As the nation’s campaign against terrorism proceeds, our military services continue to embrace high technology, advanced sensors, and precision weaponry for use on current battlefields. The term cyber warrior has truly stepped from the pages of science fiction into reality. Equipment and technology do not constitute the only developments, however, because today’s cyber warriors emerge from a society and military culture very different in many respects from those of past generations of warriors....

1 EMPLOYEE WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Values Crisis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Harnessing a Different Military . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cultures in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 2 TRADITIONAL MILITARY CULTURE . . . . . . .7 Professionalism and Homogeneity . . . . . . . .7 Fraternity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Institutional Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Value Studies of the Military . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Traditional Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 THE NEW BUSINESS-SCIENTIFIC CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 New World Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Volunteer Fighting Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Occupational Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Technology and the Great Engineering Venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Civilian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Force of Specialists . . . . . ...

Lt Col Richard M. Clark’s Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles: Airpower by the People, For the People, But Not with the People, draws on that long history to gauge what the future may hold for uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UCAV). Given the problematic history of UAVs/UCAVs, knowledge of past experience could prove beneficial to the current generation of UCAV developers and planners. To that end, Colonel Clark examines technological obstacles that have handicapped UCAVs historically and which could continue to impede their future evolution. He then turns to more contemporary organizational and cultural issues that might hinder integration of UCAVs into the force. Clark concludes his study by proposing answers to two fundamental questions: (1) What are the major obstacles to UCAVs achieving meaningful operational status in the Air Force, and (2) Can those obstacles be overcome?...

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 EVOLUTION OF UNINHABITED COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES (UCAV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 TODAY’S UCAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 TOMORROW’S UCAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85...

The concept of “deep battle” was formally introduced to US war fighters during the early 1980s through the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. As envisioned by Air Force and Army leaders, the initial purpose for the deep battle was to delay and weaken Soviet second and follow-on echelons during a European conventional war. Within the AirLand Battle construct, the Air Force had responsibility for synchronizing deep operations and for employing air interdiction against Soviet maneuver forces to set the conditions for victory in the decisive “close battle.” The fire support coordination line (FSCL), normally positioned at field artillery maximum range from the forward line of troops (FLOT), separated the Air Force’s deep operations from the Army’s close battle....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 EVOLUTION OF DEEP-BATTLE DOCTRINE DURING THE COLD WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Evolution of AirLand Battle Doctrine . . . . . . 7 Air Force Doctrine and Deep Battle . . . . . . . 11 Evolution of the Fire Support Coordination Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3 DEEP BATTLE DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Deep-Battle Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Fire Support Coordination Line Friction . . . . 34 Synthesis and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4 DEEP BATTLE TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Army Doctrinal Evolution since the Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Air Force Doctrine since the Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Joint Doctrine and the Deep Battle . . . . . . . 56 Synthesis and Final Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 5...

This study analyzes Gen O. P. Weyland’s impact on close air support (CAS) during the Korean War. First, the author briefly traces the history and evolution of air-ground support from its infancy to the start of the Korean War. Second, he shifts his focus to the effectiveness of CAS throughout the conflict and addresses why this mission was controversial for the Army and Air Force. Third, he highlights General Weyland’s perspective on tactical airpower and his role in the close-air-support “controversy.”...

1 Close Air Support in 2006 . . . . . . . . .1 2 History and Evolution of Close Air Support: World War I to the Korean War . . . . . . . 5 3 Background on Gen O. P. Weyland . . . . 17 4 Close Air Support in Korea: The Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5 An Airman’s Perspective of Close Air Support in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83...

The purpose of this paper is to recommend that the United States government maintain the defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) by aggressively supporting the US defense industry in the arms transfer process. Ironically, this recommendation is contrary to the position held at the onset of this research and analysis effort. To accomplish this purpose, this paper has three aims. First, it recognizes that the DTIB requires preservation. Second, it describes arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy based on US national security interests and the foreign policy challenges of the day. Third, it focuses on the current arms transfer decision-making process and represents it as a “Labyrinth of Control.” This section of the paper demonstrates the maze of controls used to adequately ensure that US military technologies are not diffused to foreign nations....

PRESERVING THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . 14 THE LABYRINTH OF CONTROL . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 27 MAINTAINING THE DTIB WITH US GOVERNMENT SUPPORT . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 34 GLOSSARY . . . . . 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

Dr. David R. Mets’s The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision Munitions and the Revolution in Military Affairs is a broad, thought-provoking examination of the relationship between the advancement in conventional weapons guidance technology and the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). He defines an RMA as a rapid change in military technology, doctrine, and organization leading to a sweeping new way that wars are fought. Dr. Mets then considers whether the improvement in conventional air weapons accuracy since World War II is the foundation, the main pillar, one of the principal supports, or is irrelevant to the RMA—which is said to be afoot....

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 WHAT IS A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA)? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 WHAT WERE THE NOTIONS OF THE FIRST AIRPOWER ADVOCATES OF RMA? . . . . . . . .4 HOW DID RMA WORK OUT IN WARS FROM 1939 TO 1972?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 KOREA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 CHANGE AFTER VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 WAR AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1990s: HAS THE LAST SANCTUARY BEEN CLOSED? . . . . .34 THE REMAINING HUMANITARIAN SANCTUARY AND DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS. . . . . . . . . 47 ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . .48 NOTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67...

The ground and air forces have strong interlocking connections in the battlefield operations known as close air support (CAS). In the 1970s the Army and Air Force began to develop a shared battlefield doctrine known as battlefield air interdiction(BAI) that was concerned with a class of targets that lay out a fair distance from the front lines. Later, on the battlefields of Desert Storm, the Air Force excluded BAI from its tasking orders, although some claimed interdiction missions of this nature were carried out under different names. Lt Col Terrance J. McCaffrey III looks into What Happened to BAI? Army and Air Force Battlefield Doctrine Development from Pre–Desert Storm to 2001. He traces airground doctrine and operational practices relative to battlefield interdiction from World War I to Operation Desert Storm and suggests at one point that even the flank support for Patton was, in effect, BAI. The author carries the discussion through the decade after Desert Storm and shows how the issue is too important to be dropped by either service, even as technology provides new weapons for both services....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 ORIGINS OF BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 3 WHERE WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION IN DESERT STORM? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION A VICTIM OF SUCCESS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 5 IS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION BACK? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 97 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115...

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . xi ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 1 EXPECTATIONS OF COMMAND . . . 1 What Does the Boss Expect? . . . 2 What Do the Troops Expect? . . . 9 What Do You Expect? . . . . . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2 VISION AND ENVIRONMENT . . . . . 23 Developing and Communicating Your Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Building the Environment . . . . . 30 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 WALKING THE WALK . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 4 HANDLING JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5 GREAT IDEAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Take Responsibility for Fun . . . . 95 Sponsor Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Celebrate Heroes—Not Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Mentoring Program . . . . . . . . . . 104 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Snow’s and Drew’s newest version has been slightly retitled and almost totally rewritten to reflect radically changed politicalmilitary realities. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy addresses not only traditional strategy concerns but also the chaotic nature of the post–Cold War world and the stark realities of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military conflicts along religious fault lines. Although the authors have changed a great deal in this edition, the original strategy process model, first published in 1980, remains the constant organizing scheme....

Contents DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii SECTION I FRAMING THE PROBLEM 1 STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Warfare in the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . 4 Foundations of Modern Warfare . . . . . . . . . .7 Contrasts in the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2 THE STRATEGY PROCESS—AN OVERVIEW . .13 Determining National Security Objectives . . .14 Formulating Grand National Strategy . . . . . .17 Developing Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Composing Operational Strategy . . . . . . . . 22 Formulating Battlefield Strategy (Tactics) . . .23 Influences on the Strategy Process . . . . . . .25 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 SECTION II THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 3 GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 31 Vital National Interests . . . . . ....