...HE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992... ...Declaring War on the United States (1992–1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71 3.1 From t... ...lian targets. Collateral damage is not in its lexicon. We learned that the institutions charged with protecting our borders, civil aviation, and natio... ...CC to request a fighter escort. 111 The Herndon Command Center immediately established a teleconfer- ence between Boston, New York, and Cleveland Cent... ...ing pattern and set a course direct for Manhattan.They arrived at 9:25 and established a combat air patrol (CAP) over the city. 136 Because the Otis f... ...t to buy off local Islamist movements by ceding control of many social and educational issues. Embold- ened rather than satisfied, the Islamists conti... ...ers like Qutb, and the presence of Egyptian Islamist teachers in the Saudi educational system, Islamists already had a strong intellectual influ- ence... ...merous companies and a global network of bank accounts and nongovernmental institutions. Fulfilling his bargain with T urabi, Bin Ladin used his const... ...efforts, which included a covert action program that operated from 1956 to 1971 against domestic organizations and, eventually, domestic dissi- dents....

... a Homeland Defense 14 1.3 National Crisis Management 35 2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47 2.1 A Declaration of War 47 2.2 Bin Ladin?s Appeal in the Islamic World 48 2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988?1992) 55 2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring War on the United States (1992?1996) 59 2.5 Al Qaeda?s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996?1998) 63 3. COUNTERTERR...