Description Details
The author’s examination of the counterair strategy process shows how joint force commanders should balance objectives, the balance of forces, the nature of the theater, and policy limits to build a counterair strategy that links means to ends by choosing methods, targets, and attack timing.The author’s discussion of current counterair issues shows that the services appreciate the product (freedom of action for land, sea, and air forces) that control of the air provides, but neglect the process of obtaining it. Current air power disputes emphasize the control and targeting of air resources, and slight the potential impact of these issues on America’s future ability to control the air and space....

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1 AIR SUPERIORITY AND JOINT OPERATIONS . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 2 VISIONS AND DOCTRINE . . . . 5 Doctrine . . . . 6 Counterair Doctrine Evaluation . . . . . 8 Service Doctrine . . . . . 12 Joint Doctrine . . . . . 14 Conclusion . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . 15 3 COUNTERAIR STRATEGY, TARGETS, AND TIMING . . . . . 19 The Counterair System . . . . 19 Basic Strategy Considerations . . . . 20 Strategic Choices . . . . . 22 Offense and Defense . . . . . 23 Targets . . . . 27 Strategy, Targets, and Timing . . . . 29 Measures of Success . . . . . 31 Conclusion . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . 32 4 COUNTERAIR FORCES . . . . 35 Capability and Cost . . . . 35 Air-to-Air and Surface-to-Air Weapons . . . . . 36 Manned and Unmanned Systems . . . . 37 Specialized and Multirole Forces . . . . 37 Weapons . . . . 38 Force Multipliers . . . . . 39 Conclusion . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . 40 5 COUNTERAIR ISSUES . . . . 43 Roles and Missions . . . . 43 The Bottom Up Review . . . . 44 Controlling Joint Air Forces . . . . . 48 Fire Support Coordination . . . . 50 Theater Missile Defense . . . . . 52 Conclusion . . . . 53 No...

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Drawing from the vision of airpower theorists and building on insights gained from studies on various regime changes, this thesis advances a theory of regime change and outlines a strategy for the use of airpower. To remain in power, regimes must continue to provide goods to the group of people responsible for its rise to power—the winning coalition. Different types of regimes rely on different types of goods to satisfy their winning coalition. This thesis advances the hypothesis that adversely affecting these goods will create policy failure, increase dissatisfaction among the winning coalition, and cause members to seek out a new coalition and regime to provide the lost goods. Additionally, since many regimes supply goods to third parties to retain their support, an additional hypothesis was introduced to account for the influence of international support....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 THE THEORY . . . . 5 3 THE CAUSAL MECHANISM . . . . 19 4 AMERICAN REGIME CHANGE . . . . 27 5 SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIME CHANGE . . . . . 37 6 CONCLUSION . . . . 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 53...

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A call is being made for an aircraft dedicated to the counterinsurgency (COIN) mission within military academic circles and the special operations community. Support for a COIN aircraft needs hard numbers, given the Air Force’s budget constraints brought on by the dedication to the F- 22A. Building on Arthur Davis’s COIN aircraft advocacy paper, this research doesn’t focus on further advocacy, but on a process and method for COIN aircraft procurement. The acquisition focus is on United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM) acquisition authority to couple its global war on terrorism (GWOT) mission responsibility with commercial-off-the-shelf aircraft procurement to specifically address the need for an airborne COIN capability....

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This paper shows that in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and other counterinsurgency operations, space forces will not be “war winners” but can provide crucial support. Specifically, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities can help isolate the battlespace. These systems can also enhance the ability to combat fielded rebels through surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications. Finally, the effects space forces generate can support the government and help strengthen its ability to solve the insurgents’ cause. The discussion concludes with specific recommendations to improve performance against this and future insurrections....

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This work examines the historical development of aerial precision since World War I and the emergence of the just-war tradition and international law since 1625. It then identifies specific dilemmas associated with the two sorts of judgments required by the just-war tradition, namely, jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), and explores their ramifications. The aim of this study is to encourage moral and ethical reflection by politicians, strategists, and tacticians at all levels. The issues at hand are aerial precision doctrine, the use of the precision-guided munition as the modern aerial weapon of choice, and the influence of the just-war tradition on strategic and tactical decisions....

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1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Aerial-Precision Development: Past, Present, and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 3 Airpower and the Just-War Tradition . . . . .33 4 The Dilemmas of Perfect Aerial Precision . 49 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

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The United States continues to challenge its military forces to provide maximum capability with minimum resources. In order to meet that challenge effectively, the US must take full advantage of the synergy provided by the unified action of joint forces. Those forces are employed in a wide variety of missions that change during development and execution. Formation of the joint task force (JTF) is one of several options to organize our military forces. This thesis examines the organization,training, doctrine, and experience of joint task forces within each of the five geographically tasked unified commands. This thesis compares JTF operations in Somalia, Haiti, Panama, Northern Iraq,and Hawaii along with current unified command plans for organizing and training JTFs. This thesis concludes that US armed forces are improving their ability to train and organize JTFs effectively. Continued improvement is required because current doctrine for training joint task forces is immature and the training programs implementing the doctrine are relatively new....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Thesis Purpose . . . . 2 Thesis Significance . . . . 2 Background . . . . 2 Definitions and Assumptions . . . . 3 Methodology . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . 6 2 ORGANIZATION . . . . 7 Doctrine . . . . 7 Experience . . . . 11 Analysis . . . . 20 Notes . . . . . 22 3 TRAINING . . . . . 25 Doctrine . . . . 25 Experience . . . . 27 Analysis . . . . 32 Notes . . . . . 34 4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 37 Conclusions . . . . 37 Recommendations . . . . 38 Future . . . . . 39...

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This study focuses on the development of aerial refueling methods and procedures for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV). The author states the need for UAVs, lists assumptions, and gives a brief background on them. His discussion of the three current Air Force UAV systems (Predator, DarkStar, and Global Hawk) is followed by some proposed methods and procedures for rendezvous and aerial refueling of these UAV platforms. The author rounds out his discussion by comparing and analyzing both the current UAV systems and the methods of air refueling. After proposing the UAV system best suited for air refueling, the most effective type of rendezvous for this UAV system, and the best method for con-trolling the UAV during the air refueling, the author concludes with a brief review of the implications for the Air Force and airpower enthusiasts....

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1 Introduction . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 2 The Need for Air Refueling Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Current Air Force Systems . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . 17 3 The Air Refueling Rendezvous and Controlling the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles during the Air Refueling . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 27 4 Comparison and Analysis of Current Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems, Rendezvous, and Methods of Control of the UAV during Aerial Refueling . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 36 5 Conclusions and Implications . . . . . 39...

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This study determines if a revival of the CRAF Enhancement Program is feasible and if it could be developed into a viable program for addressing AMC's airlift shortfall problem. To achieve this goal, the study analyzes the failure of the first CRAF Enhancement Program to determine if the barriers to its success were surmountable and if these same barriers might impede the success of a future program. The study determines that the first Enhancement Program failed because MAC was unable to develop an incentive plan that was attractive enough to ensure airline participation, yet be persuasive enough to elicit the required support and funding from Congress....

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1 INTRODUCTION.....1 2 THE NATIONAL AIRLIFT SYSTEM.......5 3 CRAF ENHANCEMENT: THEORY AND REALITY......21 4 THE FUTURE OF CRAF ENHANCEMENT...... 44 BIBLIOGRAPHY......65...

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Warfare is an ever evolving mixture of combinations: attack and defense, symmetry and asymmetry, maneuver and firepower, mass and economy of force, etc. True operational art manifests itself when the right balance of these combinations is applied to war fighting. This paper analyzes one such combination; ground maneuver and air interdiction. Indeed, this is a treatise on the synchronization of land power and air power, and how these two vital elements can better contribute to a successful operational campaign. The fundamental thesis is that the Joint Force Commander (JFC) must do more than merely balance this combination as separate entities, he must employ them as coequals in mutually complementary operations....

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1 JOINT WARFARE IS TEAM WARFARE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 MANEUVER AND INTERDICTION—THE RELATIONSHIP . . . 5 Ground Maneuver . . . . 5 Air Interdiction . . . . . . 6 The Relationship . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . 11 3 HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS . . . . . 13 World War I . . . . . 13 World War II . . . . 14 Korean War . . . . . 16 Vietnam War . . . . 17 Desert Storm . . . . 18 Summary . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 19 4 CURRENT MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . . 21 Army Doctrine . . . . . . 21 USAF Doctrine . . . . . . 22 Joint Doctrine . . . . 23 Maneuver and Interdiction . . . . 23 Command Relationships . . . . . . 24 Summary . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . 28 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 31 Conditions . . . . . . 31 Orchestration . . . . 35 Summary . . . . . . 36 Conclusion . . . . . 36 Notes . . . . . 37...

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This thesis analyzes the factors and conditions of command dysfunction from the cognitive, or mental, perspective of command and control warfare (C2W). The author examines the limitations of rational decision making and the tension that exists between rational and intuitive processes. Next, this thesis examines the vulnerabilities of rational and intuitive processes in order to build a cognitive warfare framework. The framework consists of three categories: the command baseline, stressors, and deception. The stressor and deception categories act on the command baseline. The analysis also suggests that there are a number of possible interactions that exist between the stressor and deception categories. This thesis uses the framework to analyze evidence of command dysfunction in three historical campaigns. The historical analyses study the German command during the Normandy Invasion, the Allied command during the first week of the Battle of the Bulge, and the Israeli command during the first half of the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War. In addition to showing that there are interactions between stressors and deception, the analyses highl...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 DECISION PROCESSES . . . . . 7 CONSIDERING A COGNITIVE WARFARE FRAMEWORK . . . 23 THE NORMANDY INVASION . . . . 35 THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE . . . . . 51 THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR IN THE SINAI . . . . . 65 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 83...

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A complex and interdependent environment in the global war on terrorism (GWOT) highlights the challenge of translating the theory of effects-based operations (EBO) into practice, particularly with respect to influencing the will of the people and achieving a desired end state. The following paper seeks to illustrate the conditions and challenges surrounding the translation of current effects-based theory into operational practice in the GWOT by using three conceptual constructs. First, the Microsoft Corporation, its connectivity to the Internet, and the persistent attacks by computer hackers on Microsoft products help frame the adversary and the complex environment and conditions surrounding the GWOT. Second, the Al-Jazeera satellite news network serves as an anecdotal backdrop for the challenges military planners face in managing EBO assessment and controlling the “effects” in EBO. Third, the versatility of both the MQ- 1B Predator unmanned aerial vehicle and Special Operations Forces illustrates the importance of developing and maintaining collective knowledge, technological relevance, and doctrinal adaptability in an ever-changin...

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1 Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 2 Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II . . . . . . . . 41 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 3 Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Lt Col Mark A. Clodfelter 4 The Influence of Aviation on the Evolution of American Naval Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Dr. David R. Mets 5 Airpower Thought in Continental Europe between the Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Dr. James S. Corum 6 Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Lt Col Peter R. Faber 7 Alexander P. de Seversky and American Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 8 Strategic Airpower and Nuclear Strategy: New Theory for a Not-Quite-So-New Apocalypse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Dr. Karl P. Mueller 9 Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict: A Short Journey to ...

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This paper analyzes the evolution of strategic bombing doctrine in order to identify the basic doctrinal tenets and then evaluate their compatibility with emerging stealth technologies. Current doctrine is an evolution of existing doctrine, theory, and experience. Therefore, to comprehend fully the meaning of doctrine, it is necessary to trace its lineage. As airpower arrived only recently in the doctrinal arena, no previous doctrine existed. Therefore, this analysis begins with the early airpower theories which provided the roots of evolution. Giulio Douhet is the most famous of the early theorists and his work provided a basis upon which to build. Following World War II (WWII), Bernard Brodie modified Douhet’s theory to incorporate atomic weapons and the experience to date. As theory evolved, so did early Air Corps "unsanctioned" doctrine. By testing each tenet against the demands of emerging stealth technologies, the paper finds that existing doctrine is basically sound, but incomplete. Therefore, the paper proposes and tests additional tenets to accommodate stealth and the increasing rate of technical advancement....

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This study follows the history of close air support (CAS) since World War II to examine how it has been apportioned and allocated in the past. It then examines the current joint air operations process. It is the contention of this study that the current system, rooted in its historical past, does not fully employ CAS to its optimum potential. The historical view of CAS has been as a tactical measure, with limited localized effects. However, properly integrated and coequal with the ground scheme of maneuver, it can have operational level effects. This study examines two theories of the use of CAS at the operational level and then recommends changes to the view of CAS and the process for its apportionment and allocation....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE HISTORY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT . . . . 7 3 CURRENT JOINT CAS DOCTRINE . . . . 39 4 TWO THEORIES OF CAS AS AN OPERATIONAL ASSET . . . . 51 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 59 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 65...

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As leaders at all levels, our Airmen must be able to anticipate and appropriately respond to a complicated and fluid national security environment. Developing such Airmen will require stronger commitments to education and training on the part of the learner to the point where learning never stops. Fostering this highly favorable attitude toward learning is possible only if Air Force education and training programs address learners’ goals, motivations, social interactions, and individual learning styles. This means the Air Force needs a stronger focus on affective learning during the instructional design (ID) process for education and training....

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To help understand and begin to develop alternative policy frameworks that fit the current and emerging security context, the US Air Force’s Air Force Research Institute (AFRI), the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), and King’s College, London, hosted a two-day conference at the RUSI offices in London on 18 and 19 May 2009. We sought to bring together some of the best thinkers on deterrence to examine how to reinvigorate this essential tool for today’s policy community. The conference exceeded our expectations, as readers will observe from the excellent products in these proceedings. From the pre-conference “thought pieces” by RUSI’s Michael Codner and AFRI’s Adam Lowther—the presentations by the keynote speakers and case study developers—to the post-conference “Quick Looks” by AFRI personnel, the outcome reflects the creativity and the seriousness with which the attendees and the planning staffs approached the topic....

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1 Framing Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century: Conference Summary . . . . . . . 1 Adam Lowther 2 Defining “Deterrence” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Michael Codner 3 Understanding Deterrence . . . . . . . .27 Adam Lowther 4 Policy and Purpose . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Gen Norton A Schwartz, USAF Lt Col Timothy R. Kirk, USAF 5 Waging Deterrence in the Twenty-first Century . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Gen Kevin Chilton, USAF Greg Weaver 6 On Nuclear Deterrence and Assurance . . 77 Keith B. Payne 7 Conference Agenda . . . . . . . . . . 121 8 Contemporary Challenges for Extended Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . .  123 Tom Scheber 9 Case Study—The August 2008 War between Russia and Georgia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Denis Corboy 10 Deterrence and Counterproliferation . . 149 Malcolm Chalmers 11 Deterrence and Saddam Hussein . . . 155 Barry Schneider 12 Stymieing Leviathan . . . . . . . . . 215 Paul Schulte 13 The Madrid Train Bombing . . . . . . .237 Peter Neumann 14 Framing Strategic Deterrence . . . . . . ...

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The United States Air Force has long favored attacking electrical power systems.Electric power has been considered a critical target in every war since World War II,and will likely be nominated in the future. Historically, there have been four basic strategies behind attacks on national electrical systems: to cause a decline in civilian morale; to inflict costs on the political leaders to induce a change; to hamper military operations; and to hinder war production. The evidence shows that the only sound reason for attacking electrical power is to effect the production of war material in a war of attrition against a self-supporting nation-state without outside assistance. The implication for future strategic air operations is important. Because attacks on electric power cause indirect collateral damage which can be politically counterproductive,and the military benefit is minimal, the United States should reject attacks on national electrical power systems in the near future....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . 5 Generation . . . . . . 5 Transmission . . . . . 7 Distribution . . . . . . 8 Control . . . . 8 Effects . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 12 3 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN TOTAL WAR . . . . . . 15 World War II—Germany . . . 17 World War II—Japan . . . . . 22 United States Strategic Bombing Survey . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . 28 4 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN LIMITED WAR . . . . . 33 Korean War . . . . . . 33 Vietnam War . . . . . 37 Desert Storm . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . 42 5 TARGETING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . 45 Failures . . . . 45 When to Target Electric Power . . . 48 Conclusions and Implications . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 57...

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This study analyzes current theater airlift organization and control principles for supporting a large contingency or conventional war. It segregates theater airlift management issues into three organizing categories: 1) organizational relationships and responsibilities, 2) theater command and control networks and supporting personnel, and 3) theater airlift management procedures. The study analyzes historical evidence from the Vietnam and Gulf Wars to derive theater airlift management lessons. By comparing this evidence to current policy trends it attempts to determine how well current doctrine reflects past lessons. In addition, the author evaluates how well-equipped current doctrine is to handle three future influences on the theater airlift system: divestiture of the C-130 fleet, growing uncertainty in the international security arena, and the fielding of the new C-17 transport aircraft....

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This paper reviews the performance of US systems against Iraq’s Scuds during Desert Storm, and examines current US efforts to defeat these potentially destabilizing weapons. Which technologies and systems will be most effective against mobile ballistic missiles? How should the United States implement selected technologies to deal with this challenge? This thesis covers the pros and cons of competing concepts to accomplish missile defense. It evaluates the most promising technical solutions to the mobile ballistic missile threat. On the basis of the extensive amount of time and research effort devoted to the problem, it is safe to say there is no quick, easy, or cheap way to locate, identify, and destroy mobile missiles and their launchers. To defeat the mobile missile threat with a high degree of confidence, the US must field an integrated system of both offensive and defensive weapons....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION....... vii Notes .......... xiv 1 DESERT STORM.....1 Notes..........9 2 PROLIFERATION.........11 Notes.........18 3 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE GAMEPLAN.....21 Notes......... 39 4 MISSILE ATTACK OPERATIONS.........43 Notes.....63 5 CONCLUSIONS.....67 Notes .......72 APPENDIX 1: Emergence of the Threat.....73 Notes......... 83 APPENDIX 2: The Long Search for a Solution........86 Notes......... 90 APPENDIX 3: Additional Missile Defense Research.....92 Notes........ 95 GLOSSARY..... 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY.......101...

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The purpose of this study is to identify criteria that will provide objective analysis of a halt-phase strategy. This study identifies the key criteria by examining air combat in three operations: the Battle of Bismarck Sea, the 1973 Golan Heights battles of the Yom Kippur War, and the Iraqi Republican Guard escape from Basra. This examination focuses on air operations looking for tactics, tactical innovations, and operational circumstances that inhibit or enhance air operations designed to halt the advance or retreat of significant ground formations. This study evaluates each case in three major phases: prehostility preparation, conduct of combat operations, and the results and analysis of the operation....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 3 2 EXPLANATION OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 5 Notes . . . . . . 13 3 CRITIQUES OF THE HALT–PHASE STRATEGY . . 15 Notes . . . . . . 22 4 THE BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA . . 25 Notes . . . . . . 34 5 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR, GOLAN HEIGHTS ACTION . . 37 Notes . . . . . . 47 6 THE IRAQI REPUBLICAN GUARD BASRA ESCAPE . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . 63 7 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 65 Notes . . . . . . 72...