A historian’s occupational disease is to find old precedents for practically everything new that comes along. And that is true for remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) as well. In one way they are merely the continuation of the millennia-old human longing for methods of striking or observing one’s enemies while remaining safe. The purpose of this essay is to briefly explore that which is old, to dwell for a time on what seems to be new, and to conclude with some speculations about the future of unmanned systems....

GENERAL MCCHRYSTAL’S STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT: EVALUATING THE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT IN AFGHANISTAN IN THE SUMMER OF 2009 Introduction . . . .1 The Tasking . . . .2 The Team . . . . 3 The Assessment Begins . . . .7 Early Organizational Difficulties and Cultural Clashes . . . .10 The Team Comes Together and Moves Forward . . .15 Initial Assessment Working Group . . . . 17 General McChrystal Takes Ownership . . . .25 General McChrystal Takes Specific Troop Numbers out of the Assessment . . . . 27 Strategic Assessment Annexes . . . .27 Conclusion . . . . . 48 NOTES . . . . . .49 ABBREVIATIONS . . . .53 APPENDIX: “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” 30 August 2009 . . . .55...

The authors assert that the lack of an effective cyberspace C2 structure critically reduces the responsiveness to combatant and joint task force commanders and increases the difficulty of integrating cyberspace capabilities into operational plans and execution. The traditional military hierarchies currently used for cyberspace C2 do not have the agility to deal with the high velocity of change that characterizes cyberspace. Instead, the authors argue for flexible organizational structures to match the complexity and pace of the cyberspace operational environment....

One of the United States’ greatest military advantages is rapid global mobility. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) provides a crucial supplement to the military’s mobility resources in time of war or national emergency. The proliferation of man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), however, poses a growing threat to the CRAF and its critical airlift capacity. In this study, Lt Col Glen Downing describes the US government’s historical and potential future uses of the CRAF during contingency operations. He examines current CRAF policies, the operating environment, and the MANPAD threat, describing the negative consequences of the shoot down of a CRAF airliner. Positing several options to counter the threat, he analyzes each following the parameters of unit cost, operating cost, funding sources, insurability, and crew training. The study concludes with a thoughtful recommendation to the Department of Defense on a course of action to confront the MANPADS threat to the CRAF....

The US commercial air carriers provide a unique and critical enabler that helps us meet our mobility requirements in the form of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Colonel Schauber contends that changes allowing increased foreign ownership or control opportunities would threaten our national security by jeopardizing the DOD’s accessibility to CRAF assets. Although the CRAF has formally been utilized only twice, its importance and our reliance on it cannot be overstated....

Gen John P. Jumper, former Air Force chief of staff, tasked Air Force Space Command with the responsibility of developing, fielding, and executing tactical and operationally responsive space capabilities near and through space. The newly created initiative known as Joint Warfighting Space focused on near space due to the advantage of achieving spacelike capabilities at a lower cost. Such capabilities could offer continuous, organic, survivable, and “stay and stare” persistence to theater commanders, thus potentially relieving the need for national and strategic systems. Effects-based operations, network-centric warfare, and rapid maneuver demand this persistence....

In support of national and military security strategies, the DOD has established the joint force commander (JFC) as the means to provide unity of command, exercised through component commanders, during contingency operations. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is key to the JFC’s successful prosecution of contingency operations. The multifaceted complexity cannot be overstated as both national and theater ISR architectures include many linked nodes that can act and be tasked independently from one another (i.e., the platforms, sensors, DOD and commercial communication nodes, and a variety of exploitation organizations). The JFC cannot continue to ignore this reality if he or she wants to properly employ ISR-intensive effects-based operations (EBO) to achieve overall campaign objectives—that is, to provide unity of ISR effects in support of the campaign plan....

In Tanker-Force Structure: Recapitalization of the KC-135, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Narvid challenges air mobility warriors to develop a tanker-force structure that overcomes the thinking of old to launch new concepts and capabilities for the future tanker. He argues that the future of warfare will require a tanker that is able to operate as a force enabler across the full spectrum of operations. This research is very timely with the Boeing 767 being looked at as a replacement for some of the older KC-135s. In this paper, Colonel Narvid examines the chronology of the tanker and the role it has played throughout its history. He argues that the next tanker must break from old capabilities, tied to a Cold War strategy, and embark on new operations and more capabilities that are able to respond to future threats....

The use of the heavy bomber during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) is just one more chapter on the flexibility of airpower. Bombers in the early stages of the war destroyed the Taliban air force on the ground and the limited air-to-air defenses, as well as disrupting command and control nodes. Orbiting close over problem areas, heavy bombers, guided by ground terminal attack controllers, precisely struck key targets. The bombers were supplying something different than traditional CAS. This new form of warfare used small parties of ground troops in support of the massive firepower that the bombers could provide. Each war is different; and in this case, there were virtually no external threats to the bombers. With total air dominance and the freedom to range over the battlefield at will, utilizing heavy bombers in the GAPS role was possible. This combination of the JDAM along with improved communications systems made this new mission a reality. With the success of these operations, Colonel Theisen believes the USAF should initiate doctrine, rules of engagement, and training changes to accommodate this mission....

In this discerning assessment of Operation Allied Force (OAF), Lt Col Michael W. Lamb Sr. examines the myriad of lessons learned that have been written, and debated, from this campaign and synthesizes them into some golden nuggets for strategists and campaign planners. Indeed, there is much to be learned. From the beginning of the campaign, the military logic of OAF has been a matter of intense, even bitter debate. The problems and questions that arise from OAF are numerous and cut across the spectrum of military operations....

In Preventing Catastrophe: US Policy Options for Management of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, Lt Col Martin J. “Marty” Wojtysiak, USAF, proposes a response to the dangerous proliferation of nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan. This paper highlights the threat in “The Nuclear Catastrophe of 2005,” a gripping projection of the worstcase scenario on the current realities of the Indian subcontinent. Written a year after the “catastrophe,” it vividly describes the events leading up to the disaster as well as the grim aftermath of a South Asian nuclear war. The remainder of the paper looks at US regional objectives and suggests how they might be achieved. The author proposes a regional proliferation regime that realistically addresses the threat and moves the United States to a pragmatic approach to manage and limit the ongoing proliferation in South Asia....

Col Thompson, in his concentrated focus on China’s military space applications, examines PRC ground, space, counterspace, and space policy aspects. His principal findings: China has plans to construct a new launch site in the deep south; PRC telemetry, tracking and com-mand capacities are improving; China has the ability to conduct limited intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance missions from space; the PRC is pursuing a counterspace capability most likely using satellite jammers and anti-satellites (possibly parasitic or nano-satellites). Col Thompson concludes that while China’s space program does not now constitute a global threat, the PRC is pursuing space capabilities that will increase its regional influence, and deny an adversary certain uses of space....

In China as Peer Competitor? Trends in Nuclear Weapons, Space, and Information Warfare Lt Col Kathryn L. Gauthier analyzes the potential for China to emerge as a peer competitor of the United States in the coming decades. First, she examines two traditional pillars of national strength— China’s status as a nuclear weapons state and as a space power. Second, she then explores China’s growing focus on information warfare (IW) as a means to wage asymmetric warfare against a technologically advanced adversary. Third, the author carefully examines the status of the three programs, highlights areas of concern and potential conflict with the United States, and analyzes the implications of these issues for the United States....

In this important study, Lt Col Wayne Johnson, USAF, argues that systematic tightening of interagency cooperation and better work on defining sensitive technology prohibitions are needed to maintain the US technological edge. He also maintains that the US government requires a new and disciplined export control process—not the current mosaic of rules, regulations, and perspectives that came out of the cold war, but a process that provides a revamped, systemic approach with consistent implementation. Colonel Johnson explores the problem of defining which technologies the United States is willing to transfer(military or dual-use) and the need to ensure that national security objectives do not take a backseat to economic expediency. To accomplish this end, he argues for better interagency cooperation as a first step leading to a more centralized, coordinated, and strategic view of technology transfer and how it impacts US national security....

Colonel Felker’s paper espouses a practical theory of airpower based on the synergistic relationship among societal structure and lines of communications that comprise infrastructure. Rather than isolating different elements of society and their concomitant targets, the theory views targets in a more holistic way. Of note, the theory articulates a culturally based paradigm with airpower applied against the linkages within a society’s system processes, rather than a “one-size-fits-all” target list that attacks form. The theory describes a way to think about airpower, not a way to execute its missions....

In this important study, Lt Col Daniel R. Simmons, USAF, argues that the United States Air Force (USAF) officer success in the twenty-first century will depend on a robust ethical and professional foundation based on Air Force core values. The Air Force has widely promulgated the following core values: “Integrity first, Service before self, and Excellence in all we do.” However, recently well publicized cases of core values failures among some Air Force officers suggest a crisis in character that threatens leadership effectiveness in the Air Force....

Lt Col Thomas D. Torkelson claims that the inability of the United States to achieve its stated political objectives in its global war on terror (GWOT) reflects its flawed kinetic-centric military strategy. This study erects a framework of effectiveness utilizing Clausewitzian principles to judge military strategy. By considering the expressed political objectives of the GWOT, the centers of gravity (COG) that military strategy should target within this struggle, and the GWOT’s placement along a Clausewitzian continuum of violence, this paper evaluates US military efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) through the perspective of two opposing models....

1 THE TIMELINESS OF TIMELESSNESS . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 2 CLAUSEWITZIAN EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . .9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 3 THE KINETIC MODEL AND ITS PREVALENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 4 THE NONKINETIC MODEL . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 5 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: THE MODELS APPLIED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113...

This important research deals with the intellectual foundation of the American profession of arms—our joint doctrine. The author, Lt Col Carl R. Pivarsky Jr., USAF, argues that the current doctrine development process has become a zero-sum game driven by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) declaring joint doctrine to be “authoritative.” This research focuses on that document and the impact it has on how we think about high-intensity, conventional combat operations. Specifically, it deals with the corruption of the definitions of maneuver and interdiction to serve parochial land force interests. The author shows in detail how definitions and terms have destroyed the command authority of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and relegated air component capabilities solely to the support of surface maneuver commanders....

Arguably a top tier concern for American foreign policy for more than a few years, Iran gets the meticulous attention of two distinguished Air Force scholars. Lt Cols Charles A. Douglass and Michael D. Hays are critical of the current American policy toward Iran and tell us why. More importantly, they point to elements necessary for an effective Iranian strategy. Their aim: “to change the fundamental calculus of the Iranian problem” to one beneficial for both Americans and Iranians....

1 SOLVING IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 IRAN’S PERCEPTIONS AND PATTERNS: HISTORIC ROOTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Ancient Persian Greatness and Cultural Pride . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Resentment of Foreign Interference . . . . . . 7 Persian-Shiite Strategic Loneliness . . . . . 10 Pragmatic National Interest Replaces Revolutionary Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 ANALYSIS OF IRAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Demographics, Politics, and Economics . . . .24 Internal Dynamics, Personalities, Power Centers, and Factions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Nuclear Desire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 US PERCEPTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49 US Perceptions of Iran Internally . . . . . . . .49 US Perceptions of Iran Externally . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 5 REVIEW OF RECENT US POLICY . . . . . . . ....

The study concludes that a viable Air Force strategy in Africa is properly based on modest “ends” that reflect US national interests on the continent that are themselves limited in scope. These modest ends require that correspondingly limited “ways” and “means” be applied in order for the entire Air Force approach to remain balanced. The ways should focus on missions that create conditions for African states to solve their own security issues, thereby increasing their legitimacy. The means should focus on building the capacity for long-term operations in Africa with access to airfields, a force structure that includes strike and transport aircraft specialized for the region, an Air Force organization tailored to the peculiar demands of the continent, and specialized cultural training for Airmen. Spaven concludes that “only by accepting the risk of stepping beyond tactical and operational thinking can the Air Force do great things for the poorest of continents.”...

1 THE GEOGRAPHY OF AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 2 AIRPOWER IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM THE PAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 CURRENT US ACTIVITIES AND GUIDANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .44 4 WHAT CAN AIRMEN EXPECT IN AFRICA? . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .54 5 HOW SHOULD AIRMEN THINK ABOUT AFRICA? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 6 CONCLUSION: A US AIR FORCE STRATEGY FOR AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75...