .24 Internal Dynamics, Personalities, Power Centers, and Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Nuclear Desire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 US PERCEPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 US Perceptions of Iran Internally . . . . . . . .49 US Perceptions of Iran Externally . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 5 REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
What follows are points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning airpower and strategic bombing. This in turn, hopefully, will give our political and military leaders a better basis on which to form decisions in future conflicts....

Table of Contents Details
1 Between the world wars, even though the US Army Air Corps received more than its fair share of funds from the Army, it continued to complain, agitate, and ask for more. . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2 Entering World War II, the Air Corps’s unbalanced doctrine and force structure leaned too heavily towards strategic bombing. Thus, air support of ground forces was inadequate and largely ignored by airmen. . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 The Air Corps entered World War II with a “Douhetian” concept of air war that emphasized area bombing and the waging of war on women and children. . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4 Airmen thought they could win the war alone. . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5 The fact that German production, especially of aircraft, continued to increase throughout 1944 proves that the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was ineffective and that the resources devoted to it would have been better spent elsewhere. . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 B...

Description Details
One of the challenges Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, sends to Air Force students, researchers, and staff offices is to investigate future concepts of operations (CONOPS). One in particular relates to this study, the CONOPS for space and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is very sensitive about incorporating new technology into its operations. While the authors advocate a feasibility study for reactors in space in a CONOPS, they also explore a deeper problem with widespread societal rejection and revulsion concerning the theoretical employment of nuclear technology in space....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 WHITHER SPACE NUCLEAR POWER? . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 SPACE NUCLEAR POWER AS TRANSSCIENTIFIC PUBLIC POLICY . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 POLITICAL PERMISSION—THE CONTEMPORARY DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 A TRANSSCIENTIFIC POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Appendix A THE HISTORY OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 B PROJECT PROMETHEUS—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—DECEMBER 2003 . . . . . . . . . . 89 C THE MEMBER GROUPS OF THE ...

Description Details
Technical innovation lies at the heart of the case for privileging airpower in the American way of war, but such innovation comprises only one of warfare’s seven vital contexts. The sheer complexity of war and warfare renders prediction, technological and other, a high-risk activity. The contexts of war and warfare are (1) political, (2) societal-cultural, (3)economic, (4) technological, (5) military-strategic, (6) geographical, and (7) historical....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii THE AIRPOWER ADVANTAGE IN FUTURE WARFARE: THE NEED FOR STRATEGY . . . . . . .1 Plan of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Why this Study? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Airpower Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Issues and Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Future Warfare: Contextual Realities . . . . . 20 US Airpower Advantage in Future Warfare . . 30 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35...

Description Details
Snow’s and Drew’s newest version has been slightly retitled and almost totally rewritten to reflect radically changed politicalmilitary realities. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy addresses not only traditional strategy concerns but also the chaotic nature of the post–Cold War world and the stark realities of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military conflicts along religious fault lines. Although the authors have changed a great deal in this edition, the original strategy process model, first published in 1980, remains the constant organizing scheme....

Table of Contents Details
Contents DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii SECTION I FRAMING THE PROBLEM 1 STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Warfare in the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . 4 Foundations of Modern Warfare . . . . . . . . . .7 Contrasts in the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2 THE STRATEGY PROCESS—AN OVERVIEW . .13 Determining National Security Objectives . . .14 Formulating Grand National Strategy . . . . . .17 Developing Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Composing Operational Strategy . . . . . . . . 22 Formulating Battlefield Strategy (Tactics) . . .23 Influences on the Strategy Process . . . . . . .25 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 SECTION II THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 3 GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 31 Vital National Interests . . . . . ....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v Theory of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Patriotism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Air, Space , and Cyber Power . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Education , Training, and Lessons Learned . 24 Preparedness , Security, and Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Leadership and Professionalism . . . . . . . 32 Character and Leadership Traits . . . . . . 35 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Intelligence, Surveillance , and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Information and Communication S . . . . . . 49 Joint Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Coalition Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Airpower at War . . . . . . . . . . . ...

Description Details
Air War College Maxwell Paper Anthology, a compilation of the award-winning papers from our 2010 graduates. Since we published the first Maxwell Paper in May 1996, we have distributed 47 papers demonstrating the highest level of analytical creativity and scholarship. The 12 papers presented here provide insight into and promote discussion on topics of importance to senior leaders....

Table of Contents Details
48 ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER: REVAMPING AN INCOMPLETE AND CONFUSING MASTER TENET . . . . . . . . .1 Col Rolanda Burnett Sr., USAF 49 THE DANGEROUS DECLINE IN THE US MILITARY’S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Col Kenneth E. Hall, USAF 50 LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR: A CASE STUDY . . . . . .39 Lt Col Michael Rafter, Canadian Forces 51 DEVELOPING A US EUROPEAN COMMAND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE STRATEGY FOR FY 2010–15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Lt Col Kevin M. Coyne, USAF 52 INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET: A 21ST CENTURY ISSUE: LEGAL, DOCTRINAL, AND POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE CYBER WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Col Rebecca A. Keller, USAF 53 US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC . . .85 Lt Col Lars Helmrich, Swedish Air Force 54 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE BELOW A 1,000-WARHEAD LIMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Lt Col David J. Baylor, USAF 55 GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED, WH...