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This paper examines how these rules affected the effective military execution of the Rolling Thunder air campaign, as well as their impact on American aircrews and the enemy. During the Vietnam War, many American air commanders were convinced that rigid Rules of Engagement (ROEs) prevented an American aerial victory over North Vietnam during the Rolling Thunder air campaign from 1965-1968. ROEs became so complicated and changed so often that aircrews found it difficult to know what the rules were from day to day. As a result, many vital military targets were either not bombed or were attacked in a very limited and piecemeal fashion....

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1. INTRODUCTION. 1 2. BACKGRIDUND INFORMATION. 3 3. IMPACT OF ROEs ON MILITARY COMMANDERS AND AIRCREWS. 12 4. ROLLINIG THUNDER --MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. 20 5. IMPACT OF ROEs ON THE ENEMY. 27 6. CONCLUSIONS. 32...

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Major Rick Paulsen's study analyzes the role of United States nuclear weapons in this new, multipolar environment. He begins with a historical look at the role nuclear weapons have played in US defense policy since 1945. He reviews current unclassified guidance and the spectrum of public opinion on where the United States should be going with its nuclear weapons programs . He then surveys the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction. Major Paulsen concludes his study by suggesting nuclear force capabilities that would provide the United States with a viable deterrent for the post-cold war era. His recommendations address a broad range of issues that focus on developing a coherent nuclear strategy....

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This thesis focuses on operational-level coalition air force interactions in three conflicts: the Korean War (1950–53), the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), and the Balkan Air Campaign (1992–95). The capability that coalition air forces offer usually benefits the overall effort, while each member’s diverging desires (or will) can degrade overall unity of effort. Analysis of the three conflicts presented here suggests several coalition considerations for air component commanders. Because each case in this thesis had unique elements that may have affected the coalition, a comparison of these elements may also reveal considerations which are important to the air component commander. Finally, the current US programs to train joint force air component commanders and operational-level staffs show promising trends for improving our ability to operate within a coalition....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE KOREAN WAR . . . . . . 7 THE PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 THE BALKAN AIR CAMPAIGN . . . . 37 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 61...

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This is a story of long-range airpower, from Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s vision of a global mission to the Global Strike Task Force and expeditionary air forces of the year 2001. It examines global power from its origins as Strategic Air Command built a fleet of bombers and tankers to meet the needs of the global nuclear-deterrent policy of the Cold War. This evolution is traced through the studies and commissions of the 1990s established to determine the force structure for the twenty-first century. The assumptions that were made to develop a force focused on expeditionary short-range airpower to project global power are established and then examined with four case studies in the application of airpower over long range....

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1 GLOBAL POWER FOR AMERICA . . . . . . . . . 1 2 WORLD WAR II ORIGINS AND COLD WAR MATURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 3 GLOBAL POWER––POST–COLD WAR: ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . .21 4 CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL POWER . . . . . . 45 5 EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . .75 6 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89...

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Under command of British general Allenby, the EEF successfully executed one of the most decisive engagements in any theater of World War I. Ably employing and synchronizing infantry, cavalry, and air forces, Allenby provided future military professionals and historians with a shining illustration of the efficacy of combined arms operations. Unfortunately, the true lessons of Allenby’s campaign were lost for future generations of military officers. This paper analyzes the reasons those in the profession of arms missed the lessons of airpower and its role in combined arms operations. The paper also delves into the role of airpower in the Middle East and how Allenby integrated a relatively new weapon system into his force structure and operational planning and execution. Though largely unexplored by military professionals and historians, Allenby’s final campaign in Palestine proved to be a momentous step in the evolution of combined arms operations....

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Introduction . . . .1 Right Weapons, Wrong War . . . .2 Finding the Right Mission . . . .3 Finding the Right Weapons—Aircraft . . . .6 Unintended Consequences . . . . .8 Finding the Right Weapons—Tactics, Procedures, and Ordnance . . . .11 Right Weapons, Wrong Way . . . . .13 Right Weapons, Right Way . . . . .15 The Wild Card . . . .18 Looking for Lessons . . . . .20 Notes . . . .27...

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This study then examined Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, and determined it could better incorporate the lessons learned from World War II. Current joint doctrine could be improved by underscoring the contribution that deception provides to surprise, the importance of integrating deception within all three levels of war, and the importance of exploiting an adversary’s preexisting beliefs when creating a deception story. Applying these World War II lessons will bolster US deception capabilities....

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This thesis analyzes the factors and conditions of command dysfunction from the cognitive, or mental, perspective of command and control warfare (C2W). The author examines the limitations of rational decision making and the tension that exists between rational and intuitive processes. Next, this thesis examines the vulnerabilities of rational and intuitive processes in order to build a cognitive warfare framework. The framework consists of three categories: the command baseline, stressors, and deception. The stressor and deception categories act on the command baseline. The analysis also suggests that there are a number of possible interactions that exist between the stressor and deception categories. This thesis uses the framework to analyze evidence of command dysfunction in three historical campaigns. The historical analyses study the German command during the Normandy Invasion, the Allied command during the first week of the Battle of the Bulge, and the Israeli command during the first half of the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War. In addition to showing that there are interactions between stressors and deception, the analyses highl...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 DECISION PROCESSES . . . . . 7 CONSIDERING A COGNITIVE WARFARE FRAMEWORK . . . 23 THE NORMANDY INVASION . . . . 35 THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE . . . . . 51 THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR IN THE SINAI . . . . . 65 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 83...

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1 THE NATURE OF THE BEAST . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-EARLY GERMAN CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 3 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-THE GERMAN 1941 CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA . . . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 PHOTO SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 4 MANEUVER WARFARE IN ACTION-THE SOVIET VERSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 5 ISRAEL: MANEUVER WARFARE, AIR POWER, AND LOGISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 6 MANEUVER WARFARE AND AIR POWER IN THE 1990s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .193 Past Limitations on Air Power . . . . . . . . . .193 Air Power and New Developments . . . . . . . 196 Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .197 Situational . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 The Cordon Sanitaire of Reconstruction . . .200 Differences in ...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 DISENGAGEMENT IN STRATEGY . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE COLD WAR . . . . .25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 5 REFRAMING DISENGAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . .83 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 6 EFFECTS OF BARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123 Illustrations Figure 1 P...

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I believe the author has filled a critical gap in aerial warfare literature. Most works focus on the technical or tactical aspects of our profession and medium, but stop short of discussions of the broader nature of war itself. Consideration of war in that larger sense is essential for those who seek to understand and especially apply air and space power in combat....

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In sum, the petroleum-based sector of a nation’s economy offers a large, vulnerable target for today’s air planner. By merging the lessons of the past with current and future trends, one can achieve immediate results and dramatically affect the out-come of war....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 UNLIMITED WAR AND OIL . . . . 3 Summary . . . . . 10 3 LIMITED WAR AND OIL . . . . . 11 Summary . . . . . 15 4 HYPERWAR AND THE FUTURE . . . . . 17 Summary . . . . . 27 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 39...

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In the 53-year history of the United States Air Force (USAF), only two airmen have risen to serve as regional commanders in chief (CINC). During the same period, 74 soldiers, sailors, and Marines were selected for geographic CINC billets. In Once in a Blue Moon: Airmen in Theater Command, Lt Col Howard D. Belote examines the reasons for this disparity and suggests how airmen might improve their prospects for becoming future regional commanders....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 EARLY PERSPECTIVES ON JOINT/COALITION COMMAND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .97 AN AIRMAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF: LAURIS NORSTAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 AN AIRMAN COMMANDER IN CHIEF AT WAR: ALBRECHT KESSELRING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES . . . . . . . . .53 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 FINAL THOUGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Illustrations 1 Allied Advances in Italy, 1943–44 . . . . . . 41 2 Commanders in Chief versus USAF Generals’ Careers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 Photographs Gen Dwight D. Eisenhower and Gen Lauris Norstad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...

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This analysis of air control examines all three conceptual frameworks. By assessing the validity of the RAF and USAF models, this study finds that air control provides political and military leaders a military strategy for a smaller defense establishment. It also identifies shortcomings and advises caution when choosing the escalatory pattern of the control model....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . 4 2 BRITISH AIR CONTROL FROM 1922 TO 1936 . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . 13 3 PROJECT CONTROL FROM 1953 TO 1954 . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . 24 4 THE PERSIAN GULF WAR FROM 1990 TO 1991 . . . . 29 Notes . . . . 35 5 ASSESSING AIR CONTROL . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . 46 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . 51...

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Accounts of seizing the tactical or operational initiative abound. At the strategic level of war, however, initiative receives only transitory mention. Authors and military professionals often assume a common understanding of strategic initiative, including which combatant has it and why. There is neither a clear definition of the concept, nor any significant analysis of the elements that contribute to it. This thesis contributes to the elimination of that gap by answering the question—what factors lead to significant shifts in strategic initiative during the conduct of modern, conventional war?...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45 . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 3 THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45 . . . . . . . . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 4 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113...

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While history cannot provide a panacea for global terrorism, today’s military can learn lessons from historical small wars and low intensity conflicts to train and employ forces effectively to wage and win a war of ideas to counter global insurgents and their ability to win popular support. This paper employs a review of two case studies, Malaya (1945–60) and Vietnam (1964–72), to illuminate my thesis....

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This paper presents an historical account of the operations of United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) special operations units in the French campaign of 1944. The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, it is intended to be a brief history of the creation, development and combat record of these units. Second, it is intended for use as an example of the utility and effectiveness of air force special operations in high intensity conventional warfare....

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I wanted to research and write a paper that will provide a culturally based view of social and political change and the strategic implications those changes might have on international relations and, specifically, military policy and planning. It is my hope that this research will give policy makers and planners cause to consider carefully the important underlying cultural factors that inevitably influence the strategic goals and behaviors of nations as they respond to a dynamic contextual environment and interact with each other on the global stage....

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This paper explains why the Iraqi performance in Desert Storm was predictable: Nonindustrialized, third world nations are incapable of fielding a decisive, conventional air force. To illustrate the point, this essay studies Iraq’s performance in the war against Iran. During the conflict, the Iraqi air force obtained all the equipment and training money could buy, but after eight years of combat experience it still made only minor contributions in a war effort against an equal foe. The in- ability of third world nations to independently organize, train, and equip air forces to decisive levels is inevitable. Avoiding large, wasted sums of money fielding a force of questionable value should lead these countries to alternative forms of aerial warfare....

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1 ORGANIZATION 1 Origins of the Ba’athist Movement 1 Iraqi Military Political Involvement 2 Organization of the Air Force 3 Organizational Summary 5 Notes 6 2 TRAINING 7 Importance of Training 7 Public Education in Iraq 8 Iraqi Military Training 9 Foreign Training 10 The Training Factor 11 Notes 13 3 EQUIPPING 14 Expanding the Military in Iraq 14 Growth of the Iraqi Air Force 15 Iraq’s Money Supply 17 Problems of Acquisition 18 Notes 20 4 EMPLOYMENT. 21 Prewar Air Power Balance 22 Start of the War 22 Air Power in the First Two Years 25 Export War 27 Targeting Iran’s Will 33 Air Support of the Army 37 Summary of Iraqi Air Combat 41 Notes 42 5 CONCLUSION 45 Failure of the Iraqi Air Force 45 Limits of Third World Air Power 46 Alternatives to a Large Air Force 46 The Future 48 BIBLIOGRAPHY 49...

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This thesis explores the evolution of Russian military doctrine in light of the lessons they say they learned from the Gulf War. Since the early 1980s, such prominent military thinkers as Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov argued that emerging technologies were generating a new revolution in military affairs. The Russian military doctrinal response to Desert Storm seems to confirm Marshal Ogarkov’s predictions. This thesis finds the new military doctrine (1) reverts from the defensive to an offensive preemption, (2) reverts from no nuclear first use to nuclear escalation, (3) guarantees ethnic Russians living in former Soviet states protection, (4) emphasizes the importance of military advancement in C4I, smart weapons, and mobility, and (5) emphasizes strategic nonnuclear deterrent forces....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 RUSSIAN VIEW OF MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 7 Relationship between Military Doctrine and Strategy . . . . 8 Military Doctrine—Military Art—Operational Art—Tactics . . . .9 Soviet/Russian Military Doctrine Evolution . . . . 9 Soviet Military Doctrine Stereotype . . . . . 16 Notes . . . . . . 19 3 RUSSIAN IMPRESSION OF THE GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 Strategy . . . . . 24 The Threat . . . . . . 25 Future War . . . . . . 25 The Initial Period of War . . . . . 27 Operational Art . . . . 28 Force Structure . . . . 31 Tactics . . . . . . 32 Technology, Research, and Development . . . . . 33 Summary . . . . 34 Notes . . . . . . 35 4 EMERGING RUSSIAN POST–GULF WAR MILITARY DOCTRINE . . . . 39 The Threat . . . . . . 41 View of Future War . . . . . 42 Force Structure and Priorities . . . . . 42 Differences with Pre–Gulf War Military Doctrine . . . . . . 43 Conclusions . . . . . . 44 Notes . . . . . . 45 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR US STRATEGISTS . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . 52...