Description Details
In this paper, I seek to demonstrate that the methods of using airpower to take the fight to the enemy and protect our ground forces during small wars need not involve the most advanced aircraft available. This “low-tech” approach does not suggest using lesser technology per se but proposes a different look for the types of aircraft that can perform a specific mission and for their manner of employment—that of protecting ground forces while combating the elusive insurgent. These same aircraft can prove invaluable in training an indigenous force to take the fight forward. By looking to relatively inexpensive, off-the-shelf aircraft, the Air Force can protect its ground-based charges and cement a relationship with embattled nations by helping them help themselves....

Description Details
The method or objective of Strategic Paralysis is to selectively attack or threaten those strategic or national level targets that most directly support the enemy’s war-making efforts and will to continue with his current behavior. Strategic Paralysis warfare should result in a change in the enemy’s behavior at a lesser cost to both sides as Airpower assets are the primary weapons --not ground troops. Why Airpower? It is the only weapon that can provide the near simultaneous shock to the enemy’s central nervous system necessary to induce paralysis. To achieve success Strategic Paralysis requires four key ingredients: 1) Correctly identifying the enemy’s National Elements of Value (NEVs), 2) High technology, 3) An enemy dependent upon a well developed, modern and vulnerable infrastructure, and 4) Aerospace Control. The bulk of this study is devoted to defining this strategy and bettering our understanding of the first ingredient, that of choosing the best targets for attack....

Table of Contents Details
1. Introduction...............1 2. The Theory of Strategic Paralysis...............12 3. Choosing the Right Targets...............34 4. More Targeting Theories...............61 5. The National Elements of Value Model...............77 6. Conclusions...............110...

Description Details
This paper analyzes the evolution of strategic bombing doctrine in order to identify the basic doctrinal tenets and then evaluate their compatibility with emerging stealth technologies. Current doctrine is an evolution of existing doctrine, theory, and experience. Therefore, to comprehend fully the meaning of doctrine, it is necessary to trace its lineage. As airpower arrived only recently in the doctrinal arena, no previous doctrine existed. Therefore, this analysis begins with the early airpower theories which provided the roots of evolution. Giulio Douhet is the most famous of the early theorists and his work provided a basis upon which to build. Following World War II (WWII), Bernard Brodie modified Douhet’s theory to incorporate atomic weapons and the experience to date. As theory evolved, so did early Air Corps "unsanctioned" doctrine. By testing each tenet against the demands of emerging stealth technologies, the paper finds that existing doctrine is basically sound, but incomplete. Therefore, the paper proposes and tests additional tenets to accommodate stealth and the increasing rate of technical advancement....

Description Details
Shooting Down a Star: Program 437, the US Nuclear ASAT System and Present-Day Copycat Killers, by Lt Col Clayton K.S. Chun, is a case study of an early US antisatellite (ASAT) weapon system. In this study, Colonel Chun shows how the US Air Force developed a rudimentary ASA system from obsolete Thor intermediate ballistic missiles, an existing space tracking system, and nuclear warheads....

Table of Contents Details
PROGRAM 437: THE BEGINNINGS . . . . . . . . 1 ASAT WEAPONS: AN ACCIDENTAL DISCOVERY? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ASAT DEVELOPMENT: THE AIR FORCE LEADS THE WAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 WHY ASAT WEAPONS? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 NIKE-ZEUS BECOMES A RIVAL. . . . . . . . . . . 8 OPERATIONAL CONCEPT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROGRAM 437 . . . . . . . . 10 LIMITING FACTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 Funding Shortfalls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Location, Location, Location. . . . . . . . . . . . 20 The Nuclear Specter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 PROGRAM 437 UNMASKED . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 A NEW MISSION FOR THE 10TH ADS . . . . . . 23 A THIRD LIFE FOR PROGRAM 437 . . . . . . . 27 THE DEMISE OF PROGRAM 437 . . . . . . . . . .29 SPACE: A CRITICAL DIMENSION . . . . . . . . .32 VULNERABILITY OF SPACE-BASED ASSETS . . 35 POTENTIAL THREATS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 NORTH KOREA: KEY EXPORTER OF TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 The DPRK’s Ballistic Missile Capabilities. . . .38 North Korea: A N...

Description Details
Recent airpower operations revealed a deficiency in the United States Air Force’s (USAF) ability to precisely attack mobile targets at standoff ranges with minimal collateral damage. Future airpower operations will be executed in politically sensitive strategic environments and thus will require the ability to precisely destroy mobile targets that may have been strategically placed by an adversary in areas with a high risk of collateral damage. Current air-to-ground guided weapon systems, including man-in-the-loop guidance weapon systems, have limited “collateral reduction” capabilities; and future autonomous precision standoff weapon systems may increase the risk and uncertainty associated with collateral damage due to technology limitations. The acquisition of a precision standoff man-in-the-loop weapon system through the modification of current weapon systems or the acquisition of a new weapon system may provide the USAF a critically needed air-to-ground capability against mobile targets in a high-risk collateral damage environment....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 THE NEED FOR PRECISION ENGAGEMENT AGAINST MOBILE TARGETS . . . . 5 3 USAF TARGET IDENTIFICATION AND GUIDED WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 23 4 FUTURE WEAPON SYSTEMS CAPABILITIES . . . . . 35 5 LEGAL ISSUES, ACCOUNTABILITY, FLEXIBILITY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY SHORTFALLS, AND ACQUISITION RISK MANAGEMENT . . . . 53 6 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . 65 GLOSSARY . . . . . 69...

Description Details
This analysis concludes the answer is to reorganize existing forces into a Quick Response Airpower Force (QRAF). The QRAF concept involves a force structure that can help reduce the operations tempo in the DOD by replacing forward presence with a credible continental United States-based, quick response, deterrent force. This study presents a discussion and background of the problem, its importance, related problems, and past attempts at solutions. It offers a framework describing a quick response force and what it should be capable of doing. After discussing the current US Air Force attempts to provide this capability, the composite wing and the Airpower Expeditionary Force, the force of tomorrow—the threetiered QRAF—is presented. The study concludes with recommendations for further study, limitations of the analysis, and its implications....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 2 2 THE PROBLEM . . . . 3 Notes . . . . . 8 3 THE FORCE REQUIREMENT . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . 13 4 THE FORCE TODAY . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . 25 5 THE FORCE TOMORROW . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . 31 6 CONCLUSION . . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 37...

Description Details
Colonel Felker’s paper espouses a practical theory of airpower based on the synergistic relationship among societal structure and lines of communications that comprise infrastructure. Rather than isolating different elements of society and their concomitant targets, the theory views targets in a more holistic way. Of note, the theory articulates a culturally based paradigm with airpower applied against the linkages within a society’s system processes, rather than a “one-size-fits-all” target list that attacks form. The theory describes a way to think about airpower, not a way to execute its missions....

Description Details
This study answers the following questions: Is John A. Warden III’s, “The Enemy as a System” analogous to the Air Corps Tactical School’s (ACTS) industrial web theory of airpower employment? If so, why (given the 50 plus years between development of these theories)? If not, what are the prime sources of divergence? The author first describes both theories using an outline from which they are compared on an “apples to apples” basis. From this analysis, similarities and differences are presented. Next, the author discusses contextual factors affecting development of both theories....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 3 2 THEORY DESCRIPTIONS AND COMPARISON . . . . . 5 Notes . . . . . 15 3 ANALYSIS OF CONTEXTUAL FACTORS . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . 30 4 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATION . . . . 33 Notes . . . . . 36 GLOSSARY . . . . 37...

Description Details
The early proponents of air power believed that with suitable aircraft, and control of the air, airmen would make surface operations impossible and irrelevant. In the years since they made these predictions, aircraft have gained capabilities far beyond those predicted by early advocates. However, airmen are still searching for a strategy that will guarantee the results their predecessors promised. Instead of replacing surface forces, air power has become their indispensable partner. Air power contributes to the security, mobility, and firepower of joint forces, but its primary contribution may be air superiority....

Description Details
The author addresses four questions: how have these air forces responded to post–Cold War political uncertainties, how have they operated, how have they responded to new air power thinking, and how have they adapted to the challenges of costs and technologies? He convincingly argues that budgetary provision has not been the most important factor in generating effective air power....

Description Details
The Air Force doctrinally advocates centralized command and control (C2) with decentralized execution as the best means to concentrate force on any facet of an enemy’s power. Although there are historical examples of effective command and control that have been less centralized, the USAF views decentralization as the cause of inefficient and suboptimal use of airpower....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . .10 2 A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMPLEXITY . . . . . .13 Notes . . .29 3 DESCRIBING CENTRALIZED COMMAND AND CONTROL WITH THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK . . .35 Notes . . .51 4 APPLYING COMPLEXITY THEORY TO DECENTRALIZE AIRPOWER COMMAND AND CONTROL . . . .55 Notes . . .88 5 ADAPTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL . . . .93 Notes . . .100 6 CONCLUSION—A CULTURAL SHIFT . . . .103 Notes . . .108...

Description Details
The role of airpower in theater campaigns is a matter of heated debate among the military services and their supporters. Lt Col. Robert P. Givens’s Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower As a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign addresses a question that is fundamental to that debate: to what extent can airpower function as a maneuver force in a theater campaign....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 FUNCTIONS OF A MANEUVER FORCE . . . . . 7 Ancient Greece––Shock Action through Direct Contact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Rome—A Maneuver Force Exerts a Zone of Influence over the Enemy . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Neoclassical Period—A Maneuver Force Compels or Denies Battle . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Napoleonic Era—A Maneuver Force Gains and Exploits a Position of Advantage . . . . . 13 Maneuver Force Performance Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Gettysburg Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Maneuver Force Characteristics of Israeli Air Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Summary ....

Description Details
The intent of this study is to develop general propositions regarding the nature of force-application (FA) effects. As part of that development, effect propositions are developed regarding time relationships, major functions of warfare, organizing schemes, levels of war, and simple and complex systems....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . 1 2 CONCEPTS AND TERMS . . . . 7 3 SYSTEMS APPROACH . . . . . . 27 4 EFFECTS: APPLICABILITY, COMPLEXITY, AND PLANNING . . . . . . 39 5 APRIMER ON EFFECTS . . . . 51 6 TARGET-EFFECT PAIRINGS AND MECHANISMS . . . . . . 63 7 COERCIVE FORCE APPLICATION AND EFFECTS . . . . . 73 8 FRAMEWORK FOR A SYSTEMS-AND-EFFECTS-BASED APPROACH. . . . . 87 9 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . 97...

Description Details
The author’s examination of the counterair strategy process shows how joint force commanders should balance objectives, the balance of forces, the nature of the theater, and policy limits to build a counterair strategy that links means to ends by choosing methods, targets, and attack timing.The author’s discussion of current counterair issues shows that the services appreciate the product (freedom of action for land, sea, and air forces) that control of the air provides, but neglect the process of obtaining it. Current air power disputes emphasize the control and targeting of air resources, and slight the potential impact of these issues on America’s future ability to control the air and space....

Table of Contents Details
1 AIR SUPERIORITY AND JOINT OPERATIONS . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . 4 2 VISIONS AND DOCTRINE . . . . 5 Doctrine . . . . 6 Counterair Doctrine Evaluation . . . . . 8 Service Doctrine . . . . . 12 Joint Doctrine . . . . . 14 Conclusion . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . 15 3 COUNTERAIR STRATEGY, TARGETS, AND TIMING . . . . . 19 The Counterair System . . . . 19 Basic Strategy Considerations . . . . 20 Strategic Choices . . . . . 22 Offense and Defense . . . . . 23 Targets . . . . 27 Strategy, Targets, and Timing . . . . 29 Measures of Success . . . . . 31 Conclusion . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . 32 4 COUNTERAIR FORCES . . . . 35 Capability and Cost . . . . 35 Air-to-Air and Surface-to-Air Weapons . . . . . 36 Manned and Unmanned Systems . . . . 37 Specialized and Multirole Forces . . . . 37 Weapons . . . . 38 Force Multipliers . . . . . 39 Conclusion . . . . 40 Notes . . . . . 40 5 COUNTERAIR ISSUES . . . . 43 Roles and Missions . . . . 43 The Bottom Up Review . . . . 44 Controlling Joint Air Forces . . . . . 48 Fire Support Coordination . . . . 50 Theater Missile Defense . . . . . 52 Conclusion . . . . 53 No...

Table of Contents Details
1 Giulio Douhet and the Origins of Airpower Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 2 Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War II . . . . . . . . 41 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 3 Molding Airpower Convictions: Development and Legacy of William Mitchell’s Strategic Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 Lt Col Mark A. Clodfelter 4 The Influence of Aviation on the Evolution of American Naval Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Dr. David R. Mets 5 Airpower Thought in Continental Europe between the Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 Dr. James S. Corum 6 Interwar US Army Aviation and the Air Corps Tactical School: Incubators of American Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183 Lt Col Peter R. Faber 7 Alexander P. de Seversky and American Airpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 Col Phillip S. Meilinger 8 Strategic Airpower and Nuclear Strategy: New Theory for a Not-Quite-So-New Apocalypse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Dr. Karl P. Mueller 9 Air Theory, Air Force, and Low Intensity Conflict: A Short Journey to ...

Description Details
This research project addresses how I believe airpower should be employed in urban warfare to achieve operational and strategic results. I chose this topic because there is an apparent disconnection between how military planners and operators view urban combat and their awareness of airpower’s unique and potentially decisive contributions in this environment. This disconnect could prove disastrous for military forces operating on urban terrain. Urban warfare has been given considerable attention by the United States Army and Marine Corps. Although their concerns are soundly based on changes in the strategic environment, I believe their focus is misplaced at the tactical level of warfare....

Description Details
This thesis follows the history of joint targeting boards since World War II to illustrate the foundations that have led to today’s joint airpower targeting process. Having established the historical background, this thesis explores the current solutions for determining airpower mission and target priorities. Using the principles of war as a framework for analysis, this thesis compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of each model to determine whether a targeting board is an effective tool for the JFC in future operations. In the end, this thesis finds a Joint Targeting Coordination Board integrated into the air component staff as the greatest potential for providing a future joint commander with an effective process for determining airpower mission priorities and selecting targets. Finally, organizational changes and recommendations are suggested to assure the targeting process overcomes individual service biases and remains focused on accomplishing the theater objectives....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . 4 2 THE HISTORY OF JOINT TARGETING SINCE WORLD WAR II . . . . . 5 World War II . . . . . . 5 Korean Conflict . . . . 6 Vietnam War . . . . . . 9 Desert Storm . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . 15 3 THE JTCB TODAY . . . 19 Current Definition . . . 19 Where the JTCB Fits into the Planning Process . . . . . . 20 Model A—The EUCOM/CFC Model . . . . . 21 Model B—The PACOM/LANTCOM Model . . . . . . 22 Summary . . . . 24 Notes . . . . . . 25 4 THE JTCB’S FUTURE EFFECTIVENESS . . . . . . 27 Assumptions . . . . . . 28 Methodology . . . . . . 29 Analysis . . . . 30 Assessment . . . 44 Notes . . . . . . 46 5 RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 51 Recommendation Number One . . . . 51 Recommendation Number Two . . . . 53 Recommendation Number Three . . . 53 Notes . . . . . . 54...

Description Details
This paper examines the long development of precision guided bombs to show that the accuracy attained in Desert Storm was an evolution not a revolution in aerial warfare. This evolution continues and gives offensive airpower the advantage over the defense. Guided bomb development started during World War One with the “aerial torpedo”. When Desert Storm initiated in 1991 there were very few guided weapons that had not been extensively tested on training ranges and in combat. The precision demonstrated to the World during Desert Storm started evolving when airpower was first envisioned as a new dimension for conducting war, and was far from a revolution. Now, the continued development of imaging infrared, laser radar, synthetic aperture radar, and millimeter wave radar autonomous seekers further increases the flexibility, range, and effectiveness of guided bombs....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION........1 EARLY GUIDED BOMBS THROUGH WORLD WAR TWO........3 World War One........3 Post World War One........4 World War Two........5 THE KOREAN WAR........19 THE VIETNAM WAR........22 Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs)........22 Electro-optical Guided Bombs........30 THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE 1970s........32 THE 1980s AND THE LIBYA RAID........35 DESERT STORM AND THE 1990s........38 Current Development Projects........41 EPILOGUE........48...

Description Details
Maj Richard J. Hazdra’s Air Mobility: The Key to the United States National Security is an examination of the force structure of Air Mobility Command (AMC) based on a model for two major theater wars. His study examines this organization’s current force structure. Air mobility is the key that unlocks the national security strategy (NSS). AMC’s force structure is crucial for the United States to implement its NSS. His study centers on the question: Can a force structure based on the possibility of fighting two major theater wars satisfy the requirements for steady-state operations? Major Hazdra examines three corollary issues: air mobility as a form of airpower that enables the military instrument of power in two basic ways, requirements placed on mobility air forces, and the structure of mobility air forces and the effectiveness of that structure....

Description Details
Dr. William P. Head’s War from above the Clouds: B-52 Operations during the Second Indochina War and the Effects of the Air War on Theory and Doctrine is an examination of B-52 operations in Vietnam and how the air war affected airpower doctrine and theory. His study examines the evolution of this awesome manned strategic weapon in Vietnam to see how the design of the B-52s originally intended mission altered—if at all—the theories of airpower first put forward by Giulio Douhet and William “Billy” Mitchell. Dr. Head also analyzes how this same operational alteration affected official United States Air Force (USAF) doctrine first formulated by Army Air Corps and Army Air Forces leaders before and during World War II—later modified in the 1950s after the USAF became a separate service....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 AIRPOWER THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE 1950s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Airpower Enters the Vietnam War . . . . . . . . 8 America Is Drawn in Deeper . . . . . . . . . . . .10 DEVELOPMENT OF THE B-52 STRATOFORTRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Insurgency War and Doctrine in the Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 Arc Light (B-52 Raids, 1965–68) . . . . . . . . .17 Modifying the B-52 Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . .22 Arc Light Expands and Airpower Controversies Grow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Arc Light Operations Continue . . . . . . . . . . 27 AIR FORCE THEORY AND DOCTRINE IN THE 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32 KEEPING A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT . . . . . . . 35 Project CHECO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Corona Harvest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 MENU BOMBING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40 COMMANDO HUNT OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . 42 AIR F...

Description Details
This study reveals how airpower made four contributions to the collapse of Italy. First, airpower shaped the grand strategy of the western Allied powers in 1943. Second, mainland attacks against rail marshaling yards, ports, and airfields did indirectly contribute militarily to Operations Husky and Avalanche. Third, both American and British strategic bombing contributed to the psychological decapitation and fall of the Fascist government on 25 July 1943. Finally, airpower coerced and aided the interim Marshal Pietro Badoglio’s government to surrender unconditionally and escape to the Allies on 9 September....

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 AN UNEXAMINED VICTORY . . . . . 3 WHEN GIANTS WALKED THE EARTH . . . . . 7 A TALE OF TWO TIGERS . . . . . 19 WHEN IN ROME . . . . 37 THE DENOUEMENT OF DEFEAT . . . . 57 NO CROWING FOR A NEW DAWN . . . . . 71...

Description Details
This study seeks to answer the question, “How can airpower help resolve time-induced tensions between political and military imperatives in the conduct of modern warfare?” To answer this question, the study begins by exploring time in the theory of war with an emphasis on time as a fourth dimension that provides a distinct perspective on warfare. With concepts gleaned from theory, this study analyzes the Arab-Israeli War of 1967, the Falklands War, and the Gulf War to determine the role airpower played in overcoming time conflicts and achieving political-military congruence. The study concludes that a time-based strategy, defined as one in which time is a paramount or extremely significant consideration, was the mechanism through which airpower worked to resolve time-induced tensions between political and military imperatives....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 Overview . . . 1 Methodology . . . . . 2 Definitions . . . . . . 2 Limits of the Argument . . . 3 Notes . . . . . 3 2 TIME IN THE THEORY OF WAR . . . 5 War Theorists on Time . . . . 6 Characteristics of Time in War . . . 7 Physical and Psychological Aspects of Time . . . . . 8 Political and Military Dynamics of Time . . . . . . 9 Summary . . . 10 Notes . . . . . 11 3 THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF 1967 . . . . . . 13 The Course of the War . . . . 13 Political Imperatives . . . . . 14 Military Imperatives . . . . . 15 The Time Problem . . . . . . 15 Operational Consequences and Risk . . . . . 16 Airpower’s Role . . . . 17 Summary . . . 19 Notes . . . . . 20 4 THE FALKLANDS WAR . . . . 21 The Course of the War . . . . 21 Political Imperatives . . . . . 22 Military Imperatives . . . . . 24 The Time Problem . . . . . . 25 Operational Consequences and Risk . . . . . 25 The Role of Airpower . . . . . 27 Summary . . . 29 Notes . . . . . 29 5 THE GULF WAR . . . . 31 The Course of the War . . . . 31 Political Imperatives . . . . . 32 Military Imperatives . . . . . 34 The Time Problem . . ....

Description Details
"The evolution of American science itself, from empiricism to a more German, theoretical approach to problem solution, is only indirectly addressed through the evolution of airpower. The biographical approach, emphasizing scientific and technological elements in Arnold’s and Kármán’s lives, is essential because the interaction of personalities, as well as their institutions, is inexorably linked to the development of American airpower. The importance of the personalities involved precludes a purely technological history of the airplane or the Air Force as a system within itself. For in the end, it was two men using their broad experience and innovative ideas, who created the blueprint with which American air supremacy has been built."...

Table of Contents Details
1GENESIS...................................................1 2 EDUCATING AN AIRPOWER ARCHITECT........9 3 CONCEPTUALIZING THE FUTURE AIR FORCE ..............................................................55 4 THE EUROPEAN INFLUENCE: THEODORE VON KÁRMÁN...................................................97 5 THE BLUEPRINT.....................................127 6 AIRPOWER UNDER CONSTRUCTION.........156 7 CONCLUSION.......................................189 APPENDIX A THE MILITARY CAREER OF HENRY HARLEY ARNOLD (CADET NO. 4596)..........205 APPENDIX B WHERE WE STAND...................209 APPENDIX C SCIENCE: THE KEY TO AIR SUPREMACY...........................................287...

Description Details
The term real-time information into the cockpit (RTIC) involves systems capabilities required to provide aircrews timely and essential off-board information to allow mission adjustments in response to rapidly changing combat conditions. The term military technical revolution (MTR) requires converging technological products which have a demonstrated military utility, and military recognition that the application of these converging technologies will cause a radical change in the character of warfare over a very short period of time. This thesis assesses the capabilities of RTIC from two perspectives: its impact on the air tasking process, and the command and control flexibility it affords the joint force air component commander (JFACC). It concludes that the impact on the air tasking process is evolutionary, not revolutionary—current RTIC capabilities remain largely dependent on human-intensive operations which limit reductions in decision cycle times. It further suggests that RTIC’s true impact on targeting is directly attributable to the increased flexibility provided to the JFACC for prosecuting the execution-day air tasking order...

Table of Contents Details
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 THE AIR TASKING PROCESS TODAY . . . . . . . . . . 7 SENSOR-TO-SHOOTER CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . 17 ENHANCING JFACC TARGETING FLEXIBILITY . . . . . . 27 A LOOK TO THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45...

Description Details
This study concludes airpower will play an increasingly dominant role in future US contingency responses. Power projection is defined as the finite application of military power by national command authority to achieve discrete political ends outside the borders of the United States, its territories, and possessions. Power projection contingencies are characterized as wars and operations short of war, but not conflicts that are global or total in nature. Future contingencies that demand a US response may occur without warning, be time sensitive, and require short duration deployments. Building a strong power projection capability requires a thorough evaluation of the relative efficacy of air, land, and sea power to perform the power projection mission. This evaluation concludes airpower has a great potential to achieve national security objectives decisively in future contingency responses....

Description Details
This study analyzes how real-time battle damage assessment (BDA) might contribute to airpower strategy and execution. It provides a historical review of BDA during World War II, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War and examines the current BDA doctrine, capabilities, and procedures to illustrate contemporary strengths and shortcomings. This study identifies potential remedies to contemporary issues based on real-time BDA solutions by addressing technological, procedural, and organizational aspects. It evaluates the strengths and limitations of these possible remedies, with respect to airpower planning and execution, to identify viable solutions. This study assesses how alternative solutions might affect airpower strategy formation and execution by examining the improvements intelligence agencies and the services are likely to pursue over the near term and concludes with recommendations for the future....

Table of Contents Details
1 INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF BOMB DAMAGE ASSESSMENT . . . . 3 3 BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT TODAY . . . . . 15 4 POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS . . . . . . . . 27 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR AIRPOWER . . . . . . 47 GLOSSARY . . . . 55...

Description Details
What follows are points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning airpower and strategic bombing. This in turn, hopefully, will give our political and military leaders a better basis on which to form decisions in future conflicts....

Table of Contents Details
1 Between the world wars, even though the US Army Air Corps received more than its fair share of funds from the Army, it continued to complain, agitate, and ask for more. . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2 Entering World War II, the Air Corps’s unbalanced doctrine and force structure leaned too heavily towards strategic bombing. Thus, air support of ground forces was inadequate and largely ignored by airmen. . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 The Air Corps entered World War II with a “Douhetian” concept of air war that emphasized area bombing and the waging of war on women and children. . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4 Airmen thought they could win the war alone. . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5 The fact that German production, especially of aircraft, continued to increase throughout 1944 proves that the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was ineffective and that the resources devoted to it would have been better spent elsewhere. . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 B...