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By the end of the Vietnam War, advances in technology allowed these FACs to control strikes against targets at night, in bad weather, and with improved precision. Laser-guided weapons systems, new computer navigation equipment, and advanced ground radars combined to provide an effective and lethal capability. If the Mosquitoes were an annoyance in Korea, the Wolves of Vietnam proved to be a deadly addition to the concept of FAC....

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Why was the United States Air Force (USAF) so resistant to the idea of dedicated suppression of enemy air defenses and electronic countermeasures support for its strikers? Why had they given the electronic combat (EC) mission almost entirely to the Navy? Was the technology of stealth really the driving force, or was there more? They needed money and technology to make them work. In short, I found the four elements of the model I propose in this paper....

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Endgame in the Pacific examines the challenges encountered by XX and XXI Bomber Commands in employing the B-29 against Japan, first from India and China, later from the Marianas. In turn, it examines the adaptations required to meet those challenges....

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1 COMPLEXITY AND TECHNOLOGY IN WAR . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 2 ENDGAME AGAINST JAPAN: THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 3 DOCTRINAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 4 APPLYING A TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTION . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 5 UNCERTAINTY AND UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 6 TECHNOLOGICAL AND OPERATIONAL ADAPTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45...

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Part 1 The Decision 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 Rumblings of Laboratory Consolidation . . . 7 3 The Catalyst: National Defense Authorization Act and Vision 21 . . . . . . . . .23 4 Overhauling Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . 45 5 Laboratory Studies and Strategy . . . . . . . 71 6 Corona 1996: Leadership and Decisions . .93 7 The Last Dance: Meeting in the Secretary’s Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 Part 2 The Transition 9 Early Strategic Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 10 Shaping the Technology Directorates . . 161 11 Getting the Message Out . . . . . . . . . . 195 12 Other Perspectives: Independent Review Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .209 13 Headquarters: Two Staff Directorates . . 227 14 The Final Push . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .253 15 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265...

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This brief study of the earliest American Airmen and their influence on the development of an air-minded culture is a work in progress.

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This paper examines the current USAF criteria for inducting C-130 aircraft into programmed depot maintenance (PDM) based on the mission, design, and series (MDS) of the aircraft. An alternative approach using an analytical model is developed in an attempt to refine the current process....

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Experiences in Operations Desert Storm and Allied Force highlighted a significant weakness in the USAF’s ability to engage time-critical targets. The weakness stems from airpower’s inability to employ force quickly and kill an emerging target before it disappears back into hiding. USAF’s engagement sequence, called the kill chain, is not fast enough to detect, locate, identify, and engage the target. Experience shows that the enemy has used this method of emerging, engaging, and dispersing since the beginning of time, and because it is still effective, the enemy has little reason to change. To help solve this difficulty, this study introduces and investigates two methods—reactive and preemptive—and determines how they might solve the problem in 2010....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . 1 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . 7 3 REACTIVE APPROACH . . . . .23 4 PREEMPTIVE APPROACH . . . . 43 5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . 61...

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Colonel Paul “P. J.” McAneny offers an analysis focused on aircraft maintenance but applicable to the entire force and recommends cultural changes to support lasting transformation. He examines the impact of metrics on transformation and evaluates the USAF aircraft maintenance culture. He asks several questions: Can focused metrics precede cultural change? Does the aircraft maintenance community support a Red Is Good culture, in which metrics are used to illuminate problems rather than measure success or failure? If so, is the community a true learning organization that can maximize its impact through continuous process-improvement initiatives? The answers lead Colonel McAneny to recommend several Air Force–level changes to meet long-term aircraft readiness and reliability targets....

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The importance of combat effects in warfare has no second. However, most combat effects would never be delivered without crucial information delivered from combat support forces. In this time of turbulent recapitalization and reorganization within the Air Force, the critical nature of combat and combat support effects must remain foremost in our decisions as we create new commands, place people and resources where needed, and forecast budgets....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi EXPANSION OR MARGINALIZATION: HOW EFFECTS-BASED ORGANIZATION COULD DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND . . . . . . . . . . .1 Domain versus Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Kepler Only . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Filling the Effects-Based Void . . . . . . . . . . .13 Further Consolidation for Better Effectiveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Combat Support Is the Mission . . . . . . . . . 23 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 LIST OF ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41...

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The author outlines the issue in an introduction and has a background chapter that explains the current system, which provides a useful description of sensors, fusion of information, shooters, and weapons. He explains the current reactive method and identifies various system weaknesses and strengths. His main theme of a preemptive approach describes in great detail the projected employment of LOCPADs as a very effective system for time-critical targeting. Marzolf insists that persistence of surveillance is crucial, especially when Airmen directing the air war in Iraq used persistence surveillance to identify and effectively target the illusive Iraqi insurgents....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 2 BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 REACTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4 PREEMPTIVE APPROACH . . . . . . . . . . . . .51 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 5 RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .83 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85...

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There is a story that still needs to be told about the Air Force contribution to—and shaping by—arms control. The ability to make these assessments did not blossom overnight. This book captures the story of a young Air Force’s initial (and limited) impact on arms-control negotiations and outcomes. It goes on to document a growing awareness by the service that it was better to help craft the US position than to be only a recipient of the outcome. The book highlights the lesson it belatedly learned in the early days of arms control: the Air Force has to plan and budget for treaty implementation as aggressively as it works to protect its equities during treaty negotiations....

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PART I Foundations for Strategic Arms Control, 1945–68 1 The United States Air Force and Arms Control: The Early Years . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Michael O. Wheeler 2 Peace through Strength Alone: US Air Force Views on Arms Control in the 1950s and Early 1960s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Edward Kaplan PART II Strategic Arms Limitations, 1969–80 3 The Road to SALT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Anne G. Campbell 4 Strategic Arms Control and the US Air Force: The SALT Era, 1969–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .95 Jeffrey A. Larsen PART III The Reagan Years, 1981–88 5 Arms Control during the Reagan Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .119 Charles D. Dusch Jr. 6 National Security Strategy, Arms Control, and the US Air Force: The Reagan Years, 1981–88 . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Forrest E. Waller Jr. PART IV Strategic Arms Reductions, 1989–2000 7 Arms Control after the Cold War . . . . . . 191 Thomas S. Mowle 8 Downsizing and Shifting Operational Emphasis for the US Air Force: The Bush and Clinton Years, 1989–2000 . . . . . . . . .227 Thomas D. Miller PART V Conclusion ...

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To make the report useful to a potentially broad audience, team members set out to answer this question through a wide-ranging examination of the geopolitical, sociological, diplomatic, technological, and operational factors that shaped the characteristics and outcome of this particular air campaign....

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1 The Demise of Yugoslavia and the Destruction of Bosnia: Strategic Causes, Effects, and Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Dr. Karl Mueller 2 The Planning Background . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Lt Col Bradley S. Davis 3 US and NATO Doctrine for Campaign Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Col Maris McCrabb 4 The Deliberate Force Air Campaign Plan . .87 Col Christopher M. Campbell 5 Executing Deliberate Force, 30 August–14 September 1995 . . . . . . . . . 131 Lt Col Mark J. Conversino 6 Combat Assessment: A Commander’s Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 7 Assessing the Effectiveness of Deliberate Force: Harnessing the Political-Military Connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 Maj Mark C. McLaughlin 8 Aircraft Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . . 199 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent iii Chapter Page 9 Weapons Used in Deliberate Force . . . . . . . 257 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 10 Deliberate Force Targeting . . . . . . . . . . . 279 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 11 Deliberate Force Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 Lt Col Richard L. Sargent 12 Deliber...

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A comparison of the Misty and A-10 FAC missions clearly demonstrates a failure of the USAF to develop a full range of suitable tactics for the direct attack of enemy fielded forces. Although the quantum leaps in weapons delivery accuracy from Vietnam to Kosovo now make it possible to destroy armor and artillery from the air, there has not been a corresponding improvement in target identification. Until USAF prioritizes the direct attack of ground forces and target identification, its ability to attack fielded forces effectively will remain limited. Drawing from the lessons of the Misty and A-10 FACs, the recommendations presented here focus on equipment, tactics and training, and doctrine....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 HISTORY OF AIR INTERDICTION FROM WORLD WAR I THROUGH VIETNAM . . . . . . . 7 3 MISTY-FAC TACTICS: HYPOTHETICAL MISSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 HISTORY OF ATTACKING FIELDED FORCES: POST-VIETNAM TO KOSOVO . . . . . . . . . . . .41 5 A-10 FORWARD AIR CONTROLLER TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 6 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .79...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii 1 THE USAF TODAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 FRAMING THE QUESTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 THE CURRENT FIGHT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Irregular Warfare: Winning the Long War . . . 6 Air Mobility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Strategic Communication: Spreading the Word . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Culture and Language in the Expeditionary Air Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Distributed Planning: The Key to Centralized Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 Unmanned Aerial Systems: The Air Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Intelligence Reform: The Secondary Effects of Merging Intelligence with Surveillance and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18 The Total Force in Transition . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Air Base Disaster Planning: Contingency Operations . . . . . . ....

Description Details
In this paper Lt Col Cristina M. Stone argues that the Air Force does not adequately prepare its intelligence analysts; targeteers; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operators; and unit-level and air and space operations center (AOC) personnel with the knowledge and expertise required to fill these positions. The author recommends that the Air Force leverage its technical and scientific core and expert organizations across the government to improve training for intelligence personnel requiring WMD expertise. Regarding ISR operations, she proposes that the Air Force develop enhanced collection capabilities. This paper recommends changes to Air Force intelligence training, technical WMD expertise, collection capabilities, and marketing to improve the nation’s ability to combat WMD....

Description Details
Air Force Smart Operations for the Twenty-first Century (AFSO 21) is the Air Force’s initiative to recapitalize funds by maximizing value and minimizing waste in operations. This paper identifies potential failure points associated with the changing Air Force culture. Overall, the Air Force’s change plan appears to be proceeding according to schedule. However, it does not appear that the Air Force is adequately planning for a long-term sustainment of AFSO 21. There is still time for Air Force senior leadership to correct the system’s alignment and put AFSO 21 on track for long-term sustainment. A culture of continuous process improvement will take root once the Air Force leadership fully commits to AFSO 21....

Description Details
Having flown in a single-seat cockpit more than 14 hours deploying to Southwest Asia, I am familiar with the negative effects of long duration flights as well as the impact transmeridian sorties have on an aircrew’s circadian rhythm. Any attempt to make that experience less painful for the aviators climbing into their jets during future deployments deserves pursuit and further investigation. Unfortunately, a great deal of the information available for the operational aircrews is either underemphasized at best or totally ignored by the personnel that the data is intended to support, the aviators. Typically, fatigue and circadian rhythm disruption are assumed as “necessary evils” that aviators have no choice but to accept. Yet fatigue can be a significant factor in terms of performance degradation and must no longer be overlooked. I have amassed the most current research regarding fatigue and its associated countermeasures, and I strongly recommend both commanders and aircrews apply the information presented in this research paper if they are to continue to safely meet the challenges of an Expeditionary Aerospace Force....

Description Details
Lt. Col. J. Reggie Hall’s Agile Combat Support Doctrine and Logistics Officer Training: Do We Need an Integrated Logistics School for the Expeditionary Air and Space Force? examines the evolution of USAF logistics doctrine, the linkage between doctrine, strategy, tactics, and training programs, and the corresponding application of logistics employment and sustainment functions in a deployed environment. In doing so, he analyzes the USAF’s diverse logistics officer training programs to determine if there is a deficiency in interdisciplinary logistics employment and sustainment training. He ascertains whether or not that training shortfall reveals a gap between USAF logistics doctrine and expeditionary air and space force combat strategy. His study also investigates the USAF transition to the air and space expeditionary force (AEF) operational employment concept as the force projection mechanism for the expeditionary air and space force and the reliance on ACS as the primary enabler to identify specific areas here the absence of integrated logistics training impacts or potentially degrades mission success....

Description Details
In Unmanned Airlift: A Viable Option for Meeting the Strategic Airlift Shortfall, Lt Col Chad T. Manske points to the growing dependency on strategic airlift as well as the abiding corollary that there will continue to be a shortfall in strategic airlift. To get to the analysis, Colonel Manske raised three crucial questions: (1) are operational requirements able to justify unmanned airlifters, (2) are current and emerging technologies likely to meet these potential operational requirements, and (3) are the operational concepts cost-effective?...

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2 THE STRATEGIC AIRLIFT SHORTFALL . . . . .7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 4 TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY . . . . . . . . .31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .62 5 FINANCIAL CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 6 ANALYSIS, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS .89 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .94 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99...

Description Details
Professor Gray identifies and discusses nine fallacies that: (1) the USAF should abandon large-scale regular warfare; (2) airpower is inherently a strategic weapon; (3) airpower is driven by technology rather than ideas; (4) airpower is about targeting; (5) airpower must be subordinate to land power; (6) the theory of strategic airpower is flawed; (7) an independent USAF interferes with an effective joint force structure; (8) airpower is a minor player in counterinsurgency (COIN); and finally, a longstanding issue, (9) the twenty-first century is about missiles, space, and cyber power and airpower is yesterday’s revolution. The discussion of these “fallacies” should stimulate the appetite of most thoughtful Airmen, but also serious advocates of all services and everyone interested in national defense....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix UNDERSTANDING AIRPOWER: BONFIRE OF THE FALLACIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Fallacies to the Left of Them, Fallacies to the Right of Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 The Fallacies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 America, the Air Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . .56 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61...

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Since the end of the Gulf War, the debate over whether there should be a separate space service, equal with the Air Force, Army, and Navy, has grown in proportion to the indispensable value of space operations to our nation’s defense. Increasing dependency on space-systems is a fact of military life. In this well-documented essay, Col Michael C. Whittington compares the leading arguments for a separate space force to the cogent arguments for an independent air force made by airpower advocates during the interwar years of 1920–1940. The airpower issues in 1920 and the space power issues of today are strikingly similar, revolving around four key issues: leadership, doctrine, technology, and funding. The irony, of course, is that these arguments, which helped create an independent air force in 1947, are challenged by many within today’s Air Force leadership, which leads Colonel Whittington to ask, “If they were cogent in 1920, would they not be relevant today?”...

Description Details
This study, Blue Horizons, was commissioned by the United States Air Force (USAF) chief of staff to provide “a new look at the future.” Specifically, the chief of staff asked the research team to provide “a common understanding of future strategic and technological trends for Air Force leaders to make better decisions.” The chief also sought to “confirm AU as [the Air Force’s] in-house think tank” and to improve the relevance of Air Force education to the decision making processes in Washington....

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CHAPTER 1—Introduction . . . .1 Methodology . . . .1 Overview . . . . . .2 CHAPTER 2—alternate futures . . . . 3 Peer China . . . . .3 A Path toward a Peer China . . . .3 Peer China 2030—Causality and Impact . . . .6 Capabilities Needed to Respond to a Peer China Crisis . . . . .7 Resurgent Russia . . . . .8 The Development of a Resurgent Russia . . . .9 Capabilities to Defend against a Resurgent Russian State . . . . .10 Failed State—Nigeria . . . .11 A Failure We Cannot Ignore . . . .11 Nigeria Shatters . . . . .13 Capabilities Required for Intervention . . . .14 Jihadist Insurgency . . . . .15 Roots of the Schism . . . .16 The Insurgency . . . . 17 Capabilities Needed to Combat the Insurgency . . . 19 Operations Analysis Results . . . .20 Conclusions and Recommendations . . . .22 Recommendations . . . .26 The Way Ahead . . . . 28 Notes . . . . 29 TITLES IN THE OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES . 37...

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One of the challenges Gen John P. Jumper, chief of staff of the Air Force, sends to Air Force students, researchers, and staff offices is to investigate future concepts of operations (CONOPS). One in particular relates to this study, the CONOPS for space and command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. The Air Force is very sensitive about incorporating new technology into its operations. While the authors advocate a feasibility study for reactors in space in a CONOPS, they also explore a deeper problem with widespread societal rejection and revulsion concerning the theoretical employment of nuclear technology in space....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ABOUT THE AUTHORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi 1 WHITHER SPACE NUCLEAR POWER? . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 2 SPACE NUCLEAR POWER AS TRANSSCIENTIFIC PUBLIC POLICY . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 3 POLITICAL PERMISSION—THE CONTEMPORARY DIMENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43 4 A TRANSSCIENTIFIC POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 5 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Appendix A THE HISTORY OF SPACE NUCLEAR POWER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .75 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 B PROJECT PROMETHEUS—FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS—DECEMBER 2003 . . . . . . . . . . 89 C THE MEMBER GROUPS OF THE ...