As leaders at all levels, our Airmen must be able to anticipate and appropriately respond to a complicated and fluid national security environment. Developing such Airmen will require stronger commitments to education and training on the part of the learner to the point where learning never stops. Fostering this highly favorable attitude toward learning is possible only if Air Force education and training programs address learners’ goals, motivations, social interactions, and individual learning styles. This means the Air Force needs a stronger focus on affective learning during the instructional design (ID) process for education and training....

To help understand and begin to develop alternative policy frameworks that fit the current and emerging security context, the US Air Force’s Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and King’s College, London, hosted a two-day conference at the RUSI offices in London on 18 and 19 May 2009. We sought to bring together some of the best thinkers on deterrence to examine how to reinvigorate this essential tool for today’s policy community. The conference exceeded our expectations, as readers will observe from the excellent products in these proceedings. From the pre-conference “thought pieces” by RUSI’s Michael Codner and AFRI’s Adam Lowther—the presentations by the keynote speakers and case study developers—to the post-conference “Quick Looks” by AFRI personnel, the outcome reflects the creativity and the seriousness with which the attendees and the planning staffs approached the topic....

1 Framing Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century: Conference Summary . . . . . . . 1 Adam Lowther 2 Defining “Deterrence” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Michael Codner 3 Understanding Deterrence . . . . . . . .27 Adam Lowther 4 Policy and Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Gen Norton A Schwartz, USAF Lt Col Timothy R. Kirk, USAF 5 Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Gen Kevin Chilton, USAF Greg Weaver 6 On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance . . 77 Keith B. Payne 7 Conference Agenda . . . . . . . . . . 121 8 Contemporary Challenges for Extended Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . .  123 Tom Scheber 9 Case Study—The August 2008 War between Russia and Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Denis Corboy 10 Deterrence and Counterproliferation . . 149 Malcolm Chalmers 11 Deterrence and Saddam Hussein . . . 155 Barry Schneider 12 Stymieing Leviathan . . . . . . . . . 215 Paul Schulte 13 The Madrid Train Bombing . . . . . . .237 Peter Neumann 14 Framing Strategic Deterrence . . . . . . ...

The United States Air Force has long favored attacking electrical power systems.Electric power has been considered a critical target in every war since World War II,and will likely be nominated in the future. Historically, there have been four basic strategies behind attacks on national electrical systems: to cause a decline in civilian morale; to inflict costs on the political leaders to induce a change; to hamper military operations; and to hinder war production. The evidence shows that the only sound reason for attacking electrical power is to effect the production of war material in a war of attrition against a self-supporting nation-state without outside assistance. The implication for future strategic air operations is important. Because attacks on electric power cause indirect collateral damage which can be politically counterproductive,and the military benefit is minimal, the United States should reject attacks on national electrical power systems in the near future....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . 5 Generation . . . . . . 5 Transmission . . . . . 7 Distribution . . . . . . 8 Control . . . . 8 Effects . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 12 3 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN TOTAL WAR . . . . . . 15 World War II—Germany . . . 17 World War II—Japan . . . . . 22 United States Strategic Bombing Survey . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . 28 4 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN LIMITED WAR . . . . . 33 Korean War . . . . . . 33 Vietnam War . . . . . 37 Desert Storm . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . 42 5 TARGETING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . 45 Failures . . . . 45 When to Target Electric Power . . . 48 Conclusions and Implications . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 57...

This study analyzes current theater airlift organization and control principles for supporting a large contingency or conventional war. It segregates theater airlift management issues into three organizing categories: 1) organizational relationships and responsibilities, 2) theater command and control networks and supporting personnel, and 3) theater airlift management procedures. The study analyzes historical evidence from the Vietnam and Gulf Wars to derive theater airlift management lessons. By comparing this evidence to current policy trends it attempts to determine how well current doctrine reflects past lessons. In addition, the author evaluates how well-equipped current doctrine is to handle three future influences on the theater airlift system: divestiture of the C-130 fleet, growing uncertainty in the international security arena, and the fielding of the new C-17 transport aircraft....

This paper reviews the performance of US systems against Iraq’s Scuds during Desert Storm, and examines current US efforts to defeat these potentially destabilizing weapons. Which technologies and systems will be most effective against mobile ballistic missiles? How should the United States implement selected technologies to deal with this challenge? This thesis covers the pros and cons of competing concepts to accomplish missile defense. It evaluates the most promising technical solutions to the mobile ballistic missile threat. On the basis of the extensive amount of time and research effort devoted to the problem, it is safe to say there is no quick, easy, or cheap way to locate, identify, and destroy mobile missiles and their launchers. To defeat the mobile missile threat with a high degree of confidence, the US must field an integrated system of both offensive and defensive weapons....

INTRODUCTION....... vii Notes .......... xiv 1 DESERT STORM.....1 Notes..........9 2 PROLIFERATION.........11 Notes.........18 3 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE GAMEPLAN.....21 Notes......... 39 4 MISSILE ATTACK OPERATIONS.........43 Notes.....63 5 CONCLUSIONS.....67 Notes .......72 APPENDIX 1: Emergence of the Threat.....73 Notes......... 83 APPENDIX 2: The Long Search for a Solution........86 Notes......... 90 APPENDIX 3: Additional Missile Defense Research.....92 Notes........ 95 GLOSSARY..... 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY.......101...

The purpose of this study is to identify criteria that will provide objective analysis of a halt-phase strategy. This study identifies the key criteria by examining air combat in three operations: the Battle of Bismarck Sea, the 1973 Golan Heights battles of the Yom Kippur War, and the Iraqi Republican Guard escape from Basra. This examination focuses on air operations looking for tactics, tactical innovations, and operational circumstances that inhibit or enhance air operations designed to halt the advance or retreat of significant ground formations. This study evaluates each case in three major phases: prehostility preparation, conduct of combat operations, and the results and analysis of the operation....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 3 2 EXPLANATION OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 5 Notes . . . . . . 13 3 CRITIQUES OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 15 Notes . . . . . . 22 4 THE BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA . . 25 Notes . . . . . . 34 5 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR, GOLAN HEIGHTS ACTION . . 37 Notes . . . . . . 47 6 THE IRAQI REPUBLICAN GUARD BASRA ESCAPE . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . 63 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . 72...

This research project addresses how I believe airpower should be employed in urban warfare to achieve operational and strategic results. I chose this topic because there is an apparent disconnection between how military planners and operators view urban combat and their awareness of airpower’s unique and potentially decisive contributions in this environment. This disconnect could prove disastrous for military forces operating on urban terrain. Urban warfare has been given considerable attention by the United States Army and Marine Corps. Although their concerns are soundly based on changes in the strategic environment, I believe their focus is misplaced at the tactical level of warfare....

This is a book about strategy and war fighting in the midst of a revolution in military affairs as the world moves into the twenty-first century. The book's purpose is to focus attention on the operational problems, enemy strategies, and threats that will confront US national security decision makers in the twenty-first century. The participating authors are either professional military officers or civilian professionals who specialize in national security issues....

1 Principles of War for the Battlefield of the Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Barry R. Schneider 2 New-Era Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Gen Charles A. Homer, USAF, (Ret.) 3 The Revolution in Military Affairs . . . . . . .65 Jeffrey McKitrick, James Blackwell, Fred Littlepage, George Kraus, Richard Blanchfield and Dale Hill 4 Air Theory for the Twenty-First Century . . 103 Col John A. Warden III, USAF Overview: Future Airpower and Strategy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 5 Parallel War and Hyperwar Is Every Want a Weakness? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 Col Richard Szafranski, USAF Overview: Information Warfare Issues . . . 149 6 Information War - Cyberwar - Netwar . . . 153 George Stein 7 Information Warfare: Impacts and Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Col JamesW. McLendon, USAF Overview: Biological Warfare Issues. . . . . 201 8 The Biological Weapon: APoor Nation's Weapon of Mass Destruction . . . . . . . . . . 205 Lt Col Terry N. Mayer, USAF 9 Twenty-First Century Germ W...

1 THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THE DOCTRINAL PROCESS: SOME SUGGESTED STEPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 CONCEPTS, DOCTRINES, PRINCIPLES . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4 SOME SEMINAL THINKERS ON TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 5 WEAPONS AND DOCTRINE: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 6 INSIGHTS ON TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 7 OF SABER CHARGES, ESCORT FIGHTERS, AND SPACECRAFT: THE SEARCH FOR DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 8 LOOKING BACKWARD TO SEE AHEAD IN SPACE: REFLECTIONS ON THE NEED FOR SPACE DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 9 A MO...

A MATTER OF DOCTRINE.............................1 Definitions................................................ 1 Direction.................................................. 3 Notes....................................................... 7 2 THE HISTORIC PRECEDENT: A REQUIREMENT FOR FLEXIBILITY........................................ 9 The Lessons of War.................................... 9 The Nuclear Imperative............................. 15 Notes.................................................. 21 3 THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY.................. 25 Real Smarts in Small Packages .................26 Near Nukes and Real Nukes .......................32 Space: Star Wars in Context .....................40 Notes.................................................. 47 4 APPLYING THE LESSONS: CHANGING AEROSPACE DOCTRINE.............................. 51 The Importance of Actions .........................52 The Global Perspective.............................. 57 Proposals for the Future: A Doctrinal Synthesis...............................................59 The Falklands: A Global Scenario..............64 Notes....................

DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix PART I Strategic Factors Reshaping Strategies and Missions Maj Gen Charles D. Link, USAF Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Air Power in the New Security Environment . . .9 Secretary of the Air Force Donald B . Rice Air Power in US Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Dr EdwardN. Luttwak The United States as an Aerospace Power in the Emerging Security Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Dr Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Col John A . Warden III, USAF The Role of the US Air Force in the Employment of Air Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 PART II Air Power as an Element of US Power Projection Page Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Air Power since World War I...

This paper asserts there exists a dangerous GAP in US strategic intertheater transportation capabilities, propounds a model describing the GAP, and proposes a solution to the problem. Using the Gulf War logistics flow as a model, the three phase points are shown and their airlift/sealift tradeoffs discussed. Other logistics support options, which figured in the war, such as prepositioning and host nation support, are discussed and the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations shown to be, in many ways, a fortuitous theater of operations. This serendipitous combination of circumstances contributed greatly to our successful logistics buildup and is unlikely to recur....

Logistics Flow During The Gulf War 1 Introduction 1 Strategic lift Phasing 4 Transportation/Support Modes 8 Mobility Studies 16 Summary 19 Conclusion 23 Notes 24 Filling The Gap: The Airship 28 Prologue 28 Introduction 31 The Airship in History 32 Airship Technology 42 Potential Military Roles 53 Conclusion 68 Epilogue 69 Notes 72...

The planning for space-based MTI is in its early phases. A “Concept of Operations for Space-Based MTI” has been written, as has a “Space-Based MTI Roadmap.” US Space Command has also written the Long Range Plan, which includes space-based MTI concepts in its plan for 2020. These plans are a good start but do not address several important issues, including satellite architecture, whether satellite MTI systems should completely replace airborne systems, who should be responsible for the system, and how battle managers will operate in the new system....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 3 2 THE EVOLUTION OF MOVING TARGET INDICATOR RADAR SYSTEMS . . . .5 Notes . . . . 11 3 THE MECHANICS OF SPACE OPERATIONS . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . 23 4 UNITED STATES SPACE ORGANIZATIONS THAT MAY AFFECT SPACE-BASED SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT . . . .27 Notes . . . . 34 5 TECHNOLOGICAL DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT AIRBORNE MOVING TARGET INDICATOR SYSTEMS AND PROPOSED SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . 42 6 ISSUES TO CONSIDER FOR SPACE-BASED MOVING TARGET INDICATOR PLANNING . . . . 45 Notes . . . . 53 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . 55...

Colonel dePalo believes that better application of the doctrinal tenets of airpower is needed for more effective and efficient utilization of USAF combat rescue forces. He uses the tenets of flexibility, concentration, and persistence to demonstrate that the current force can transform to more effectively support the global war on terrorism and adapt to new roles and missions leading to a more agile, multifaceted personnel-recovery capability worldwide. This force can ably support USAF combat search and rescue requirements while also supporting broader personnel-recovery requirements for both the military and civilians. The potential exists to expand even beyond personnel recovery to support other missions such as the infiltration and exfiltration of battlefield Airmen. He argues that it is important to define the force as a war-fighting capability instead of as an executable function. Better integration of the force into strategic planning will facilitate matching this capability to desired effects, leading to a force able to execute a broad range of missions in varying environments....

Wills argues that the twentieth-century argument between air and ground proponents has changed significantly since the Gulf War, and it comes down to the relative importance of the ground or air in the mix. It is more than just using air as a supporting component to the ground forces—if this is true, current force organization and employment is adequate. However, if the air predominates in combat operations, then, as Wills puts it in his first chapter, joint operations doctrine needs to be rethought. A changed balance “will affect the military at every level . . . force structure, organization, weapons acquisition, doctrine, and training” (p. 3). Notwithstanding the blunt commentary from ground proponents, Wills offers that airpower has come to dominate air/ground relations....

1 FRAMING THE DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 AIRPOWER, WAR, AND DIPLOMACY . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 3 ASSESSING THE AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 4 THE AFGHAN MODEL AND BEYOND . . . . . .35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 5 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69...

1 THE NATURE OF THE BEAST . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-EARLY GERMAN CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-THE GERMAN 1941 CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA . . . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 PHOTO SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 4 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-THE SOVIET VERSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 5 ISRAEL: MANEUVER WARFARE, AIR POWER, AND LOGISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 6 MANEUVER WARFARE AND AIR POWER IN THE 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .193 Past Limitations on Air Power . . . . . . . . . .193 Air Power and New Developments . . . . . . . 196 Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .197 Situational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 The Cordon Sanitaire of Reconstruction . . .200 Differences in ...

Two examples from twentieth-century conflicts demonstrate the potential that missiles possess to disrupt an opponent’s land-based airpower and achieve significant political consequences. Iraq’s use of Scud ballistic missiles in the 1991 Persian Gulf War produced nearly instantaneous political effects. The Scuds did not threaten the coalition military forces opposing Saddam Hussein, but instead threatened the existence of the coalition itself by nearly bringing Israel into the war. Negating this threat demanded an urgent response from land-based airpower, and large numbers of coalition aircraft were forced to perform a new mission: Scud Hunting. Almost 50years before Desert Storm, the Allies in World War II had faced a similar threat from the V-1 and V-2. Thousands of sorties were diverted to bomb missiles that were chiefly fired at London and Antwerp. In both conflicts, coalition and Allied forces possessed enough airpower that the diversion did not prevent them from performing other necessary missions. Yet, in the future, as the United States Air Force (USAF)dwindles in numbers, the ability of land-based airpower to deal with the m...

This thesis explores the evolution of Russian military doctrine in light of the lessons they say they learned from the Gulf War. Since the early 1980s, such prominent military thinkers as Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov argued that emerging technologies were generating a new revolution in military affairs. The Russian military doctrinal response to Desert Storm seems to confirm Marshal Ogarkov’s predictions. This thesis finds the new military doctrine (1) reverts from the defensive to an offensive preemption, (2) reverts from no nuclear first use to nuclear escalation, (3) guarantees ethnic Russians living in former Soviet states protection, (4) emphasizes the importance of military advancement in C4I, smart weapons, and mobility, and (5) emphasizes strategic nonnuclear deterrent forces....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 RUSSIAN VIEW OF MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 7 Relationship between Military Doctrine and Strategy . . . . 8 Military Doctrine—Military Art—Operational Art—Tactics . . . .9 Soviet/Russian Military Doctrine Evolution . . . . 9 Soviet Military Doctrine Stereotype . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . . 19 3 RUSSIAN IMPRESSION OF THE GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 Strategy . . . . . 24 The Threat . . . . . . 25 Future War . . . . . . 25 The Initial Period of War . . . . . 27 Operational Art . . . . 28 Force Structure . . . . 31 Tactics . . . . . . 32 Technology, Research, and Development . . . . . 33 Summary . . . . 34 Notes . . . . . . 35 4 EMERGING RUSSIAN POST–GULF WAR MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 39 The Threat . . . . . . 41 View of Future War . . . . . 42 Force Structure and Priorities . . . . . 42 Differences with Pre–Gulf War Military Doctrine . . . . . . 43 Conclusions . . . . . . 44 Notes . . . . . . 45 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGISTS . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . 52...

The purpose of this paper is to recommend that the United States government maintain the defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) by aggressively supporting the US defense industry in the arms transfer process. Ironically, this recommendation is contrary to the position held at the onset of this research and analysis effort. To accomplish this purpose, this paper has three aims. First, it recognizes that the DTIB requires preservation. Second, it describes arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy based on US national security interests and the foreign policy challenges of the day. Third, it focuses on the current arms transfer decision-making process and represents it as a “Labyrinth of Control.” This section of the paper demonstrates the maze of controls used to adequately ensure that US military technologies are not diffused to foreign nations....

PRESERVING THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . 14 THE LABYRINTH OF CONTROL . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 27 MAINTAINING THE DTIB WITH US GOVERNMENT SUPPORT . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 34 GLOSSARY . . . . . 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

In March 1992, the Air Force published a new Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force. This document is not merely an update of previous editions. Instead, it is a statement of propositions concerning the use of aerospace power set within the context of war, and based on explicit analysis of historical and contemporary experience. Its intent is to provide guidance for the exercise of professional judgement by all aerospace leaders. This thesis is intended to provide a framework for examining this new doctrine. It traces the heritage of aerospace power and examines the history and theory behind Air Force doctrine. It then evaluates how well this new manual explains aerospace power’s role in Desert Storm and assesses the implications of the doctrine necessary for the future joint use of aerospace forces. The research question asks how well this new AFM 1-1 provides the basic guidelines needed for using aerospace power in a theater-level conventional war such as Desert Storm. Unclassified material relating to the history of aerospace doctrine, aerospace performance in Desert Storm, and other service...

I. DOCTRINAL BEGINNINGS Introduction 1 Doctrine Defined 2 Sources of Doctrine 3 Previous Doctrines 4 II. ANALYSIS OF THE NEW AFM 1-1 Introduction 19 Chapter 1. "War and the American Mind" 20 Chapter 2. “The Nature of Aerospace Power" 21 Chapter 3. "Employing Aerospace Forces" 23 Chapter 4. "Preparing the Air Force for War" 25 Evaluation of AFM 1-1 as Doctrine 26 AFM 1-1 and Desert Storm 29 III. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS National Security Policy 34 Nationa1 Mi1itary Strategy 35 Need For Joint Doctrine 38 Naval Doctrine 40 Marine Doctrine 42 Army Doctrine 44 Air Force Doctrine 45 Resolution 46 IV. CONCLUSION . 48...

Regardless of one’s views on the AEF, this paper presents points for discussion as the Air Force comes to grips with both the changing nature of future conflict and the Air Force’s ability to provide the National Command Authorities with a credible aerospace force. We encourage open debate on this critical topic....

The author outlines the issue in an introduction and has a background chapter that explains the current system, which provides a useful description of sensors, fusion of information, shooters, and weapons. He explains the current reactive method and identifies various system weaknesses and strengths. His main theme of a preemptive approach describes in great detail the projected employment of LOCPADs as a very effective system for time-critical targeting. Marzolf insists that persistence of surveillance is crucial, especially when Airmen directing the air war in Iraq used persistence surveillance to identify and effectively target the illusive Iraqi insurgents....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 REACTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4 PREEMPTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85...

This analysis takes a didactic approach. It attempts to demystify the aura surrounding operational design by presenting a theoretical framework for comprehending its fundamental precepts. The goals of this analysis are threefold: provide a methodological example for understanding and applying design, show how design enhances decision making and risk analysis, and investigate the major differences between design in major combat operations and design in counterinsurgency (COIN)....

1 The Process of Operational Design 1 2 Developing an Operational Approach 21 3 Methodology for Understanding and Employing Operational Design 31 4 Establishing the Link between Operational Design and Decision Analysis 59 5 Operational Design and Counterinsurgency 83...

This thesis examines three campaigns during which aerial terror raids, peripheral to the main war efforts and incapable of destroying the enemy war-making capacity, elicited disproportionate reactions from the targeted leaderships. The raids on London during World War I, the V-1 and V-2 raids on London three decades later, and the Scud attacks on Israel during Desert Storm each show evidence of overreaction by Allied/coalition leaders. A review of the nature of terrorism and of airpower reveals that aerial weapons are uniquely suitable as terror weapons. An analysis of the differences between nuisance attacks and conventional civilian bombing, along with an understanding of the pressures on the leaders involved, leads to an explanation for past overreactions: aerial terror raids shock targeted leaders into visceral responses. Historically short-lived, these responses are based on the pressures of representative government and the tendency to overestimate the capability of terror weapons while underestimating the resilience of the population....

INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE ANATOMY OF TERROR . . . . . 3 BEYOND THE TRENCHES . . . . 9 “V” FOR VENGEANCE . . . . . 13 DECISIVE TERROR . . . . 19 ANALYSIS . . . . . 25 CONCLUSION . . . . . 31 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

This paper asserts that the current operational requirements and system concept generation processes can and should be significantly improved. To develop that assertion, the paper examines the evolution of the processes since the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the "Packard Commission") made its recommendations in 1986. Examining this evolution reveals fundamental problems that have been alleviated to some extent by recent reforms but remain to such a degree that further improvement is warranted. Therefore, this paper makes six major recommendations for improving the operational requirements and system concepts generation processes....

1. IMPORTANT PROCESSES FOR TOUGH QUESTIONS 1 2. IMPROVING DEFENSE PLANNING 11 Section 1: The case for Strategies-to-Tasks for Objectives - Budget Links Section 2: The Case for Strategies-to-Tasks for Long-Range Planning 3 .IMPROVING DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 28 Section 1: The Case for vesting the JROC with Milestone 0 Authority Section 2: The Case for a Pure Mission Need Statement, No Early Acquisition Category, and the JROC for All Mission Need Statements Section 3: The Case for Operational Planners Leading Phase 0 4. CONCLUSION 54...

This study defines the nature of the war on terrorism by assessing the changing nature of terrorism itself and develops an analytical framework within which to assess the strategies of terrorist groups. It compares the strategies of old terrorist groups—Red Army Faction, Palestinian Liberation Organization, and Irish Republican Army—to the new terrorism, the militant Islamic movement. This study concludes that there is a “new terrorism” that is not merely terrorism but a global insurgency. The strategy of this new movement requires an aggressive war on terrorism as a counterstrategy but not necessarily the war that the United States is trying to fight. This study develops guidelines for military strategy against the insurgents by using the same analytical framework to assess the insurgents’ strategy....

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 NATURE OF TERRORISM . . . . . . . . 5 3 HOW TO ANALYZE TERRORIST STRATEGIES . . . .19 4 “OLD” TERRORISM . . . . . . . . 27 5 “NEW” TERRORISM . . . . . . . . 49 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . .71...

In Unmanned Airlift: A Viable Option for Meeting the Strategic Airlift Shortfall, Lt Col Chad T. Manske points to the growing dependency on strategic airlift as well as the abiding corollary that there will continue to be a shortfall in strategic airlift. To get to the analysis, Colonel Manske raised three crucial questions: (1) are operational requirements able to justify unmanned airlifters, (2) are current and emerging technologies likely to meet these potential operational requirements, and (3) are the operational concepts cost-effective?...

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 THE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SHORTFALL . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4 TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY . . . . . . . . .31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 5 FINANCIAL CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 6 ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS .89 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99...

In Thinking Effects: Effects-Based Methodology for Joint Operations, the authors propose that military actions should be employed through effects-based operations (EBO). Submitting that this methodology is extremely promising, they recognize two major areas of challenge. First, is modifying both service and joint doctrine to fully articulate what can be accomplished with EBO. Second, there are major issues in the area of command and control (C2). Effective C2 for EBO depends on how intelligence analysis and combat assessment not only are performed but also integrated into the planning process....

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 TIME FOR A NEW PARADIGM? . . . . . . . . . . . .4 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ON EFFECTS . . . 17 CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR EFFECTS . . . . . . . 29 A GENERAL THEORY OF JOINT EFFECTS BASED OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 AN IDEALIZED JOINT EBO PROCESS . . . . . . .55 WHAT ARE THE MAJOR CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE EBO METHODOLOGY?. . .77 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .87 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95...

Endgame in the Pacific examines the challenges encountered by XX and XXI Bomber Commands in employing the B-29 against Japan, first from India and China, later from the Marianas. In turn, it examines the adaptations required to meet those challenges....

1 COMPLEXITY AND TECHNOLOGY IN WAR . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 ENDGAME AGAINST JAPAN: THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 DOCTRINAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4 APPLYING A TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5 UNCERTAINTY AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6 TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL ADAPTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45...