Description Details
This thesis focuses on operational-level coalition air force interactions in three conflicts: the Korean War (1950–53), the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), and the Balkan Air Campaign (1992–95). The capability that coalition air forces offer usually benefits the overall effort, while each member’s diverging desires (or will) can degrade overall unity of effort. Analysis of the three conflicts presented here suggests several coalition considerations for air component commanders. Because each case in this thesis had unique elements that may have affected the coalition, a comparison of these elements may also reveal considerations which are important to the air component commander. Finally, the current US programs to train joint force air component commanders and operational-level staffs show promising trends for improving our ability to operate within a coalition....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE KOREAN WAR . . . . . . 7 THE PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 THE BALKAN AIR CAMPAIGN . . . . 37 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 61...

Description Details
Colonel Lenderman explores the increase in the number and influence of mobility generals in the late twentieth century and looks toward the future, presenting possible reasons why these generals will continue to rise or why their opportunities may be limited. She concludes by discussing the significance of this study as it pertains to the Air Force’s development and the nation’s security....

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1 MAHAN AND THE PURPOSE OF AIRPOWER . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 THE RISE OF MOBILITY OPERATIONS . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 THE RISE OF MOBILITY GENERALS . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4 THE FUTURE OF MOBILITY GENERALS . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .72 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .77 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79...

Description Details
This study analyzes whether special operations forces (SOF) should use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to support intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications, and resupply capability deficiencies. The author’s objective is to review the missions and requirements of the United States Special Operations Command, examine current and future unmanned aerial vehicle technologies, and analyze whether unmanned aircraft technologies are mature enough to meet the demanding special operations mission. The result of the analysis is that unmanned aerial vehicles have tremendous potential. But, due to the technological limitations and a lack of systems maturity, unmanned aerial vehicles lack the range, reliability, datalink capability, and size to meet SOF needs at this time. However, in the future, UAVs should be able to fulfill several SOF capability deficiencies....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASKS AND CAPABILITY DEFICIENCIES . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 12 CURRENT AND EMERGING UAV TECHNOLOGIES . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . 24 ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

Description Details
The purpose of this study is to help ensure the US military, especially the USAF, is prepared to take advantage of reusable launch vehicles (RLV) should the NASA-led effort to develop an RLV demonstrator prove successful. The focus of this study is an explanation of how the US military could use RLVs, by describing and analyzing two concepts of operations....

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INTRODUCTION . . . 1 CONCEPTS AND ATTRIBUTES . . . . . . . 7 CONCEPTS OF OPERATIONS . . . . . . 19 ANALYSIS . . . . 29 CONCLUSIONS . . . . 43 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . 49...

Description Details
This paper reviews the performance of US systems against Iraq’s Scuds during Desert Storm, and examines current US efforts to defeat these potentially destabilizing weapons. Which technologies and systems will be most effective against mobile ballistic missiles? How should the United States implement selected technologies to deal with this challenge? This thesis covers the pros and cons of competing concepts to accomplish missile defense. It evaluates the most promising technical solutions to the mobile ballistic missile threat. On the basis of the extensive amount of time and research effort devoted to the problem, it is safe to say there is no quick, easy, or cheap way to locate, identify, and destroy mobile missiles and their launchers. To defeat the mobile missile threat with a high degree of confidence, the US must field an integrated system of both offensive and defensive weapons....

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INTRODUCTION....... vii Notes .......... xiv 1 DESERT STORM.....1 Notes..........9 2 PROLIFERATION.........11 Notes.........18 3 THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE GAMEPLAN.....21 Notes......... 39 4 MISSILE ATTACK OPERATIONS.........43 Notes.....63 5 CONCLUSIONS.....67 Notes .......72 APPENDIX 1: Emergence of the Threat.....73 Notes......... 83 APPENDIX 2: The Long Search for a Solution........86 Notes......... 90 APPENDIX 3: Additional Missile Defense Research.....92 Notes........ 95 GLOSSARY..... 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY.......101...

Description Details
Boyd and Warden represent a major transition in the evolution of air power theory. Early air power theorists argued that one could defeat the enemy by paralyzing his war-making and war-sustaining capabilities—a form of economic warfare based upon industrial targeting. In contrast, Boyd and Warden contend thatone should target enemy command and control—that is, control warfare based upon command targeting....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 THE NOTION OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 BOYD’S THEORY OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . 20 WARDEN’S THEORY OF STRATEGIC PARALYSIS . . . . . 23 Notes . . . . . 30 CLAUSEWITZ AND JOMINI REVISITED . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 37 BOYD, WARDEN, AND THE EVOLUTION OF AIR POWER THEORY . . . . 39 The Past—Paralysis by Economic Warfare and Industrial Targeting . . . . 39 The Present—Paralysis by Control Warfare and Command Targeting . . . . 41 The Future—Paralysis by Control Warfare and Informational Targeting . . . . 42 Notes . . . . . 44 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . 50 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 51...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 DISENGAGEMENT IN STRATEGY . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE COLD WAR . . . . .25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 5 REFRAMING DISENGAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . .83 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 6 EFFECTS OF BARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123 Illustrations Figure 1 P...

Description Details
This study analyzes the feasibility of guerrilla warfare as the basis for a strategy of airpower employment for a weak air force confronting an opponent with a stronger air force. The analysis begins with a distillation of the theory of guerrilla warfare into five elements essential to its success: superior intelligence, security, mobility advantage, surprise, and sustainment. The author then compares the ground combat environment of the traditional guerrilla with the airpower environment of the potential air guerrilla and concludes that these five elements can be met in the airpower environment provided the weak force has sufficient ingenuity and the necessary resources. An investigation of recent trends in technology and the prevailing strategic environment indicates that it increasingly possible for a weak force to obtain these resources. The author assesses that air guerrilla warfare is a viable warfighting strategy, but points out that the likelihood of a weak force actually adopting air guerrilla warfare will depend on its regional security needs and its resolve to protract a conflict. The study concludes that air guerrilla wa...

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INTRODUCTION . . . .1 THE ESSENTIALS OF GUERRILLA WARFARE . . . . . 11 GUERRILLA WARFARE IN THE AIRPOWER ENVIRONMENT . . . 24 THE FEASIBILITY OF AIR GUERRILLA WARFARE . . . . 47 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . 58 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 64...

Description Details
Lt Col Richard M. Clark’s Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles: Airpower by the People, For the People, But Not with the People, draws on that long history to gauge what the future may hold for uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UCAV). Given the problematic history of UAVs/UCAVs, knowledge of past experience could prove beneficial to the current generation of UCAV developers and planners. To that end, Colonel Clark examines technological obstacles that have handicapped UCAVs historically and which could continue to impede their future evolution. He then turns to more contemporary organizational and cultural issues that might hinder integration of UCAVs into the force. Clark concludes his study by proposing answers to two fundamental questions: (1) What are the major obstacles to UCAVs achieving meaningful operational status in the Air Force, and (2) Can those obstacles be overcome?...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 EVOLUTION OF UNINHABITED COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES (UCAV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 TODAY’S UCAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 TOMORROW’S UCAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85...

Description Details
The concept of “deep battle” was formally introduced to US war fighters during the early 1980s through the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. As envisioned by Air Force and Army leaders, the initial purpose for the deep battle was to delay and weaken Soviet second and follow-on echelons during a European conventional war. Within the AirLand Battle construct, the Air Force had responsibility for synchronizing deep operations and for employing air interdiction against Soviet maneuver forces to set the conditions for victory in the decisive “close battle.” The fire support coordination line (FSCL), normally positioned at field artillery maximum range from the forward line of troops (FLOT), separated the Air Force’s deep operations from the Army’s close battle....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 EVOLUTION OF DEEP-BATTLE DOCTRINE DURING THE COLD WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Evolution of AirLand Battle Doctrine . . . . . . 7 Air Force Doctrine and Deep Battle . . . . . . . 11 Evolution of the Fire Support Coordination Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3 DEEP BATTLE DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Deep-Battle Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Fire Support Coordination Line Friction . . . . 34 Synthesis and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4 DEEP BATTLE TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Army Doctrinal Evolution since the Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Air Force Doctrine since the Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Joint Doctrine and the Deep Battle . . . . . . . 56 Synthesis and Final Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 5...

Description Details
The study reviews each force’s combat glider experience and analyzes it in light of the glider doctrine, or lack thereof, with which each began the war. While military cargo gliders have seen their day, recent technological advances in gliders make them a viable platform for certain missions requiring stealth and silence....

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ABSTRACT ii INTRODUCTION 1 PRE-WAR DEVELOPMENT 3 The Early Years in Germany 3 Early Gliders in the US 4 A US Military Glider? For What Purpose? 4 Gliders Head Into Combat. 5 Come Join the Glider pilot Corps! 8 Glider pilot Training Shortfalls 9 Military Gliders in Britain 12 OPERATIONAL USE OF GLIDERS 13 Germany 13 Early Commando Raids 14 Crete 15 Other Operations 16 US and Great Britain 17 Sicily 17 British Gliders are First to Normandy 24 US Glider Pilots Join the War in France 20 Disappointment at Arnhem 22 Operation Market 22 Glider Success Over the Rhine? 23 Operation Dragoon 24 US Commando Operations in Burma 25 Summation 26 POST-WAR GLIDER POLICY 27 TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN GLIDERS 29 TODAY’S LIMITED MILITARY ROLE FOR GLIDERS 31 CONCLUSIONS 32 NOTES 36 BIBLIOGRAPHY 42...

Description Details
Accounts of seizing the tactical or operational initiative abound. At the strategic level of war, however, initiative receives only transitory mention. Authors and military professionals often assume a common understanding of strategic initiative, including which combatant has it and why. There is neither a clear definition of the concept, nor any significant analysis of the elements that contribute to it. This thesis contributes to the elimination of that gap by answering the question—what factors lead to significant shifts in strategic initiative during the conduct of modern, conventional war?...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 THE RUSSO–GERMAN WAR, 1941–45 . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 3 THE PACIFIC WAR, 1941–45 . . . . . . . . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 4 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .111 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113...

Description Details
This study analyzes the characteristics and capabilities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to determine their capability to carry weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The author presents an overview of the various forms of WMD—chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The objective is to review the characteristics of both UAVs and WMD to determine if they are capable of being used together as an effective weapon. The result indicates that there is great potential for the use of UAVs as delivery systems for WMD, particularly by developing nations and nonstate actors such as terrorist groups who may not have the technical capability to employ other means. The potential exists for the proliferation of both UAVs and WMD to become widespread and thus a major security concern. There is no clear solution to this problem; however, actions including bringing the issue to the forefront, strengthening export and arms controls, deterrence, and defense will have a synergistic effect that will help mitigate this threat....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE AND REMOTELY PILOTED VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES . . . . . 5 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION . . . . 13 A PROLIFERATION SCENARIO . . . . . 27 ANALYSIS . . . . . 29 CONCLUSION . . . . . 41 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 43...

Description Details
The term real-time information into the cockpit (RTIC) involves systems capabilities required to provide aircrews timely and essential off-board information to allow mission adjustments in response to rapidly changing combat conditions. The term military technical revolution (MTR) requires converging technological products which have a demonstrated military utility, and military recognition that the application of these converging technologies will cause a radical change in the character of warfare over a very short period of time. This thesis assesses the capabilities of RTIC from two perspectives: its impact on the air tasking process, and the command and control flexibility it affords the joint force air component commander (JFACC). It concludes that the impact on the air tasking process is evolutionary, not revolutionary—current RTIC capabilities remain largely dependent on human-intensive operations which limit reductions in decision cycle times. It further suggests that RTIC’s true impact on targeting is directly attributable to the increased flexibility provided to the JFACC for prosecuting the execution-day air tasking order...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THE AIR TASKING PROCESS TODAY . . . . . . . . . . 7 SENSOR-TO-SHOOTER CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . 17 ENHANCING JFACC TARGETING FLEXIBILITY . . . . . . 27 A LOOK TO THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45...

Description Details
The purpose of this thesis is to take the first steps toward a military space power theory. It begins by answering the question: Why does the US military need space power theory? The United States or any military spacefaring nation needs theory because space power is more than simply a force enhancer but is a separate and unique form of military power with the capacity to deter and compel. An analysis of the fundamental attributes of military power—identified here as presence, perspective, response, and destructive capability—demonstrates the unique advantages and disadvantages of space vis-à-vis land, sea, and airpower. A unifying principle of “globalness” links the laws, rules, and precepts of a prototype theory based on space power’s unique capabilities. The space power theory provides a common vision that allows a space-faring nation to take full advantage of these unique capabilities....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . 1 2 NATIONAL AND MILITARY POWER . . . . 9 3 SPACE AND MILITARY POWER . . . . . . 25 4 SPACE POWER THEORY . . . . . . . . . 41 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 61 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . 67...

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1 NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS . . . . . . . . . . 1 Ambling toward Sputnik . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 NASA’s Predecessor Organization and the DOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2 EISENHOWER ACT I: REACTION TO SPUTNIK AND THE BIRTH OF NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31 Eisenhower Attempts to Calm the Nation . . .32 President’s Scientific Advisory Committee and Civil Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Johnson and the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee . . . . . . . . . . . 46 The NACA Enters the Fray . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 The PSAC and “Introduction to Outer Space” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 Balancing Civilian and Military Responsibilities in Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 3 EISENHOWER ACT II: FORGING A NASA-DOD RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 To Compete with the Soviet Union . . . . . . . 93 Space for Peace? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Air Force Phi...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . xi ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 1 EXPECTATIONS OF COMMAND . . . 1 What Does the Boss Expect? . . . 2 What Do the Troops Expect? . . . 9 What Do You Expect? . . . . . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2 VISION AND ENVIRONMENT . . . . . 23 Developing and Communicating Your Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Building the Environment . . . . . 30 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 WALKING THE WALK . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 4 HANDLING JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5 GREAT IDEAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Take Responsibility for Fun . . . . 95 Sponsor Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Celebrate Heroes—Not Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Mentoring Program . . . . . . . . . . 104 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
The analysis presented in this thesis evaluates the contents of past Air Force strategic vision documents and studies the process used to create such documents. The thesis argument is that strategic vision documents can fulfill important functions for an organization, and that greater attention to the process of creating these documents can result in a more effective final product....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Historical Perspective . . . . . . 2 Overview . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 STRATEGIC VISION PRINCIPLES . . . . . . 5 Vision, Defined and Explained . . . . . 5 Attributes of Vision . . . . . 6 Functions of Vision . . . . . 6 Importance of Vision for an Organization . . . . . 7 Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Vision . . . . . . 8 Notes . . . . . . 10 3 VISIONS FROM THE PAST . . . . 13 Air Power and the Future . . . . 13 The Air Force and US National Security: Global Reach—Global Power . . . . . 15 Global Reach—Global Power: The Evolving Air Force Contribution to National Security . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . 20 4 VISION: A PRESENT-DAY VIEW . . . . 23 An Interest in Updating Our “Guiding Construct” . . . . . . 23 Global Presence . . . . 23 Current Efforts for a New Strategic Vision . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . . 27 5 IMPROVING THE PROCESS . . . . . . 29 Phases in the Process for the Vision Architect . . . . . 29 Lesson Implications . . . . 38 Conclusion . . . . . . 38 Notes . . . . . . 39 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 41...

Description Details
In Department of Defense Energy Strategy: Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks, Col Gregory J. Lengyel, United States Air Force (USAF), takes a comprehensive look at our national energy problems from a perspective unique to the Department of Defense (DOD). From his fictional opening implying that conflicts of the future could revolve around volatile world energy markets to his recommendations on creating and implementing a DOD energy strategy for improved energy security, the reader should find this book both thought provoking and informative....

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1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 US ENERGY PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 3 IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROBLEM—VULNERABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 4 ENERGY STRATEGY FOR IMPROVED ENERGY SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

Description Details
This thesis describes crony attack, comments on requirements for successful development of crony attack methodology, and investigates a prominent case where the United States apparently used this strategy. This thesis treats crony attack primarily as a form of strategic attack, carried out during the air campaign portion of military operations. It also outlines a theoretical foundation for such a targeting strategy....

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1 Introduction . . . .1 2 Background . . . . . 5 3 Theory of Crony Attack. . . . .15 4 Strategy of Crony Attack. . . . .21 5 Operation Allied Force: A Case Study. . . . .27 6 Conclusions. . . . .41 BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . .43...

Description Details
This study attempts to determine whether air component commands are capable of developing an effective airpower strategy. It examines US Central Command Air Forces (CENTAF) because of its recent experience in developing and executing a sizable airpower contribution to a theater campaign. The author sets the background by describing CENTAF’s role in the Persian Gulf War theater campaign strategy. The conclusion is that the commander in chief (CINC) of Central Command did not think that CENTAF had an acceptable holistic airpower strategy in August 1990 and therefore requested the assistance of the Air Staff at the Pentagon. Next, the author justifies and describes credible sources for determining the attributes of an effective operational-level airpower strategy. Using this information, he recommends a notional air component commander’s campaign planning organization and describes the individual branch’s responsibilities and products....

Table of Contents Details
1 USCENTAF’S ROLE IN CENTCOM’S PERSIAN GULF CAMPAIGN STRATEGY . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 2 CREDIBLE SOURCES FOR DETERMINING THE ATTRIBUTES OF AN EFFECTIVE AIRPOWER STRATEGY . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 10 3 RECOMMENDED RESPONSIBILITIES AND PRODUCTS OF AN AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER’S CAMPAIGN PLANNING ORGANIZATION . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . 18 4 REPORT ON USCENTAF PLANNING STAFF’S STATUS—EARLY 1995 . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 27 5 IMPLICATIONS/SOLUTIONS TO AIR COMPONENT COMMANDS’ COMBAT PLANNING SHORTFALLS . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . 33 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 35 ...

Description Details
This paper explains why the Iraqi performance in Desert Storm was predictable: Nonindustrialized, third world nations are incapable of fielding a decisive, conventional air force. To illustrate the point, this essay studies Iraq’s performance in the war against Iran. During the conflict, the Iraqi air force obtained all the equipment and training money could buy, but after eight years of combat experience it still made only minor contributions in a war effort against an equal foe. The in- ability of third world nations to independently organize, train, and equip air forces to decisive levels is inevitable. Avoiding large, wasted sums of money fielding a force of questionable value should lead these countries to alternative forms of aerial warfare....

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1 ORGANIZATION 1 Origins of the Ba’athist Movement 1 Iraqi Military Political Involvement 2 Organization of the Air Force 3 Organizational Summary 5 Notes 6 2 TRAINING 7 Importance of Training 7 Public Education in Iraq 8 Iraqi Military Training 9 Foreign Training 10 The Training Factor 11 Notes 13 3 EQUIPPING 14 Expanding the Military in Iraq 14 Growth of the Iraqi Air Force 15 Iraq’s Money Supply 17 Problems of Acquisition 18 Notes 20 4 EMPLOYMENT. 21 Prewar Air Power Balance 22 Start of the War 22 Air Power in the First Two Years 25 Export War 27 Targeting Iran’s Will 33 Air Support of the Army 37 Summary of Iraqi Air Combat 41 Notes 42 5 CONCLUSION 45 Failure of the Iraqi Air Force 45 Limits of Third World Air Power 46 Alternatives to a Large Air Force 46 The Future 48 BIBLIOGRAPHY 49...

Description Details
This study determines if a revival of the CRAF Enhancement Program is feasible and if it could be developed into a viable program for addressing AMC's airlift shortfall problem. To achieve this goal, the study analyzes the failure of the first CRAF Enhancement Program to determine if the barriers to its success were surmountable and if these same barriers might impede the success of a future program. The study determines that the first Enhancement Program failed because MAC was unable to develop an incentive plan that was attractive enough to ensure airline participation, yet be persuasive enough to elicit the required support and funding from Congress....

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1 INTRODUCTION.....1 2 THE NATIONAL AIRLIFT SYSTEM.......5 3 CRAF ENHANCEMENT: THEORY AND REALITY......21 4 THE FUTURE OF CRAF ENHANCEMENT...... 44 BIBLIOGRAPHY......65...

Description Details
The United States Air Force has long favored attacking electrical power systems.Electric power has been considered a critical target in every war since World War II,and will likely be nominated in the future. Historically, there have been four basic strategies behind attacks on national electrical systems: to cause a decline in civilian morale; to inflict costs on the political leaders to induce a change; to hamper military operations; and to hinder war production. The evidence shows that the only sound reason for attacking electrical power is to effect the production of war material in a war of attrition against a self-supporting nation-state without outside assistance. The implication for future strategic air operations is important. Because attacks on electric power cause indirect collateral damage which can be politically counterproductive,and the military benefit is minimal, the United States should reject attacks on national electrical power systems in the near future....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 NATIONAL ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . 5 Generation . . . . . . 5 Transmission . . . . . 7 Distribution . . . . . . 8 Control . . . . 8 Effects . . . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 12 3 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN TOTAL WAR . . . . . . 15 World War II—Germany . . . 17 World War II—Japan . . . . . 22 United States Strategic Bombing Survey . . . . . . 25 Notes . . . . . 28 4 ELECTRICAL POWER TARGETING IN THE PAST— ATTACKS IN LIMITED WAR . . . . . 33 Korean War . . . . . . 33 Vietnam War . . . . . 37 Desert Storm . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . 42 5 TARGETING ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . 45 Failures . . . . 45 When to Target Electric Power . . . 48 Conclusions and Implications . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . 54 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 57...

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Wills argues that the twentieth-century argument between air and ground proponents has changed significantly since the Gulf War, and it comes down to the relative importance of the ground or air in the mix. It is more than just using air as a supporting component to the ground forces—if this is true, current force organization and employment is adequate. However, if the air predominates in combat operations, then, as Wills puts it in his first chapter, joint operations doctrine needs to be rethought. A changed balance “will affect the military at every level . . . force structure, organization, weapons acquisition, doctrine, and training” (p. 3). Notwithstanding the blunt commentary from ground proponents, Wills offers that airpower has come to dominate air/ground relations....

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1 FRAMING THE DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 AIRPOWER, WAR, AND DIPLOMACY . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 3 ASSESSING THE AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 4 THE AFGHAN MODEL AND BEYOND . . . . . .35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 5 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69...

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The purpose of this paper is to recommend that the United States government maintain the defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) by aggressively supporting the US defense industry in the arms transfer process. Ironically, this recommendation is contrary to the position held at the onset of this research and analysis effort. To accomplish this purpose, this paper has three aims. First, it recognizes that the DTIB requires preservation. Second, it describes arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy based on US national security interests and the foreign policy challenges of the day. Third, it focuses on the current arms transfer decision-making process and represents it as a “Labyrinth of Control.” This section of the paper demonstrates the maze of controls used to adequately ensure that US military technologies are not diffused to foreign nations....

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PRESERVING THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . 14 THE LABYRINTH OF CONTROL . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 27 MAINTAINING THE DTIB WITH US GOVERNMENT SUPPORT . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 34 GLOSSARY . . . . . 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

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This study examines the links between science, philosophy, and military theory. The author uses two case studies to demonstrate the links between these disciplines. He presents an overview on the rise of Newtonian science, and he examines how the key frameworks and concepts of that science became interwoven into Western civilization to affect its philosophy with an emphasis on its interpretation by the German Romanticist philosopher Immanuel Kant. He then shows how Newtonian science and Kant’s philosophy affected the military theory of Carl von Clausewitz. His second case study concerns the theory and philosophy of evolution developed by British philosopher Herbert Spencer and its influence on the military theory of J. F. C. Fuller. The author compares these two case studies to find commonalities between them that suggest a mechanism which explains how and why scientific theory and their philosophical interpretations eventually influence military theory. The author then uses this mechanism as a tool with which “new” sciences such as quantum mechanics, relativity, and complexity theory can be evaluated to see if and in what manner t...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE RISE OF NEWTONIAN SCIENCE . . . . . 5 KANT . . . . 15 CLAUSEWITZ . . . . 21 SPENCER AND FULLER . . . . . 29 THE PATH FROM SCIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY TO MILITARY THEORY . . . . 39 THE NEW SCIENCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY THEORY . . . . . 47 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 59...

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Dr. William P. Head’s War from above the Clouds: B-52 Operations during the Second Indochina War and the Effects of the Air War on Theory and Doctrine is an examination of B-52 operations in Vietnam and how the air war affected airpower doctrine and theory. His study examines the evolution of this awesome manned strategic weapon in Vietnam to see how the design of the B-52s originally intended mission altered—if at all—the theories of airpower first put forward by Giulio Douhet and William “Billy” Mitchell. Dr. Head also analyzes how this same operational alteration affected official United States Air Force (USAF) doctrine first formulated by Army Air Corps and Army Air Forces leaders before and during World War II—later modified in the 1950s after the USAF became a separate service....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 AIRPOWER THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Airpower Enters the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . 8 America Is Drawn in Deeper . . . . . . . . . . . .10 DEVELOPMENT OF THE B-52 STRATOFORTRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Insurgency War and Doctrine in the Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Arc Light (B-52 Raids, 1965–68) . . . . . . . . .17 Modifying the B-52 Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Arc Light Expands and Airpower Controversies Grow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Arc Light Operations Continue . . . . . . . . . . 27 AIR FORCE THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 KEEPING A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT . . . . . . . 35 Project CHECO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Corona Harvest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 MENU BOMBING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 COMMANDO HUNT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . 42 AIR F...

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In sum, the petroleum-based sector of a nation’s economy offers a large, vulnerable target for today’s air planner. By merging the lessons of the past with current and future trends, one can achieve immediate results and dramatically affect the out-come of war....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 UNLIMITED WAR AND OIL . . . . 3 Summary . . . . . 10 3 LIMITED WAR AND OIL . . . . . 11 Summary . . . . . 15 4 HYPERWAR AND THE FUTURE . . . . . 17 Summary . . . . . 27 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 31 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 39...

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It was inevitable that the airman’s perspective regarding the employment of airpower in an operational theater would surface in North Africa, the first major American offensive of World War II. The North Africa experience provided a model for the organization and employment of tactical airpower in subsequent campaigns in Europe, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. In each of these campaigns, planners have continued to refine, expand, and improve the effectiveness of tactical air support for all forces in a theater. Differences in opinion on the employment of forces will continue among air, ground, and sea commanders in combat situations. However, when the overall commander in the theater makes a decision on the strategy and priority of operations, the air component commander must and will apply his forces in accordance with that decision....

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GETTING TOGETHER...................................1 Vincent Orange A GLIDER IN THE PROPWASH OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE?..........................................30 David R. Mets THE LEGEND OF LAURENCE KUTER............64 Daniel R. Mortensen PATTON AND WEYLAND...........................100 David Spires APPENDIX...............................................108 BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................124...

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Dr. David R. Mets’s The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision Munitions and the Revolution in Military Affairs is a broad, thought-provoking examination of the relationship between the advancement in conventional weapons guidance technology and the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). He defines an RMA as a rapid change in military technology, doctrine, and organization leading to a sweeping new way that wars are fought. Dr. Mets then considers whether the improvement in conventional air weapons accuracy since World War II is the foundation, the main pillar, one of the principal supports, or is irrelevant to the RMA—which is said to be afoot....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 WHAT IS A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA)? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 WHAT WERE THE NOTIONS OF THE FIRST AIRPOWER ADVOCATES OF RMA? . . . . . . . .4 HOW DID RMA WORK OUT IN WARS FROM 1939 TO 1972?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 KOREA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 CHANGE AFTER VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 WAR AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1990s: HAS THE LAST SANCTUARY BEEN CLOSED? . . . . .34 THE REMAINING HUMANITARIAN SANCTUARY AND DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS. . . . . . . . . 47 ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . .48 NOTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67...

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This study seeks to answer the question, “How can airpower help resolve time-induced tensions between political and military imperatives in the conduct of modern warfare?” To answer this question, the study begins by exploring time in the theory of war with an emphasis on time as a fourth dimension that provides a distinct perspective on warfare. With concepts gleaned from theory, this study analyzes the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Falklands War, and the Gulf War to determine the role airpower played in overcoming time conflicts and achieving political-military congruence. The study concludes that a time-based strategy, defined as one in which time is a paramount or extremely significant consideration, was the mechanism through which airpower worked to resolve time-induced tensions between political and military imperatives....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Overview . . . 1 Methodology . . . . . 2 Definitions . . . . . . 2 Limits of the Argument . . . 3 Notes . . . . . 3 2 TIME IN THE THEORY OF WAR . . . 5 War Theorists on Time . . . . 6 Characteristics of Time in War . . . 7 Physical and Psychological Aspects of Time . . . . . 8 Political and Military Dynamics of Time . . . . . . 9 Summary . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 11 3 THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF 1967 . . . . . . 13 The Course of the War . . . . 13 Political Imperatives . . . . . 14 Military Imperatives . . . . . 15 The Time Problem . . . . . . 15 Operational Consequences and Risk . . . . . 16 Airpower’s Role . . . . 17 Summary . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 20 4 THE FALKLANDS WAR . . . . 21 The Course of the War . . . . 21 Political Imperatives . . . . . 22 Military Imperatives . . . . . 24 The Time Problem . . . . . . 25 Operational Consequences and Risk . . . . . 25 The Role of Airpower . . . . . 27 Summary . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 29 5 THE GULF WAR . . . . 31 The Course of the War . . . . 31 Political Imperatives . . . . . 32 Military Imperatives . . . . . 34 The Time Problem . . ....

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The most significant implication of this study, however, is the predicted variance in changing kill ratio as the force ratio changes. The wide middle area of stability, identified as numerical attrition, is consistent with the traditional notion that kill ratio is largely a function of training and technology. It is also consistent with most of the historical record, including the early campaigns of World War II, that suggested that nominal changes in the relative mass of forces brought about little change in the kill ratio. This is also the reason evolving technology often produced the only observable change in the kill ratio. The rapid change in attrition rate at either end of the model also has great explanatory value....

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1 REVIEW OF LITERATURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 METHODOLOGY: RED FLAG . . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 3 RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .59 4 STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . .61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .65 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .207...

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This study analyzes Gen O. P. Weyland’s impact on close air support (CAS) during the Korean War. First, the author briefly traces the history and evolution of air-ground support from its infancy to the start of the Korean War. Second, he shifts his focus to the effectiveness of CAS throughout the conflict and addresses why this mission was controversial for the Army and Air Force. Third, he highlights General Weyland’s perspective on tactical airpower and his role in the close-air-support “controversy.”...

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1 Close Air Support in 2006 . . . . . . . . .1 2 History and Evolution of Close Air Support: World War I to the Korean War . . . . . . . 5 3 Background on Gen O. P. Weyland . . . . 17 4 Close Air Support in Korea: The Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5 An Airman’s Perspective of Close Air Support in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83...

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This paper analyzes the participation of the US Twelfth Air Force in the Mediterranean theater of operation from 1943 to 1944 and also studies the coalition and joint operations required in the air campaign. Coalition and joint warfare provides numerous command, control, and coordination problems that are not easily de-conflicted. The goal of this paper is to highlight the lessons learned from the selected operations and their applicability to twenty-first-century warfare. The author will examine the development of tactics and operational procedures that were unique to this theater of war and the leadership challenges encountered in a coalition or joint command structure. This study will also examine the effectiveness of combined air operations with the RAF in support of the amphibious landings conducted by the US Fifth and British Eight Armies at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio, Italy....

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1 Introduction . . . . 1 2 ALLIED AIR OPERATIONS IN NORTH AFRICA . . . . .5 3 OPERATION HUSKY AND THE INVASION OF SICILY . . . .17 4 OPERATION AVALANCHE AND THE INVASION OF ITALY . .33 5 OPERATION SHINGLE AND THE ASSAULT OF ANZIO . . . .47 6 Conclusion . . . . 63 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 69...

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To help educate airmen about the realities of counterinsurgency, this study addresses how insurgent warfare is fundamentally different from conventional wars, develops lessons from two case studies, highlights the challenges that US airmen face, and examines the adequacy of Air Force and Joint doctrine for counterinsurgency operations....

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INTRODUCTION......8 Insurgencies: Not Uncommon ....8 Insurgencies in the Abstract....10 Insurgencies: Fundamentally Different.....11 Counterinsurgency: The US Airman’s Challenge .....12 Methodology of this Study......14 Limitations of the Study....15 SOUTH VIETNAMESE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN AND OPERATION FARMGATE, 1961-1964.....16 Origins of Conflict ......16 Overview of FARMGATE .....18 Program Inception....18 Concept of Operations ......19 Analysis of Operations......20 US Air Force Involvement......20 Army of the Republic of Vietnam ......22 Vietnamese Air Force ....23 Factors Affecting the Role of Air Advisors....24 National Politics....24 US Inter-Service Competition....26 Cultural Factors.....28 Command, Control and Operations ....29 Tasking Air Assets......29 Mission Planning and Targeting Guidance.....31 Combat Intelligence ....32 Other Significant Issues ....33 Rules of Engagement .....33 Training.....34 Equipment....35 FARMGATE Counterinsurgency Operations: Lessons Learned.....37 EL SALVADOR INSURGENCY: 1981-1992.....39 Overview of Operations....41 US Involvement ....41 Salvadoran Milita...

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Drawing from the vision of airpower theorists and building on insights gained from studies on various regime changes, this thesis advances a theory of regime change and outlines a strategy for the use of airpower. To remain in power, regimes must continue to provide goods to the group of people responsible for its rise to power—the winning coalition. Different types of regimes rely on different types of goods to satisfy their winning coalition. This thesis advances the hypothesis that adversely affecting these goods will create policy failure, increase dissatisfaction among the winning coalition, and cause members to seek out a new coalition and regime to provide the lost goods. Additionally, since many regimes supply goods to third parties to retain their support, an additional hypothesis was introduced to account for the influence of international support....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 2 THE THEORY . . . . 5 3 THE CAUSAL MECHANISM . . . . 19 4 AMERICAN REGIME CHANGE . . . . 27 5 SOUTH VIETNAMESE REGIME CHANGE . . . . . 37 6 CONCLUSION . . . . 49 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 53...

Description Details
This study follows the history of close air support (CAS) since World War II to examine how it has been apportioned and allocated in the past. It then examines the current joint air operations process. It is the contention of this study that the current system, rooted in its historical past, does not fully employ CAS to its optimum potential. The historical view of CAS has been as a tactical measure, with limited localized effects. However, properly integrated and coequal with the ground scheme of maneuver, it can have operational level effects. This study examines two theories of the use of CAS at the operational level and then recommends changes to the view of CAS and the process for its apportionment and allocation....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE HISTORY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT . . . . 7 3 CURRENT JOINT CAS DOCTRINE . . . . 39 4 TWO THEORIES OF CAS AS AN OPERATIONAL ASSET . . . . 51 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 59 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 65...

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This thesis examines three campaigns during which aerial terror raids, peripheral to the main war efforts and incapable of destroying the enemy war-making capacity, elicited disproportionate reactions from the targeted leaderships. The raids on London during World War I, the V-1 and V-2 raids on London three decades later, and the Scud attacks on Israel during Desert Storm each show evidence of overreaction by Allied/coalition leaders. A review of the nature of terrorism and of airpower reveals that aerial weapons are uniquely suitable as terror weapons. An analysis of the differences between nuisance attacks and conventional civilian bombing, along with an understanding of the pressures on the leaders involved, leads to an explanation for past overreactions: aerial terror raids shock targeted leaders into visceral responses. Historically short-lived, these responses are based on the pressures of representative government and the tendency to overestimate the capability of terror weapons while underestimating the resilience of the population....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE ANATOMY OF TERROR . . . . . 3 BEYOND THE TRENCHES . . . . 9 “V” FOR VENGEANCE . . . . . 13 DECISIVE TERROR . . . . 19 ANALYSIS . . . . . 25 CONCLUSION . . . . . 31 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

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In Unmanned Airlift: A Viable Option for Meeting the Strategic Airlift Shortfall, Lt Col Chad T. Manske points to the growing dependency on strategic airlift as well as the abiding corollary that there will continue to be a shortfall in strategic airlift. To get to the analysis, Colonel Manske raised three crucial questions: (1) are operational requirements able to justify unmanned airlifters, (2) are current and emerging technologies likely to meet these potential operational requirements, and (3) are the operational concepts cost-effective?...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 THE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SHORTFALL . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4 TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY . . . . . . . . .31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 5 FINANCIAL CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 6 ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS .89 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99...