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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABOUT THE EDITOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii Introduction to Genocide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Dr. Douglas C. Peifer Case Studies 1 American Intervention in Africa: Building on the Lessons of Somalia . . . . . . . . . . 21 Lt Col Aaron Steffens, USAF 2 Genocide, Airpower, and Intervention: Rwanda 1994 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Maj George Stanley, USAF 3 Defeating Genocide: An Operational Concept Based on the Rwandan Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 Lt Col Keith Reeves, USAF 4 Côte d’Ivoire: Intervention and Prevention Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 CDR Timothy E. Boyer, USN Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Dr. Douglas C. Peifer CONTRIBUTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14...

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This paper examines how these rules affected the effective military execution of the Rolling Thunder air campaign, as well as their impact on American aircrews and the enemy. During the Vietnam War, many American air commanders were convinced that rigid Rules of Engagement (ROEs) prevented an American aerial victory over North Vietnam during the Rolling Thunder air campaign from 1965-1968. ROEs became so complicated and changed so often that aircrews found it difficult to know what the rules were from day to day. As a result, many vital military targets were either not bombed or were attacked in a very limited and piecemeal fashion....

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1. INTRODUCTION. 1 2. BACKGRIDUND INFORMATION. 3 3. IMPACT OF ROEs ON MILITARY COMMANDERS AND AIRCREWS. 12 4. ROLLINIG THUNDER --MISSION EFFECTIVENESS. 20 5. IMPACT OF ROEs ON THE ENEMY. 27 6. CONCLUSIONS. 32...

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Major Rick Paulsen's study analyzes the role of United States nuclear weapons in this new, multipolar environment. He begins with a historical look at the role nuclear weapons have played in US defense policy since 1945. He reviews current unclassified guidance and the spectrum of public opinion on where the United States should be going with its nuclear weapons programs . He then surveys the potential threat of weapons of mass destruction. Major Paulsen concludes his study by suggesting nuclear force capabilities that would provide the United States with a viable deterrent for the post-cold war era. His recommendations address a broad range of issues that focus on developing a coherent nuclear strategy....

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At its core this work is a database covering Anglo-American strategic bomber operations against Germany, Italy, and Axis associated or occupied Europe. As such it allows swift and easy listing of day-by-day bombing, bombing of strategic target systems by location and tonnage, bombing of specific countries, comparisons of US and British targeting and operations, and much more....

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This paper reviews the historical accounts of the Royal Air Force (R.A.F) experiences in air policing during the interwar period, 1919-1939. It analyzes the evidence from the view of operational doctrine and applies an in-depth look at the basic tenets of R.A.F. air policing campaigns. It seeks to answer the question: to what doctrine did air commanders subscribe? It further analyzes the development of air policing tactical doctrine throughout the interwar period. It summarizes the conclusions and then offers this insight as it may apply to contemporary operations. This work seeks to provide an insightful view of the British experience and attempts to explain what has never been explained before, namely “how” air policing worked from the vantage point of those who conducted it. By tracing the R.A.F. operations during the more significant air policing examples and looking at the indigenous response, it describes the actual operational mechanism at work....

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This thesis focuses on operational-level coalition air force interactions in three conflicts: the Korean War (1950–53), the Persian Gulf War (1990–91), and the Balkan Air Campaign (1992–95). The capability that coalition air forces offer usually benefits the overall effort, while each member’s diverging desires (or will) can degrade overall unity of effort. Analysis of the three conflicts presented here suggests several coalition considerations for air component commanders. Because each case in this thesis had unique elements that may have affected the coalition, a comparison of these elements may also reveal considerations which are important to the air component commander. Finally, the current US programs to train joint force air component commanders and operational-level staffs show promising trends for improving our ability to operate within a coalition....

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INTRODUCTION . . . . 1 THE KOREAN WAR . . . . . . 7 THE PERSIAN GULF WAR . . . . . . 23 THE BALKAN AIR CAMPAIGN . . . . 37 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . 61...

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This is a story of long-range airpower, from Gen Henry H. “Hap” Arnold’s vision of a global mission to the Global Strike Task Force and expeditionary air forces of the year 2001. It examines global power from its origins as Strategic Air Command built a fleet of bombers and tankers to meet the needs of the global nuclear-deterrent policy of the Cold War. This evolution is traced through the studies and commissions of the 1990s established to determine the force structure for the twenty-first century. The assumptions that were made to develop a force focused on expeditionary short-range airpower to project global power are established and then examined with four case studies in the application of airpower over long range....

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1 GLOBAL POWER FOR AMERICA . . . . . . . . . 1 2 WORLD WAR II ORIGINS AND COLD WAR MATURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 3 GLOBAL POWER––POST–COLD WAR: ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE . . . . . . . . .21 4 CASE STUDIES IN GLOBAL POWER . . . . . . 45 5 EVALUATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . .75 6 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii NOTE from the Commander of Air University . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .iii DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xv PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xxi Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 PHOTOGRAPHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 EPILOGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 WHAT BECAME OF THEM? . . . . . . . . . . . . .135 GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .139 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . ....

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The years from 1947 through the beginning of the twenty first century witnessed the USAF steadily progress until it became the preeminent air force in the world. With less than 400,000 active duty personnel, the USAF has capabilities and tasks today that were not imaginable six decades ago. The World War II legacy from the Army Air Forces, epitomized in the familiar Air Force song lyrics “off we go into the wild blue yonder, climbing high into the sky!” is not forgotten. However, a strong professional image and unparalleled responsibilities in air and space are far more descriptive of today’s USAF....

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Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2 Hezbollah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3 The War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 4 By the Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 5 Civilian Damage in Lebanon . . . . . . .75 6 Targeting for Effect . . . . . . . . . . .105 7 Perfect Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 8 Airpower against Terrorism . . . . . . . . . 145...

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Under command of British general Allenby, the EEF successfully executed one of the most decisive engagements in any theater of World War I. Ably employing and synchronizing infantry, cavalry, and air forces, Allenby provided future military professionals and historians with a shining illustration of the efficacy of combined arms operations. Unfortunately, the true lessons of Allenby’s campaign were lost for future generations of military officers. This paper analyzes the reasons those in the profession of arms missed the lessons of airpower and its role in combined arms operations. The paper also delves into the role of airpower in the Middle East and how Allenby integrated a relatively new weapon system into his force structure and operational planning and execution. Though largely unexplored by military professionals and historians, Allenby’s final campaign in Palestine proved to be a momentous step in the evolution of combined arms operations....

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1 GREAT ADVENTURE BEGINS . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 THREE MUSKETEERS TIMES TWO . . . . . . . 11 3 AIR-TO-GROUND BATTLE FOR ITALY . . . . .45 4 OPERATION STRANGLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65...

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Introduction . . . .1 Right Weapons, Wrong War . . . .2 Finding the Right Mission . . . .3 Finding the Right Weapons—Aircraft . . . .6 Unintended Consequences . . . . .8 Finding the Right Weapons—Tactics, Procedures, and Ordnance . . . .11 Right Weapons, Wrong Way . . . . .13 Right Weapons, Right Way . . . . .15 The Wild Card . . . .18 Looking for Lessons . . . . .20 Notes . . . .27...

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This study then examined Joint Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception, and determined it could better incorporate the lessons learned from World War II. Current joint doctrine could be improved by underscoring the contribution that deception provides to surprise, the importance of integrating deception within all three levels of war, and the importance of exploiting an adversary’s preexisting beliefs when creating a deception story. Applying these World War II lessons will bolster US deception capabilities....

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In 1944 a young man from Nahant, Massachusetts, experienced World War II as an unsung corporal assigned to an unheralded unit near an obscure English village. Few history books recall his war. But he and his unit personified a brand of service—seldom newsworthy, often tedious, always selfless—that underpinned Allied victory. This man was my father. This research paper is his unit’s story....

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This volume offers the best assessment we have of General Henry H. “Hap” Arnold as he survived four wartime heart attacks and continued to work tirelessly for proper recognition of airpower. It will also continue my emphasis while Chief of Staff of the US Air Force on encouraging professional reading through making historical accounts available to personnel of the finest air force in the world, a success achieved in large part because of Hap Arnold....

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HAP AT MIDPOINT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 6 ENGLAND 31 AUGUST–8 SEPTEMBER 1943 . . . . . . . . . 13 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13 The Diary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 7 CAIRO, TEHRAN, PALESTINE, CAIRO, ITALY 11 NOVEMBER–15 DECEMBER 1943 . . . . . . .67 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67 The Diary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74 Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 8 ENGLAND, NORMANDY BEACHES, ITALY 8 JUNE–21 JUNE 1944 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .131 The Diary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Postscript . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 9 QUEBEC 11 SEPTEMBER–16 SEPTEMBER 1944 . ...

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This thesis analyzes the factors and conditions of command dysfunction from the cognitive, or mental, perspective of command and control warfare (C2W). The author examines the limitations of rational decision making and the tension that exists between rational and intuitive processes. Next, this thesis examines the vulnerabilities of rational and intuitive processes in order to build a cognitive warfare framework. The framework consists of three categories: the command baseline, stressors, and deception. The stressor and deception categories act on the command baseline. The analysis also suggests that there are a number of possible interactions that exist between the stressor and deception categories. This thesis uses the framework to analyze evidence of command dysfunction in three historical campaigns. The historical analyses study the German command during the Normandy Invasion, the Allied command during the first week of the Battle of the Bulge, and the Israeli command during the first half of the Arab-Israeli October 1973 War. In addition to showing that there are interactions between stressors and deception, the analyses highl...

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INTRODUCTION . . . . . 1 DECISION PROCESSES . . . . . 7 CONSIDERING A COGNITIVE WARFARE FRAMEWORK . . . 23 THE NORMANDY INVASION . . . . 35 THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE . . . . . 51 THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR IN THE SINAI . . . . . 65 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . 83...