Description Details
The introduction of Shrike anti-radiation missile (ARM) negated the requirement to overfly the site, but its short range required further improvement. The improvement came in the Standard ARM, a missile that was followed by development of the High-Speed Anti- Radiation Missile, or HARM, the weapon of choice for today’s Weasel. That aircraft is the Wild Weasel, indicating the need for such an aircraft in the future....

Description Details
The US commercial air carriers provide a unique and critical enabler that helps us meet our mobility requirements in the form of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Colonel Schauber contends that changes allowing increased foreign ownership or control opportunities would threaten our national security by jeopardizing the DOD’s accessibility to CRAF assets. Although the CRAF has formally been utilized only twice, its importance and our reliance on it cannot be overstated....

Description Details
In support of national and military security strategies, the DOD has established the joint force commander (JFC) as the means to provide unity of command, exercised through component commanders, during contingency operations. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is key to the JFC’s successful prosecution of contingency operations. The multifaceted complexity cannot be overstated as both national and theater ISR architectures include many linked nodes that can act and be tasked independently from one another (i.e., the platforms, sensors, DOD and commercial communication nodes, and a variety of exploitation organizations). The JFC cannot continue to ignore this reality if he or she wants to properly employ ISR-intensive effects-based operations (EBO) to achieve overall campaign objectives—that is, to provide unity of ISR effects in support of the campaign plan....

Description Details
In this discerning assessment of Operation Allied Force (OAF), Lt Col Michael W. Lamb Sr. examines the myriad of lessons learned that have been written, and debated, from this campaign and synthesizes them into some golden nuggets for strategists and campaign planners. Indeed, there is much to be learned. From the beginning of the campaign, the military logic of OAF has been a matter of intense, even bitter debate. The problems and questions that arise from OAF are numerous and cut across the spectrum of military operations....

Description Details
This important research deals with the intellectual foundation of the American profession of arms—our joint doctrine. The author, Lt Col Carl R. Pivarsky Jr., USAF, argues that the current doctrine development process has become a zero-sum game driven by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff (CJCS) declaring joint doctrine to be “authoritative.” This research focuses on that document and the impact it has on how we think about high-intensity, conventional combat operations. Specifically, it deals with the corruption of the definitions of maneuver and interdiction to serve parochial land force interests. The author shows in detail how definitions and terms have destroyed the command authority of the joint force air component commander (JFACC) and relegated air component capabilities solely to the support of surface maneuver commanders....

Description Details
This paper seeks to answer the following question: What are the doctrinal imperatives of providing effective airlift support to enclaves? Doctrinal imperatives are those necessary and sufficient propositions that describe the optimal way to employ airlift forces in support of an enclave. In short, this paper attempts to determine the best way to conduct airlift operations to support enclaves....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 THE LUFTWAFFE’S AERIAL RESUPPLY OF THE SIXTH ARMY AT STALINGRAD . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 4 KHE SANH, THE AMERICAN AERIAL RESUPPLY OF THE US MARINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 5 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55...

Description Details
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction dramatically in-creases the likelihood of operating in “hostile” environments, thereby eliminating the civil reserve airfleet’s contribution to strategic airlift. Commercial airlift aircraft, built for efficiency, represent a fiscally responsible complement to the military’s airlift fleet. In order to meet current and future force requirements, especially with a continental-based force structure, the United States needs to supplement its strategic airlift fleet with a COTS airlift aircraft....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 THE CIVILIAN–MILITARY AIRLIFT PARTNERSHIP: EFFICIENCY VERSUS EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS, CURRENT CAPABILITIES, AND THE SHORTFALL . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 4 THE ALTERNATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58...

Description Details
"Colonel Cirafici provides a clear picture of theater air mobility forces structure, their capabilities, and limitations . He has identified problem areas, and recommended improve ments. Colonel Cirafici has looked to the future and examined how ongoing changes in theater air mobility forces and equipment will increase the combatant commander's options in the theater. The greatest value of his study is to create a clearer understanding of how theater air mobility forces act to enhance operations and support the battlefield."...

Description Details
In Tanker-Force Structure: Recapitalization of the KC-135, Lieutenant Colonel Juan Narvid challenges air mobility warriors to develop a tanker-force structure that overcomes the thinking of old to launch new concepts and capabilities for the future tanker. He argues that the future of warfare will require a tanker that is able to operate as a force enabler across the full spectrum of operations. This research is very timely with the Boeing 767 being looked at as a replacement for some of the older KC-135s. In this paper, Colonel Narvid examines the chronology of the tanker and the role it has played throughout its history. He argues that the next tanker must break from old capabilities, tied to a Cold War strategy, and embark on new operations and more capabilities that are able to respond to future threats....

Description Details
In this important study, Lt Col Wayne Johnson, USAF, argues that systematic tightening of interagency cooperation and better work on defining sensitive technology prohibitions are needed to maintain the US technological edge. He also maintains that the US government requires a new and disciplined export control process—not the current mosaic of rules, regulations, and perspectives that came out of the cold war, but a process that provides a revamped, systemic approach with consistent implementation. Colonel Johnson explores the problem of defining which technologies the United States is willing to transfer(military or dual-use) and the need to ensure that national security objectives do not take a backseat to economic expediency. To accomplish this end, he argues for better interagency cooperation as a first step leading to a more centralized, coordinated, and strategic view of technology transfer and how it impacts US national security....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 About Revolutions in Military Affairs and Disproportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 DOCTRINE FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . 8 Global-Mobility Strategic Air Campaigns . . . 10 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 3 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 4 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Operational Concepts for Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Operational Concepts for Global-Mobility Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 5 TECHNOLOGY FOR STRATEGIC AIR CAMPAIGNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Technology for Offensive Strategic Air Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Technology for Global-Mobility ...

Description Details
This is a book of quotations and comments about air power, war, and military matters. But it would be a great mistake to simply read the quotes and take them literally. Each selection presents a picture that you can look at again and again. Taken together, different views of the same subject matter are like a drafter's plans: they can make either an interesting multiple-view description of the subject or a puzzle....

Description Details
The author's contention is that training for night air operations, particularly with our sister services, is in its infancy. Using his personal experience he sets out to recommend better uses of the training facilities of all the services to improve the situation . After examining the history of joint operations and night air operations, presenting a hypothetical joint night scenario to show the tremendous challenges of such operations, and describing the current status of joint night training programs, the author recommends a phased building-block approach that should increase the Air Force's capability to perform both single-service and joint operations any time of the day or night. This will ensure that we train as we plan to fight in future air operations....

Table of Contents Details
1 HISTORY AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . 1 Joint Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Night Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2 DOING IT IN THE DARK THE CHALLENGE . . 17 Operation Tae Kwon Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Mission Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Offensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 On-Call Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 Mission Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Offensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 On-Call Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 Mission Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 PHOTO SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 3 CURRENT TRAINING PROGRAMS . . . . . . . 61 Requirements for Re...

Description Details
This is not a history of military airlift but rather an investigation of ideas and concepts as they have evolved and have been applied to warfighting . Airlift is the backbone of deterrence . A properly structured and equipped airlift force is critical to the successful execution of the national military strategy . How we think about airlift and how we translate those thoughts into a meaningful expression of how to develop, deploy, and employ airlift forces is vital to the national defense. Colonel Miller's study is a definitive step in that important process....

Table of Contents Details
1 THE PRE-WORLD WAR II ERA . . . . . . . . . .1 The Air Power Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I Air Transportation Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ANew Air Transport Organization . . . . . . . . .13 The Woodring Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Prewar Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Prelude to World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 2 WORLDWIDE AIRLIFT IN THE WAR YEARS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Air Corps Ferrying Command . . . . . . . .27 June 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 The Air Transport Command . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Army Air Force Regulation 20-44 . . . . . . . . 65 The Nexus of Policy and Doctrine . . . . . . .67 White and Green: Doctrinal Hallmarks . . . . .72 The Strategic Airlift Heritage of World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 3 TROOP CARRIER AND THEATER AIRLIFT IN WORLD WAR II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79 Origins of Troo...

Description Details
Psychological Operations : Principles and Case Studies serves as a fundamental guide to PSYOP philosophy, concepts, principles, issues, and thought for both those new to, and those experienced in, the PSYOP field and PSYOP applications . This book clarifies the value of PSYOP as a cost-effective weapon and incorporates it as a psychological instrument of US military and political power, especially given our present budgetary constraints. The authors contribute to the understanding of psychological operations by presenting diverse articles that portray the value of the planned use of human actions to influence perceptions, public opinion, attitudes, and behaviors so that PSYOP victories can be achieved in war and in peace. The four sections classify articles with related themes into a common category....

Description Details
Is America’s counterinsurgency (COIN) effort being shortchanged? Does a one-dimensional doctrine fail to exploit America’s full COIN potential? Would a genuinely joint approach provide better options to decision makers confronted with the harsh realities of twenty-first century insurgencies? This study insists the answers are unequivocally “yes.” It analyzes the pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution. It also offers insights and ideas from an Airman’s perspective for strengthening joint COIN doctrine development in order to deliver fresh alternatives to our national decision-makers and combatant commanders....

Table of Contents Details
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................iii INTRODUCTION ........................................1 FM 3-24’S GROUND-FORCE CONVENTIONALITY ......................................................8 COIN AND AN AIRMAN’S WAY OF THINKING .......................................................11 FM 3-24’S AIRPOWER MYTHS.....................18 CONSIDERATIONS FOR AIRMINDED COIN DOCTRINE ..........................................28 CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.................63 END NOTES ..........................................69...

Description Details
The overseas base planning process reflected the evolution and growing sophistication of American strategic thinking during the tumultuous period from 1942 through 1948. The results of the planning shaped, in many ways, the East-West struggle for much of the second half of the twentieth century. Elliott Converse has performed a great and remarkable service by capturing the often confusing and chaotic essence of the base planning effort during this turbulent period. His exhaustive research brings the issues, attitudes, and personalities involved into clear focus....

Table of Contents Details
1 THE FIRST PLANS, 1942–1943 . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2 BASE PLANNING, 1943–1945 . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 3 BASE PLANNING TAKES SHAPE, 1945 . . . . 101 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 4 POSTWAR ADJUSTMENTS, 1946–1948 . . .151 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227 ...

Description Details
"The publication of this book puts to rest 35 years of false history. It also decisively concludes the erroneous dishonor suffered by Gen John Daniel Lavelle, the Seventh Air Force commander. General Lavelle, Colonel O’Malley, and personnel of the Seventh Air Force acted pursuant to presidential orders secretly issued on 3 February 1972 in the Oval Office. It is clear that they loyally and bravely served, protected, and defended the Constitution of the United States."...

Table of Contents Details
1 The Fatal Crash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 The Hard Coal Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 Saint Rose School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4 Saint Rose Basketball . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5 West Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 6 Diane Muennink, Silver Wings, and the Air Force Academy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7 The B-47 Bomber and the General’s Aide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 8 The Blackbird SR-71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 9 Colonel O’Malley and Combat in Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 10 Combat Operations in North Vietnam . . 129 11 SAC Wing Commander . . . . . . . . . . . .163 12 Brigadier General: First General Officer Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175 13 Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185 14 Air Staff Plans and Operations . . . . . . .201 15 Vice-Chief of the US Air Force . . . . . . . 219 16 Pacific Air Force Commander . . . . . . . . 233 17 Tactical Air Force Commander and the Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .243 APPENDIX: War Messages ...

Table of Contents Details
THE CONTEXT: A DIFFERENT MIND-SET . . . . . 1 The Mind-Set in World War I . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Post-World War I Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 GIULIO DOUHET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 A Continental Theorist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 HUGH TRENCHARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 British Empire Theorist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4 WILLIAM MITCHELL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 New World Theorist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5 JOHN WARDEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Theorist or Throwback? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6...

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . xi INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 AIRPOWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 OUTCOMES AND ARGUMENTS . . . . . . 97 TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 PRINCIPLES OF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 COMMAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201 DOCTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227 TWENTY GOOD BOOKS . . . . . . . . . . . . 247 SOURCE INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251 TOPICAL INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259...

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE HUMP AIRLIFT OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 6 SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Illustrations Figure Page 1 Air Force Leadership Framework (Proposed) . . . . . . . . . ...

Description Details
Snow’s and Drew’s newest version has been slightly retitled and almost totally rewritten to reflect radically changed politicalmilitary realities. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy addresses not only traditional strategy concerns but also the chaotic nature of the post–Cold War world and the stark realities of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military conflicts along religious fault lines. Although the authors have changed a great deal in this edition, the original strategy process model, first published in 1980, remains the constant organizing scheme....

Table of Contents Details
Contents DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii SECTION I FRAMING THE PROBLEM 1 STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Warfare in the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . 4 Foundations of Modern Warfare . . . . . . . . . .7 Contrasts in the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2 THE STRATEGY PROCESS—AN OVERVIEW . .13 Determining National Security Objectives . . .14 Formulating Grand National Strategy . . . . . .17 Developing Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Composing Operational Strategy . . . . . . . . 22 Formulating Battlefield Strategy (Tactics) . . .23 Influences on the Strategy Process . . . . . . .25 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 SECTION II THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 3 GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 31 Vital National Interests . . . . . ....

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v Theory of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Patriotism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Air, Space , and Cyber Power . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Education , Training, and Lessons Learned . 24 Preparedness , Security, and Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Leadership and Professionalism . . . . . . . 32 Character and Leadership Traits . . . . . . 35 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Intelligence, Surveillance , and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Information and Communication S . . . . . . 49 Joint Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Coalition Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Airpower at War . . . . . . . . . . . ...

Table of Contents Details
DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 PREPARING TO TALK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Types of Speaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Teaching Lecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Audience Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Audience Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 Selecting the Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Narrowing the Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Choosing a Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 General Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Specific Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Gathering Material . . . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
Air War College Maxwell Paper Anthology, a compilation of the award-winning papers from our 2010 graduates. Since we published the first Maxwell Paper in May 1996, we have distributed 47 papers demonstrating the highest level of analytical creativity and scholarship. The 12 papers presented here provide insight into and promote discussion on topics of importance to senior leaders....

Table of Contents Details
48 ARTICULATION BEYOND THE BUMPER STICKER: REVAMPING AN INCOMPLETE AND CONFUSING MASTER TENET . . . . . . . . .1 Col Rolanda Burnett Sr., USAF 49 THE DANGEROUS DECLINE IN THE US MILITARY’S INFECTIOUS-DISEASE VACCINE PROGRAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Col Kenneth E. Hall, USAF 50 LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF THE DECISION FOR WAR: A CASE STUDY . . . . . .39 Lt Col Michael Rafter, Canadian Forces 51 DEVELOPING A US EUROPEAN COMMAND INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE STRATEGY FOR FY 2010–15 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Lt Col Kevin M. Coyne, USAF 52 INFLUENCE OPERATIONS AND THE INTERNET: A 21ST CENTURY ISSUE: LEGAL, DOCTRINAL, AND POLICY CHALLENGES IN THE CYBER WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Col Rebecca A. Keller, USAF 53 US NATIONAL SECURITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE IN THE ARCTIC . . .85 Lt Col Lars Helmrich, Swedish Air Force 54 CONSIDERATIONS FOR A US NUCLEAR FORCE STRUCTURE BELOW A 1,000-WARHEAD LIMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Lt Col David J. Baylor, USAF 55 GETTING WAR FIGHTERS WHAT THEY NEED, WH...

Description Details
As the nation’s campaign against terrorism proceeds, our military services continue to embrace high technology, advanced sensors, and precision weaponry for use on current battlefields. The term cyber warrior has truly stepped from the pages of science fiction into reality. Equipment and technology do not constitute the only developments, however, because today’s cyber warriors emerge from a society and military culture very different in many respects from those of past generations of warriors....

Table of Contents Details
1 EMPLOYEE WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Values Crisis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Harnessing a Different Military . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cultures in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 2 TRADITIONAL MILITARY CULTURE . . . . . . .7 Professionalism and Homogeneity . . . . . . . .7 Fraternity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Institutional Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Value Studies of the Military . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Traditional Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 THE NEW BUSINESS-SCIENTIFIC CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 New World Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Volunteer Fighting Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Occupational Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Technology and the Great Engineering Venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Civilian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Force of Specialists . . . . . ...