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"Colonel Cirafici provides a clear picture of theater air mobility forces structure, their capabilities, and limitations . He has identified problem areas, and recommended improve ments. Colonel Cirafici has looked to the future and examined how ongoing changes in theater air mobility forces and equipment will increase the combatant commander's options in the theater. The greatest value of his study is to create a clearer understanding of how theater air mobility forces act to enhance operations and support the battlefield."...
This book examines the role that theater-level commanders in the UN and NATO played in influencing the use of airpower over Bosnia between the spring of 1993 and the end of 1995. It also uncovers factors explaining why top UN and NATO commanders in the region acted as they did. The central thesis of this study is that the commanders’ needs to balance the various responsibilities inherent in command powerfully affected their actions when they tried to influence the use of airpower....
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 MILITARY INFLUENCE ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3 BACKGROUND ON THE USE OF AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA: 1992–APRIL 1993 . . . . . . . . . .57 4 NATO AIR SUPPORT AND AIR STRIKES: MAY–DECEMBER 1993 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5 AIRPOWER THREATS, USES, AND DISAPPOINTMENTS: JANUARY–JUNE 1994 . .115 6 COMPETING MISSIONS AND DEMANDS FOR FORCE PROTECTION: AUGUST–DECEMBER 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 7 PAVING THE WAY TO ENFORCEMENT: JANUARY–JUNE 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .203 8 SREBRENICA AND THE DECISIONS TO USE AIRPOWER: JULY–AUGUST 1995 . . 245 9 DELIBERATE FORCE: AUGUST–SEPTEMBER 1995 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273 10 CONCLUSIONS: MILITARY INFLUENCE ON AIRPOWER IN BOSNIA . . . . . . . . . . . . 313...
1 -NO. 3 WING ROYAL NAVAL AIR SERVICE (JULY 1916-MAY 1917) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2 BRITISH BOMBING BEGINS . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 3 41ST WING ROYAL FLYING CORPS (JUNE 1917-JANUARY 1918) . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 125 4 . EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE (FEBRUARY-NOVEMBER 1918) . . . . . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 5 EIGHTH BRIGADE AND INDEPENDENT FORCE OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 6 POSTWAR ASSESSMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . .239 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 299 Illustrations 1 'Battle Casualties, Night Squadrons, June-November 1918 . . . . . . . . . 210 Photographs Handley Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 DeHavilland 4B . . . . . . . . . ...
Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 THE NEED FOR BETTER LISTENING . . . . . . . 1 2 FALLACIES ABOUT LISTENING . . . . . . . . . . 5 Fallacy #1: Listening Is Not My Problem! . . . . . 5 Fallacy #2: Listening and Hearing Are the Same . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Fallacy #3: Good Readers Are Good Listeners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Fallacy #4: Smarter People Are Better Listeners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Fallacy #5: Listening Improves with Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Fallacy #6: Listening Skills Are Difficult to Learn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3 THE PROCESS OF LISTENING . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Receiving . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Attending . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Understanding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Responding . . . . . . ...
This study answers the following questions: Is John A. Warden III’s, “The Enemy as a System” analogous to the Air Corps Tactical School’s (ACTS) industrial web theory of airpower employment? If so, why (given the 50 plus years between development of these theories)? If not, what are the prime sources of divergence? The author first describes both theories using an outline from which they are compared on an “apples to apples” basis. From this analysis, similarities and differences are presented. Next, the author discusses contextual factors affecting development of both theories....
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 THEORY DESCRIPTIONS AND COMPARISON . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 15 3 ANALYSIS OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 30 4 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 36 GLOSSARY . . . . 37...
Lt Col Karen U. Kwiatkowski’s Expeditionary Air Operations in Africa: Challenges and Solutions details air operations challenges in Africa. She discusses how the USAF currently meets or avoids these challenges. She contends that Africa is like the “western frontier” of America’s history—undeveloped, brimming with opportunity as well as danger, and that it is a place where standard assumptions often do not apply. Africa has not been, and is not today, a US geostrategic interest area. However, as the dawn of the twenty-first century breaks over a planet made both intimate and manageable by CNN and DHL Air Express, Colonel Kwiatkowski believes that the winners will be those who understand Africa and can meet the challenges of air operations on the continent first....
1 WHAT THE WORLD KNOWS ABOUT AIR OPERATIONS CHALLENGES IN AFRICA . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2 WHAT THE USAF KNOWS ABOUT AIR OPERATIONS IN AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Recent Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 WHAT THE USAF IS DOING ABOUT AIR OPERATIONS IN AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Some Solutions for Future Improvement . . .33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 4 WHAT AIRCREWS KNOW ABOUT AIR EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS IN AFRICA . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 5 SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71...
This thesis follows the history of joint targeting boards since World War II to illustrate the foundations that have led to today’s joint airpower targeting process. Having established the historical background, this thesis explores the current solutions for determining airpower mission and target priorities. Using the principles of war as a framework for analysis, this thesis compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each model to determine whether a targeting board is an effective tool for the JFC in future operations. In the end, this thesis finds a Joint Targeting Coordination Board integrated into the air component staff as the greatest potential for providing a future joint commander with an effective process for determining airpower mission priorities and selecting targets. Finally, organizational changes and recommendations are suggested to assure the targeting process overcomes individual service biases and remains focused on accomplishing the theater objectives....
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 THE HISTORY OF JOINT TARGETING SINCE WORLD WAR II . . . . . 5 World War II . . . . . . 5 Korean Conflict . . . . 6 Vietnam War . . . . . . 9 Desert Storm . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . 15 3 THE JTCB TODAY . . . 19 Current Definition . . . 19 Where the JTCB Fits into the Planning Process . . . . . . 20 Model A—The EUCOM/CFC Model . . . . . 21 Model B—The PACOM/LANTCOM Model . . . . . . 22 Summary . . . . 24 Notes . . . . . . 25 4 THE JTCB’S FUTURE EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . 27 Assumptions . . . . . . 28 Methodology . . . . . . 29 Analysis . . . . 30 Assessment . . . 44 Notes . . . . . . 46 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 51 Recommendation Number One . . . . 51 Recommendation Number Two . . . . 53 Recommendation Number Three . . . 53 Notes . . . . . . 54...
In this paper, Lt Col Devin L. Cate tackles the question of whether an air superiority fighter is relevant to warfare in the twenty-first century.
This study examines the development of military night aviation from its origins through the First World War. Emphasis is on the evolution of night flying in those countries which fought on the Western Front, namely France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States . While night flying occurred in other theaters, the most intense air effort was clearly in t°he west. There, belligerents pressed aviation technology and tactics to the limits ; the skies of northern France and Flanders offered the only opportunity for movement across the stagnated front. Another important consideration was the availability of rich documentation concerning night aerial activity in the theater....
The early proponents of air power believed that with suitable aircraft, and control of the air, airmen would make surface operations impossible and irrelevant. In the years since they made these predictions, aircraft have gained capabilities far beyond those predicted by early advocates. However, airmen are still searching for a strategy that will guarantee the results their predecessors promised. Instead of replacing surface forces, air power has become their indispensable partner. Air power contributes to the security, mobility, and firepower of joint forces, but its primary contribution may be air superiority....
This paper examines how these rules affected the effective military execution of the Rolling Thunder air campaign, as well as their impact on American aircrews and the enemy. During the Vietnam War, many American air commanders were convinced that rigid Rules of Engagement (ROEs) prevented an American aerial victory over North Vietnam during the Rolling Thunder air campaign from 1965-1968. ROEs became so complicated and changed so often that aircrews found it difficult to know what the rules were from day to day. As a result, many vital military targets were either not bombed or were attacked in a very limited and piecemeal fashion....
1. INTRODUCTION. 1 2. BACKGRIDUND INFORMATION. 3 3. IMPACT OF ROEs ON MILITARY COMMANDERS AND AIRCREWS. 12 4. ROLLINIG THUNDER --MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. 20 5. IMPACT OF ROEs ON THE ENEMY. 27 6. CONCLUSIONS. 32...
This is a study of the applicability of prospect theory to military decision making.Prospect theory posits that the decision maker’s reference point determines thedomain in which he makes a decision. One implication of this study is that if the decision maker can do the same for asubordinate or for an enemy, he may be better able to predict their responses in agiven situation. The project’s goal is to develop a framework for assessing riskpropensity. It does this by first describing the military decision-making process andconcluding that it is a rational decision-making process. Second, this study describesprospect theory and matches the key aspects of the theory with the militarydecision-making process. Third, it proposes a framework for assessing riskpropensity. The theory is tested in a case study of Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1944decision to launch Operation Market Garden. This decision is analyzed in terms ofGraham T. Allison’s three models for decision making and prospect theory todetermine which model or theory seems to provide the best explanations for Eisenhower’s decision....
INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 MILITARY DECISION MAKING AND PROSPECT THEORY. . . . 5 MARKET GARDEN: CALCULATED RISK OR FOOLISH GAMBLE? . . . . 19 APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK . . . . 39 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 47...