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L-am cunoscut în 4 ianuarie 2003 pe paradoxalul paradoxist Florentin Smarandache (nascut în Balcesti, Vâlcea, la 10 decembrie 1954) la întâlnirea organizata de colegii sai de la Liceul Pedagogic Râmnicu Vâlcea si desfasurata în mod mai mult sau mai putin paradoxal la Liceul de Arta Râmnicu Vâlcea. Venise în vacanta de Craciun acasa, la Balcesti. Facuse o calatorie lunga, tocmai de dincolo de Ocean, din SUA, de la Universitatea “New Mexico” din orasul Gallup, statul New Mexico, unde este acum conferentiar universitar doctor la Facultatea de Matematica. A doua zi, a plecat spre patria de adoptie, dar nu fara a face o escala în Roma: nu-i nici un paradox în asta, din moment ce el este român si vorba ceea – “Toate drumurile duc la Roma!”....

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The best summary of Nietzsche's philosophy by Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols is Nietzsche’s polemic tract attacking: writers, philosophers, views, worldviews, schools, position, arguments, idols, truths, nations, rationalism, -ismologies, causality, improvers, morality, religions, artists, modern ideas, believers, etc. Nietzsche also puts forth his own ideas – read slowly. Translated from German to English by Daniel Fidel Ferrer (February 2013). Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer / By Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). [Götzen-Dämmerung. English]. Translation of text, afterward, notes, letters, and appendixes by ©Daniel Fidel Ferrer, 2013. 1. Philosophy. 2). Metaphysics. 3). Philosophy, German. 4). Philosophy, German -- 19th century. 5). Philosophy, German – Greek influences. I. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900. II. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. ...

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"From the military school (Kriegsschule) of life. - What does not kill me makes me stronger. (Aus der Kriegsschule des Lebens. — Was mich nicht umbringt, macht mich stärker). [Translator note. This maxim (#8) is one of the most famous quotes from Nietzsche. See the concept Kriegsschule’ in Nietzsche’s notebook of Spring 1888 18 [1]. A slightly different versions of this section is in one of the Nietzsche’s notebook and has this version of the maxim #8: “What does not kill us — that bring us to that makes us stronger. Il faut le tuer Wagnerisme.” English translation from French of the last sentence might be: “He must be killed, Wagnerism”. Spring 1888 15 [118]. Complete text in German and French for the other version: [“Was uns nicht umbringt — das bringen wir um, das macht uns stärker. Il faut tuer le Wagnerisme”]. Notebook: Spring 1888 15 [118]. From the Preface: "This essay - the title betrays it - is above all a recreation, a spot of sunshine, a leap sideways into the idleness of a psychologist. Perhaps a new war? And are new idols sounded out?... This little essay is a great declaration of war (grosse Kriegserklärun...

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Table of Contents 1). Twilight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer (pages 3 - 80). Main text. Starting with Nietzsche’s Preface. 2). Afterward Notes (pages 81 - 83). 3). Dedication and Acknowledgements (page 83). 4). Appendix A. Section on “Twilight of Idols” from “Ecce Homo” (pages 84 - 87). 5). Appendix B. Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks and Letters concerning “Twilight of Idols” (pages 88 - 93). 6). Appendix C. Select chronology of Nietzsche’s life (pages 94 - 95). 7). Word index (pages 96 - 156). ...

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THE CONTEXT: A DIFFERENT MIND-SET . . . . . 1 The Mind-Set in World War I . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Post-World War I Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 GIULIO DOUHET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 A Continental Theorist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 HUGH TRENCHARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 British Empire Theorist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4 WILLIAM MITCHELL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 New World Theorist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5 JOHN WARDEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Theorist or Throwback? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6...

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This study examines the links between science, philosophy, and military theory. The author uses two case studies to demonstrate the links between these disciplines. He presents an overview on the rise of Newtonian science, and he examines how the key frameworks and concepts of that science became interwoven into Western civilization to affect its philosophy with an emphasis on its interpretation by the German Romanticist philosopher Immanuel Kant. He then shows how Newtonian science and Kant’s philosophy affected the military theory of Carl von Clausewitz. His second case study concerns the theory and philosophy of evolution developed by British philosopher Herbert Spencer and its influence on the military theory of J. F. C. Fuller. The author compares these two case studies to find commonalities between them that suggest a mechanism which explains how and why scientific theory and their philosophical interpretations eventually influence military theory. The author then uses this mechanism as a tool with which “new” sciences such as quantum mechanics, relativity, and complexity theory can be evaluated to see if and in what manner t...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE RISE OF NEWTONIAN SCIENCE . . . . . 5 KANT . . . . 15 CLAUSEWITZ . . . . 21 SPENCER AND FULLER . . . . . 29 THE PATH FROM SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY TO MILITARY THEORY . . . . 39 THE NEW SCIENCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY THEORY . . . . . 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 59...

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This study analyzes the historical debate between the United States Army (USA) and United States Air Force over the issue of close air support (CAS). Specifically,this study examines four CAS subissues from World War I through the Korean War:priorities in the employment of airpower, the ownership and apportionment of CASassets, the most effective CAS command and control (C2) system, and the debate overwhether to procure a single or multipurpose CAS aircraft. The case study herein analyzes the CAS philosophy of Lt Gen Edward Mallory Almond, USA. The author reasoned that General Almond’s diverse background in Army, Navy, and Air Force theory and employment would make him a logical candidate for a study. While his opinions are much more complex than this abstract can do justice to, General Almond’s CAS thoughts evolved to the following: (1) Air priorities should first be, air superiority, CAS second, and then interdiction and strategic attack;(2) The Army should maintain operational control of sufficient (meaning “lots of”)CAS air assets and practice decentralized control (down to the division or corps level); (3) The services should b...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: WORLD WAR I THROUGH WORLD WAR II . . . . 5 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: THE KOREAN WAR . . . . . 29 CLOSE AIR SUPPORT: A GROUND COMMANDER’S PERSPECTIVE . . . . . 51 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 69...

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This research is framed in the context of a specialized weapon in military aviation: an unmanned multirole fighter capable of replacing manned systems and their respective missions. This paper gives a brief history of unmanned aerial vehicles and their employment as weapons to demonstrate the evolution from ISR platform to unmanned combat air vehicle and then evolves into two main sections of “can we” and “should we” pursue this avenue of development. The primary means of answering the research question is both technical and philosophical. Before being able to answer if the Air Force should pursue an unmanned fighter, it is necessary to determine if it is technically feasible for such a system....

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This is a study of the applicability of prospect theory to military decision making.Prospect theory posits that the decision maker’s reference point determines thedomain in which he makes a decision. One implication of this study is that if the decision maker can do the same for asubordinate or for an enemy, he may be better able to predict their responses in agiven situation. The project’s goal is to develop a framework for assessing riskpropensity. It does this by first describing the military decision-making process andconcluding that it is a rational decision-making process. Second, this study describesprospect theory and matches the key aspects of the theory with the militarydecision-making process. Third, it proposes a framework for assessing riskpropensity. The theory is tested in a case study of Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1944decision to launch Operation Market Garden. This decision is analyzed in terms ofGraham T. Allison’s three models for decision making and prospect theory todetermine which model or theory seems to provide the best explanations for Eisenhower’s decision....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 MILITARY DECISION MAKING AND PROSPECT THEORY. . . . 5 MARKET GARDEN: CALCULATED RISK OR FOOLISH GAMBLE? . . . . 19 APPLYING THE FRAMEWORK . . . . 39 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 47...

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According to CMSgt Cari Kent, 30th Space Wing command chief, it is at basic training that Airmen learn everything they need to succeed in the Air Force.1 In recent incidents, Airmen have exhibited unacceptable actions. These range from transporting cruise missiles loaded with warheads from Minot to Barksdale AFB in 2007 and erroneously shipping nuclear-missile fuses to Taiwan in 2006, to other lesser-known infractions in the Air Force. Certainly, the remedy to such attitudes and behaviors could not be simply applying lessons learned at basic training. Or could the application of the basics taught to initial trainees have changed the course of some of these events? What do Airmen experience at basic training that leads the chief to this conclusion?...

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Drawing on the histories of three services—Great Britain’s Royal Air Force from 1918 to 1938, the Israeli Air Force from 1967 to 1973, and the United States Air Force from 1953 to 1965—Major Carter offers three case studies to determine if the cult of the offensive applies to air forces. He concludes that cults of the offensive have indeed influenced airpower doctrine in the past, and that detailed offensive planning and a critical evaluation of capabilities provide two methods for avoiding this potential trap. ...

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INTRODUCTION . . .1 THE NATURE OF OFFENSE AND DEFENSE FOR AIRPOWER . . .5 AIRPOWER AND THE IDEOLOGY OF THE OFFENSIVE . . .18 ROYAL AIR FORCE, 1918–38 . . .31 ISRAELI AIR FORCE, 1967–73 . . .52 UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, 1953–65 . . .65 IMPLICATIONS . . .88 NOTES . . .95 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . .107...

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This study analyzes and builds on Dr. Robert Pape’s framework for analyzing airpower strategies. The analysis shows the underlying value of his Targets and Timing, Mechanism, Outcomes construct as well as the considerable clarification and expansion it requires in order to perform comprehensive air strategy analysis for the broad range of strategic air and space tasks....

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At first glance, strategic aerial reconnaissance appears to be a mere technical tool. The term refers to the use of aircraft to collect strategic intelligence using photographic or electronic means. According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), strategic intelligence refers to “intelligence that is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels.” Strategic intelligence includes information provided by sources other than aircraft, including naval vessels, ground communications intercept sites, satellites, published literature, defectors, and spies. Because Air Force aircraft provided the bulk of information used by American war plans from 1945 to 1953, this book focuses on the origins of the USAF strategic aerial reconnaissance. Although official JCS publications did not specifically list strategic aerial reconnaissance, the term may be defined as the use of aircraft to gather information necessary to conduct strategic air war, also called strategic air bombardment....

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1 THE ORIGINS OF STRATEGIC AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2 GROPING IN THE DARK: RECONNAISSANCE BEFORE CONTAINMENT, 1945 –1946 . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 3 FROM CONTAINMENT TO BERLIN: ORGANIZATIONAL STEPS TO FILL INTELLIGENCE GAPS, 1947–1948 . . . . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 4 STRATEGIC BOMBING QUESTIONED: INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS AND WAR PLANS, 1949 –1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124 5 THE TEST: STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE IN KOREA, 1950 –1953 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174...

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This analysis takes a didactic approach. It attempts to demystify the aura surrounding operational design by presenting a theoretical framework for comprehending its fundamental precepts. The goals of this analysis are threefold: provide a methodological example for understanding and applying design, show how design enhances decision making and risk analysis, and investigate the major differences between design in major combat operations and design in counterinsurgency (COIN)....

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1 The Process of Operational Design 1 2 Developing an Operational Approach 21 3 Methodology for Understanding and Employing Operational Design 31 4 Establishing the Link between Operational Design and Decision Analysis 59 5 Operational Design and Counterinsurgency 83...

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I developed this thesis because I perceived a void in applying these themes—technology, force reductions, and futuristic visions—to command and control and to related impacts for staff structures. I seek concrete application of these ideas, rather than more rhetoric on what might be . . . someday. This paper represents my effort to peer into our future and see possibilities....

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This paper explores the relationship between Information Warfare (IW) and Public Affairs (PA) and reveals a direct link through the role of propaganda in each. A historical analysis of propaganda in past wars yields lessons which can be applied to formulating PA policy on IW today. In light of the evidence, three possible options emerge regarding the possible IW roles PA might adopt. Option One—a “Hands Off” policy—seeks to avoid any association with IW and represents the current PA approach. Option Two upholds the primacy of truth but acknowledges PA must take an active role in IW. Option Three suggests PA abandon its policy to tell the truth and actively en-gage in all IW activities, including disinformation. This paper finds Option Two as the logical role for PA in today’s environment and concludes with several recommendations to implement the policy....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 4 2 DEFINING INFORMATION WARFARE AND IDENTIFYING THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS LINK . . . . . 5 Information Warfare and the CNN Factor . . . . 7 Public Affairs and Psychological Operations Roles Begin to Blur . . . . 8 Notes . . . .12 3 A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MILITARY PROPAGANDA . . . . .15 Revolutionary War . . . . . 16 Civil War . . . . .17 Spanish–American War . . . . .18 World War I . . . . .19 World War II: The War against Germany . . . . .21 World War II: The War against Japan . . . . .23 Korea and Vietnam . . . .24 Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War . . . . . 25 Summary . . . . .27 Notes . . . .28 4 PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPTIONS/IMPLICATIONS FOR INFORMATION WARFARE . . . . .31 Three Public Affairs Path Options . . . . .31 Option One: “Hands Off” . . . .31 Option Two: Public Affairs Conducts Information Warfare, Upholding Primacy of Truth . . . . .34 Option Three: Public Affairs Engages in Information Warfare, Including Disinformation . . . . .38 Notes . . . .40 5 CONCLUSION . . . . .43...

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The reader should know that the scenario presented in this monograph is not a forecast of a specific future but rather is structured to help the reader understand the magnitude and shape of Africa’s largest economy and the impact it has on the world. As we see in the 2009 global recession and credit crisis in today’s globalized world, a failure in Nigeria, like the failure of almost any other nation, could have serious repercussions across the planet. Whether Nigeria is able to grow into a thriving, stable, and vibrant democracy or whether it becomes a failed state, the people of the United States must be ready to support Nigeria as a fellow member of the international system....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 NIGERIA IN CONTEXT: DEFINING FAILURE . . . . 9 3 THE SOCIAL SCHISMS OF NIGERIA . . . . 21 Col Douglas W. Jaquis 4 NIGERIAN POLITICS . . . . 33 Col Mark D. DeLong 5 NIGERIA’S ECONOMY . . . 39 Col Daniel B. Gordon 6 MILITARY VECTORS . . . . 55 Col Robert S. McAllum 7 NIGERIA IN 2030: PATHS TO FAILURE . . . .65 Col Christopher J. Kinnan 8 TECHNOLOGY AND FAILED STATE 2030—THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCERESPONDS . . . . .95 Col Christopher J. Kinnan 9 SUMMARY . . . . . 109...

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The traditional American military brute-force strategy does not always meet our national needs in this new world order. Strategic Coercion offers one alternative to this brute-force approach. Simply stated, strategic coercion is the act of inducing or compelling an adversary to do something to which he is averse. It involves using force and threatening action to compel an adversary to cease his current activity, or coerce him to reverse actions already taken. Two contemporary theories of strategic coercion seem to offer promising alternatives to brute force....

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This paper explores the utility of a debriefing method resulting in individual, unit, and organizational transcendence toward increased effectiveness in the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF). The conceptual framework is centered on the transformational and complexity theories of leadership science. The study offers for consideration a debriefing methodology termed “holistic” as a structure for achieving both individualistic and unit inner growth and efficiency. The problem examined is the lack of proper leadership tools in the RNoAF’s operational units to understand and cope with the effects of increased stress. Based on theory and examples from operational practice, holistic debriefing is presented as a possible means for leaders to increase mission effectiveness through improved stress coping mechanisms. The secondary effects from people engaging with themselves and each other through holistic debriefing are increased self-knowledge, interpersonal trust, group confidence, and an improved working environment....

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This history continues the story of United States Air Force ideas, concepts, and doctrine from the watershed of massive retaliation/flexible response that was occasioned in 1960. The first three chapters of this volume are in effect reprinted from the 1974 edition of Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, and the following chapters have been added to bring this never-ending story up to 1984....

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This is not a history of military airlift but rather an investigation of ideas and concepts as they have evolved and have been applied to warfighting . Airlift is the backbone of deterrence . A properly structured and equipped airlift force is critical to the successful execution of the national military strategy . How we think about airlift and how we translate those thoughts into a meaningful expression of how to develop, deploy, and employ airlift forces is vital to the national defense. Colonel Miller's study is a definitive step in that important process....

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1 THE PRE-WORLD WAR II ERA . . . . . . . . . .1 The Air Power Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I Air Transportation Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ANew Air Transport Organization . . . . . . . . .13 The Woodring Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Prewar Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Prelude to World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 2 WORLDWIDE AIRLIFT IN THE WAR YEARS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Air Corps Ferrying Command . . . . . . . .27 June 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Air Transport Command . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Army Air Force Regulation 20-44 . . . . . . . . 65 The Nexus of Policy and Doctrine . . . . . . .67 White and Green: Doctrinal Hallmarks . . . . .72 The Strategic Airlift Heritage of World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 3 TROOP CARRIER AND THEATER AIRLIFT IN WORLD WAR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 Origins of Troo...

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PART I Space Organization, Doctrine, and Architecture 1 An Aerospace Strategy for an Aerospace Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Stephen E. Wright 2 After the Gulf War: Balancing Space Power’s Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 Frank Gallegos 3 Blueprints for the Future: Comparing National Security Space Architectures . . . . . . . . . . 103 Christian C. Daehnick PART II Sanctuary/Survivability Perspectives 4 Safe Heavens: Military Strategy and Space Sanctuary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 David W. Ziegler PART III Space Control Perspectives 5 Counterspace Operations for Information Dominance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249 James G. Lee 6 When the Enemy Has Our Eyes . . . . . . . 303 Cynthia A. S. McKinley PART IV High-Ground Perspectives 7 National Security Implications of Inexpensive Space Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365 William W. Bruner III 8 Concepts of Operations for a Reusable Launch Space Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 437 Michael A. Rampino 9 The Inherent Limitations of Space Power: Fact or Fiction...