Description Details
This companion to personal professional study is intended to promote the early development of such a lifetime program and to serve as a tool to facilitate its planning and execution....

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1 THE INFANCY OF AIRPOWER. . . . . . . . . .3 2 NAVAL AVIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 3 AIRPOWER IN WORLD WAR I . . . . . . . . . 11 4 LAYING THE INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS, 1919–1931 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5 AN AGE OF INNOVATION, 1931–1941 . . . . 19 6 NAVAL AVIATION BETWEEN THE WARS . . . .23 7 WORLD WAR II: THE RISE OF THE LUFTWAFFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 8 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—THE STRATEGIC BOMBING DIMENSION . . . . . . . . . .33 9 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—THE TACTICAL AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 10 WORLD WAR II: EUROPE—NAVAL AVIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 11 WORLD WAR II: ROYAL AIR FORCE . . . .45 12 WORLD WAR II: SOVIET AIR FORCE . . . .51 13 WORLD WAR II: THE FALL OF THE LUFTWAFFE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 14 WORLD WAR II: PACIFIC—JAPANESE AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 15 WORLD WAR II: PACIFIC—THE USAAF IN THE SOUTHWEST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 16 WORLD WAR II: CENTRAL PACIFIC—NAVAL AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 17 WORLD WAR II...

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To help educate airmen about the realities of counterinsurgency, this study addresses how insurgent warfare is fundamentally different from conventional wars, develops lessons from two case studies, highlights the challenges that US airmen face, and examines the adequacy of Air Force and Joint doctrine for counterinsurgency operations....

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INTRODUCTION......8 Insurgencies: Not Uncommon ....8 Insurgencies in the Abstract....10 Insurgencies: Fundamentally Different.....11 Counterinsurgency: The US Airman’s Challenge .....12 Methodology of this Study......14 Limitations of the Study....15 SOUTH VIETNAMESE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN AND OPERATION FARMGATE, 1961-1964.....16 Origins of Conflict ......16 Overview of FARMGATE .....18 Program Inception....18 Concept of Operations ......19 Analysis of Operations......20 US Air Force Involvement......20 Army of the Republic of Vietnam ......22 Vietnamese Air Force ....23 Factors Affecting the Role of Air Advisors....24 National Politics....24 US Inter-Service Competition....26 Cultural Factors.....28 Command, Control and Operations ....29 Tasking Air Assets......29 Mission Planning and Targeting Guidance.....31 Combat Intelligence ....32 Other Significant Issues ....33 Rules of Engagement .....33 Training.....34 Equipment....35 FARMGATE Counterinsurgency Operations: Lessons Learned.....37 EL SALVADOR INSURGENCY: 1981-1992.....39 Overview of Operations....41 US Involvement ....41 Salvadoran Milita...

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Drawing from the vision of airpower theorists and building on insights gained from studies on various regime changes, this thesis advances a theory of regime change and outlines a strategy for the use of airpower. To remain in power, regimes must continue to provide goods to the group of people responsible for its rise to power—the winning coalition. Different types of regimes rely on different types of goods to satisfy their winning coalition. This thesis advances the hypothesis that adversely affecting these goods will create policy failure, increase dissatisfaction among the winning coalition, and cause members to seek out a new coalition and regime to provide the lost goods. Additionally, since many regimes supply goods to third parties to retain their support, an additional hypothesis was introduced to account for the influence of international support....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 THE THEORY . . . . 5 3 THE CAUSAL MECHANISM . . . . 19 4 AMERICAN REGIME CHANGE . . . . 27 5 SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIME CHANGE . . . . . 37 6 CONCLUSION . . . . 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 53...

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A call is being made for an aircraft dedicated to the counterinsurgency (COIN) mission within military academic circles and the special operations community. Support for a COIN aircraft needs hard numbers, given the Air Force’s budget constraints brought on by the dedication to the F- 22A. Building on Arthur Davis’s COIN aircraft advocacy paper, this research doesn’t focus on further advocacy, but on a process and method for COIN aircraft procurement. The acquisition focus is on United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) acquisition authority to couple its global war on terrorism (GWOT) mission responsibility with commercial-off-the-shelf aircraft procurement to specifically address the need for an airborne COIN capability....

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This paper shows that in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other counterinsurgency operations, space forces will not be “war winners” but can provide crucial support. Specifically, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities can help isolate the battlespace. These systems can also enhance the ability to combat fielded rebels through surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications. Finally, the effects space forces generate can support the government and help strengthen its ability to solve the insurgents’ cause. The discussion concludes with specific recommendations to improve performance against this and future insurrections....

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This work examines the historical development of aerial precision since World War I and the emergence of the just-war tradition and international law since 1625. It then identifies specific dilemmas associated with the two sorts of judgments required by the just-war tradition, namely, jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), and explores their ramifications. The aim of this study is to encourage moral and ethical reflection by politicians, strategists, and tacticians at all levels. The issues at hand are aerial precision doctrine, the use of the precision-guided munition as the modern aerial weapon of choice, and the influence of the just-war tradition on strategic and tactical decisions....

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1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Aerial-Precision Development: Past, Present, and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 3 Airpower and the Just-War Tradition . . . . .33 4 The Dilemmas of Perfect Aerial Precision . 49 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

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This study determines if a revival of the CRAF Enhancement Program is feasible and if it could be developed into a viable program for addressing AMC's airlift shortfall problem. To achieve this goal, the study analyzes the failure of the first CRAF Enhancement Program to determine if the barriers to its success were surmountable and if these same barriers might impede the success of a future program. The study determines that the first Enhancement Program failed because MAC was unable to develop an incentive plan that was attractive enough to ensure airline participation, yet be persuasive enough to elicit the required support and funding from Congress....

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1 INTRODUCTION.....1 2 THE NATIONAL AIRLIFT SYSTEM.......5 3 CRAF ENHANCEMENT: THEORY AND REALITY......21 4 THE FUTURE OF CRAF ENHANCEMENT...... 44 BIBLIOGRAPHY......65...

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Warfare is an ever evolving mixture of combinations: attack and defense, symmetry and asymmetry, maneuver and firepower, mass and economy of force, etc. True operational art manifests itself when the right balance of these combinations is applied to war fighting. This paper analyzes one such combination; ground maneuver and air interdiction. Indeed, this is a treatise on the synchronization of land power and air power, and how these two vital elements can better contribute to a successful operational campaign. The fundamental thesis is that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) must do more than merely balance this combination as separate entities, he must employ them as coequals in mutually complementary operations....

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1 JOINT WARFARE IS TEAM WARFARE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 MANEUVER AND INTERDICTION—THE RELATIONSHIP . . . 5 Ground Maneuver . . . . 5 Air Interdiction . . . . . . 6 The Relationship . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . 11 3 HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS . . . . . 13 World War I . . . . . 13 World War II . . . . 14 Korean War . . . . . 16 Vietnam War . . . . 17 Desert Storm . . . . 18 Summary . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 19 4 CURRENT MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . . 21 Army Doctrine . . . . . . 21 USAF Doctrine . . . . . . 22 Joint Doctrine . . . . 23 Maneuver and Interdiction . . . . 23 Command Relationships . . . . . . 24 Summary . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . 28 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 31 Conditions . . . . . . 31 Orchestration . . . . 35 Summary . . . . . . 36 Conclusion . . . . . 36 Notes . . . . . 37...

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A complex and interdependent environment in the global war on terrorism (GWOT) highlights the challenge of translating the theory of effects-based operations (EBO) into practice, particularly with respect to influencing the will of the people and achieving a desired end state. The following paper seeks to illustrate the conditions and challenges surrounding the translation of current effects-based theory into operational practice in the GWOT by using three conceptual constructs. First, the Microsoft Corporation, its connectivity to the Internet, and the persistent attacks by computer hackers on Microsoft products help frame the adversary and the complex environment and conditions surrounding the GWOT. Second, the Al-Jazeera satellite news network serves as an anecdotal backdrop for the challenges military planners face in managing EBO assessment and controlling the “effects” in EBO. Third, the versatility of both the MQ- 1B Predator unmanned aerial vehicle and Special Operations Forces illustrates the importance of developing and maintaining collective knowledge, technological relevance, and doctrinal adaptability in an ever-changin...

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This paper analyzes the evolution of strategic bombing doctrine in order to identify the basic doctrinal tenets and then evaluate their compatibility with emerging stealth technologies. Current doctrine is an evolution of existing doctrine, theory, and experience. Therefore, to comprehend fully the meaning of doctrine, it is necessary to trace its lineage. As airpower arrived only recently in the doctrinal arena, no previous doctrine existed. Therefore, this analysis begins with the early airpower theories which provided the roots of evolution. Giulio Douhet is the most famous of the early theorists and his work provided a basis upon which to build. Following World War II (WWII), Bernard Brodie modified Douhet’s theory to incorporate atomic weapons and the experience to date. As theory evolved, so did early Air Corps "unsanctioned" doctrine. By testing each tenet against the demands of emerging stealth technologies, the paper finds that existing doctrine is basically sound, but incomplete. Therefore, the paper proposes and tests additional tenets to accommodate stealth and the increasing rate of technical advancement....

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This study follows the history of close air support (CAS) since World War II to examine how it has been apportioned and allocated in the past. It then examines the current joint air operations process. It is the contention of this study that the current system, rooted in its historical past, does not fully employ CAS to its optimum potential. The historical view of CAS has been as a tactical measure, with limited localized effects. However, properly integrated and coequal with the ground scheme of maneuver, it can have operational level effects. This study examines two theories of the use of CAS at the operational level and then recommends changes to the view of CAS and the process for its apportionment and allocation....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE HISTORY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT . . . . 7 3 CURRENT JOINT CAS DOCTRINE . . . . 39 4 TWO THEORIES OF CAS AS AN OPERATIONAL ASSET . . . . 51 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 59 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 65...

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As leaders at all levels, our Airmen must be able to anticipate and appropriately respond to a complicated and fluid national security environment. Developing such Airmen will require stronger commitments to education and training on the part of the learner to the point where learning never stops. Fostering this highly favorable attitude toward learning is possible only if Air Force education and training programs address learners’ goals, motivations, social interactions, and individual learning styles. This means the Air Force needs a stronger focus on affective learning during the instructional design (ID) process for education and training....

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To help understand and begin to develop alternative policy frameworks that fit the current and emerging security context, the US Air Force’s Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and King’s College, London, hosted a two-day conference at the RUSI offices in London on 18 and 19 May 2009. We sought to bring together some of the best thinkers on deterrence to examine how to reinvigorate this essential tool for today’s policy community. The conference exceeded our expectations, as readers will observe from the excellent products in these proceedings. From the pre-conference “thought pieces” by RUSI’s Michael Codner and AFRI’s Adam Lowther—the presentations by the keynote speakers and case study developers—to the post-conference “Quick Looks” by AFRI personnel, the outcome reflects the creativity and the seriousness with which the attendees and the planning staffs approached the topic....

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1 Framing Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century: Conference Summary . . . . . . . 1 Adam Lowther 2 Defining “Deterrence” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Michael Codner 3 Understanding Deterrence . . . . . . . .27 Adam Lowther 4 Policy and Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Gen Norton A Schwartz, USAF Lt Col Timothy R. Kirk, USAF 5 Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Gen Kevin Chilton, USAF Greg Weaver 6 On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance . . 77 Keith B. Payne 7 Conference Agenda . . . . . . . . . . 121 8 Contemporary Challenges for Extended Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . .  123 Tom Scheber 9 Case Study—The August 2008 War between Russia and Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Denis Corboy 10 Deterrence and Counterproliferation . . 149 Malcolm Chalmers 11 Deterrence and Saddam Hussein . . . 155 Barry Schneider 12 Stymieing Leviathan . . . . . . . . . 215 Paul Schulte 13 The Madrid Train Bombing . . . . . . .237 Peter Neumann 14 Framing Strategic Deterrence . . . . . . ...

Description Details
The United States Air Force has long favored attacking electrical power systems.Electric power has been considered a critical target in every war since World War II,and will likely be nominated in the future. Historically, there have been four basic strategies behind attacks on national electrical systems: to cause a decline in civilian morale; to inflict costs on the political leaders to induce a change; to hamper military operations; and to hinder war production. The evidence shows that the only sound reason for attacking electrical power is to effect the production of war material in a war of attrition against a self-supporting nation-state without outside assistance. The implication for future strategic air operations is important. Because attacks on electric power cause indirect collateral damage which can be politically counterproductive,and the military benefit is minimal, the United States should reject attacks on national electrical power systems in the near future....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . 5 Generation . . . . . . 5 Transmission . . . . . 7 Distribution . . . . . . 8 Control . . . . 8 Effects . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 12 3 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN TOTAL WAR . . . . . . 15 World War II—Germany . . . 17 World War II—Japan . . . . . 22 United States Strategic Bombing Survey . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . 28 4 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN LIMITED WAR . . . . . 33 Korean War . . . . . . 33 Vietnam War . . . . . 37 Desert Storm . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . 42 5 TARGETING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . 45 Failures . . . . 45 When to Target Electric Power . . . 48 Conclusions and Implications . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 57...

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This study analyzes current theater airlift organization and control principles for supporting a large contingency or conventional war. It segregates theater airlift management issues into three organizing categories: 1) organizational relationships and responsibilities, 2) theater command and control networks and supporting personnel, and 3) theater airlift management procedures. The study analyzes historical evidence from the Vietnam and Gulf Wars to derive theater airlift management lessons. By comparing this evidence to current policy trends it attempts to determine how well current doctrine reflects past lessons. In addition, the author evaluates how well-equipped current doctrine is to handle three future influences on the theater airlift system: divestiture of the C-130 fleet, growing uncertainty in the international security arena, and the fielding of the new C-17 transport aircraft....

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The purpose of this study is to identify criteria that will provide objective analysis of a halt-phase strategy. This study identifies the key criteria by examining air combat in three operations: the Battle of Bismarck Sea, the 1973 Golan Heights battles of the Yom Kippur War, and the Iraqi Republican Guard escape from Basra. This examination focuses on air operations looking for tactics, tactical innovations, and operational circumstances that inhibit or enhance air operations designed to halt the advance or retreat of significant ground formations. This study evaluates each case in three major phases: prehostility preparation, conduct of combat operations, and the results and analysis of the operation....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 3 2 EXPLANATION OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 5 Notes . . . . . . 13 3 CRITIQUES OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 15 Notes . . . . . . 22 4 THE BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA . . 25 Notes . . . . . . 34 5 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR, GOLAN HEIGHTS ACTION . . 37 Notes . . . . . . 47 6 THE IRAQI REPUBLICAN GUARD BASRA ESCAPE . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . 63 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . 72...

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This is a book about strategy and war fighting in the midst of a revolution in military affairs as the world moves into the twenty-first century. The book's purpose is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies, and threats that will confront US national security decision makers in the twenty-first century. The participating authors are either professional military officers or civilian professionals who specialize in national security issues....

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1 Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Barry R. Schneider 2 New-Era Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Gen Charles A. Homer, USAF, (Ret.) 3 The Revolution in Military Affairs . . . . . . .65 Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill 4 Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century . . 103 Col John A. Warden III, USAF Overview: Future Airpower and Strategy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 5 Parallel War and Hyperwar Is Every Want a Weakness? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Col Richard Szafranski, USAF Overview: Information Warfare Issues . . . 149 6 Information War - Cyberwar - Netwar . . . 153 George Stein 7 Information Warfare: Impacts and Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Col JamesW. McLendon, USAF Overview: Biological Warfare Issues. . . . . 201 8 The Biological Weapon: APoor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction . . . . . . . . . . 205 Lt Col Terry N. Mayer, USAF 9 Twenty-First Century Germ W...

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A MATTER OF DOCTRINE.............................1 Definitions................................................ 1 Direction.................................................. 3 Notes....................................................... 7 2 THE HISTORIC PRECEDENT: A REQUIREMENT FOR FLEXIBILITY........................................ 9 The Lessons of War.................................... 9 The Nuclear Imperative............................. 15 Notes.................................................. 21 3 THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY.................. 25 Real Smarts in Small Packages .................26 Near Nukes and Real Nukes .......................32 Space: Star Wars in Context .....................40 Notes.................................................. 47 4 APPLYING THE LESSONS: CHANGING AEROSPACE DOCTRINE.............................. 51 The Importance of Actions .........................52 The Global Perspective.............................. 57 Proposals for the Future: A Doctrinal Synthesis...............................................59 The Falklands: A Global Scenario..............64 Notes....................

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix PART I Strategic Factors Reshaping Strategies and Missions Maj Gen Charles D. Link, USAF Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Air Power in the New Security Environment . . .9 Secretary of the Air Force Donald B . Rice Air Power in US Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Dr EdwardN. Luttwak The United States as an Aerospace Power in the Emerging Security Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Dr Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Col John A . Warden III, USAF The Role of the US Air Force in the Employment of Air Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 PART II Air Power as an Element of US Power Projection Page Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Air Power since World War I...

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This paper asserts there exists a dangerous GAP in US strategic intertheater transportation capabilities, propounds a model describing the GAP, and proposes a solution to the problem. Using the Gulf War logistics flow as a model, the three phase points are shown and their airlift/sealift tradeoffs discussed. Other logistics support options, which figured in the war, such as prepositioning and host nation support, are discussed and the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations shown to be, in many ways, a fortuitous theater of operations. This serendipitous combination of circumstances contributed greatly to our successful logistics buildup and is unlikely to recur....

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Logistics Flow During The Gulf War 1 Introduction 1 Strategic lift Phasing 4 Transportation/Support Modes 8 Mobility Studies 16 Summary 19 Conclusion 23 Notes 24 Filling The Gap: The Airship 28 Prologue 28 Introduction 31 The Airship in History 32 Airship Technology 42 Potential Military Roles 53 Conclusion 68 Epilogue 69 Notes 72...

Description Details
The planning for space-based MTI is in its early phases. A “Concept of Operations for Space-Based MTI” has been written, as has a “Space-Based MTI Roadmap.” US Space Command has also written the Long Range Plan, which includes space-based MTI concepts in its plan for 2020. These plans are a good start but do not address several important issues, including satellite architecture, whether satellite MTI systems should completely replace airborne systems, who should be responsible for the system, and how battle managers will operate in the new system....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 3 2 THE EVOLUTION OF MOVING TARGET INDICATOR RADAR SYSTEMS . . . .5 Notes . . . . 11 3 THE MECHANICS OF SPACE OPERATIONS . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . 23 4 UNITED STATES SPACE ORGANIZATIONS THAT MAY AFFECT SPACE-BASED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT . . . .27 Notes . . . . 34 5 TECHNOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT AIRBORNE MOVING TARGET INDICATOR SYSTEMS AND PROPOSED SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . 42 6 ISSUES TO CONSIDER FOR SPACE-BASED MOVING TARGET INDICATOR PLANNING . . . . 45 Notes . . . . 53 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . 55...

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Colonel dePalo believes that better application of the doctrinal tenets of airpower is needed for more effective and efficient utilization of USAF combat rescue forces. He uses the tenets of flexibility, concentration, and persistence to demonstrate that the current force can transform to more effectively support the global war on terrorism and adapt to new roles and missions leading to a more agile, multifaceted personnel-recovery capability worldwide. This force can ably support USAF combat search and rescue requirements while also supporting broader personnel-recovery requirements for both the military and civilians. The potential exists to expand even beyond personnel recovery to support other missions such as the infiltration and exfiltration of battlefield Airmen. He argues that it is important to define the force as a war-fighting capability instead of as an executable function. Better integration of the force into strategic planning will facilitate matching this capability to desired effects, leading to a force able to execute a broad range of missions in varying environments....

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Wills argues that the twentieth-century argument between air and ground proponents has changed significantly since the Gulf War, and it comes down to the relative importance of the ground or air in the mix. It is more than just using air as a supporting component to the ground forces—if this is true, current force organization and employment is adequate. However, if the air predominates in combat operations, then, as Wills puts it in his first chapter, joint operations doctrine needs to be rethought. A changed balance “will affect the military at every level . . . force structure, organization, weapons acquisition, doctrine, and training” (p. 3). Notwithstanding the blunt commentary from ground proponents, Wills offers that airpower has come to dominate air/ground relations....

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1 FRAMING THE DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 AIRPOWER, WAR, AND DIPLOMACY . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 3 ASSESSING THE AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 4 THE AFGHAN MODEL AND BEYOND . . . . . .35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 5 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69...

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Two examples from twentieth-century conflicts demonstrate the potential that missiles possess to disrupt an opponent’s land-based airpower and achieve significant political consequences. Iraq’s use of Scud ballistic missiles in the 1991 Persian Gulf War produced nearly instantaneous political effects. The Scuds did not threaten the coalition military forces opposing Saddam Hussein, but instead threatened the existence of the coalition itself by nearly bringing Israel into the war. Negating this threat demanded an urgent response from land-based airpower, and large numbers of coalition aircraft were forced to perform a new mission: Scud Hunting. Almost 50years before Desert Storm, the Allies in World War II had faced a similar threat from the V-1 and V-2. Thousands of sorties were diverted to bomb missiles that were chiefly fired at London and Antwerp. In both conflicts, coalition and Allied forces possessed enough airpower that the diversion did not prevent them from performing other necessary missions. Yet, in the future, as the United States Air Force (USAF)dwindles in numbers, the ability of land-based airpower to deal with the m...

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This thesis explores the evolution of Russian military doctrine in light of the lessons they say they learned from the Gulf War. Since the early 1980s, such prominent military thinkers as Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov argued that emerging technologies were generating a new revolution in military affairs. The Russian military doctrinal response to Desert Storm seems to confirm Marshal Ogarkov’s predictions. This thesis finds the new military doctrine (1) reverts from the defensive to an offensive preemption, (2) reverts from no nuclear first use to nuclear escalation, (3) guarantees ethnic Russians living in former Soviet states protection, (4) emphasizes the importance of military advancement in C4I, smart weapons, and mobility, and (5) emphasizes strategic nonnuclear deterrent forces....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 RUSSIAN VIEW OF MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 7 Relationship between Military Doctrine and Strategy . . . . 8 Military Doctrine—Military Art—Operational Art—Tactics . . . .9 Soviet/Russian Military Doctrine Evolution . . . . 9 Soviet Military Doctrine Stereotype . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . . 19 3 RUSSIAN IMPRESSION OF THE GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 Strategy . . . . . 24 The Threat . . . . . . 25 Future War . . . . . . 25 The Initial Period of War . . . . . 27 Operational Art . . . . 28 Force Structure . . . . 31 Tactics . . . . . . 32 Technology, Research, and Development . . . . . 33 Summary . . . . 34 Notes . . . . . . 35 4 EMERGING RUSSIAN POST–GULF WAR MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 39 The Threat . . . . . . 41 View of Future War . . . . . 42 Force Structure and Priorities . . . . . 42 Differences with Pre–Gulf War Military Doctrine . . . . . . 43 Conclusions . . . . . . 44 Notes . . . . . . 45 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGISTS . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . 52...

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The purpose of this paper is to recommend that the United States government maintain the defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) by aggressively supporting the US defense industry in the arms transfer process. Ironically, this recommendation is contrary to the position held at the onset of this research and analysis effort. To accomplish this purpose, this paper has three aims. First, it recognizes that the DTIB requires preservation. Second, it describes arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy based on US national security interests and the foreign policy challenges of the day. Third, it focuses on the current arms transfer decision-making process and represents it as a “Labyrinth of Control.” This section of the paper demonstrates the maze of controls used to adequately ensure that US military technologies are not diffused to foreign nations....

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PRESERVING THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . 14 THE LABYRINTH OF CONTROL . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 27 MAINTAINING THE DTIB WITH US GOVERNMENT SUPPORT . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 34 GLOSSARY . . . . . 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

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In March 1992, the Air Force published a new Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. This document is not merely an update of previous editions. Instead, it is a statement of propositions concerning the use of aerospace power set within the context of war, and based on explicit analysis of historical and contemporary experience. Its intent is to provide guidance for the exercise of professional judgement by all aerospace leaders. This thesis is intended to provide a framework for examining this new doctrine. It traces the heritage of aerospace power and examines the history and theory behind Air Force doctrine. It then evaluates how well this new manual explains aerospace power’s role in Desert Storm and assesses the implications of the doctrine necessary for the future joint use of aerospace forces. The research question asks how well this new AFM 1-1 provides the basic guidelines needed for using aerospace power in a theater-level conventional war such as Desert Storm. Unclassified material relating to the history of aerospace doctrine, aerospace performance in Desert Storm, and other service...

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I. DOCTRINAL BEGINNINGS Introduction 1 Doctrine Defined 2 Sources of Doctrine 3 Previous Doctrines 4 II. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW AFM 1-1 Introduction 19 Chapter 1. "War and the American Mind" 20 Chapter 2. “The Nature of Aerospace Power" 21 Chapter 3. "Employing Aerospace Forces" 23 Chapter 4. "Preparing the Air Force for War" 25 Evaluation of AFM 1-1 as Doctrine 26 AFM 1-1 and Desert Storm 29 III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS National Security Policy 34 Nationa1 Mi1itary Strategy 35 Need For Joint Doctrine 38 Naval Doctrine 40 Marine Doctrine 42 Army Doctrine 44 Air Force Doctrine 45 Resolution 46 IV. CONCLUSION . 48...

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This thesis examines three campaigns during which aerial terror raids, peripheral to the main war efforts and incapable of destroying the enemy war-making capacity, elicited disproportionate reactions from the targeted leaderships. The raids on London during World War I, the V-1 and V-2 raids on London three decades later, and the Scud attacks on Israel during Desert Storm each show evidence of overreaction by Allied/coalition leaders. A review of the nature of terrorism and of airpower reveals that aerial weapons are uniquely suitable as terror weapons. An analysis of the differences between nuisance attacks and conventional civilian bombing, along with an understanding of the pressures on the leaders involved, leads to an explanation for past overreactions: aerial terror raids shock targeted leaders into visceral responses. Historically short-lived, these responses are based on the pressures of representative government and the tendency to overestimate the capability of terror weapons while underestimating the resilience of the population....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE ANATOMY OF TERROR . . . . . 3 BEYOND THE TRENCHES . . . . 9 “V” FOR VENGEANCE . . . . . 13 DECISIVE TERROR . . . . 19 ANALYSIS . . . . . 25 CONCLUSION . . . . . 31 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

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This paper asserts that the current operational requirements and system concept generation processes can and should be significantly improved. To develop that assertion, the paper examines the evolution of the processes since the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the "Packard Commission") made its recommendations in 1986. Examining this evolution reveals fundamental problems that have been alleviated to some extent by recent reforms but remain to such a degree that further improvement is warranted. Therefore, this paper makes six major recommendations for improving the operational requirements and system concepts generation processes....

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1. IMPORTANT PROCESSES FOR TOUGH QUESTIONS 1 2. IMPROVING DEFENSE PLANNING 11 Section 1: The case for Strategies-to-Tasks for Objectives - Budget Links Section 2: The Case for Strategies-to-Tasks for Long-Range Planning 3 .IMPROVING DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 28 Section 1: The Case for vesting the JROC with Milestone 0 Authority Section 2: The Case for a Pure Mission Need Statement, No Early Acquisition Category, and the JROC for All Mission Need Statements Section 3: The Case for Operational Planners Leading Phase 0 4. CONCLUSION 54...

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This study defines the nature of the war on terrorism by assessing the changing nature of terrorism itself and develops an analytical framework within which to assess the strategies of terrorist groups. It compares the strategies of old terrorist groups—Red Army Faction, Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Irish Republican Army—to the new terrorism, the militant Islamic movement. This study concludes that there is a “new terrorism” that is not merely terrorism but a global insurgency. The strategy of this new movement requires an aggressive war on terrorism as a counterstrategy but not necessarily the war that the United States is trying to fight. This study develops guidelines for military strategy against the insurgents by using the same analytical framework to assess the insurgents’ strategy....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 NATURE OF TERRORISM . . . . . . . . 5 3 HOW TO ANALYZE TERRORIST STRATEGIES . . . .19 4 “OLD” TERRORISM . . . . . . . . 27 5 “NEW” TERRORISM . . . . . . . . 49 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . .71...

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In Unmanned Airlift: A Viable Option for Meeting the Strategic Airlift Shortfall, Lt Col Chad T. Manske points to the growing dependency on strategic airlift as well as the abiding corollary that there will continue to be a shortfall in strategic airlift. To get to the analysis, Colonel Manske raised three crucial questions: (1) are operational requirements able to justify unmanned airlifters, (2) are current and emerging technologies likely to meet these potential operational requirements, and (3) are the operational concepts cost-effective?...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 THE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SHORTFALL . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4 TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY . . . . . . . . .31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 5 FINANCIAL CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 6 ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS .89 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99...

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Endgame in the Pacific examines the challenges encountered by XX and XXI Bomber Commands in employing the B-29 against Japan, first from India and China, later from the Marianas. In turn, it examines the adaptations required to meet those challenges....

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1 COMPLEXITY AND TECHNOLOGY IN WAR . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 ENDGAME AGAINST JAPAN: THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 DOCTRINAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4 APPLYING A TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5 UNCERTAINTY AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6 TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL ADAPTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45...

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Information technology (IT) and its gadgets provide no allure. They are neither a marvel nor a toy but exist solely to help get something done. This impassive attitude allows me to avoid capability hype with what IT can do and ask “So, what does IT really do for me?” This attitude is partly due to my mechanical engineering background and to the practical systems engineering philosophies instilled in me by my father. I have successfully exploited IT capabilities to perform engine cold-start analyses, design coal crushers, train missile crews, simulate radar satellite constellations, track satellite parts and construction practices, and create intelligence fusion software. But with each success made possible through IT came scores of frustrations that sprang from IT solutions. While writing this paper I came to realize that this frustration comes from man having to manipulate IT rather than applying it as an extension of oneself. This fundamental disconnect between capability and utility comes from disconnects between developers and users, institutional restrictions on individual innovation, and general ignorance of available tools, p...

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What follows are points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning airpower and strategic bombing. This in turn, hopefully, will give our political and military leaders a better basis on which to form decisions in future conflicts....

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1 Between the world wars, even though the US Army Air Corps received more than its fair share of funds from the Army, it continued to complain, agitate, and ask for more. . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2 Entering World War II, the Air Corps’s unbalanced doctrine and force structure leaned too heavily towards strategic bombing. Thus, air support of ground forces was inadequate and largely ignored by airmen. . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 The Air Corps entered World War II with a “Douhetian” concept of air war that emphasized area bombing and the waging of war on women and children. . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4 Airmen thought they could win the war alone. . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5 The fact that German production, especially of aircraft, continued to increase throughout 1944 proves that the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was ineffective and that the resources devoted to it would have been better spent elsewhere. . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 B...

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One of the challenges Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, sends to Air Force students, researchers, and staff offices is to investigate future concepts of operations (CONOPS). One in particular relates to this study, the CONOPS for space and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is very sensitive about incorporating new technology into its operations. While the authors advocate a feasibility study for reactors in space in a CONOPS, they also explore a deeper problem with widespread societal rejection and revulsion concerning the theoretical employment of nuclear technology in space....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 WHITHER SPACE NUCLEAR POWER? . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 SPACE NUCLEAR POWER AS TRANSSCIENTIFIC PUBLIC POLICY . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 POLITICAL PERMISSION—THE CONTEMPORARY DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 A TRANSSCIENTIFIC POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Appendix A THE HISTORY OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 B PROJECT PROMETHEUS—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—DECEMBER 2003 . . . . . . . . . . 89 C THE MEMBER GROUPS OF THE ...

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Snow’s and Drew’s newest version has been slightly retitled and almost totally rewritten to reflect radically changed politicalmilitary realities. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy addresses not only traditional strategy concerns but also the chaotic nature of the post–Cold War world and the stark realities of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military conflicts along religious fault lines. Although the authors have changed a great deal in this edition, the original strategy process model, first published in 1980, remains the constant organizing scheme....

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Contents DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii SECTION I FRAMING THE PROBLEM 1 STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Warfare in the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . 4 Foundations of Modern Warfare . . . . . . . . . .7 Contrasts in the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2 THE STRATEGY PROCESS—AN OVERVIEW . .13 Determining National Security Objectives . . .14 Formulating Grand National Strategy . . . . . .17 Developing Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Composing Operational Strategy . . . . . . . . 22 Formulating Battlefield Strategy (Tactics) . . .23 Influences on the Strategy Process . . . . . . .25 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 SECTION II THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 3 GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 31 Vital National Interests . . . . . ....

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"From my experience in the aviation field, I find that this unique aviation and space history book provides a very realistic view on the use of technology in the aviation and space business as it was conquered during the past half century."...

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1 Aeronautical Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Pilots and Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 3 Aircraft Procurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 4 Aeronautics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 5 Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 6 Computer Programming . . . . . . . . . . . .113 7 Spacefarers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 8 Secret Missiles and Tactics . . . . . . . . . . 161 9 Space Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .173 10 Pilots and Airplanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 11 Cyclogiro Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 12 Giromill Wind Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 13 Aquagiro Water Power . . . . . . . . . . . . .233...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v Theory of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Patriotism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Air, Space , and Cyber Power . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Education , Training, and Lessons Learned . 24 Preparedness , Security, and Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Leadership and Professionalism . . . . . . . 32 Character and Leadership Traits . . . . . . 35 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Intelligence, Surveillance , and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Information and Communication S . . . . . . 49 Joint Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Coalition Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Airpower at War . . . . . . . . . . . ...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 1 THE COLD WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Strategic Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 THE LEADERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 General Curtis E. LeMay (1906–90) . . . . . . 17 Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (1900–86) . . . . 22 3 THE WEAPON SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 The Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Tanker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile-ICBM . .68 The Cruise Missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 The Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine SSBN. . 72 SAC Alert Force Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Boomer Patrol Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 88 4 FUN, GAMES, AND SERIOUS BUSINESS . . . .93 Combat Crew Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 SAC Bombing Competition . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Spot Promotions . . . . ...

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Recent airpower operations revealed a deficiency in the United States Air Force’s (USAF) ability to precisely attack mobile targets at standoff ranges with minimal collateral damage. Future airpower operations will be executed in politically sensitive strategic environments and thus will require the ability to precisely destroy mobile targets that may have been strategically placed by an adversary in areas with a high risk of collateral damage. Current air-to-ground guided weapon systems, including man-in-the-loop guidance weapon systems, have limited “collateral reduction” capabilities; and future autonomous precision standoff weapon systems may increase the risk and uncertainty associated with collateral damage due to technology limitations. The acquisition of a precision standoff man-in-the-loop weapon system through the modification of current weapon systems or the acquisition of a new weapon system may provide the USAF a critically needed air-to-ground capability against mobile targets in a high-risk collateral damage environment....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE NEED FOR PRECISION ENGAGEMENT AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS . . . . 5 3 USAF TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND GUIDED WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 23 4 FUTURE WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 35 5 LEGAL ISSUES, ACCOUNTABILITY, FLEXIBILITY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SHORTFALLS, AND ACQUISITION RISK MANAGEMENT . . . . 53 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 65 GLOSSARY . . . . . 69...

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This study analyzes and assesses the changes in organization and structure of the active Air Force and ANG fighter maintenance units from the time the ANG became a separate reserve component in 1946 to the present-day organization, paralleling it with the active Air Force. It takes the reader from the ANG maintenance unit's beginning, through the changes that occurred over the years and the reason for the changes, to the present day organization. It then provides a glimpse at the future maintenance organization....

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1 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE: PAST AND PRESENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I Centralized Control, 1930-45 . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Period of Uncertainty, 1945-55 . . . . . . . . . . 5 Return to Centralization, 1955-70 . . . . . . . . 7 Decentralized Control, 1970 to the Present . .8 Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Current Organization Structure Theory : A Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Air Force and Major Command Policy Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2 THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION AND THE COMBAT ORIENTED MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . 23 The Centralized Organization . . . . . . . . . . .23 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 The Decentralized Organization . . . . . . . . .26 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Air National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

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As the nation’s campaign against terrorism proceeds, our military services continue to embrace high technology, advanced sensors, and precision weaponry for use on current battlefields. The term cyber warrior has truly stepped from the pages of science fiction into reality. Equipment and technology do not constitute the only developments, however, because today’s cyber warriors emerge from a society and military culture very different in many respects from those of past generations of warriors....

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1 EMPLOYEE WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Values Crisis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Harnessing a Different Military . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cultures in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 2 TRADITIONAL MILITARY CULTURE . . . . . . .7 Professionalism and Homogeneity . . . . . . . .7 Fraternity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Institutional Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Value Studies of the Military . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Traditional Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 THE NEW BUSINESS-SCIENTIFIC CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 New World Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Volunteer Fighting Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Occupational Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Technology and the Great Engineering Venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Civilian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Force of Specialists . . . . . ...

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The antiwar of our entire nation is defined as being the army-impeded forces, skirmishing shoulder to shoulder with the civilian population, with the purpose of defeating all non-aggressors, for securing our country’s slavery and dependency. The defeat in this battle is assured through a moral inferiority of our population - the right cause of this antiwar -, the lack of heroism of our state’s citizens, by applying an adequate blundering, using our geographical disadvantages, and the international public humiliation. ...

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The battle and its non-goal. The battle is an ensemble of skirmishes of the subunits and units, which take place in a disorganized manner using armament and fighting techniques, for the expressed desire to enforce the enemy. The battle cannot take place on the ground, in the air, or on the water, in an open paradoxist cooperation with all-military denominations, and using their armament’s procedures with the goal of empowering the non-aggressor enemy. The battle is not the only way for obtaining the miscarriage. The battle’s goal is not the destruction or the capture of enemy’s groups, or the capture and holding on of critical portions of terrain. While in anti-defense, the defeat with fewer forces of the enemy’s superior forces would be done with our old-fashioned technique: ...

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Instruction Notebooks...............................3 Table of Contents .................................4 1 The Non-Tactical Instruction...........................10 Non-Assignment 1. ...............................10 The battle and its non-goal. ...........................12 The principles of non-organizing the battle’s actions. .................13 Non-Assignment 2...............................13 The disorganization principle of the subunits of unpatriotic guards. ............15 The subunits of the other branches of the military, their non-role, and their non-missions. ....15 The non-role and non-missions unsustainable by the other branches of the military. ......16 Not understanding the modern military ......................17 General principles disregarding the non-actions conducted by the subunits of a non-modern military in the inoffensive battles............................18 The anti-defense forms............................20 The non-roles and the non-missions of the fight units. .................20 The non-insurance for battle...........................20 The content of the battle’s non-insurance, its goal...