Description Details
The ground and air forces have strong interlocking connections in the battlefield operations known as close air support (CAS). In the 1970s the Army and Air Force began to develop a shared battlefield doctrine known as battlefield air interdiction(BAI) that was concerned with a class of targets that lay out a fair distance from the front lines. Later, on the battlefields of Desert Storm, the Air Force excluded BAI from its tasking orders, although some claimed interdiction missions of this nature were carried out under different names. Lt Col Terrance J. McCaffrey III looks into What Happened to BAI? Army and Air Force Battlefield Doctrine Development from Pre–Desert Storm to 2001. He traces airground doctrine and operational practices relative to battlefield interdiction from World War I to Operation Desert Storm and suggests at one point that even the flank support for Patton was, in effect, BAI. The author carries the discussion through the decade after Desert Storm and shows how the issue is too important to be dropped by either service, even as technology provides new weapons for both services....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 ORIGINS OF BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 3 WHERE WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION IN DESERT STORM? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION A VICTIM OF SUCCESS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 5 IS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION BACK? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 97 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115...

Description Details
In this compelling study, Lt Col Carla D. Bass argues that the American military, underestimating vulnerabilities of the US information infrastructure, has based its strategic policy not on a firm foundation, but rather has built castles on sand. Lieutenant Colonel Bass believes that the United States cannot simply postulate doctrine and tactics which rely so extensively on information and information technology without comparable attention to information and information systems protection and assurance....

Description Details
This study examines one aspect of weather modification, benign weather modification (BWM), for possible use in assisting military operations. After briefly reviewing the history and science of weather modification, this thesis bounds the aspects of weather modification being addressed. It then describes barriers to BWM,showing how they affect current weather modification policy in the military. Examples are shown of current civilian BWM techniques, their possible use by the military, and some military-unique needs for weather modification....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . . .1 AN OVERVIEW OF WEATHER MODIFICATION . . . . . . 7 BARRIERS TO WEATHER MODIFICATION. . . . . 13 MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF WEATHER MODIFICATION . .21 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS. . . . . .29 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . .33...

Description Details
In GPS and Galileo: Friendly Foes?, Lt Col Roftiel Constantine, United States Air Force (USAF), analyzes the heated competition to provide service from high in the skies of medium earth orbit. The European Union (EU) is developing Galileo, its own global positioning and navigation satellite system, scheduled to be operational by 2010. The EU states that Galileo will provide greater precision to all users than is currently available from the United States’ (US) global positioning system (GPS) through improved coverage of satellite signals at higher latitudes, and, unlike GPS, Galileo will be guaranteed to be always available—even during war or political disagreement. Regarding the enormous importance of GPS to the United States and millions of users worldwide, the prospect of a second, competing, and potentially interfering global satellite navigation system could have serious military, foreign policy, and industrial implications. The US government would benefit from the heightened awareness of the risks and opportunities Colonel Constantine presents for the United States surrounding the Galileo program....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION TO THE GPS AND GALILEO PROGRAMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2 HISTORY OF SATELLITE NAVIGATION . . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 GALILEO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4 GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . .35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 5 FIVE STEPS THE US GOVERNMENT SHOULD UNDERTAKE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55...

Description Details
Professor Gray identifies and discusses nine fallacies that: (1) the USAF should abandon large-scale regular warfare; (2) airpower is inherently a strategic weapon; (3) airpower is driven by technology rather than ideas; (4) airpower is about targeting; (5) airpower must be subordinate to land power; (6) the theory of strategic airpower is flawed; (7) an independent USAF interferes with an effective joint force structure; (8) airpower is a minor player in counterinsurgency (COIN); and finally, a longstanding issue, (9) the twenty-first century is about missiles, space, and cyber power and airpower is yesterday’s revolution. The discussion of these “fallacies” should stimulate the appetite of most thoughtful Airmen, but also serious advocates of all services and everyone interested in national defense....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix UNDERSTANDING AIRPOWER: BONFIRE OF THE FALLACIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Fallacies to the Left of Them, Fallacies to the Right of Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 The Fallacies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 America, the Air Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61...

Table of Contents Details
PART I Conceptualization 1 Centralizing the Defense Establishment . . .3 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 Defense Communications Agency and System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 3 National Military Command System . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WWMCCS Is Born . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 5 Three WWMCCS Failures . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 PART II Formalization 6 WWMCCS Automatic Data Processing Upgrade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 7 Centralizing Communications Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .117 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 8 The WWMCCS Council and the Modern WWMCCS Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 9 The WWMCCS Architect and Architecture 163 Notes . . . . ...

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . xi ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 1 EXPECTATIONS OF COMMAND . . . 1 What Does the Boss Expect? . . . 2 What Do the Troops Expect? . . . 9 What Do You Expect? . . . . . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2 VISION AND ENVIRONMENT . . . . . 23 Developing and Communicating Your Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Building the Environment . . . . . 30 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 WALKING THE WALK . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 4 HANDLING JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5 GREAT IDEAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Take Responsibility for Fun . . . . 95 Sponsor Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Celebrate Heroes—Not Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Mentoring Program . . . . . . . . . . 104 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
Since the end of the Gulf War, the debate over whether there should be a separate space service, equal with the Air Force, Army, and Navy, has grown in proportion to the indispensable value of space operations to our nation’s defense. Increasing dependency on space-systems is a fact of military life. In this well-documented essay, Col Michael C. Whittington compares the leading arguments for a separate space force to the cogent arguments for an independent air force made by airpower advocates during the interwar years of 1920–1940. The airpower issues in 1920 and the space power issues of today are strikingly similar, revolving around four key issues: leadership, doctrine, technology, and funding. The irony, of course, is that these arguments, which helped create an independent air force in 1947, are challenged by many within today’s Air Force leadership, which leads Colonel Whittington to ask, “If they were cogent in 1920, would they not be relevant today?”...

Description Details
This paper asserts there exists a dangerous GAP in US strategic intertheater transportation capabilities, propounds a model describing the GAP, and proposes a solution to the problem. Using the Gulf War logistics flow as a model, the three phase points are shown and their airlift/sealift tradeoffs discussed. Other logistics support options, which figured in the war, such as prepositioning and host nation support, are discussed and the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations shown to be, in many ways, a fortuitous theater of operations. This serendipitous combination of circumstances contributed greatly to our successful logistics buildup and is unlikely to recur....

Table of Contents Details
Logistics Flow During The Gulf War 1 Introduction 1 Strategic lift Phasing 4 Transportation/Support Modes 8 Mobility Studies 16 Summary 19 Conclusion 23 Notes 24 Filling The Gap: The Airship 28 Prologue 28 Introduction 31 The Airship in History 32 Airship Technology 42 Potential Military Roles 53 Conclusion 68 Epilogue 69 Notes 72...

Description Details
This thesis explores the evolution of Russian military doctrine in light of the lessons they say they learned from the Gulf War. Since the early 1980s, such prominent military thinkers as Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov argued that emerging technologies were generating a new revolution in military affairs. The Russian military doctrinal response to Desert Storm seems to confirm Marshal Ogarkov’s predictions. This thesis finds the new military doctrine (1) reverts from the defensive to an offensive preemption, (2) reverts from no nuclear first use to nuclear escalation, (3) guarantees ethnic Russians living in former Soviet states protection, (4) emphasizes the importance of military advancement in C4I, smart weapons, and mobility, and (5) emphasizes strategic nonnuclear deterrent forces....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 RUSSIAN VIEW OF MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 7 Relationship between Military Doctrine and Strategy . . . . 8 Military Doctrine—Military Art—Operational Art—Tactics . . . .9 Soviet/Russian Military Doctrine Evolution . . . . 9 Soviet Military Doctrine Stereotype . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . . 19 3 RUSSIAN IMPRESSION OF THE GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 Strategy . . . . . 24 The Threat . . . . . . 25 Future War . . . . . . 25 The Initial Period of War . . . . . 27 Operational Art . . . . 28 Force Structure . . . . 31 Tactics . . . . . . 32 Technology, Research, and Development . . . . . 33 Summary . . . . 34 Notes . . . . . . 35 4 EMERGING RUSSIAN POST–GULF WAR MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 39 The Threat . . . . . . 41 View of Future War . . . . . 42 Force Structure and Priorities . . . . . 42 Differences with Pre–Gulf War Military Doctrine . . . . . . 43 Conclusions . . . . . . 44 Notes . . . . . . 45 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGISTS . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . 52...

Description Details
This study, Blue Horizons, was commissioned by the United States Air Force (USAF) chief of staff to provide “a new look at the future.” Specifically, the chief of staff asked the research team to provide “a common understanding of future strategic and technological trends for Air Force leaders to make better decisions.” The chief also sought to “confirm AU as [the Air Force’s] in-house think tank” and to improve the relevance of Air Force education to the decision making processes in Washington....

Table of Contents Details
CHAPTER 1—Introduction . . . .1 Methodology . . . .1 Overview . . . . . .2 CHAPTER 2—alternate futures . . . . 3 Peer China . . . . .3 A Path toward a Peer China . . . .3 Peer China 2030—Causality and Impact . . . .6 Capabilities Needed to Respond to a Peer China Crisis . . . . .7 Resurgent Russia . . . . .8 The Development of a Resurgent Russia . . . .9 Capabilities to Defend against a Resurgent Russian State . . . . .10 Failed State—Nigeria . . . .11 A Failure We Cannot Ignore . . . .11 Nigeria Shatters . . . . .13 Capabilities Required for Intervention . . . .14 Jihadist Insurgency . . . . .15 Roots of the Schism . . . .16 The Insurgency . . . . 17 Capabilities Needed to Combat the Insurgency . . . 19 Operations Analysis Results . . . .20 Conclusions and Recommendations . . . .22 Recommendations . . . .26 The Way Ahead . . . . 28 Notes . . . . 29 TITLES IN THE OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES . 37...

Description Details
One of the challenges Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, sends to Air Force students, researchers, and staff offices is to investigate future concepts of operations (CONOPS). One in particular relates to this study, the CONOPS for space and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is very sensitive about incorporating new technology into its operations. While the authors advocate a feasibility study for reactors in space in a CONOPS, they also explore a deeper problem with widespread societal rejection and revulsion concerning the theoretical employment of nuclear technology in space....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 WHITHER SPACE NUCLEAR POWER? . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 SPACE NUCLEAR POWER AS TRANSSCIENTIFIC PUBLIC POLICY . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 POLITICAL PERMISSION—THE CONTEMPORARY DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 A TRANSSCIENTIFIC POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Appendix A THE HISTORY OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 B PROJECT PROMETHEUS—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—DECEMBER 2003 . . . . . . . . . . 89 C THE MEMBER GROUPS OF THE ...

Description Details
Technical innovation lies at the heart of the case for privileging airpower in the American way of war, but such innovation comprises only one of warfare’s seven vital contexts. The sheer complexity of war and warfare renders prediction, technological and other, a high-risk activity. The contexts of war and warfare are (1) political, (2) societal-cultural, (3)economic, (4) technological, (5) military-strategic, (6) geographical, and (7) historical....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii THE AIRPOWER ADVANTAGE IN FUTURE WARFARE: THE NEED FOR STRATEGY . . . . . . .1 Plan of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Why this Study? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Airpower Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Issues and Arguments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Future Warfare: Contextual Realities . . . . . 20 US Airpower Advantage in Future Warfare . . 30 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35...

Description Details
Snow’s and Drew’s newest version has been slightly retitled and almost totally rewritten to reflect radically changed politicalmilitary realities. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy addresses not only traditional strategy concerns but also the chaotic nature of the post–Cold War world and the stark realities of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military conflicts along religious fault lines. Although the authors have changed a great deal in this edition, the original strategy process model, first published in 1980, remains the constant organizing scheme....

Table of Contents Details
Contents DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii SECTION I FRAMING THE PROBLEM 1 STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Warfare in the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . 4 Foundations of Modern Warfare . . . . . . . . . .7 Contrasts in the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2 THE STRATEGY PROCESS—AN OVERVIEW . .13 Determining National Security Objectives . . .14 Formulating Grand National Strategy . . . . . .17 Developing Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Composing Operational Strategy . . . . . . . . 22 Formulating Battlefield Strategy (Tactics) . . .23 Influences on the Strategy Process . . . . . . .25 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 SECTION II THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 3 GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 31 Vital National Interests . . . . . ....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v Theory of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Patriotism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Air, Space , and Cyber Power . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Education , Training, and Lessons Learned . 24 Preparedness , Security, and Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Leadership and Professionalism . . . . . . . 32 Character and Leadership Traits . . . . . . 35 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Intelligence, Surveillance , and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Information and Communication S . . . . . . 49 Joint Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Coalition Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Airpower at War . . . . . . . . . . . ...

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii 1 THE COLD WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Strategic Flexibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 THE LEADERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 General Curtis E. LeMay (1906–90) . . . . . . 17 Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (1900–86) . . . . 22 3 THE WEAPON SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 The Bomber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Tanker . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 The Intercontinental Ballistic Missile-ICBM . .68 The Cruise Missile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 The Fleet Ballistic Missile Submarine SSBN. . 72 SAC Alert Force Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Boomer Patrol Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 88 4 FUN, GAMES, AND SERIOUS BUSINESS . . . .93 Combat Crew Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 SAC Bombing Competition . . . . . . . . . . . 94 Spot Promotions . . . . ...

Description Details
This study analyzes and assesses the changes in organization and structure of the active Air Force and ANG fighter maintenance units from the time the ANG became a separate reserve component in 1946 to the present-day organization, paralleling it with the active Air Force. It takes the reader from the ANG maintenance unit's beginning, through the changes that occurred over the years and the reason for the changes, to the present day organization. It then provides a glimpse at the future maintenance organization....

Table of Contents Details
1 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE: PAST AND PRESENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I Centralized Control, 1930-45 . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Period of Uncertainty, 1945-55 . . . . . . . . . . 5 Return to Centralization, 1955-70 . . . . . . . . 7 Decentralized Control, 1970 to the Present . .8 Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Current Organization Structure Theory : A Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Air Force and Major Command Policy Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2 THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION AND THE COMBAT ORIENTED MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . 23 The Centralized Organization . . . . . . . . . . .23 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 The Decentralized Organization . . . . . . . . .26 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Air National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...