Description Details
During the Lebanon conflict, the IAF employed the most advanced combat aircraft in the world to attack targets in southern Lebanon in an effort to compel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Shi’ite forces to reduce the frequency of guerrilla attacks against Israeli ground troops. This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of those air raids in supporting the Israeli coercive strategy. This study contends there were two reasons for this failure. First, the asymmetry of motivation favored the Shi’ites, which negated the effectiveness of air strikes as a“carrot.” Second, the air strikes were unable to create a realistic fear of escalation for the targets. This was caused by two factors: the Lebanese environment and the inability of the air strikes to add significantly to the costs of the target organizations. This paper finds that Army and Air Force airpower theory and doctrine have converged at the operational level of warfare. The kernel of a future airpower theory may be found in two propositions. The first is the general agreement between the Army and the Air Force that airpower can provide important, potentially decisive ...

Description Details
This paper explores the relationship between Information Warfare (IW) and Public Affairs (PA) and reveals a direct link through the role of propaganda in each. A historical analysis of propaganda in past wars yields lessons which can be applied to formulating PA policy on IW today. In light of the evidence, three possible options emerge regarding the possible IW roles PA might adopt. Option One—a “Hands Off” policy—seeks to avoid any association with IW and represents the current PA approach. Option Two upholds the primacy of truth but acknowledges PA must take an active role in IW. Option Three suggests PA abandon its policy to tell the truth and actively en-gage in all IW activities, including disinformation. This paper finds Option Two as the logical role for PA in today’s environment and concludes with several recommendations to implement the policy....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 4 2 DEFINING INFORMATION WARFARE AND IDENTIFYING THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS LINK . . . . . 5 Information Warfare and the CNN Factor . . . . 7 Public Affairs and Psychological Operations Roles Begin to Blur . . . . 8 Notes . . . .12 3 A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MILITARY PROPAGANDA . . . . .15 Revolutionary War . . . . . 16 Civil War . . . . .17 Spanish–American War . . . . .18 World War I . . . . .19 World War II: The War against Germany . . . . .21 World War II: The War against Japan . . . . .23 Korea and Vietnam . . . .24 Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War . . . . . 25 Summary . . . . .27 Notes . . . .28 4 PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPTIONS/IMPLICATIONS FOR INFORMATION WARFARE . . . . .31 Three Public Affairs Path Options . . . . .31 Option One: “Hands Off” . . . .31 Option Two: Public Affairs Conducts Information Warfare, Upholding Primacy of Truth . . . . .34 Option Three: Public Affairs Engages in Information Warfare, Including Disinformation . . . . .38 Notes . . . .40 5 CONCLUSION . . . . .43...

Description Details
Sustained Coercive Air Presence (SCAP) is an airpower approach to peace enforcement designed to impose a cease-fire on an unwilling belligerent and then use a prolonged air presence to enhance long-term diplomatic efforts that seek a political solution. The competing agendas and political infighting associated with United Nations and coalition operations also seriously hinders a SCAP strategy. Nonetheless, if politicians decide on an airpower approach to peace enforcement, SCAP in concert with the economic, informational, and political instruments of power is a viable strategy against a modern, well-armed foe....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF SUSTAINED COERCIVE AIR PRESENCE . . . . . 7 3 OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT . . . . 19 4 COERCIVE AIRPOWER OVER BOSNIA–HERZEGOVINA . . . . 39 5 CONCLUSION . . . . 59...

Description Details
While investigating these topics, my research centered on an interview with one of the former Soviet Union’s top missile engineers, the vice commander of Air Combat Command, discussions with the USAF Air Armament Center’s chief of advanced concepts, and on recently declassified CIA documents regarding the US reconnaissance program and National Intelligence Estimates. Also important to this work are Russian language sources documenting the Soviet need to develop mobile missiles. Although many other sources within the media and academia were tapped for information, these were the most prominent. As a result, this study highlights many of the great technological leaps America has made toward being able to attack mobile missiles, but it also underscores the need for improved coordination....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . .1 2 THE EVOLUTION AND SPREAD OF MOBILE BALLISTIC MISSILES. . . 5 3 THE AMERICAN COLD WAR RESPONSE . . . . . . . . . 21 4 RESPONDING TO MOBILE BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE POST–COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT. . . . . . . 37 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . 51...

Description Details
This study examines the history of technology and sovereignty, which reveals a model for the evolution of international law. Specifically, the history of sea, air, and space provides examples on past issues of sovereignty. A three-stage pat-tern of international law emerges. Under the assumption that sovereignty issues related to information warfare will follow the same path, the current state of sovereignty regarding information is established. To focus the study, a functional outline for international convention, the International Regime for Information Security (IRIS), is advanced. IRIS balances US domestic privacy needs with US national security demands. Specifically, technology issues regarding digital identification and encryption are weighed against civil liberties and intelligence needs....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . 7 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . 16 3 INFORMATION RELIANCE . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . 28 4 STATUS QUO—CYBERLITIGATION . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . 36 5 THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR INFORMATION SECURITY MODEL. . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . 47 6 THE FUTURE . . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . . 56...

Description Details
This paper examines the counterterrorist strategy employed on the Island of Basilan during Operation Enduring Freedom- Philippines (OEF–P) and discusses its potential applicability in the current Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) insurgency. The strategy used the principles found in the Diamond Model, the counterinsurgency (COIN) model that Dr. Gordon McCormick developed....

Description Details
This paper explores the utility of a debriefing method resulting in individual, unit, and organizational transcendence toward increased effectiveness in the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF). The conceptual framework is centered on the transformational and complexity theories of leadership science. The study offers for consideration a debriefing methodology termed “holistic” as a structure for achieving both individualistic and unit inner growth and efficiency. The problem examined is the lack of proper leadership tools in the RNoAF’s operational units to understand and cope with the effects of increased stress. Based on theory and examples from operational practice, holistic debriefing is presented as a possible means for leaders to increase mission effectiveness through improved stress coping mechanisms. The secondary effects from people engaging with themselves and each other through holistic debriefing are increased self-knowledge, interpersonal trust, group confidence, and an improved working environment....

Description Details
This paper addresses the use of airpower during the French military operations in Africa since 1960. Using case study methodology, it emphasizes the operational level of war and analyzes the use of the different French army, air force, and naval aviation operational roles; the adaptation of equipment to conditions in Africa; and the changes in the French- African policy that have influenced the use of airpower....

Description Details
This research is framed in the context of a specialized weapon in military aviation: an unmanned multirole fighter capable of replacing manned systems and their respective missions. This paper gives a brief history of unmanned aerial vehicles and their employment as weapons to demonstrate the evolution from ISR platform to unmanned combat air vehicle and then evolves into two main sections of “can we” and “should we” pursue this avenue of development. The primary means of answering the research question is both technical and philosophical. Before being able to answer if the Air Force should pursue an unmanned fighter, it is necessary to determine if it is technically feasible for such a system....

Description Details
My interest in the center of gravity (COG) concept began in the Republic of Singapore when I noticed with some amusement that a concept which purports to help campaign planners focus their main effort can be embroiled in such controversy and confusion. I attempt to unravel some of the mystique that surrounds the employment of the COG concept. Hopefully, by drawing out the potential sources of confusion that often accompany the use of the concept, we can soften the difficulties of communication and shift the focus of our arguments in a direction that will be more profitable to all....

Description Details
One of the United States’ greatest military advantages is rapid global mobility. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) provides a crucial supplement to the military’s mobility resources in time of war or national emergency. The proliferation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), however, poses a growing threat to the CRAF and its critical airlift capacity. In this study, Lt Col Glen Downing describes the US government’s historical and potential future uses of the CRAF during contingency operations. He examines current CRAF policies, the operating environment, and the MANPAD threat, describing the negative consequences of the shoot down of a CRAF airliner. Positing several options to counter the threat, he analyzes each following the parameters of unit cost, operating cost, funding sources, insurability, and crew training. The study concludes with a thoughtful recommendation to the Department of Defense on a course of action to confront the MANPADS threat to the CRAF....

Description Details
In Tanker-Force Structure: Recapitalization of the KC-135, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Narvid challenges air mobility warriors to develop a tanker-force structure that overcomes the thinking of old to launch new concepts and capabilities for the future tanker. He argues that the future of warfare will require a tanker that is able to operate as a force enabler across the full spectrum of operations. This research is very timely with the Boeing 767 being looked at as a replacement for some of the older KC-135s. In this paper, Colonel Narvid examines the chronology of the tanker and the role it has played throughout its history. He argues that the next tanker must break from old capabilities, tied to a Cold War strategy, and embark on new operations and more capabilities that are able to respond to future threats....

Description Details
The use of the heavy bomber during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is just one more chapter on the flexibility of airpower. Bombers in the early stages of the war destroyed the Taliban air force on the ground and the limited air-to-air defenses, as well as disrupting command and control nodes. Orbiting close over problem areas, heavy bombers, guided by ground terminal attack controllers, precisely struck key targets. The bombers were supplying something different than traditional CAS. This new form of warfare used small parties of ground troops in support of the massive firepower that the bombers could provide. Each war is different; and in this case, there were virtually no external threats to the bombers. With total air dominance and the freedom to range over the battlefield at will, utilizing heavy bombers in the GAPS role was possible. This combination of the JDAM along with improved communications systems made this new mission a reality. With the success of these operations, Colonel Theisen believes the USAF should initiate doctrine, rules of engagement, and training changes to accommodate this mission....

Description Details
In this important study, Lt Col Wayne Johnson, USAF, argues that systematic tightening of interagency cooperation and better work on defining sensitive technology prohibitions are needed to maintain the US technological edge. He also maintains that the US government requires a new and disciplined export control process—not the current mosaic of rules, regulations, and perspectives that came out of the cold war, but a process that provides a revamped, systemic approach with consistent implementation. Colonel Johnson explores the problem of defining which technologies the United States is willing to transfer(military or dual-use) and the need to ensure that national security objectives do not take a backseat to economic expediency. To accomplish this end, he argues for better interagency cooperation as a first step leading to a more centralized, coordinated, and strategic view of technology transfer and how it impacts US national security....

Description Details
Lt Col Thomas D. Torkelson claims that the inability of the United States to achieve its stated political objectives in its global war on terror (GWOT) reflects its flawed kinetic-centric military strategy. This study erects a framework of effectiveness utilizing Clausewitzian principles to judge military strategy. By considering the expressed political objectives of the GWOT, the centers of gravity (COG) that military strategy should target within this struggle, and the GWOT’s placement along a Clausewitzian continuum of violence, this paper evaluates US military efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) through the perspective of two opposing models....

Table of Contents Details
1 THE TIMELINESS OF TIMELESSNESS . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 2 CLAUSEWITZIAN EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . .9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 THE KINETIC MODEL AND ITS PREVALENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4 THE NONKINETIC MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: THE MODELS APPLIED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113...

Description Details
The study concludes that a viable Air Force strategy in Africa is properly based on modest “ends” that reflect US national interests on the continent that are themselves limited in scope. These modest ends require that correspondingly limited “ways” and “means” be applied in order for the entire Air Force approach to remain balanced. The ways should focus on missions that create conditions for African states to solve their own security issues, thereby increasing their legitimacy. The means should focus on building the capacity for long-term operations in Africa with access to airfields, a force structure that includes strike and transport aircraft specialized for the region, an Air Force organization tailored to the peculiar demands of the continent, and specialized cultural training for Airmen. Spaven concludes that “only by accepting the risk of stepping beyond tactical and operational thinking can the Air Force do great things for the poorest of continents.”...

Table of Contents Details
1 THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 2 AIRPOWER IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM THE PAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 CURRENT US ACTIVITIES AND GUIDANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 4 WHAT CAN AIRMEN EXPECT IN AFRICA? . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 5 HOW SHOULD AIRMEN THINK ABOUT AFRICA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 6 CONCLUSION: A US AIR FORCE STRATEGY FOR AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75...

Description Details
There is a story that still needs to be told about the Air Force contribution to—and shaping by—arms control. The ability to make these assessments did not blossom overnight. This book captures the story of a young Air Force’s initial (and limited) impact on arms-control negotiations and outcomes. It goes on to document a growing awareness by the service that it was better to help craft the US position than to be only a recipient of the outcome. The book highlights the lesson it belatedly learned in the early days of arms control: the Air Force has to plan and budget for treaty implementation as aggressively as it works to protect its equities during treaty negotiations....

Table of Contents Details
PART I Foundations for Strategic Arms Control, 1945–68 1 The United States Air Force and Arms Control: The Early Years . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Michael O. Wheeler 2 Peace through Strength Alone: US Air Force Views on Arms Control in the 1950s and Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Edward Kaplan PART II Strategic Arms Limitations, 1969–80 3 The Road to SALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Anne G. Campbell 4 Strategic Arms Control and the US Air Force: The SALT Era, 1969–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Jeffrey A. Larsen PART III The Reagan Years, 1981–88 5 Arms Control during the Reagan Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 Charles D. Dusch Jr. 6 National Security Strategy, Arms Control, and the US Air Force: The Reagan Years, 1981–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Forrest E. Waller Jr. PART IV Strategic Arms Reductions, 1989–2000 7 Arms Control after the Cold War . . . . . . 191 Thomas S. Mowle 8 Downsizing and Shifting Operational Emphasis for the US Air Force: The Bush and Clinton Years, 1989–2000 . . . . . . . . .227 Thomas D. Miller PART V Conclusion ...

Table of Contents Details
Part 1 The Decision 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Rumblings of Laboratory Consolidation . . . 7 3 The Catalyst: National Defense Authorization Act and Vision 21 . . . . . . . . .23 4 Overhauling Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 Laboratory Studies and Strategy . . . . . . . 71 6 Corona 1996: Leadership and Decisions . .93 7 The Last Dance: Meeting in the Secretary’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Part 2 The Transition 9 Early Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 10 Shaping the Technology Directorates . . 161 11 Getting the Message Out . . . . . . . . . . 195 12 Other Perspectives: Independent Review Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 13 Headquarters: Two Staff Directorates . . 227 14 The Final Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253 15 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265...

Description Details
In his book The Quest: Haywood Hansell and American Strategic Bombing in World War II, Charles Griffith makes a major contribution in detailing the role played by General Hansell from his early days as an instructor at the Air Corps Tactical School to the heady days and nights as a young war planner developing the air war plan used by the United States during World War II to his triumphs and disappointments as a commander in the field. While the book tells this story well, it does more than just relate the life and times of Possum Hansell. The book goes a long way toward explaining the origins of many of the arguments about the utility of airpower in the closing decade of the twentieth century....

Table of Contents Details
1 THE PROBLEMS OF AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2 THE EARLY YEARS: EDUCATION AND ACTS .23 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 3 PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 4 THE FRICTIONS OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 5 THE GLOBAL BOMBER FORCE . . . . . . . . .129 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152 6 TRIUMPH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 7 TRAGEDY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223...

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 About Revolutions in Military Affairs and Disproportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 DOCTRINE FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . 8 Global-Mobility Strategic Air Campaigns . . . 10 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 4 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Operational Concepts for Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Operational Concepts for Global-Mobility Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5 TECHNOLOGY FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Technology for Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Technology for Global-Mobility ...