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This paper explores the advances in automatic identification technology, specifically radio frequency identification, and seeks to exploit these capabilities for use in the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain. Using technological trends, a thorough literature review, and the opinions of experts, the paper compares current technology to a 2035 requirements forecast to identify capability gaps. The end goal is logistics situational awareness, whereby the DOD has the ability to provide end-to-end visibility throughout its supply chain and can rapidly mobilize, deploy, sustain, and redeploy forces in support of national security objectives....

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In this paper, I seek to demonstrate that the methods of using airpower to take the fight to the enemy and protect our ground forces during small wars need not involve the most advanced aircraft available. This “low-tech” approach does not suggest using lesser technology per se but proposes a different look for the types of aircraft that can perform a specific mission and for their manner of employment—that of protecting ground forces while combating the elusive insurgent. These same aircraft can prove invaluable in training an indigenous force to take the fight forward. By looking to relatively inexpensive, off-the-shelf aircraft, the Air Force can protect its ground-based charges and cement a relationship with embattled nations by helping them help themselves....

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The author contends that urban terrain has become the preferred battlespace of US adversaries in the early twenty-first century. This environment poses unique challenges, especially to air and space warfare. The difficulty of sorting friendlies from enemy combatants, the latter intermingled with large numbers of noncombatants in very confined spaces, creates serious dilemmas for maneuver and aviation forces. Colonel Kemper believes that this mission, though well documented, has received neither the priority nor the resources necessary to ensure operational excellence and success on the modern battlefield. Thus, he not only inquires about whether we are training like we fight, but also seeks to determine what makes aviation urban operations so complicated and unique that they require stand-alone doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures....

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1 THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THE DOCTRINAL PROCESS: SOME SUGGESTED STEPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3 CONCEPTS, DOCTRINES, PRINCIPLES . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 4 SOME SEMINAL THINKERS ON TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 5 WEAPONS AND DOCTRINE: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 6 INSIGHTS ON TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 7 OF SABER CHARGES, ESCORT FIGHTERS, AND SPACECRAFT: THE SEARCH FOR DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .91 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 8 LOOKING BACKWARD TO SEE AHEAD IN SPACE: REFLECTIONS ON THE NEED FOR SPACE DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 9 A MO...

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The study reviews each force’s combat glider experience and analyzes it in light of the glider doctrine, or lack thereof, with which each began the war. While military cargo gliders have seen their day, recent technological advances in gliders make them a viable platform for certain missions requiring stealth and silence....

Table of Contents Details
ABSTRACT ii INTRODUCTION 1 PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENT 3 The Early Years in Germany 3 Early Gliders in the US 4 A US Military Glider? For What Purpose? 4 Gliders Head Into Combat. 5 Come Join the Glider pilot Corps! 8 Glider pilot Training Shortfalls 9 Military Gliders in Britain 12 OPERATIONAL USE OF GLIDERS 13 Germany 13 Early Commando Raids 14 Crete 15 Other Operations 16 US and Great Britain 17 Sicily 17 British Gliders are First to Normandy 24 US Glider Pilots Join the War in France 20 Disappointment at Arnhem 22 Operation Market 22 Glider Success Over the Rhine? 23 Operation Dragoon 24 US Commando Operations in Burma 25 Summation 26 POST-WAR GLIDER POLICY 27 TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN GLIDERS 29 TODAY’S LIMITED MILITARY ROLE FOR GLIDERS 31 CONCLUSIONS 32 NOTES 36 BIBLIOGRAPHY 42...

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This thesis evaluates the near-term military utility of virtual reality (VR) and its component technologies to the battle management of an air campaign. It presumes a large-scale air campaign on the order to that in the Gulf War where air operations were continuous, prolonged, and intense. The research concludes by assessing the viability and implication of a military decision to invest in a VR-enhanced air battle management system. Recommendations are given for areas in need of further research and development....

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This study examines the history of technology and sovereignty, which reveals a model for the evolution of international law. Specifically, the history of sea, air, and space provides examples on past issues of sovereignty. A three-stage pat-tern of international law emerges. Under the assumption that sovereignty issues related to information warfare will follow the same path, the current state of sovereignty regarding information is established. To focus the study, a functional outline for international convention, the International Regime for Information Security (IRIS), is advanced. IRIS balances US domestic privacy needs with US national security demands. Specifically, technology issues regarding digital identification and encryption are weighed against civil liberties and intelligence needs....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . 7 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . 16 3 INFORMATION RELIANCE . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . 28 4 STATUS QUO—CYBERLITIGATION . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . 36 5 THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR INFORMATION SECURITY MODEL. . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . 47 6 THE FUTURE . . . . . . 49 Notes . . . . . . . 56...

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In this important study, Lt Col Wayne Johnson, USAF, argues that systematic tightening of interagency cooperation and better work on defining sensitive technology prohibitions are needed to maintain the US technological edge. He also maintains that the US government requires a new and disciplined export control process—not the current mosaic of rules, regulations, and perspectives that came out of the cold war, but a process that provides a revamped, systemic approach with consistent implementation. Colonel Johnson explores the problem of defining which technologies the United States is willing to transfer(military or dual-use) and the need to ensure that national security objectives do not take a backseat to economic expediency. To accomplish this end, he argues for better interagency cooperation as a first step leading to a more centralized, coordinated, and strategic view of technology transfer and how it impacts US national security....

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Part 1 The Decision 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Rumblings of Laboratory Consolidation . . . 7 3 The Catalyst: National Defense Authorization Act and Vision 21 . . . . . . . . .23 4 Overhauling Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 Laboratory Studies and Strategy . . . . . . . 71 6 Corona 1996: Leadership and Decisions . .93 7 The Last Dance: Meeting in the Secretary’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Part 2 The Transition 9 Early Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 10 Shaping the Technology Directorates . . 161 11 Getting the Message Out . . . . . . . . . . 195 12 Other Perspectives: Independent Review Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 13 Headquarters: Two Staff Directorates . . 227 14 The Final Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253 15 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265...

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The method or objective of Strategic Paralysis is to selectively attack or threaten those strategic or national level targets that most directly support the enemy’s war-making efforts and will to continue with his current behavior. Strategic Paralysis warfare should result in a change in the enemy’s behavior at a lesser cost to both sides as Airpower assets are the primary weapons --not ground troops. Why Airpower? It is the only weapon that can provide the near simultaneous shock to the enemy’s central nervous system necessary to induce paralysis. To achieve success Strategic Paralysis requires four key ingredients: 1) Correctly identifying the enemy’s National Elements of Value (NEVs), 2) High technology, 3) An enemy dependent upon a well developed, modern and vulnerable infrastructure, and 4) Aerospace Control. The bulk of this study is devoted to defining this strategy and bettering our understanding of the first ingredient, that of choosing the best targets for attack....

Table of Contents Details
1. Introduction...............1 2. The Theory of Strategic Paralysis...............12 3. Choosing the Right Targets...............34 4. More Targeting Theories...............61 5. The National Elements of Value Model...............77 6. Conclusions...............110...

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This study analyzes the feasibility of guerrilla warfare as the basis for a strategy of airpower employment for a weak air force confronting an opponent with a stronger air force. The analysis begins with a distillation of the theory of guerrilla warfare into five elements essential to its success: superior intelligence, security, mobility advantage, surprise, and sustainment. The author then compares the ground combat environment of the traditional guerrilla with the airpower environment of the potential air guerrilla and concludes that these five elements can be met in the airpower environment provided the weak force has sufficient ingenuity and the necessary resources. An investigation of recent trends in technology and the prevailing strategic environment indicates that it increasingly possible for a weak force to obtain these resources. The author assesses that air guerrilla warfare is a viable warfighting strategy, but points out that the likelihood of a weak force actually adopting air guerrilla warfare will depend on its regional security needs and its resolve to protract a conflict. The study concludes that air guerrilla wa...

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . .1 THE ESSENTIALS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE . . . . . 11 GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE AIRPOWER ENVIRONMENT . . . 24 THE FEASIBILITY OF AIR GUERRILLA WARFARE . . . . 47 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . 58 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 64...

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This study addresses three main questions to determine the transport bomber’s usefulness. The first is whether commanders can use such an aircraft in ways that truly enhance force application and mobility operations without unduly undermining one in favor of the other? The answer, because of technology enhancements and budget constraints, is definitely yes. The second question targets technology, specifically, by asking whether engineers could place some elements of both missions on a single aircraft? Again, the answer appears to be positive. This study analyzes budgetary and operational constraints in an attempt to answer the question of the appropriate force mix. ...

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . .3 2 OPERATIONAL UTILITY . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . 17 3 TECHNOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT . . . . 19 Notes . . . . .28 4 BUDGETARY AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS . . . .31 Notes . . . .41 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . .43 Notes . . . . .45...

Description Details
The study reviews each force’s combat glider experience and analyzes it in light of the glider doctrine, or lack thereof, with which each began the war. While military cargo gliders have seen their day, recent technological advances in gliders make them a viable platform for certain missions requiring stealth and silence....

Table of Contents Details
ABSTRACT ii INTRODUCTION 1 PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENT 3 The Early Years in Germany 3 Early Gliders in the US 4 A US Military Glider? For What Purpose? 4 Gliders Head Into Combat. 5 Come Join the Glider pilot Corps! 8 Glider pilot Training Shortfalls 9 Military Gliders in Britain 12 OPERATIONAL USE OF GLIDERS 13 Germany 13 Early Commando Raids 14 Crete 15 Other Operations 16 US and Great Britain 17 Sicily 17 British Gliders are First to Normandy 24 US Glider Pilots Join the War in France 20 Disappointment at Arnhem 22 Operation Market 22 Glider Success Over the Rhine? 23 Operation Dragoon 24 US Commando Operations in Burma 25 Summation 26 POST-WAR GLIDER POLICY 27 TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN GLIDERS 29 TODAY’S LIMITED MILITARY ROLE FOR GLIDERS 31 CONCLUSIONS 32 NOTES 36 BIBLIOGRAPHY 42...

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Why was the United States Air Force (USAF) so resistant to the idea of dedicated suppression of enemy air defenses and electronic countermeasures support for its strikers? Why had they given the electronic combat (EC) mission almost entirely to the Navy? Was the technology of stealth really the driving force, or was there more? They needed money and technology to make them work. In short, I found the four elements of the model I propose in this paper....

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The study concludes with recommendations for rethinking the Air Operations Center. Methods for improving responsiveness include time-value based target analysis, greater use of alert or reserve forces, on-board mission planning, and limited decentralization, with mission-type orders and commander’s intent transmitted to lower echelons. Solutions for improving assessment include delegating target assessment functions to the wings, focusing theater-level intelligence personnel on mission assessment, using statistical and effects-based evaluation techniques, using Air Force Special Operations forces to evaluate target system degradation, and acquiring technology that can conduct “top-down” assessment of the enemy’s war-making systems....

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In Weather Operations in the Transformation Era, Col John M. Lanicci, USAF, takes a compelling look at future weather operations. His hypothesis is that a consolidated battlespace picture integrates both natural and man-made elements, which is totally consistent with USAF transformation efforts. He points out that the way ahead is easier said than done and offers several cogent reasons why the weather operations portion of information-in-warfare has not caught up with current USAF doctrine.Significant advances in information technology and advent of effects-based operations are propelling the USAF weather community away from traditional, single-inject stand-up briefings towards continuously updated advice to war fighters at every step of campaign/mission planning and execution. This technological momentum will make it necessary to fundamentally change data collection, analysis, prediction, and product tailoring. The author outlines these changes in a concept called weather, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (WISR), a term first used by the Air Staff to describe the total integration of natural and man-made environments ...

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The most significant implication of this study, however, is the predicted variance in changing kill ratio as the force ratio changes. The wide middle area of stability, identified as numerical attrition, is consistent with the traditional notion that kill ratio is largely a function of training and technology. It is also consistent with most of the historical record, including the early campaigns of World War II, that suggested that nominal changes in the relative mass of forces brought about little change in the kill ratio. This is also the reason evolving technology often produced the only observable change in the kill ratio. The rapid change in attrition rate at either end of the model also has great explanatory value....

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1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 METHODOLOGY: RED FLAG . . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 4 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207...

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In this well-researched and insightful study, Lt Col Gregory A. Roman examines the relationships between military organizational hierarchies and the impact of battlespace information. Drawing on a sophisticated range of studies and data and using numerous illustrations, the author contends that the outmoded effects of traditionally centralized (and technologically proliferating) command and control orientations preclude the US military (and particularly the Air Force) from effectively applying and acting upon the benefits of information-age technologies in an age of information warfare. The author sees future warfare characterized by faster decision making, faster operational tempos, and a torrent of tactical battlefield information. These new realities necessitate greater decentralization of control, more flexible information gathering, and creative, nontraditional military organizational arrangements....

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This paper analyzes the evolution of strategic bombing doctrine in order to identify the basic doctrinal tenets and then evaluate their compatibility with emerging stealth technologies. Current doctrine is an evolution of existing doctrine, theory, and experience. Therefore, to comprehend fully the meaning of doctrine, it is necessary to trace its lineage. As airpower arrived only recently in the doctrinal arena, no previous doctrine existed. Therefore, this analysis begins with the early airpower theories which provided the roots of evolution. Giulio Douhet is the most famous of the early theorists and his work provided a basis upon which to build. Following World War II (WWII), Bernard Brodie modified Douhet’s theory to incorporate atomic weapons and the experience to date. As theory evolved, so did early Air Corps "unsanctioned" doctrine. By testing each tenet against the demands of emerging stealth technologies, the paper finds that existing doctrine is basically sound, but incomplete. Therefore, the paper proposes and tests additional tenets to accommodate stealth and the increasing rate of technical advancement....

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The United States Air Force has long favored attacking electrical power systems.Electric power has been considered a critical target in every war since World War II,and will likely be nominated in the future. Historically, there have been four basic strategies behind attacks on national electrical systems: to cause a decline in civilian morale; to inflict costs on the political leaders to induce a change; to hamper military operations; and to hinder war production. The evidence shows that the only sound reason for attacking electrical power is to effect the production of war material in a war of attrition against a self-supporting nation-state without outside assistance. The implication for future strategic air operations is important. Because attacks on electric power cause indirect collateral damage which can be politically counterproductive,and the military benefit is minimal, the United States should reject attacks on national electrical power systems in the near future....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . 5 Generation . . . . . . 5 Transmission . . . . . 7 Distribution . . . . . . 8 Control . . . . 8 Effects . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 12 3 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN TOTAL WAR . . . . . . 15 World War II—Germany . . . 17 World War II—Japan . . . . . 22 United States Strategic Bombing Survey . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . 28 4 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN LIMITED WAR . . . . . 33 Korean War . . . . . . 33 Vietnam War . . . . . 37 Desert Storm . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . 42 5 TARGETING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . 45 Failures . . . . 45 When to Target Electric Power . . . 48 Conclusions and Implications . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 57...