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This study examines the history of technology and sovereignty, which reveals a model for the evolution of international law. Specifically, the history of sea, air, and space provides examples on past issues of sovereignty. A three-stage pat-tern of international law emerges. Under the assumption that sovereignty issues related to information warfare will follow the same path, the current state of sovereignty regarding information is established. To focus the study, a functional outline for international convention, the International Regime for Information Security (IRIS), is advanced. IRIS balances US domestic privacy needs with US national security demands. Specifically, technology issues regarding digital identification and encryption are weighed against civil liberties and intelligence needs....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . 7 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . 16 3 INFORMATION RELIANCE . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . 28 4 STATUS QUO—CYBERLITIGATION . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . 36 5 THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR INFORMATION SECURITY MODEL. . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . 47 6 THE FUTURE . . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . . 56...

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The United States Air Force has long favored attacking electrical power systems.Electric power has been considered a critical target in every war since World War II,and will likely be nominated in the future. Historically, there have been four basic strategies behind attacks on national electrical systems: to cause a decline in civilian morale; to inflict costs on the political leaders to induce a change; to hamper military operations; and to hinder war production. The evidence shows that the only sound reason for attacking electrical power is to effect the production of war material in a war of attrition against a self-supporting nation-state without outside assistance. The implication for future strategic air operations is important. Because attacks on electric power cause indirect collateral damage which can be politically counterproductive,and the military benefit is minimal, the United States should reject attacks on national electrical power systems in the near future....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . 5 Generation . . . . . . 5 Transmission . . . . . 7 Distribution . . . . . . 8 Control . . . . 8 Effects . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 12 3 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN TOTAL WAR . . . . . . 15 World War II—Germany . . . 17 World War II—Japan . . . . . 22 United States Strategic Bombing Survey . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . 28 4 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN LIMITED WAR . . . . . 33 Korean War . . . . . . 33 Vietnam War . . . . . 37 Desert Storm . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . 42 5 TARGETING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . 45 Failures . . . . 45 When to Target Electric Power . . . 48 Conclusions and Implications . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 57...

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Recent airpower operations revealed a deficiency in the United States Air Force’s (USAF) ability to precisely attack mobile targets at standoff ranges with minimal collateral damage. Future airpower operations will be executed in politically sensitive strategic environments and thus will require the ability to precisely destroy mobile targets that may have been strategically placed by an adversary in areas with a high risk of collateral damage. Current air-to-ground guided weapon systems, including man-in-the-loop guidance weapon systems, have limited “collateral reduction” capabilities; and future autonomous precision standoff weapon systems may increase the risk and uncertainty associated with collateral damage due to technology limitations. The acquisition of a precision standoff man-in-the-loop weapon system through the modification of current weapon systems or the acquisition of a new weapon system may provide the USAF a critically needed air-to-ground capability against mobile targets in a high-risk collateral damage environment....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE NEED FOR PRECISION ENGAGEMENT AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS . . . . 5 3 USAF TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND GUIDED WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 23 4 FUTURE WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 35 5 LEGAL ISSUES, ACCOUNTABILITY, FLEXIBILITY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SHORTFALLS, AND ACQUISITION RISK MANAGEMENT . . . . 53 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 65 GLOSSARY . . . . . 69...

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Maj Richard J. Hazdra’s Air Mobility: The Key to the United States National Security is an examination of the force structure of Air Mobility Command (AMC) based on a model for two major theater wars. His study examines this organization’s current force structure. Air mobility is the key that unlocks the national security strategy (NSS). AMC’s force structure is crucial for the United States to implement its NSS. His study centers on the question: Can a force structure based on the possibility of fighting two major theater wars satisfy the requirements for steady-state operations? Major Hazdra examines three corollary issues: air mobility as a form of airpower that enables the military instrument of power in two basic ways, requirements placed on mobility air forces, and the structure of mobility air forces and the effectiveness of that structure....

Table of Contents Details
1 NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS . . . . . . . . . . 1 Ambling toward Sputnik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 NASA’s Predecessor Organization and the DOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2 EISENHOWER ACT I: REACTION TO SPUTNIK AND THE BIRTH OF NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Eisenhower Attempts to Calm the Nation . . .32 President’s Scientific Advisory Committee and Civil Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Johnson and the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee . . . . . . . . . . . 46 The NACA Enters the Fray . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 The PSAC and “Introduction to Outer Space” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 Balancing Civilian and Military Responsibilities in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 3 EISENHOWER ACT II: FORGING A NASA-DOD RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 To Compete with the Soviet Union . . . . . . . 93 Space for Peace? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Air Force Phi...

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The B-52 and Jet Propulsion: A Case Study in Organizational Innovation is a coherent and nonpolemical discussion of the revolution in military affairs, a hot topic in the national security arena. Mark Mandeles examines an interesting topic, how can the military better understand, manage, and evaluate technological development programs. We see Murphy’s Law (anything that can go wrong, will go wrong) in operation. No matter how carefully the military designs, plans, and programs the process of technological development, inevitably, equipment, organizations, and people will challenge the desired expectations. The book focuses on the introduction of jet propulsion into the B-52. This case study illustrates the reality that surprises and failures are endemic to development programs where information and knowledge are indeterminate, ambiguous, and imperfect....

Table of Contents Details
Chapter 1 Introduction ................................1 Chapter 2 Innovation and Military Revolutions ..............................................................4 Chapter 3 Logic and Procedure of Analysis ..............................................................17 Chapter 4 Prelude: Jet Propulsion and the Air Force.....................................................29 Chapter 5 The Introduction of Jet Propulsion into the B-52..........................................54 Chapter 6 Conclusion................................99 Table 1 USAF Engine Development Time.....42 Table 2 B-52 TimeLine...............................56 Table 3 Maximum Takeoff Weights and Combat Radii.......................................66 Table 4 XB-52 Performance Requirements..........................................75 Table 5 Boeing Company Comparison of Basic Turbopropand Basic Turbojet Models ...............................87 Appendix XB-52 Program Select Senior Personnel...............................................115...

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This work examines the historical development of aerial precision since World War I and the emergence of the just-war tradition and international law since 1625. It then identifies specific dilemmas associated with the two sorts of judgments required by the just-war tradition, namely, jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), and explores their ramifications. The aim of this study is to encourage moral and ethical reflection by politicians, strategists, and tacticians at all levels. The issues at hand are aerial precision doctrine, the use of the precision-guided munition as the modern aerial weapon of choice, and the influence of the just-war tradition on strategic and tactical decisions....

Table of Contents Details
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Aerial-Precision Development: Past, Present, and Future . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 3 Airpower and the Just-War Tradition . . . . .33 4 The Dilemmas of Perfect Aerial Precision . 49 5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

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This paper asserts that the current operational requirements and system concept generation processes can and should be significantly improved. To develop that assertion, the paper examines the evolution of the processes since the President’s Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management (the "Packard Commission") made its recommendations in 1986. Examining this evolution reveals fundamental problems that have been alleviated to some extent by recent reforms but remain to such a degree that further improvement is warranted. Therefore, this paper makes six major recommendations for improving the operational requirements and system concepts generation processes....

Table of Contents Details
1. IMPORTANT PROCESSES FOR TOUGH QUESTIONS 1 2. IMPROVING DEFENSE PLANNING 11 Section 1: The case for Strategies-to-Tasks for Objectives - Budget Links Section 2: The Case for Strategies-to-Tasks for Long-Range Planning 3 .IMPROVING DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 28 Section 1: The Case for vesting the JROC with Milestone 0 Authority Section 2: The Case for a Pure Mission Need Statement, No Early Acquisition Category, and the JROC for All Mission Need Statements Section 3: The Case for Operational Planners Leading Phase 0 4. CONCLUSION 54...

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The antiwar of our entire nation is defined as being the army-impeded forces, skirmishing shoulder to shoulder with the civilian population, with the purpose of defeating all non-aggressors, for securing our country’s slavery and dependency. The defeat in this battle is assured through a moral inferiority of our population - the right cause of this antiwar -, the lack of heroism of our state’s citizens, by applying an adequate blundering, using our geographical disadvantages, and the international public humiliation. ...

Excerpt Details
The battle and its non-goal. The battle is an ensemble of skirmishes of the subunits and units, which take place in a disorganized manner using armament and fighting techniques, for the expressed desire to enforce the enemy. The battle cannot take place on the ground, in the air, or on the water, in an open paradoxist cooperation with all-military denominations, and using their armament’s procedures with the goal of empowering the non-aggressor enemy. The battle is not the only way for obtaining the miscarriage. The battle’s goal is not the destruction or the capture of enemy’s groups, or the capture and holding on of critical portions of terrain. While in anti-defense, the defeat with fewer forces of the enemy’s superior forces would be done with our old-fashioned technique: ...

Table of Contents Details
Instruction Notebooks...............................3 Table of Contents .................................4 1 The Non-Tactical Instruction...........................10 Non-Assignment 1. ...............................10 The battle and its non-goal. ...........................12 The principles of non-organizing the battle’s actions. .................13 Non-Assignment 2...............................13 The disorganization principle of the subunits of unpatriotic guards. ............15 The subunits of the other branches of the military, their non-role, and their non-missions. ....15 The non-role and non-missions unsustainable by the other branches of the military. ......16 Not understanding the modern military ......................17 General principles disregarding the non-actions conducted by the subunits of a non-modern military in the inoffensive battles............................18 The anti-defense forms............................20 The non-roles and the non-missions of the fight units. .................20 The non-insurance for battle...........................20 The content of the battle’s non-insurance, its goal...