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1 Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 2 Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II . . . . . . . . 41 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 3 Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Lt Col Mark A. Clodfelter 4 The Influence of Aviation on the Evolution of American Naval Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Dr. David R. Mets 5 Airpower Thought in Continental Europe between the Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Dr. James S. Corum 6 Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Lt Col Peter R. Faber 7 Alexander P. de Seversky and American Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 8 Strategic Airpower and Nuclear Strategy: New Theory for a Not-Quite-So-New Apocalypse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Dr. Karl P. Mueller 9 Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict: A Short Journey to ...

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The importance of combat effects in warfare has no second. However, most combat effects would never be delivered without crucial information delivered from combat support forces. In this time of turbulent recapitalization and reorganization within the Air Force, the critical nature of combat and combat support effects must remain foremost in our decisions as we create new commands, place people and resources where needed, and forecast budgets....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi EXPANSION OR MARGINALIZATION: HOW EFFECTS-BASED ORGANIZATION COULD DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND . . . . . . . . . . .1 Domain versus Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Kepler Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Filling the Effects-Based Void . . . . . . . . . . .13 Further Consolidation for Better Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Combat Support Is the Mission . . . . . . . . . 23 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 LIST OF ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41...

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This paper reviews the performance of US systems against Iraq’s Scuds during Desert Storm, and examines current US efforts to defeat these potentially destabilizing weapons. Which technologies and systems will be most effective against mobile ballistic missiles? How should the United States implement selected technologies to deal with this challenge? This thesis covers the pros and cons of competing concepts to accomplish missile defense. It evaluates the most promising technical solutions to the mobile ballistic missile threat. On the basis of the extensive amount of time and research effort devoted to the problem, it is safe to say there is no quick, easy, or cheap way to locate, identify, and destroy mobile missiles and their launchers. To defeat the mobile missile threat with a high degree of confidence, the US must field an integrated system of both offensive and defensive weapons....

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INTRODUCTION....... vii Notes .......... xiv 1 DESERT STORM.....1 Notes..........9 2 PROLIFERATION.........11 Notes.........18 3 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE GAMEPLAN.....21 Notes......... 39 4 MISSILE ATTACK OPERATIONS.........43 Notes.....63 5 CONCLUSIONS.....67 Notes .......72 APPENDIX 1: Emergence of the Threat.....73 Notes......... 83 APPENDIX 2: The Long Search for a Solution........86 Notes......... 90 APPENDIX 3: Additional Missile Defense Research.....92 Notes........ 95 GLOSSARY..... 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY.......101...

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This research project addresses how I believe airpower should be employed in urban warfare to achieve operational and strategic results. I chose this topic because there is an apparent disconnection between how military planners and operators view urban combat and their awareness of airpower’s unique and potentially decisive contributions in this environment. This disconnect could prove disastrous for military forces operating on urban terrain. Urban warfare has been given considerable attention by the United States Army and Marine Corps. Although their concerns are soundly based on changes in the strategic environment, I believe their focus is misplaced at the tactical level of warfare....

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The author outlines the issue in an introduction and has a background chapter that explains the current system, which provides a useful description of sensors, fusion of information, shooters, and weapons. He explains the current reactive method and identifies various system weaknesses and strengths. His main theme of a preemptive approach describes in great detail the projected employment of LOCPADs as a very effective system for time-critical targeting. Marzolf insists that persistence of surveillance is crucial, especially when Airmen directing the air war in Iraq used persistence surveillance to identify and effectively target the illusive Iraqi insurgents....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 REACTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4 PREEMPTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85...

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Air War College Maxwell Paper Anthology, a compilation of the award-winning papers from our 2010 graduates. Since we published the first Maxwell Paper in May 1996, we have distributed 47 papers demonstrating the highest level of analytical creativity and scholarship. The 12 papers presented here provide insight into and promote discussion on topics of importance to senior leaders....

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48 ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER: REVAMPING AN INCOMPLETE AND CONFUSING MASTER TENET . . . . . . . . .1 Col Rolanda Burnett Sr., USAF 49 THE DANGEROUS DECLINE IN THE US MILITARY’S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Col Kenneth E. Hall, USAF 50 LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR: A CASE STUDY . . . . . .39 Lt Col Michael Rafter, Canadian Forces 51 DEVELOPING A US EUROPEAN COMMAND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE STRATEGY FOR FY 2010–15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Lt Col Kevin M. Coyne, USAF 52 INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET: A 21ST CENTURY ISSUE: LEGAL, DOCTRINAL, AND POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE CYBER WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Col Rebecca A. Keller, USAF 53 US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC . . .85 Lt Col Lars Helmrich, Swedish Air Force 54 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE BELOW A 1,000-WARHEAD LIMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Lt Col David J. Baylor, USAF 55 GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED, WH...

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As the nation’s campaign against terrorism proceeds, our military services continue to embrace high technology, advanced sensors, and precision weaponry for use on current battlefields. The term cyber warrior has truly stepped from the pages of science fiction into reality. Equipment and technology do not constitute the only developments, however, because today’s cyber warriors emerge from a society and military culture very different in many respects from those of past generations of warriors....

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1 EMPLOYEE WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Values Crisis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Harnessing a Different Military . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cultures in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 2 TRADITIONAL MILITARY CULTURE . . . . . . .7 Professionalism and Homogeneity . . . . . . . .7 Fraternity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Institutional Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Value Studies of the Military . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Traditional Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 THE NEW BUSINESS-SCIENTIFIC CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 New World Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Volunteer Fighting Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Occupational Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Technology and the Great Engineering Venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Civilian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Force of Specialists . . . . . ...

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The purpose of this work is to provide the air planner with an air strategy that may, under certain defined conditions, be more likely to yield success than current air power theories. Our current stock of strategic ideas tend to rely on a unitary, rational actor assumption to describe the decision-making environments of our potential adversaries. We believe reliance on this simplistic assumption may skew the counterstrategy development process. We propose an alternate decision framework that identifies the importance of consensus decision making and the central role organizations often play in this complex process....

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1 INTRODUCTION. . . .1 Notes . . . . .3 2 ORGANIZATIONAL INFLUENCES ON NATIONAL DECISION MAKING. . . .5 Notes. . . . .10 3 AIR STRATEGIES. . . .11 Notes. . . .21 4 THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN CRISIS—A CASE STUDY. . . . .23 Notes. . . .27 5 CONCLUSION. . . . .29 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . .33...

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This study examines the question: What strategic approach should the United States Air Force (USAF) take toward theater missile defense (TMD) and antimissile offensive actions in the near term? This study begins with an introductory chapter asking the stated question in context, presenting the methodology used, and summarizing the proposals given at the end of the treatment. The methodological approach to this study involves historical and literature reviews, inter-views, and a qualitative comparison of current and proposed weapons systems, capabilities, and doctrine. Broad strategic options, not specific tactical systems, are the focus of this study....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . 5 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . 18 3 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE AND ANTIMISSILE OPTIONS . . . . . 21 Notes . . . 34 4 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE AND ANTIMISSILE QUALITATIVE EVALUATION: COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS . . . . . 39 Notes . . . 48 5 PROPOSALS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . 51 Notes . . . 61...

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Sustained Coercive Air Presence (SCAP) is an airpower approach to peace enforcement designed to impose a cease-fire on an unwilling belligerent and then use a prolonged air presence to enhance long-term diplomatic efforts that seek a political solution. The competing agendas and political infighting associated with United Nations and coalition operations also seriously hinders a SCAP strategy. Nonetheless, if politicians decide on an airpower approach to peace enforcement, SCAP in concert with the economic, informational, and political instruments of power is a viable strategy against a modern, well-armed foe....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF SUSTAINED COERCIVE AIR PRESENCE . . . . . 7 3 OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT . . . . 19 4 COERCIVE AIRPOWER OVER BOSNIA–HERZEGOVINA . . . . 39 5 CONCLUSION . . . . 59...

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While investigating these topics, my research centered on an interview with one of the former Soviet Union’s top missile engineers, the vice commander of Air Combat Command, discussions with the USAF Air Armament Center’s chief of advanced concepts, and on recently declassified CIA documents regarding the US reconnaissance program and National Intelligence Estimates. Also important to this work are Russian language sources documenting the Soviet need to develop mobile missiles. Although many other sources within the media and academia were tapped for information, these were the most prominent. As a result, this study highlights many of the great technological leaps America has made toward being able to attack mobile missiles, but it also underscores the need for improved coordination....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . .1 2 THE EVOLUTION AND SPREAD OF MOBILE BALLISTIC MISSILES. . . 5 3 THE AMERICAN COLD WAR RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . 21 4 RESPONDING TO MOBILE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE POST–COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT. . . . . . . 37 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . 51...

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My interest in the center of gravity (COG) concept began in the Republic of Singapore when I noticed with some amusement that a concept which purports to help campaign planners focus their main effort can be embroiled in such controversy and confusion. I attempt to unravel some of the mystique that surrounds the employment of the COG concept. Hopefully, by drawing out the potential sources of confusion that often accompany the use of the concept, we can soften the difficulties of communication and shift the focus of our arguments in a direction that will be more profitable to all....

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One of the United States’ greatest military advantages is rapid global mobility. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) provides a crucial supplement to the military’s mobility resources in time of war or national emergency. The proliferation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), however, poses a growing threat to the CRAF and its critical airlift capacity. In this study, Lt Col Glen Downing describes the US government’s historical and potential future uses of the CRAF during contingency operations. He examines current CRAF policies, the operating environment, and the MANPAD threat, describing the negative consequences of the shoot down of a CRAF airliner. Positing several options to counter the threat, he analyzes each following the parameters of unit cost, operating cost, funding sources, insurability, and crew training. The study concludes with a thoughtful recommendation to the Department of Defense on a course of action to confront the MANPADS threat to the CRAF....

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In Tanker-Force Structure: Recapitalization of the KC-135, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Narvid challenges air mobility warriors to develop a tanker-force structure that overcomes the thinking of old to launch new concepts and capabilities for the future tanker. He argues that the future of warfare will require a tanker that is able to operate as a force enabler across the full spectrum of operations. This research is very timely with the Boeing 767 being looked at as a replacement for some of the older KC-135s. In this paper, Colonel Narvid examines the chronology of the tanker and the role it has played throughout its history. He argues that the next tanker must break from old capabilities, tied to a Cold War strategy, and embark on new operations and more capabilities that are able to respond to future threats....

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There is a story that still needs to be told about the Air Force contribution to—and shaping by—arms control. The ability to make these assessments did not blossom overnight. This book captures the story of a young Air Force’s initial (and limited) impact on arms-control negotiations and outcomes. It goes on to document a growing awareness by the service that it was better to help craft the US position than to be only a recipient of the outcome. The book highlights the lesson it belatedly learned in the early days of arms control: the Air Force has to plan and budget for treaty implementation as aggressively as it works to protect its equities during treaty negotiations....

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PART I Foundations for Strategic Arms Control, 1945–68 1 The United States Air Force and Arms Control: The Early Years . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Michael O. Wheeler 2 Peace through Strength Alone: US Air Force Views on Arms Control in the 1950s and Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Edward Kaplan PART II Strategic Arms Limitations, 1969–80 3 The Road to SALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Anne G. Campbell 4 Strategic Arms Control and the US Air Force: The SALT Era, 1969–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Jeffrey A. Larsen PART III The Reagan Years, 1981–88 5 Arms Control during the Reagan Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 Charles D. Dusch Jr. 6 National Security Strategy, Arms Control, and the US Air Force: The Reagan Years, 1981–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Forrest E. Waller Jr. PART IV Strategic Arms Reductions, 1989–2000 7 Arms Control after the Cold War . . . . . . 191 Thomas S. Mowle 8 Downsizing and Shifting Operational Emphasis for the US Air Force: The Bush and Clinton Years, 1989–2000 . . . . . . . . .227 Thomas D. Miller PART V Conclusion ...

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To make the report useful to a potentially broad audience, team members set out to answer this question through a wide-ranging examination of the geopolitical, sociological, diplomatic, technological, and operational factors that shaped the characteristics and outcome of this particular air campaign....

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1 The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Dr. Karl Mueller 2 The Planning Background . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Lt Col Bradley S. Davis 3 US and NATO Doctrine for Campaign Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Col Maris McCrabb 4 The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan . .87 Col Christopher M. Campbell 5 Executing Deliberate Force, 30 August–14 September 1995 . . . . . . . . . 131 Lt Col Mark J. Conversino 6 Combat Assessment: A Commander’s Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 7 Assessing the Effectiveness of Deliberate Force: Harnessing the Political-Military Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 8 Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . 199 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent iii Chapter Page 9 Weapons Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . 257 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 10 Deliberate Force Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 11 Deliberate Force Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 12 Deliber...

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A comparison of the Misty and A-10 FAC missions clearly demonstrates a failure of the USAF to develop a full range of suitable tactics for the direct attack of enemy fielded forces. Although the quantum leaps in weapons delivery accuracy from Vietnam to Kosovo now make it possible to destroy armor and artillery from the air, there has not been a corresponding improvement in target identification. Until USAF prioritizes the direct attack of ground forces and target identification, its ability to attack fielded forces effectively will remain limited. Drawing from the lessons of the Misty and A-10 FACs, the recommendations presented here focus on equipment, tactics and training, and doctrine....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF AIR INTERDICTION FROM WORLD WAR I THROUGH VIETNAM . . . . . . . 7 3 MISTY-FAC TACTICS: HYPOTHETICAL MISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 HISTORY OF ATTACKING FIELDED FORCES: POST-VIETNAM TO KOSOVO . . . . . . . . . . . .41 5 A-10 FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79...

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Maj Richard J. Hazdra’s Air Mobility: The Key to the United States National Security is an examination of the force structure of Air Mobility Command (AMC) based on a model for two major theater wars. His study examines this organization’s current force structure. Air mobility is the key that unlocks the national security strategy (NSS). AMC’s force structure is crucial for the United States to implement its NSS. His study centers on the question: Can a force structure based on the possibility of fighting two major theater wars satisfy the requirements for steady-state operations? Major Hazdra examines three corollary issues: air mobility as a form of airpower that enables the military instrument of power in two basic ways, requirements placed on mobility air forces, and the structure of mobility air forces and the effectiveness of that structure....

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The United States no longer enjoys a near monopoly on space effects. Every week brings news of advances in space technologies by China, Russia, India, European powers, and others. Space, as a strategic medium (and probably a future war-fighting medium), is the ultimate high ground; it is now widely shared and could be hotly contested. Ranging from satellite-based access to Internet services to China’s recent shoot down of one of its own satellites, new capabilities derived from space-based assets are accelerating in terms of quality, ingenuity, and importantly, availability to allies and enemies alike....

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1 MODELING THE SPACE-POWER CONTINUUM.1 Domestic Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 National-Security Space Power . . . . . . . . . . 2 Military Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 International Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Applying the Strategic Framework . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 CHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Domestic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 National-Security Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Military Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 International Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3 INDIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Domestic Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 National-Security Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Military Space Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 International Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4 EUROPEAN UNION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Domestic Envi...

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A decision to put weapons in space—or to refrain from doing so—should be based on a firm understanding about what such weapons can be expected to achieve. More specifically since numerous orbital weapons concepts have been advocated as natural evolutions of surface and airborne weapons, it would appear useful to compare those proposed spacebased systems with their terrestrial counterparts. Does the United States Need Space-Based Weapons? by Maj William L. Spacy II evaluates the theoretical capabilities of orbital weapons and compares them to weapons already in existence and to emerging concepts proposed for development....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Space Weaponization Debate . . . . . . . . . . 1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 SPACE-BASED WEAPONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Directed Energy Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Direct Impact Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Defending Space-Based Assets . . . . . . . . . 32 Technological Factors Bearing on Space-Based Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 3 SEEKING CONTROL OF SPACE: GROUND-BASED ALTERNATIVES FOR SPACE CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Defensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Nondestructive Approaches to Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Destructive Approaches to Offensive Counterspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 4 ATTACKING TERRESTRIAL...