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DISCLAIMER...............................................ii DEDICATION..............................................iii ABOUT THE AUTHOR..................................vii PREFACE...................................................ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...................................xi Robert D. Knapp and J. A. Liner....................1 Murry C. Woodbury and Bruce A. Tyndall........5 William L. Stribling......................................9 Walter R. Weaver......................................11 John F. Curry.............................................15 Frederick I. Eglin.......................................17 John H. Williamson & William C. McDonald...19 Claire L. Chennault....................................21 Harold L. George.......................................25 Kenneth N. Walker.....................................29 Haywood S. Hansell...................................31 Laurence S. Kuter......................................35 Glenn Miller..............................................37 Clark Gable..............................................39 Ira C. Eaker.........................................

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix United States Air Force Vision . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Wright Brothers: Wilbur (1867–1912) and Orville (1871–1948) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Col Edgar S. Gorrell (1891–1945) . . . . . . . . .8 Maj Gen William L. “Billy” Mitchell (1879–1936) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Col William C. Sherman (1888–1927) . . . . .22 Dr. Robert H. Goddard (1882–1945) . . . . . .28 Maj Gen Haywood Hansell, Jr. (1903–1988) 36 Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold (1886–1950) . . .42 Air Corps Tactical School (Acts) . . . . . . . . . .48 Lt Gen Harold L. “Hal” George (1893–1986) 52 Gen Muir S. Fairchild (1894–1950) . . . . . . .58 Brig Gen Kenneth N. Walker (1898–1943) . .64 Gen George C. Kenney (1889–1977) . . . . . 70 Gen Laurence S. Kuter (1905–1979) . . . . . .78 Maj Gen Claire L. Chennault (1890–1958) . .84 Gen Ira C. Eaker (1896–1987) . . . . . . . . . .92 Dr. Theodore von Kármán (1881–1963) . . .100...

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The overseas base planning process reflected the evolution and growing sophistication of American strategic thinking during the tumultuous period from 1942 through 1948. The results of the planning shaped, in many ways, the East-West struggle for much of the second half of the twentieth century. Elliott Converse has performed a great and remarkable service by capturing the often confusing and chaotic essence of the base planning effort during this turbulent period. His exhaustive research brings the issues, attitudes, and personalities involved into clear focus....

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1 THE FIRST PLANS, 1942–1943 . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 2 BASE PLANNING, 1943–1945 . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 3 BASE PLANNING TAKES SHAPE, 1945 . . . . 101 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138 4 POSTWAR ADJUSTMENTS, 1946–1948 . . .151 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .227 ...

Description Details
"The publication of this book puts to rest 35 years of false history. It also decisively concludes the erroneous dishonor suffered by Gen John Daniel Lavelle, the Seventh Air Force commander. General Lavelle, Colonel O’Malley, and personnel of the Seventh Air Force acted pursuant to presidential orders secretly issued on 3 February 1972 in the Oval Office. It is clear that they loyally and bravely served, protected, and defended the Constitution of the United States."...

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1 The Fatal Crash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 The Hard Coal Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3 Saint Rose School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 4 Saint Rose Basketball . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5 West Point . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37 6 Diane Muennink, Silver Wings, and the Air Force Academy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 7 The B-47 Bomber and the General’s Aide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .63 8 The Blackbird SR-71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 9 Colonel O’Malley and Combat in Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 10 Combat Operations in North Vietnam . . 129 11 SAC Wing Commander . . . . . . . . . . . .163 12 Brigadier General: First General Officer Assignments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175 13 Joint Chiefs of Staff . . . . . . . . . . . . . .185 14 Air Staff Plans and Operations . . . . . . .201 15 Vice-Chief of the US Air Force . . . . . . . 219 16 Pacific Air Force Commander . . . . . . . . 233 17 Tactical Air Force Commander and the Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .243 APPENDIX: War Messages ...

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THE CONTEXT: A DIFFERENT MIND-SET . . . . . 1 The Mind-Set in World War I . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Post-World War I Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 2 GIULIO DOUHET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 A Continental Theorist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3 HUGH TRENCHARD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 British Empire Theorist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4 WILLIAM MITCHELL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 New World Theorist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 5 JOHN WARDEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Theorist or Throwback? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Organization for War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 6...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE HUMP AIRLIFT OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 6 SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Illustrations Figure Page 1 Air Force Leadership Framework (Proposed) . . . . . . . . . ...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 DISENGAGEMENT IN STRATEGY . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE COLD WAR . . . . .25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 5 REFRAMING DISENGAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . .83 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 6 EFFECTS OF BARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123 Illustrations Figure 1 P...

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The purpose of The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis is to share Major Mills’s rhetorical understanding with young officers attending initial intelligence training. Throughout he infuses key elements from the rhetorical discourse community into the discourse community that deals with training in military intelligence....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 LET’S GET RHETORICAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 INTELLIGENCE PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4 WHAT THE FOUCAULT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 5 POWER PLUG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 6 DISCONTINUITY FEVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7 IN THE TRENCHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

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Lt Col Richard M. Clark’s Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles: Airpower by the People, For the People, But Not with the People, draws on that long history to gauge what the future may hold for uninhabited combat aerial vehicles (UCAV). Given the problematic history of UAVs/UCAVs, knowledge of past experience could prove beneficial to the current generation of UCAV developers and planners. To that end, Colonel Clark examines technological obstacles that have handicapped UCAVs historically and which could continue to impede their future evolution. He then turns to more contemporary organizational and cultural issues that might hinder integration of UCAVs into the force. Clark concludes his study by proposing answers to two fundamental questions: (1) What are the major obstacles to UCAVs achieving meaningful operational status in the Air Force, and (2) Can those obstacles be overcome?...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 EVOLUTION OF UNINHABITED COMBAT AERIAL VEHICLES (UCAV) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 TODAY’S UCAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34 TOMORROW’S UCAVs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85...

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It was inevitable that the airman’s perspective regarding the employment of airpower in an operational theater would surface in North Africa, the first major American offensive of World War II. The North Africa experience provided a model for the organization and employment of tactical airpower in subsequent campaigns in Europe, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. In each of these campaigns, planners have continued to refine, expand, and improve the effectiveness of tactical air support for all forces in a theater. Differences in opinion on the employment of forces will continue among air, ground, and sea commanders in combat situations. However, when the overall commander in the theater makes a decision on the strategy and priority of operations, the air component commander must and will apply his forces in accordance with that decision....

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GETTING TOGETHER...................................1 Vincent Orange A GLIDER IN THE PROPWASH OF THE ROYAL AIR FORCE?..........................................30 David R. Mets THE LEGEND OF LAURENCE KUTER............64 Daniel R. Mortensen PATTON AND WEYLAND...........................100 David Spires APPENDIX...............................................108 BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................124...

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The concept of “deep battle” was formally introduced to US war fighters during the early 1980s through the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine. As envisioned by Air Force and Army leaders, the initial purpose for the deep battle was to delay and weaken Soviet second and follow-on echelons during a European conventional war. Within the AirLand Battle construct, the Air Force had responsibility for synchronizing deep operations and for employing air interdiction against Soviet maneuver forces to set the conditions for victory in the decisive “close battle.” The fire support coordination line (FSCL), normally positioned at field artillery maximum range from the forward line of troops (FLOT), separated the Air Force’s deep operations from the Army’s close battle....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 EVOLUTION OF DEEP-BATTLE DOCTRINE DURING THE COLD WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Evolution of AirLand Battle Doctrine . . . . . . 7 Air Force Doctrine and Deep Battle . . . . . . . 11 Evolution of the Fire Support Coordination Line . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Synthesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 3 DEEP BATTLE DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Deep-Battle Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Fire Support Coordination Line Friction . . . . 34 Synthesis and Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4 DEEP BATTLE TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Army Doctrinal Evolution since the Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Air Force Doctrine since the Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Joint Doctrine and the Deep Battle . . . . . . . 56 Synthesis and Final Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 61 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 5...

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Chapter 1 Navigators of the First Global Air Force.........................................................1 Chapter 2 Prelude to War.............................8 Chapter 3 Death on a Bright Sunday Morning...................................................13 Chapter 4 Attack on Clark Field...................16 Chapter 5 George Berkowitz........................20 Chapter 6 Harry Schreiber...........................23 Chapter 7 William Meenagh........................27 Chapter 8 Regroup....................................31 Chapter 9 Richard Wellington Cease............34 Chapter 10 Paul E. Dawson.........................38 Chapter 11 George Markovich.....................40 Chapter 12 War Plan Orange III.................46 Chapter 13 Carl R. Wildner.........................51 Chapter 14 Harry McCool............................55 Chapter 15 Merrill Kern Gordon, Jr...............58 Chapter 16 Francis B. Rang........................64 Chapter 17 Corregidor................................66 Chapter 18 William Scott Warner.................70 Chapter 19 Jay M. Horowitz.........................74 Chapter 20 The Super Fort...

Description Details
Dr. David R. Mets’s The Long Search for a Surgical Strike: Precision Munitions and the Revolution in Military Affairs is a broad, thought-provoking examination of the relationship between the advancement in conventional weapons guidance technology and the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA). He defines an RMA as a rapid change in military technology, doctrine, and organization leading to a sweeping new way that wars are fought. Dr. Mets then considers whether the improvement in conventional air weapons accuracy since World War II is the foundation, the main pillar, one of the principal supports, or is irrelevant to the RMA—which is said to be afoot....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 WHAT IS A REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS (RMA)? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 WHAT WERE THE NOTIONS OF THE FIRST AIRPOWER ADVOCATES OF RMA? . . . . . . . .4 HOW DID RMA WORK OUT IN WARS FROM 1939 TO 1972?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 KOREA. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 CHANGE AFTER VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 YOM KIPPUR WAR, 1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 WAR AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE 1990s: HAS THE LAST SANCTUARY BEEN CLOSED? . . . . .34 THE REMAINING HUMANITARIAN SANCTUARY AND DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS. . . . . . . . . 47 ORGANIZATIONAL IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . .48 NOTES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .50 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67...

Description Details
The ground and air forces have strong interlocking connections in the battlefield operations known as close air support (CAS). In the 1970s the Army and Air Force began to develop a shared battlefield doctrine known as battlefield air interdiction(BAI) that was concerned with a class of targets that lay out a fair distance from the front lines. Later, on the battlefields of Desert Storm, the Air Force excluded BAI from its tasking orders, although some claimed interdiction missions of this nature were carried out under different names. Lt Col Terrance J. McCaffrey III looks into What Happened to BAI? Army and Air Force Battlefield Doctrine Development from Pre–Desert Storm to 2001. He traces airground doctrine and operational practices relative to battlefield interdiction from World War I to Operation Desert Storm and suggests at one point that even the flank support for Patton was, in effect, BAI. The author carries the discussion through the decade after Desert Storm and shows how the issue is too important to be dropped by either service, even as technology provides new weapons for both services....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 ORIGINS OF BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28 3 WHERE WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION IN DESERT STORM? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4 WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION A VICTIM OF SUCCESS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .71 5 IS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION BACK? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 97 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .107 ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .115...

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Through a careful examination of primary and secondary sources, as well as his own acumen as a sharp officer, Cox uses Brett’s life to illuminate those factors that at first sped Brett through the ranks and then those variables that appeared to block his further advancement....As much as studies of commanders who grabbed the brass ring, this examination of George H. Brett adds insight into the makings of effective leadership and successful command....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 EARLY LIFE AND CAREER . . . . . . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 3 THE BUILDUP TO WAR . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 4 CONFLAGRATION IN THE PACIFIC . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5 AIRPOWER AND ANTAGONISM IN AUSTRALIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 6 COMMAND IN THE CARIBBEAN . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101...

Description Details
Religion and culture in general have been long neglected by planners, policy makers, and diplomats. Our experience in Phase IV, or the constructive phase, of Operation Iraqi Freedom has clearly exposed this inattention as a serious flaw in bringing peaceful development to Iraq. These authors suggest that military chaplains can be a part of a better solution. It is not a case of trying to proselyte; it is rather one of engaging local religious leaders to facilitate the stabilization process....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 RELIGION IN STABILITY OPERATIONS . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 CHAPLAINS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 4 MODIFICATIONS TO THE CHAPLAIN SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 5 CONCLUSIONS AND RESPONSES TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . vii PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . xi ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv 1 EXPECTATIONS OF COMMAND . . . 1 What Does the Boss Expect? . . . 2 What Do the Troops Expect? . . . 9 What Do You Expect? . . . . . . . . . 18 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2 VISION AND ENVIRONMENT . . . . . 23 Developing and Communicating Your Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Building the Environment . . . . . 30 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 3 WALKING THE WALK . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72 4 HANDLING JUSTICE . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5 GREAT IDEAS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Take Responsibility for Fun . . . . 95 Sponsor Program . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 Celebrate Heroes—Not Machines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Mentoring Program . . . . . . . . . . 104 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
This study analyzes Gen O. P. Weyland’s impact on close air support (CAS) during the Korean War. First, the author briefly traces the history and evolution of air-ground support from its infancy to the start of the Korean War. Second, he shifts his focus to the effectiveness of CAS throughout the conflict and addresses why this mission was controversial for the Army and Air Force. Third, he highlights General Weyland’s perspective on tactical airpower and his role in the close-air-support “controversy.”...

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1 Close Air Support in 2006 . . . . . . . . .1 2 History and Evolution of Close Air Support: World War I to the Korean War . . . . . . . 5 3 Background on Gen O. P. Weyland . . . . 17 4 Close Air Support in Korea: The Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5 An Airman’s Perspective of Close Air Support in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .81 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83...

Description Details
Wills argues that the twentieth-century argument between air and ground proponents has changed significantly since the Gulf War, and it comes down to the relative importance of the ground or air in the mix. It is more than just using air as a supporting component to the ground forces—if this is true, current force organization and employment is adequate. However, if the air predominates in combat operations, then, as Wills puts it in his first chapter, joint operations doctrine needs to be rethought. A changed balance “will affect the military at every level . . . force structure, organization, weapons acquisition, doctrine, and training” (p. 3). Notwithstanding the blunt commentary from ground proponents, Wills offers that airpower has come to dominate air/ground relations....

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1 FRAMING THE DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 AIRPOWER, WAR, AND DIPLOMACY . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 3 ASSESSING THE AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 4 THE AFGHAN MODEL AND BEYOND . . . . . .35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 5 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69...

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The purpose of this paper is to recommend that the United States government maintain the defense technological and industrial base (DTIB) by aggressively supporting the US defense industry in the arms transfer process. Ironically, this recommendation is contrary to the position held at the onset of this research and analysis effort. To accomplish this purpose, this paper has three aims. First, it recognizes that the DTIB requires preservation. Second, it describes arms transfers as an instrument of foreign policy based on US national security interests and the foreign policy challenges of the day. Third, it focuses on the current arms transfer decision-making process and represents it as a “Labyrinth of Control.” This section of the paper demonstrates the maze of controls used to adequately ensure that US military technologies are not diffused to foreign nations....

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PRESERVING THE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGICAL AND INDUSTRIAL BASE . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 6 ARMS TRANSFERS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF US FOREIGN POLICY . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . 14 THE LABYRINTH OF CONTROL . . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 27 MAINTAINING THE DTIB WITH US GOVERNMENT SUPPORT . . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 34 GLOSSARY . . . . . 35 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 37...

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Snow’s and Drew’s newest version has been slightly retitled and almost totally rewritten to reflect radically changed politicalmilitary realities. Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy addresses not only traditional strategy concerns but also the chaotic nature of the post–Cold War world and the stark realities of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and military conflicts along religious fault lines. Although the authors have changed a great deal in this edition, the original strategy process model, first published in 1980, remains the constant organizing scheme....

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Contents DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xviii SECTION I FRAMING THE PROBLEM 1 STRATEGY IN PERSPECTIVE . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Warfare in the Eighteenth Century . . . . . . . . 4 Foundations of Modern Warfare . . . . . . . . . .7 Contrasts in the Cold War . . . . . . . . . . . . .10 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 2 THE STRATEGY PROCESS—AN OVERVIEW . .13 Determining National Security Objectives . . .14 Formulating Grand National Strategy . . . . . .17 Developing Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Composing Operational Strategy . . . . . . . . 22 Formulating Battlefield Strategy (Tactics) . . .23 Influences on the Strategy Process . . . . . . .25 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 SECTION II THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 3 GRAND NATIONAL STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . 31 Vital National Interests . . . . . ....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THE INNOVATION IMPERATIVE . . . . . . . . . 3 THE ADVERSARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 THE PLAN: 3 AUGUST 1990–15 JANUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 CLASH OF ARMS: 17–26 JANUARY 1991 . . . .28 CENTAF ADAPTS: 27 JANUARY–5 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .42 ATTRITION WAR: 6–23 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . 59 GROUND WAR: 24–28 FEBRUARY 1991 . . . .63 THE KEYS TO INNOVATION . . . . . . . . . . . 71 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Appendix A Primary USAF Units That Participated . . . 101 B Chronology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 C Location of Air Strikes during Desert Storm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 D Distribution of Strikes against RGFC Heavy Divisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 E Iraqi Prisoner of War Comment...

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As the nation’s campaign against terrorism proceeds, our military services continue to embrace high technology, advanced sensors, and precision weaponry for use on current battlefields. The term cyber warrior has truly stepped from the pages of science fiction into reality. Equipment and technology do not constitute the only developments, however, because today’s cyber warriors emerge from a society and military culture very different in many respects from those of past generations of warriors....

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1 EMPLOYEE WARRIORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Values Crisis? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Harnessing a Different Military . . . . . . . . . . 3 Cultures in Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 2 TRADITIONAL MILITARY CULTURE . . . . . . .7 Professionalism and Homogeneity . . . . . . . .7 Fraternity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Institutional Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Value Studies of the Military . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Traditional Culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 THE NEW BUSINESS-SCIENTIFIC CULTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 New World Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Volunteer Fighting Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14 Occupational Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Technology and the Great Engineering Venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Civilian Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Force of Specialists . . . . . ...